Monitoring, Enforcement, and Compliance

This paper asks a foundation question in international law: Can we predict when a state will comply with a ruling from the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)? The I.C.J. serves as the United Nations’ central forum for adjudicating legal disputes between states. However, its legal authority rests entirely on voluntary compliance, which has led many scholars to question its practical effectiveness. This paper seeks to assess the unpredictability of state compliance by examining multiple independent variables. If empirical factors such as geopolitical factors have statistical importance, it would support the view that factors outside of the I.C.J. have influence over state behavior, and in turn support skepticism toward the I.C.J. enforcement. Conversely, if variables tied to the legal proceedings are statistically important, it would suggest that states do comply with the I.C.J. if certain expectations are met. I find strong evidence that (1) states are significantly less likely to comply when they challenge the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction, and (2) the presence of a judge from the state being asked to comply is positively associated with compliance. I find (3) weaker evidence that states are more likely to comply when jurisdiction is based on a treaty or special agreement rather than compulsory jurisdiction. Finally, I found (4) weak or no evidence that geopolitical factors such as population size, GDP, or military strength had statistical importance in predicting compliance. These findings suggest that the legal process’s features, especially how jurisdiction is established and whether domestic legal actors are directly involved, are stronger predictors of compliance than broader geopolitical or economic attributes.

I. Introduction

Despite the enactment of the Nth Room Prevention Act, digital sexual violence remains a pertinent issue in South Korea, with instances of such crimes continuing to increase. A key factor of this increase is jurisdictional: much of the crime takes place on encrypted overseas platforms such as Telegram and Signal. Focusing mainly on the crime of sextortion, this Comment presents suggestions to mitigate the jurisdictional enforcement issues. The Comment begins by providing an overview of Korea’s existing legal frameworks on digital sexual violence, examining the digital sexual violence laws pre-Nth Room Act, the revisions promulgated by the Nth Room Act, and the merits and limitations of the amendments. The Comment then engages in a comparative analysis of other countries’ laws addressing digital sexual violence, focusing on how they interact with encrypted overseas platforms. Through this analysis, the Comment draws ideas for domestic reforms Korea can implement. The Comment also analyzes international law regimes Korea can utilize; specifically, the Budapest Convention, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), and the complaints mechanisms pertaining to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It further addresses concerns that increased enforcement of digital sexual violence regulations over encrypted platforms can present, namely the possible intrusion on privacy and freedom of expression rights. The Comment concludes with a proposal of concrete legal measures, both domestically and internationally, that the Korean government should implement.

This article discusses a new guide that has been developed to support the responsible use of digital open-source information to investigate systematic and conflict-related sexual violence (SCRSV). Drafted by the Institute for International Criminal Investigations and the Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley School of Law, the just-published pilot version of the Open-Source Practitioner’s Guide to the Murad Code aims to minimize the risks and maximize the potential for digital investigations into SCRSV.  Part I of this article opens with a brief history of accountability for SCRSV, touching on the need to strengthen SCRSV investigations and providing a brief introduction to existing ethical guidelines. That is followed by a short history of digital open source investigations. Part II brings those histories together, touching on the various roles that digital investigations are beginning to play in the investigation and prosecution of SCRSV, acknowledging challenges to integrating digital methods into investigations, offering suggestions for resolving those challenges, and summarizing the guide’s relevant content. Part III looks to the future, exploring the potential for both tech-assisted and machine-led processes to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of SCRSV. The article concludes with some thoughts on how emerging digital technologies, and especially machine learning-based research methods, may prove useful to future accountability for SCRSV crimes.

I. Introduction

I. Introduction

Write it down. Write it. With ordinary ink

on ordinary paper; they weren’t given food,

they all died of hunger. All. How many?

It’s a large meadow. How much grass per head?

I. Introduction

I. Proposals for a U.N. Rapid-Reaction Force

A. The Potential for a Standing U.N. Rapid-Reaction Force