Two Terribles: A Day Without Space and AI Enabled Synthetic Biological Weapons

I. What if?

National security officials are often asked: What keeps you up at night? The question may be literal and refer to the latest crisis. More often, it is an inquiry about worst case scenarios. This paper addresses two terribles that warrant the immediate and ongoing attention of national security lawyers. 

A Day Without Space: In May 2024, the United States government confirmed what it had previously suggested, “Russia . . . is developing a new satellite carrying a nuclear device. This capability could pose a threat to all satellites operated by countries and companies around the globe.”1 Space practitioners refer to “A Day Without Space.” General Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, refers to the advent of Russia’s nuclear space weapon as “Day-Zero”2 (a play on the concept of zero-day cyber vulnerabilities), the day after which we now know it is possible for Russia (or perhaps China, which is known to have a robust Antisatellite (ASAT) program)3 to destroy or disable America’s space assets.

AI Generated or enhanced biological agents: The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (ATA) states, “Rapid advances in dual-use technology, including bioinformatics, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and genomic editing, could enable development of novel biological threats.”4 RAND President Jason Matheny calls Synthetic biology (Synbio) and AI “grave security challenges for which we are currently unprepared.”5

What if, China or Russia disrupts, knocks out, or destroys U.S. national and commercial space capabilities? What if, AI enables non-state actors and individuals, as well as states, to create heretofore unknown synthetic biological weapons?

Section II of this paper starts with a description of the threats. Section III provides recommendations for policymakers. However, this article and Section IV are ultimately directed to national security lawyers (i.e., the  lawyers who will help respond to these threats)  and those who educate national security lawyers asking: What should national security lawyers know about these threats? And what should national security lawyers do now to prepare for these threats? There is no correct answer, although the article indicates those steps a competent and diligent lawyer should be taking now, such as mastering existing law, suggesting needed law, and assuring necessary legal resources are dedicated to these threats.  However, these steps are a point of departure, not a destination. There is a correct timeline, not a day too late, which means now. 

II. Threats

A. Warning Order: The Lights are Blinking Red

A day without space and synthetic biology present different types of risk. However, they share some common features that warrant the attention of national security lawyers and commentators. Both threats are potentially catastrophic with the potential to undermine social order and economic stability and test societal resilience. Both threats are potentially indiscriminate and thus bear global implications. That means they warrant international cooperation and the use of international law to deter and mitigate their risks. An effective response also requires a governmental approach cutting across traditional national security bureaucracies and disciplines. An effective response involves coordination and cooperation between governmental, commercial, and academic actors. These are challenging problems, made more challenging by the need for sustained effort. These threats also emerge from dual -use capabilities – satellites and synthetic biology offering significant commercial and scientific benefits. This makes their potential as threats harder to detect and distinguish. It also means that their risks cannot be successfully addressed with prohibitions and bans, even if such prohibitions could be effectively verified. Finally, outside of small groups of specialists, these threats have not entered the mainstream of national security legal practice and thought. They warrant the immediate attention of national security lawyers and those who train them. These are the department, agency, private, and military lawyers who will (or should) work with policymakers, health officials, and  responders to ensure that the legal framework for responding to these threats is capable of addressing these challenges and practitioners prepared to do so. 

In the military, when commanders contemplate a potential military movement or operation, they issue a warning order. This alerts the affected units to the mission, the requirements, and the timeline. This Article is a warning order to the national security legal community. A day without space and synthetic biology present novel and potentially catastrophic threats for which we are not prepared. The national security legal community needs to get ready, today, to respond to these threats. 

B. A Day without Space

Space is integral to American life. It is central to our economy. It is central to our recreation and travel. And it is central to U.S. national security. As of January 2025, the U.S. as a nation has 8,921 functional satellites in space.6 In contrast, China is understood to have 805 satellites in space, Russia 1,542, and the combined world, including China, 4,668. Most U.S. satellites are privately owned and operated. By one count in May 2023, 91 percent of U.S. satellites were commercial.7 Most of these satellites are in low earth orbit (LEO), a preferred orbit for communications and imaging satellites. Some are in medium earth orbit (MEO), an orbit generally used for television, weather, and communications satellites, and some are in geostationary orbit (GEO), which is generally used for navigation and GPS satellites. The numbers will change and are changing with the advent of satellite constellations and the parallel exponential growth in the use of small cube satellites. Starlink alone has placed 6,874 satellites in LEO orbit and plans to place up to 42,000.8   

As these statistics suggest, no nation benefits more from space than the United States. That also means no state is more dependent on space than the United States. Cell phones communicate via satellites. GPS satellites guide air traffic, truck traffic, and private vehicles. A next day economy and supply chain is dependent on a transportation grid positioned and guided by GPS. That includes the manner in which most Americans have access to food and groceries. Banking transactions are communicated via satellite links.

