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In paragraph two of its resolution on lethal autonomous weapon systems, pursuant to U.N. General Assembly resolution 78/241, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to solicit the views of Member States and Observer States regarding lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Specifically, the request encompassed perspectives on addressing the multifaceted challenges and concerns raised by LAWS, including humanitarian, legal, security, technological, and ethical dimensions, as well as reflections on the role of human agency in the deployment of force. The Secretary-General was further mandated to submit a comprehensive report to the General Assembly at its seventy-ninth session, incorporating the full spectrum of views received and including an annex containing those submissions for further deliberation by Member States.
In implementation of this directive, on February first, 2024, the Office for Disarmament Affairs issued a note verbale to all Member States and Observer States, drawing attention to paragraph two of resolution 78/241 and inviting their formal input. Corresponding communications—notes verbales and letters—were also disseminated to the entities identified in paragraph three of the resolution, requesting their contributions on the matter. For the first time, this Article analyzes the positions of States parties on LAWS submitted to the Secretary-General in 2024, pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/241 calling for the views of Member States and Observer States on lethal autonomous weapons systems, inter alia, “on ways to address the related challenges and concerns they raise from humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical perspectives and on the role of humans in the use of force.” The Article focuses on Member States’ positions in relation to human-centric approaches to LAWS and compliance with international humanitarian law. Moreover, it argues that the standard for autonomous weapons systems’ compliance with the laws of war should not only be whether they follow the principles of international humanitarian law of distinction, proportionality, and precaution, but whether they can be free of algorithmic bias. The last several years of data analysis have shown that data bias and algorithmic bias can result in unintended consequences that pose the risk of unlawful discrimination. From housing to finance, mortgage lending to credit worthiness, and college applications to job recruitment, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) can result in unintended consequences that pose the biggest risk to women and minorities. While relying on potentially biased inputs, the “black box” of a machine can magnify these biases in its outputs or decisions. Furthermore, machine learning can help algorithms even learn to discriminate.
AI mistakes are often patterned, reflecting patterns in training data, algorithms, or the AI’s fundamental design. The Article asks whether Yale Law School professor Oona Hathaway’s recent arguments on individual and state responsibility for the patterns of “Mistakes” in War may also apply to the pattern of biases in AI-driven LAWS. In current and future disputes, machines do and will continue to make life-and-death decisions without the help of human decision-making. Who will then be responsible for the “mistakes” in war?
Although much has been written about algorithmic bias, an “algorithmic divide” can create an AI-driven weapons asymmetry between different nation states depending on who has access to AI. In the final analysis, the Article argues that the transformative potential of AI must be harnessed not in conflict but in conflict resolution.
The purpose of this article is to reassert the primacy of each state’s territorial jurisdiction as a fundamental basis for resolving international IP disputes. It identifies the principle that I have elsewhere termed the “territorial independence of IP laws” as specially relevant to the problems of parallel imports and cross-border IP infringement, and it explains how the proper application of the territorial independence principle resolves IP disputes in a manner that avoids running afoul of international law, maintains the integrity of basic U.S. principles of statutory construction, and remains consistent with the various federal statutes protecting IP rights. The territorial independence principle arises from the basic doctrine of international law that states have primary prescriptive jurisdiction with regard to their own territories, and this has important implications for how IP laws should be interpreted in multinational IP disputes.
How can you tell where someone is “from”? Historically, an individual’s national identity was singular, starting with formal nationality. One’s national center of gravity was readily determinable. Not so today. Determining one’s primary national identification is no longer an easy thing in many cases. This is consequentially enabled by the growing acceptance of dual citizenship. One can openly identify as a formal member of more than one country in a way that was disfavored in the past.
International investment law, however, has not caught up to this reality. In an increasing number of international arbitrations, tribunals are shutting the doors on dual national claimants under the doctrine of “dominant and effective nationality.” The test, which requires arbitrators to determine to which of two nationalities a claimant is more strongly attached, works from antiquated conceptions of nationality as essentially singular. Contemporary sociological conditions now allow for fluid and non-zero-sum national associations. Moreover, application of the dominant nationality test will have unintended consequences. It may revive an imperial era practice in which investors from the Global North carefully nurture their homeland citizenship even while they establish themselves permanently as non-citizens, alongside their investments, in states of the Global South.
For better or worse, citizenship’s place in the world has been transformed. International investment law has been generally slow to absorb change, siloed from scholarship outside the perimeter of specialized arbitration journals. The nature of international arbitration, moreover, systemically inclines it to putative doctrinal regularity. Here as in other areas tribunals should come to incorporate elements of global social meanings into their decision-making presumptions. This Article brings citizenship theory to bear on a field that is systemically insulated from exogenous bodies of scholarship.
