CJIL Online 5.2
Summer
2026
I. Introduction
The Article examines the concept of semi-democracy and governance straddling between monarchs and parliamentary assemblies in Qatar and Kuwait. Qatar’s Constitution envisaged universal elections for the country’s constitutive assembly, known as the Shura Council. These took place in 2021 and the right to vote was enjoyed by all Qatari citizens, irrespective of sex, religion or other factor. In 2024, the Emir of Qatar was requested by families and tribes to abolish the elections for the Shura Council and replace the appointment of members through a decision of the Emir, whereby the latter would secure two votes for each tribe and family; one member would be appointed by the Emir, while the other from among the family or tribe through an internal vote. The switch to an appointment system was put to a popular vote through a referendum in November 2024, which was overwhelmingly approved by the Qatari electorate. The Decree which approved the referendum equally heeded to calls for expanding the range of persons recognized as Qatari citizens. These should be perceived as both liberal and radical in a part of the world steeped in conservatism. By contrast, Kuwait’s constitutional tradition, although relatively older and more entrenched has recently come under attack when in 2024 the country’s Emir dissolved the National Assembly twice and suspended several civil liberties.
The concept of “Networked multilateralism” has recently emerged, particularly within the UN framework, as a compelling vision of future global governance, calling for stronger cooperation among the numerous institutions and actors within the fragmented global governance system. This essay develops this concept against the backdrop of conventional theories of fragmentation in International Law scholarship and regime complexity in International Relations scholarship, with a focus on cooperation between IOs as pivotal global governance actors. It identifies three key challenges: the cooperation dilemma facing IOs when confronting multisectoral, cross-border problems; the need for mechanisms that foster proactive inter-IO cooperation; and the necessity of revisiting perceptions of global governance, IOs, and multilateralism. The essay argues that existing theoretical and governance frameworks inadequately address these challenges and proposes a shift towards networked multilateralism. This approach recognizes IOs as independent-yet-interdependent actors within a broader global governance network, rather than as isolated structures governing discrete sectors of international affairs. Effective networked multilateralism, therefore, requires reconceptualization and practical reforms to IOs’ mandates and operations. By expanding traditional notions of multilateralism and emphasizing inter-IO cooperation, this approach seeks to enhance the ability of international law and its institutions to deliver coordinated responses to multisectoral challenges, thus better meeting the complex demands of the 21st century.
This Comment discusses the recent and ongoing substantial expansion of the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) and evaluates the extent to which, as the scope of the FDPR expands, it is increasingly in tension with both international and domestic law. This Comment analyzes the viability of the available legal and procedural mechanisms, both international and domestic, to challenge or halt the FDPR’s expansion. Finally, this Comment cautions that the low likelihood of companies seeking and prevailing on such relief suggests that further expansion of the FDPR is particularly troubling.