In the national security domain, the U.S. relies on its space assets for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); communications, missile warning, tracking, and defense, remote sensing, weather, and situational awareness.

In 2019, the United States and NATO recognized space as a fifth operational domain. There is ongoing doctrinal debate whether space should be used to conduct maneuver warfare and not just used in support of earth and sea based warfare, for example, with the use of space to ground weapons.9 Some commentators view Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as the first “space conflict” with space assets used to operate drones, guide missiles, conduct electronic and cyber warfare, and to support and disrupt communications.10 Militaries around the world are studying the war in Ukraine, not just to determine the impact of drones on warfare, but also how to use and deny one’s opponent the use of space.11 The importance of space as a national security asset is increasing; space is the ultimate high ground.

No wonder that when in February 2024 the Chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence publicly called upon the executive branch to declassify information about a possible Russian space based nuclear weapon the statement drew attention. The announcement followed the notification to Congress of intelligence indicating that Russia was developing a nuclear antisatellite capability. Stories and briefings followed with headlines like “Is this a Sputnik Moment?”12 Not many details followed. The NSC spokesman stated: “This is not an active capability that’s been deployed,” and, “We are not talking about a weapon that can be used to attack human beings or cause physical destruction here on earth.”13 In May 2024, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy elaborated. “Russia is also developing a concerning anti-satellite capability related to a new satellite carrying a nuclear device that Russia is developing. This capability could pose a threat to all satellites operated by countries and companies around the globe, as well as to the vital communications, scientific, meteorological, agricultural, commercial, and national security services we all depend on.”14

Threats to satellites are not new. The United States was the first nation to test a kinetic ASAT weapon in 1985. The test conducted at an altitude of 326 miles produced 700 pieces of debris, 300 pieces of which are still traceable in LEO orbit. In 2007, China conducted a direct assent ASAT missile against a defunct weather satellite causing 3,000 pieces of traceable debris. India conducted a direct assent kinetic ASAT test in 2019 causing 270 pieces of traceable debris. Russia conducted a direct assent kinetic ASAT test in 2021 causing 1,500 pieces of traceable debris taking three months to catalog. There15 are reports that Israel may possess an untested direct assent ASAT capability.16

There are other ways to destroy or disable satellites that are not kinetic. These include co-orbital kinetic vehicles and weapons along with kinetic attacks on ground stations. Non-kinetic means of attack might include lasers, dazzling, high-powered microwave interference, electromagnetic pulses, and physical capture known as remote proximity operations (RPO). China has developed a space plane known as the reusable experimental spacecraft, which may have RPO as a mission. (The United States also has an experimental space plane known as the X-37B.)17 Satellites and their capabilities can also be attacked or disrupted by electronic interference, spoofing, and meaconing (intercepting and overriding) the up or down links, cyberattacks on ground stations and traditional counterintelligence threats like human interference on the ground. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Annual Space Threat assessment offers a rubric for assessing space threats, including: type of attack, attribution, reversibility, awareness, attacker damage assessment, and collateral damage.18 To this assessment rubric one might add the capacity (to repeat or expand an attack) and the possessing state’s adherence to the law of armed conflict or other norms.

The apparent development of a Russian capacity to detonate a nuclear device in space is different in kind. To start, it is nuclear; thus its use would cross a strategic and moral line not crossed since 1945 increasing, if not demanding, an immediate escalatory response. The scale of the threat is different as well. The U.S. conducted a nuclear weapons test in space in 1962 called Starfish Prime. The test left a radiation belt in space while the resulting electromagnetic pulse disabled the UK’s first Ariel satellite launched two months earlier.19 Clearly, these were unintended results. In 1963, the U.S. and Soviet Union signed the Test Ban Treaty undertaking “to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas.”20

There is speculation, without USG confirmation, as to whether the Russian weapon in development is intended to have kinetic effect or generate an EMP that will “fry” the target satellites, or most likely all satellites within the weapons range. What we do know from Assistant Secretary Plumb’s testimony is that whatever the device’s effect it will likely have the capacity to disable or destroy most if not all satellites in LEO. To the extent it is kinetic in impact, it may also initiate what is known as the Kessler Syndrome, the notional moment where debris in space is so dense that it is no longer possible for satellites to orbit without collision and the cascading generation of further debris and collisions leading to the elimination of orbital capacity.

