CJIL Online 4.2

Summer

2025

Having published in the first issue of the first volume of this journal twenty-five years ago, I am delighted to accept the invitation to comment on Professor Richard Albert’s thought-provoking new conceptualization of constitutionalism as it might relate to New Zealand. The issues are not free from controversy in New Zealand, so I tread carefully and from an orthodox constitutional perspective.  I also sound a note of warning about assumptions, grounded in realism.

Albert favors lawful and peaceful attempts by peoples to use the levers of politics and law to achieve constitutional recognition within a state. He sees this as preferable to the sort of revolutionary self‑determination pursued through violence, such as by the Dutch against the Habsburgs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or the Americans against the British in the eighteenth century. Few would disagree. But I caution against assuming away the underlying influence of coercive power in modern nation states. A worldwide resurgence of power politics is currently underway. Legal and political mechanisms in even well-established democratic states can be susceptible to power.

Underlying patterns and distribution of historical coercive power influence the path-dependent nature of constitutional evolution in any state. Historical coercive roots have a habit of running through the grain of a nation’s constitutional culture. They can determine the success of constitutional initiatives. For example, Indigenous peoples are a numerical minority in most states now and their political power tends to reflect that. In many cases, peaceful and lawful initiatives are the only means of constitutional recognition available to indigenous peoples. But such initiatives do not always succeed.

In this Essay, I briefly outline how Albert’s framework can characterize aspects of the constitutional evolution of New Zealand.

On February 20, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in Mohamed Wa Baile’s favor on his claim that Switzerland violated his rights under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in conjunction with Article 8. Mr. Wa Baile alleged that Swiss law enforcement violated his rights when they subjected him to an identity check without offering an objective reason for doing so. The Court’s finding of a substantive violation of Article 14 with respect to racial profiling was unprecedented. The Court relied on factors such as the Administrative Court’s ruling that law enforcement had no objective reason for requesting identification from Mr. Wa Baile, statistics showing the extent of racial profiling practices in Switzerland, as well as Switzerland’s failure to implement adequate measures to remedy the issue. Similar to Switzerland, statistics show the prevalence of racial profiling in France. France also hesitates to enact laws and implement measures to prevent racial profiling. This is noted in a pending class action lawsuit in the European Court of Human Rights: Seydi and others v. France. This Comment argues that the theory behind Switzerland’s liability in Wa Baile v. Switzerland gives rise to allegations of Article 14 violations in France, as law enforcement exhibits a pattern of conducting identity checks absent reasonable suspicion and objective justifications.

This Essay examines the concept of “decolonial constitutionalism,” as articulated by Professor Richard Albert, focusing on its application to Chile’s recent constitution-making processes. Albert defines decolonial constitutionalism as “the use of legal, legitimate, and non-violent means to assert sovereignty, to secure rights, or to achieve recognition for a people, nation, or state.” The Essay explores how Chile’s attempts to draft a new constitution between 2019 and 2023 reflect both the potential and challenges of decolonial constitutionalism, particularly in relation to the rights and recognition of Indigenous Peoples. The first process (2019–2022) prominently featured Indigenous demands, including the proposal to reconfigure Chile as a plurinational state, but was ultimately rejected by the public. The second process (2023), in contrast, marginalized Indigenous claims and emphasized national unity, leading to another rejection. Despite these failures, the Essay argues that the constitutional recognition of Indigenous Peoples, even in a limited form, represents a significant—albeit incomplete—step toward decolonization. The Essay concludes by suggesting that future efforts to address Indigenous rights may need to shift from constitution-making to judicial enforcement and international legal mechanisms. Through this analysis, the Essay contributes to the broader discourse on how constitutional processes can serve as tools for decolonial emancipation.

Surrogacy is a growing area of assisted reproductive technology that is used transnationally. Opinions on the practice vary widely, influencing legislation around the world. Some areas ban the practice altogether, while other areas have little regulation at all. International rights to health, including autonomy and reproductive rights, are evoked throughout the surrogacy process. Surrogacy, like wet nursing, involves women using reproductive abilities to support other families in exchange for compensation. This Comment supports regulation on surrogacy that does not ban the practice, arguing instead that international rights support the continued use of surrogacy, and that wet nursing supports the idea that surrogates should be compensated for their work.