Thousands of international investment and trade agreements contain provisions protecting investments made by parties from the signatory states. One such provision is Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a mechanism allowing foreign investors to sue host states in arbitration for treaty violations. Fossil fuel investors are increasingly utilizing ISDS successfully to hold states liable for climate action; arbitral tribunals are awarding large compensations to these investors when states deny them permits for upstream activities or enact phase-out policies attempting to ban fossil fuel consumption. These awards impose heavy burdens on states while simultaneously deterring climate action by creating fears of liability. This Comment proposes that states could invoke the security exception, a common clause in these international agreements that allows a state to violate its treaty obligations to protect its essential security interests, to defend action targeting fossil fuel assets for the purpose of mitigating climate change. Historically, tribunals have accepted a broad slate of interests, from economic to environmental, as within the purview of the security exception, and they have afforded wide discretion to invoking states in defining their security interests for themselves. Climate change poses a significant security threat to the socioeconomic and political stability of countries. Invoking the security exception to defend climate action would be a novel and potentially effective defense that could help states win such disputes, advancing global efforts to achieve the Paris Agreement climate goals.
Some positive developments in international law had humble beginnings. They started from a small group of idealists who wanted to change the world for the better. Once their ideas gathered momentum, they got the support of people with power and transformed the world. State after state followed each other in a cascade toward improving international law. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that are beneficial for the initial germination of ideas with the potential to positively revolutionize international law. By using a series of case studies focused on the initiation of major transformations that improved international law, this paper attempts to recommend how national and international settings should be arranged to support such transformations.
Geographical indications (GIs) designating wines, spirits, and agricultural products have been the subject of a trade war between the U.S. and EU for several decades. The American legal regime often denies European producers exclusive rights to use GIs in the American market because U.S. authorities consider many European terms generic. As a result, EU regulators are reluctant to protect American designations of origin in the European market. Little progress has been made toward reaching a consensus about which terms should be protected and how they should be protected in transatlantic trade.
Economics has been the dominant lens through which the U.S.-EU conflict has been viewed, and commercial considerations have driven the parties to the current stalemate. This Comment proposes to break the impasse by suggesting that GIs should be understood in a new legal context: as a form of cultural property (CP). GIs are CP by definition and analogy, and several principles in national and international CP regimes have implications for the GI debate: producers of CP have a right to exclusive possession and use of their property, CP protection increases cultural strength, and bilateral arrangements in conjunction with national legal regimes can accomplish international goals of CP protection.
The principles in this Comment apply generally to all types of agricultural products marketed using geographically specific terms, but the piece will use the wine sector as a central example. To that end, this Comment makes the following recommendations for achieving progress in resolving the trade dispute: 1) for moral and economic reasons, there should be balanced American recognition of a greater number of European GIs in exchange for reciprocal European recognition of American ones; 2) the GI debate on the international stage should be connected to the burgeoning movement to protect traditional knowledge; 3) engagement between the U.S. and EU on the subject of GIs should continue on a bilateral basis; and 4) part of that bilateral interaction should be a notice register of U.S. and EU GIs.
Big data—extremely large quantities of information and the analytics used to process it—is now crucial to the way militaries operate on the battlefield. Data is used to run weapons systems, analyze intelligence, procure and deploy personnel, evaluate battlefield conditions, detain prisoners, and more. And not only is data increasingly being used on the battlefield, but operations targeting adversaries’ data—to acquire it, delete and destroy it, or distort or poison it—are becoming increasingly important as well. Beyond the battlefield, big data lies at the epicenter of adversarial activities below the armed conflict threshold. Because data is the fuel of artificial intelligence (AI), it is generating an AI arms race among the U.S., China, Russia, and other states, incentivizing large-scale cyber operations related to data. And big data is increasingly central to humanitarian operations on, and adjacent to, the battlefield, for example to monitor humanitarian crises, facilitate early warning systems, and deliver aid, as well as to investigate and prosecute atrocities.
All of these uses of data in military operations raise challenging interpretive questions under key bodies of international law: international humanitarian law (IHL), the jus ad bellum and international human rights law (IHRL). But they also challenge us to consider anew various long-standing critiques of legalism in the international sphere more generally: what we might call the efficacy critique—are these laws effective at all in constraining state and non-state actors?—what we might call the legitimation critique—do laws of war actually sanitize, and thereby legitimate, acts of aggression?—and the critique that law is simply ineffective in adapting to rapid technological or societal change.