We cannot be sure whether a Russian device will work. Neither can they. Neither can we know what a day without space would look like on the ground and how long it would last. The HPSCI Chairman pressed the issue in June 2024 stating, “This threat would mean that our economic, international security, and social systems come to a grinding halt. This would be a catastrophic and devastating attack upon Western economic and democratic systems. Vladimir Putin knows this. Checkmate.”21 He also stated that the impact of a nuclear explosion in LEO would last approximately one year.22

The indiscriminate nature of Russia’s “device” presents a deterrence dilemma. The device will likely destroy or disable Russian and Chinese satellites and not just U.S. assets. However, unlike mutual assured destruction (MAD), which so far, has correctly presumed that nuclear powers will not assume the risk of destruction by launching a first strike, it is not clear that the certain concurrent destruction of Russia’s space assets would have deterrent effect on a Russian decision to use a nuclear device. Again, Assistant Secretary Plumb:

Russia’s investments in counterspace systems are designed to exploit what it views as a U.S. overreliance on space for conducting military operations and to offset perceived U.S. military advantages. As noted in the ODNI 2024 ATA, Russia will be more reliant on counterspace capabilities as it rebuilds its ground force from extensive losses in its war against Ukraine.23

Moreover, given the imbalance in space assets and U.S. reliance on those assets, Russia can engage in a form of space blackmail or strategic ambiguity about the use of such a weapon as leverage. The U.S. needs a deterrent policy as effective as MAD,  a degree of resilience that conveys the same deterrent effect, or both. 

As stated by Assistant Secretary Plumb “our primary means of deterring in space will be through resilience.”24 The plan is called Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture described by the Deputy Secretary of Defense as “proliferated constellations of smaller, resilient, lower-cost satellites.”25 As noted on its webpage, Space Force is deploying redundant capacity across LEO, MEO, and GEO. In other words, the U.S. military is adopting a space architecture that is distributed, disaggregated, diversified, protected, and proliferated and the U.S. wants adversaries to know it. The United States also relies on world class, or better put - space class, Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which helps provide advance warning of attack. Strategic and tactical SSA may be one reason that the civilian and commercial space situational awareness mission was transferred to the Department of Commerce in 2024 allowing Space Force to focus on military space missions and disaggregate classified capabilities to track space objects from overt capabilities shared with the public.

For the U.S. military, resilience also comes in the form of alternative means of communication, navigation, and timing such as the potential adoption of new fiber optic timing systems, and a classified system known as M-Code,26 and old systems like Loran, which was used during World War II and the Cold War to triangulate positions. Soldiers continue to learn to navigate using compass and map and sailors are once again training to use sextants and read the stars. It is also evident from the Annual Threat Assessment and other sources that U.S. intelligence community has prioritized the collection of information about foreign adversaries space capabilities and intentions.

It is not evident that the civilian community, commercial and public, is aware of the imminence and totality of the threat to U.S. spaces assets, or taken measures to prepare for it. The advent of commercial constellations offers a measure of resilience in the form of distribution and proliferation. It is alarming that Assistant Secretary Plumb noted that the launch of the first 23 satellites of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture was “accomplished in less than three years from contract award to launch, an accelerated timeline made possible by leveraging commercial satellite bus lines and existing technologies.”27 Three years is a long day without space. 

C. Synthetic Biology

Synthetic biology (SynBio) refers to the design and fabrication of biological components and systems that do not already exist in the natural world and the application of engineering principles to biology, including components and systems that already exist.28 The field in one form or another has been around since the 1970s; however, at least five factors have revolutionized the field in exponential manner since the 2009 creation of the CRISPR gene editing tool.29 These factors include the advent of gene editing techniques, new DNA synthesis tools, improvements in genome sequencing, and cloud labs.30 As Dr. Tara O’Toole has said, “it is all about being able to read, write, and edit the code of life . . . life is written in code.” And, as O’Toole and others have also said, a fifth factor AI “is going to fundamentally improve the accuracy and the speed and decrease the cost of all these core biotechnology.”31 This was the conclusion of a DHS study: “LLMs [large language AI models] have been shown to lower the educational and knowledge barriers for traditional biological agents and toxins by providing protocols and troubleshooting information at every step of the pathway, enabling non-experts to perform tasks with an enhanced degree of competency or to overcome area of ignorance outside of a particular area of expertise.”32

Synthetic biology has many commercial, agricultural, and medical benefits. Some of these benefits are realized, some offer benefit if successfully scaled, and some are conceptual but likely. For example, synthetic biology has been used to create biofuels and batteries that run on bacteria. Gene editing can be used to create drought resistant and high yield crops as well as sterilize herbicide and pesticide resistant insects and rodents. Synbio processes have created synthetic chemicals to manufacture tires, paints, adhesives, diapers, and acrylic, all products that would otherwise rely on organic chemicals derived from petroleum creating greenhouse gases. Since the 1970s synthetic bacterium have been used to digest petroleum components from oil spills. Perhaps most promising, synbio has led to medical advances, including new organ transplant methods, flu and other vaccines, and research offers promise of altering cells to attack cancer cells and treat Parkinson’s disease and make new synthetic antibiotics.

Synthetic biology also comes with risks. Four stand out. Laboratory accidents can occur leading to the release of pathogens and viruses into the natural environment and general population. Two fields are thought to magnify the potential dangerous impact of such accidents. Gain of Function Research of Concern (GOFROC) refers to any genetic mutation in an organism that confers a new or enhanced ability.33 One subset of GOFROC involves Enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPP), a field of study designed to predict and anticipate how diseases might mutate so scientists can develop vaccines and treatments.34 By one count, between 1975 and 2016 sixty accidents occurred at the most safe labs, known as Biosafety Level 4 laboratories, resulting in human exposure to highly infectious pathogens, but not necessarily laboratory release.35 There are 69 known and declared Level 4 labs in the world and more coming on line.36 One theory behind the origin of COVID-19 is that it entered the population stream of Wuhan through accidental release and exposure at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.37

There are surely other Level 4 labs, including clandestine labs, as multiple countries are known to engage in bioweapons research notwithstanding the absolute prohibition on doing so in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and customary international law. After signing the BWC in 1972, Russia maintained a clandestine biological and chemical weapons program, a fact suspected by U.S. intelligence and confirmed by Boris Yeltsin in 1992. More recently, The Washington Post has reported on commercial satellite images that indicate that Russia has expanded the use of a Russian military lab previously associated with biological weapons development.38

Risk also occurs naturally as viruses, bacteria, and other pathogens emerge through natural processes or zoonotic diseases spread from animals to humans. Although not technically within the definition of synthetic biology when this occurs naturally, such zoonotic transmission could involve synthetically created vectors. One theory behind the origin of COVID-19 is that it occurred naturally in animals and spread zoonotically from animal to humans in a so-called wet market in Wuhan.39

Purposeful but unintentional harm may also occur from the propensity of scientists to push to the edge of knowledge without fully recognizing the risks of doing so or proceeding in spite of the risks. The study of mirror bacteria is an example of this.40 One additional risk is that given the scientific and academic pressures and incentives to publish first, scientists engaged in research with benign intent may provide insight to state and non-state actors with malign intent. There have also been instances of DIY “quackery” involving potentially dangerous experiments. Cloud labs increase these risks.41  

The risks from synthetic biology are thought greatest with the creation of intentional harm in the form of novel biological agents. First, as noted, gene editing tools and cloud labs contribute to the democratization of synthetic biology capabilities for better or for worse by lowering the bar to entry. Second, in context, the development of synthetically generated biological weapons could erase two of the presumed deterrents to the use of biological weapons – there indiscriminate nature (for other than individualized attacks) and the assurance of belligerent reprisal in the case of an attack on the United States.42 Such deterrent reasoning does not apply in the case of anarchists, terrorists, and death cults like ISIS. Indiscriminate and widespread death is often the purpose of such actors, and assured retaliation does not influence an actor who does not control a territory or homeland or who covets death. Further, malign state actors may believe that they can mask the attribution of an attack by using synthetic agents, which are unknown and presumably untraceable. Commentators have warned, “The nightmare of a biological holocaust is far from fanciful . . .An authoritative People’s Liberation Army textbook discusses the potential for ‘specific ethnic genetic attacks.’”43 Biologists might debate the viability of “race-based” genetic attacks given the genetic diversity of many population pools. But that doesn’t mean malign states will not try. Some militaries are also experimenting with synthetic biology for beneficial purposes like blood clotting agents. However, states not constrained by bioethics may also seek to create so-called super soldiers by genetically suppressing the human capacity to feel fear and fatigue.