This Article uses the rise of big data on the battlefield first to respond to these critiques and defend the importance of legalism when addressing armed conflict, and second to consider the multiple interpretive challenges and gaps in the law that are created by the new techno-social reality of big data on the battlefield. As in other instances of disruptive technological and societal change, the laws of armed conflict must be both justified anew and then adjusted, either through textual gap-filling, interpretive translation, policymaking, or the construction of new legal paradigms.
This Article explores the rise of a new model of global governance: the “click-and-commit world order,” characterized by digitally mediated pledging platforms through which a wide array of actors—states, corporations, cities, NGOs, and individuals—publicly commit to addressing global problems through non-binding promises. In contrast to traditional treaty-making, these pledging platforms offer a decentralized, voluntary framework for international cooperation that relies on public declarations rather than negotiated obligations.
Within the U.N. system, this mode of governance developed within the United Nations Global Compact and the Paris Climate Agreement, where bottom-up pledges were institutionalized within formal and informal international structures. The internet now amplifies and democratizes this model, enabling coordination and norm diffusion without requiring state action or legal enforcement. Examples such as the Net Zero Space Initiative and a range of climate-related platforms illustrate how the pledging order bypasses formal treaty regimes in favor of reputational incentives, public transparency, and symbolic participation.
The Article evaluates the values, risks, and institutional dynamics of this emergent order, including its emphasis on pluralism, voluntarism, and functional over status-based participation. Ultimately, the pledging order reflects a shift from constitutional, rule-restraining global law toward a voluntarist, productivity-oriented attempt to address 21st-century transnational challenges—particularly where formal multilateralism has stalled.
The modern system of international criminal justice, which was born out of World War II and built in its current form during the early 1990s, is both revolutionary and a relic. The ideals, innovation, and vision that created the international legal order were ground-breaking at the time but have failed to evolve at a pace that ensures its relevance and efficacy. The challenges we face today are drastically different from those in the period in which the framework was conceived, the institutions were formed, and the laws were drafted. While these changes have been incremental over several decades, technological advances have led to fundamental transformations in how individuals communicate, how societies interact, and how states engage with each other and their constituents. The law, in contrast, has been slower to evolve, owing in large part to the dearth of enforcement mechanisms. One can point to an abundance of academic literature and soft law instruments that provide scholarly guidance on the interpretation of international law applicable to new and emerging technologies. However, this debate is siloed from the practical realities of international law in which very few court cases have tested how international law applies to these technologies in practice. This Article assesses the effectiveness of the current system of international criminal justice in the face of emerging threats, assessing whether and how existing international law applies and identifying where it falls short.
A day without space, a term used to describe the loss or destruction of America’s space assets, and the potential generation of novel biological threats using AI and synthetic biology present catastrophic and potentially existential threats to U.S. security in a way that nuclear weapons did before and continue to do so today. Yet they have not received the level of attention from national security lawyers or commentators they warrant. This article describes the threats. It describes the current and inchoate nature of the law to address these threats. And it makes initial recommendations to policymakers and lawyers about how to use law to address these threats. This article is a warning order: It is time for national security lawyers across the government and not just specialists to engage these issues, which require whole of government and whole of country solutions.
In a potential future peer-on-peer or near peer conflict, the technological capabilities that are both taken for granted and a source of military superiority will be an immediate and high-value target. Global navigation and positioning systems, satellite imaging, precision guidance, instantaneous communication, and much more— the adversary will seek to shut down these capabilities. Turning off the technology, or fighting “in the dark,” presents complex operational and tactical challenges of navigation, logistics, communication, command and control, coordination, and targeting, to name just a few. However, executing military operations in such a technology-deprived environment also requires the application and implementation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) in the dark, which introduces a set of parallel challenges and concerns.
This Essay explores the challenges for the law when all the technological capabilities that are deeply incorporated into our daily lives and our military operations are not available in armed conflict—because the capabilities have been turned off, jammed, spoofed, or taken down. The law of armed conflict, in contrast, will not be turned off. LOAC applies regardless of capability, type of conflict, or any other distinguishing scenario about a particular conflict. A first challenge lies in the application of LOAC in such situations, including training for the wars the military will need to fight, new questions of interoperability with partners and allies, and a more careful understanding of the relationship between law and policy in the implementation of military operations. Second, the application of LOAC “in the dark” presents the risk of significant pressures on the law as our understandings of and discourse about key principles are put to new tests. Consider proportionality and precautions, for example—current implementation of both core principles of targeting is replete with reliance on technological capabilities that may or will be degraded or rendered unavailable. And yet the absence of those capabilities does not diminish or alter these core legal obligations, highlighting the need to analyze and reaffirm the meaning and application of these fundamental rules. Other pillars of LOAC that will face significant pressure are the role of reasonableness, doubt, and certainty in decision-making and the relationship between capabilities and obligations.