There is academic debate over whether the risk from synthetic biology is exaggerated. It may not matter. As with nuclear weapons, even if one concludes that the risk of the malign use of synthetic biology is low, the risk is not zero and the potential consequences are extraordinary. We also know the risk is real. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda sought chemical and biological weapons with which to attack the United States. In September 2023, RAND’s Jeff Alstott testified that “[w]ithout safeguards, the development of ever-more-advanced AI systems will bring ever-greater reductions to the barriers to launch such attacks, until we are at the point in which a lone actor can cause a pandemic, killing millions.”44 Recall that the age of bioterrorism arguably began with the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult’s sarin attack on the Tokyo subway. If such an actor was not constrained in the use of sarin, they will not be constrained in the use of even more deadly and unknown synbio agents.

The U.S. response to synthetic biology as a security threat has been episodic and siloed even after the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. Not surprisingly, national security agencies have led the way. There have been studies, reports, and plans. One of the most thorough and balanced is the Department of Defense (DoD)-sponsored National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology. The report highlights three risks: “(1) re-creating known pathogen viruses, (2) making existing bacteria more dangerous, and (3) making harmful biochemicals via in situ syntheses.”45 Upon DoD request, the study also produced “a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in synthetic biology.”46 The matrix includes four assessment categories with factors defining each: Usability of the Technology, Usability as a Weapon, Requirements of Actors, and Potential for Mitigation. The risk assessment matrix seeks to address risk without stifling innovation and the benefits of microbiological research.47 Alas, the DHS concluded in 2024 that “[t]he U.S. Government currently does not have an overarching legal or regulatory framework to comprehensively regulate or oversee AI research and development, production, and use of resulting applications.”48  

III. Policy Recommendations

These threats require the government to align process, policy, intelligence, and resources. Each of these threats also warrant specific and tailored responses. In the case of space, for example, here are four illustrative policy steps we should take now.

• Resilience Starts with Knowledge. The government, think tanks, and academia should study the primary and secondary effects of a day without space for civilians, social order, and the civilian economy. This might start with an understanding of whether we are indeed talking about a day without space, or something potentially much longer. How long it would take to reconstitute U.S. commercial space assets will depend on at least four factors: (1) The nature of the attack (e.g., a nuclear device exploded in space will have longer term, wider, and lingering effect than ground station cyberattacks); (2) the state of U.S. commercial and governmental resiliency and redundancy in space; (3) U.S. capacity to build and replace space assets; and, (4) U.S. launch capacity and redundancy.

• Doctrine and Deterrence. The United States is developing space doctrine, principally through the efforts of Space Force.49 However, this doctrine is oriented toward Space Force and military missions (as military doctrines are) and space as a military domain. There are also classified elements to space doctrine, which limit its usefulness as a civilian planning resource. Further, it is not apparent whether the United States government has developed and enunciated a theory of deterrence at the policy level.

 There have been public steps in this direction. In April 2022, the United States government declared as a matter of policy that it would not conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile testing.50 Fourteen other nations and the European Space Agency (ESA) joined the declaration, but not Russia, China, Iran, or India. Former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall also publicly signaled in December 2024 that the United States is prepared and capable of defending its assets in space, according to a New York Times interview:

“…the Air Force started to build out a suite of what Mr. Kendall called “low-debris-causing weapons” that will be able to disrupt or disable Chinese or other enemy satellites, the first of which is expected to be operational by 2026. Kendall and Gen. Chance Saltzman, the chief of Space Operations, would not specify how these American systems will work. But other former Pentagon officials have said they likely will include electronic jamming, cyberattacks, lasers, high-powered microwave systems, or even U.S. satellites that can grab or move enemy satellites…the debate about ‘the sanctity or purity of space’ is effectively over.”51

However, while the U.S. government has surely planned for such eventualities, it is not clear that we have established and communicated a viable theory of deterrence as was done with nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Would, for example, the U.S. be prepared to target Beidou or Glonass? Would the U.S. treat an attack on satellites as an armed attack? Would it matter if the satellites in question were owned and operated by the government or commercial entities, or whether the loss of use was temporary or permanent? These are questions national security policy makers and national security lawyers should address. As was the case with the study of nuclear deterrence, think tanks and academics should join the debate.52  

• Critical infrastructure. The U.S. government should designate U.S. commercial space assets as a critical infrastructure. This is not required to address the challenges posed by a day without space, but it is helpful. As is known to national security practitioners and lawyers, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (2003) and Presidential Policy Directive 21 (2013), the USG has designated sixteen critical infrastructures. Designation, in theory, and often in practice comes with greater bureaucratic and resource attention. It also signals to potential opponents that the U.S. treats the asset as critical and will respond and act accordingly.      

• Defense industrial base. One of the lessons of the war in Ukraine is that the defense industrial base matters and that the American industrial base is in disarray. As Mark Bowden has written,53 the U.S. capacity to produce munitions cannot keep up with demand. Three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the U.S. has gone from producing 14,000 155-millimeter artillery shells per month to 40,000 per month. But Ukraine has been firing up to 8,000 shells a day and would fire more if it had them. The problem repeats itself with other munitions, including cruise missiles and drones. As Bowden explains, capacity comes from a reliable and redundant supply chain, diversified manufacturing sources so there is no single point of failure, reliable and predictable budgets, and legal authorities that permit flexible and expedited contracting. This is not the U.S. model in munitions or in space.

The U.S. space launch capacity currently relies on a single space launch provider, SpaceX. That is not U.S. policy, it is the reality that three additional companies have yet to field viable alternatives, although Blue Origin successfully tested its New Glenn rocket in January 2024.54 Remarkably, until 2020, the U.S. had relied on Russia for human space flight launch, and it was not until 2022 that the U.S. stopped using the Russian RD-189 engine for national security launches,55 when Putin terminated transfers and support services in response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for invading Ukraine. One wonders whether there are other such supply chain vulnerabilities. Policymakers concerned about a day without space should verify that the components of U.S. space launch capacities are either U.S.-made or derive from reliable and allied sources. Congress for its part, has for over a decade relied on continuing resolutions to fund the government, leading to unpredictable funding and static budgets.56 If there is good news, it is that the Defense Production Act provides broad and flexible authority to enhance the defense industrial base, including national security space launch if the President and executive branch are prepared to use it.    When it comes to resilience, all roads lead back to the defense industrial base, and U.S. policy, resources, and law need to act like it.

In the case of synthetic biology, here are five illustrative policy steps we should take and take now.

• Institutional Review Boards. Much of the research into synthetic biology occurs in academia. The principal mechanism for reviewing the safety and security of academic research is known as an institutional review board (IRB). These are committees of academics and administrators who review proposed experiments, programs, and projects to ensure they are ethical and bounded by appropriate safety and security protocols. U.S.- funded or requested research is subject to what is known as the common rule, now revised common rule, addressed to human experimentation. However, depending on the university, IRB reviews are generally limited to human and animal experimentation. Moreover, many academics eschew their use, unless required to do so because of federal funding, because of the delay and bureaucracy involved. 

Policymakers and lawyers, in government, academia, and industry should create an index of existing IRB requirements and thresholds and then ask at least five questions:

(1)        Does the IRB architecture address the range of potential risks posed by synthetic biology?

(2)        Are additional tools needed to determine what is occurring in government, academia, and industry to ensure those activities are subject to appropriate security and safety safeguards?

(3)        Are there similar mechanisms, or mechanisms that accomplish the same goals in international practice, and if not, how should the U.S. encourage the adoption of such mechanisms?

(4)        Are such mechanisms warranted in industry? And

(5)        In all scenarios, are the requirements verifiable and enforceable, and if not, why not?

• Supply Chain Security – In both directions. The response to the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the importance of supply chain reliability and redundance. However, supply chain integrity works both ways. Policymakers should prioritize the oversight of Know Your Customer (KYC) thresholds and requirements for cloud labs and genetic engineering tools. Gaps should be filled. Executive Order 14110, “On the Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence” illustrated how this goal might be achieved. Section 4.2, for example, relying on the authority of Section 705 of the DPA, required companies developing potential dual-use foundational models (i.e., those AI systems most capable of generating synthetic biology agents) to report on an ongoing basis on inter alia physical and cybersecurity protections to safeguard the models from sophisticated threats. However, President Trump has revoked E.O. 14110, and the U.S. Government has yet to indicate whether and how it will fill this information gap. Conversely, the government should evaluate its own supply chains in the field of synthetic biology research and development to ensure they are secure, reliable, and redundant. 

• The Imperiale Matrix. With reference to the earlier 2018 study of biosecurity chaired by University of Michigan Professor Mike Imperiale, policymakers should ask whether the “Imperiale Risk Matrix” been adopted, and whether the additional recommendations of the study have been adopted. If not, why not? If so, should the matrix and recommendations be applied to other synthetic biology sectors and endeavors?

IV. National Security Law, Lawyers, and Next Steps

What should national security lawyers be doing?

Competence and Diligence. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and their state bar equivalents state: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” The comment to the rule adds under “Maintaining Competence” “… a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” The comment contemplates the use of technology by lawyers, and while it does not mention space or synthetic biology, the principle applies nonetheless.

What does “competence” mean in the context of today’s security threats and practice? It means that national security lawyers need to understand the traditional threats, like those posed by the great power rivalries associated with China and Russia, along with the recurring threats posed by Iran and North Korea, and state and non-state sponsored terrorism. They also need to know how to apply the tools of national security law to address these threats, including the authorities, processes, and values associated with intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, nonproliferation, and use of the military. National security lawyers also need to understand the emerging and now present threats that derive from artificial intelligence, quantum information systems, synthetic biology, and space. For most national security lawyers, this will require working with different agencies and cultures, different decision-making processes, and new areas of knowledge and law, most of which are not taught in law school.  

The National Security Legal Toolbox. Cognizant of the risks posed by a day without space and synthetic biology, national security lawyers will need to consider what they bring to the national security toolbox and what they need to add to the toolbox.

Space law is inchoate. Experts may debate how inchoate, but clearly an international regime whose backbone is five United Nations treaties from the late 1960s and 1970s is dated. The most important of these treaties is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).57 Originally signed by the U.S., Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, the treaty now has 115 parties. In 1967, there were two space powers and scant contemplation of a commercial space industry. Among other things, the OST provides:

The exploration and use of outer space … shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries… and shall be the province of all mankind. (Art. 1)

State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in out space in any other manner. (Art. IV)

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. (Art. IV)

The Rescue Agreement (1968), as the title implies, addresses the obligations of states to rescue astronauts and cosmonauts. The Liability Convention (1972) assigns to state parties, i.e., national governments, responsibility for the space launches and objects in space launched from their territory. Although the treaty mechanism for adjudicating disputed liability has never been used, the convention serves as predicate for regulating the commercial space launch industry and commercial space activities. The Registration Convention (1975) creates a mechanism for recording and allocating orbital tracks and transmission frequencies, without which commercial satellites could not effectively communicate to earth and collisions would become endemic. Finally, the Moon Agreement (1979) was intended to regulate exploitation of the Moon in the interests of all mankind. However, key states, including the U.S., have not become members on the ground that the Agreement discourages commercial exploration of space resources. 58

States are, of course, also developing the customary international law of space through practice, but it is hard to argue that there are many generally accepted norms regarding the use of weapons in space that are not “nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” As is clear from the purported development of the Russian nuclear device, the OST in this respect appears aspirational rather than operational and lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms, even if the Parties could agree on what the terms mean. Clearly, the four states that have tested direct assent ASATs do not recognize a norm against the use of kinetic weapons in space. Most constraints come in the form of policy statements about responsible practice, if they come at all. One question lawyers and policymakers should ask is whether and in what manner the U.S. and other like-minded space nations and entities should purposefully develop the customary international law of space? Lawyers should not wait to be asked, but rather affirmatively recommend options. 

U.S. domestic law offers a more coherent legal framework, albeit spread across multiple agencies and departments. In brief, commercial launch and operation is regulated through licensing by three departments, which licensing implements U.S. international legal commitments under the U.N. treaties as well as U.S. law. The Department of Commerce, Office of Space Operations, has policy cognizance over and licenses remote sensing. The Federal Aviation Administration licenses space launch and recovery. The Federal Communications Commission licenses and overseas communication transmission and frequency assignment. Other law applies as well, for example, the National Environmental Policy Act59 (NEPA) requires environmental impact statements (EIS) for “major federal actions” including space launches, although there is legal debate over whether NEPA extends to operations in outer space and when and how EIS must be completed. This warrants definitive resolution. There is no national security exemption to NEPA, although courts have considered national security as a factor in considering how to tailor adjudicative remedies. Regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which oversees implementation of the Act, contemplate exemptions for “actions with significant effect” in “emergency circumstances” following consultation with CEQ.60 The Commercial Space Launch Act (1984) and Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (2015)61 provide legislative authority for space launch and licensing and in the latter act recognize the authority of commercial actors to engage in exploitation of space resources, thus incentivizing space exploration and launch. Some commercial space operators have complained about excessive domestic regulation. A national security question is whether the regulation of U.S. space launch capacity is efficient, effective, and could respond in a timely manner if U.S. space assets are lost in part or in whole.

In the area of national security, domestic law is clear and arguably coherent. The key enabling intelligence and military authorities are found in Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code including those pertaining to Space Force and Space Command.62 What may be missing is not law, but an established practice and process for exercising that law in new and novel ways. This is an area ripe for tabletop exercises followed by interagency validation of the authorities used, or if necessary a request for additional legislative authority.     

The law applicable to synthetic biology is also inchoate. Where domestic space law arguably presents a cohesive whole, albeit spread across agencies, there are significant gaps in the regulation and oversight of synthetic biology. Authority, where it exists, is spread across agencies, many of which are not engaged in the daily national security enterprise, like the EPA.

The Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) policy applies to  federally funding life sciences research “on biological agents and toxins that, when enhanced, have the potential to pose risks to public health, agriculture, food security, economic security, or national security.”63 The DURC is intended to encourage a culture of responsibility and “to increase the awareness of researchers, research institutions, and federal funding agencies about the biosafety and biosecurity concerns associated with certain types of research and to ensure that appropriate risk mitigation measures are in place to prevent biosafety incidents (e.g., unintended personal exposure or release of an agent outside of containment) or biosecurity incidents (e.g., theft or intentional misuse of information, knowledge, products, or technology.)”64 These measures include steps to provide for biosafety, physical security, and personnel reliability. The DURC covers research involving listed agents and toxins. In addition, it covers nine categories of experiments, including those that “enhance the susceptibility of a host population to a pathogen or toxin.”65

In addition, the government regulates certain biotechnology applications through a framework established in 1986 under the auspices of the Office of Science and Technology Policy within the Executive Office of the President. The framework links policy to a patchwork of enabling laws assigning authorities and responsibilities to agencies such as FDA, USDA, and EPA over certain food, drugs, plants, and animals. This area warrants urgent consideration of where there are gaps along with constant oversight, resources, and improved coherence in responding to potential synthetic biology threats.

A third pillar of U.S. regulation seeks to prevent designated and sanctioned states, entities, and individuals from acquiring access to materials and know-how with military, national security, or proliferation applications. This is done with an export regime comprised of Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulated sanctions implemented pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and specific enabling statutes, the Export Reform Control Act and Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and the Arms Export Control Act. These laws have been interpreted to include in certain instances “deemed exports,” the transfer of knowledge through commercial and academic collaboration, and not just the transfer of material objects.66 However, statutory and interpretive clarity is necessary to ensure compliance and to protect actors from unwitting transgressions.

The transfer of national security objects and knowledge is also accomplished by reviewing foreign acquisition of U.S. companies and property using Title VII of the Defense Production Act, more commonly referred to as the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which reviews such transactions for approval, mitigation, or presidential denial.67 National security lawyers should actively ensure synthetic biology risks align with CFIUS review criteria. They should also note here that the CFIUS process includes numerous statutory timelines and presumptions to encourage timely review. Companies may not always like or agree with the outcome, but the mechanism might well serve as a model elsewhere as a national security process that is timely and procedurally predictable.

There is less international law in the synthetic biology area than with 68 space. However, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is clear that:

“Each State Party undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”69

The BWC has 187 State Parties. The prohibitions found in the BWC are understood to comprise customary international law as well. The 2003 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (to the Biodiversity Convention) has 167 Parties, but not the U.S. Article 17 obligates Parties to notify an International Biosafety Clearinghouse and affected nations of release of living modified organisms that may impact diversity and human health. 70

What happens when the relevant law is incomplete? First, national security actors use the law they have, which may or may not be a good contextual fit. With respect to space and synthetic biology, available law is the traditional national security tools found in Title 10, Title 50, and IEEPA. The Defense Production Act is another vital, but underutilized tool beyond traditional defense acquisition areas, DHS emergency response, and CFIUS. The U.S. government response to COVID-19 demonstrated the value of the DPA in encouraging and establishing production capacity and through the “friendly” use of the DPA directing resources to priority needs based on consultation rather than direction to industry. National security lawyers working the space portfolio and those working the synthetic biology portfolio should systematically work through the DPA and identify those sections that may assist their missions. Doing so will also help lawyers identify gaps in necessary authority and signal to industry potential DPA uses. 

The absence of specific law also heightens the importance of constitutional law, including the President’s authority as Commander in Chief, Chief Executive, and in the area of foreign affairs. Litigation also becomes more prominent as a methodology to resolve larger policy issues and not just disputes between parties as the government seeks to regulate private or commercial behavior. However, litigation is a poor mechanism for developing public policy, accenting as it does the specific interests and legal views of the parties.

The promulgation and voluntary application of ethical codes and best practices also become more important as guideposts and to fill regulatory gaps. There may not be law on the matter, but a research scientist (or her lawyer, for that matter), might ask: “Is this a good idea?” National security lawyers are reminded of Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct stating that “in rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”71 However, lawyers are also reminded that they should clearly indicate what is law and what is prudential advice. 

Next Steps?

Having considered what is in the national security toolbox, national security policymakers and lawyers should concurrently consider what should be in the toolbox. Here are five overarching questions that will help answer the question.

Are these threats receiving the necessary attention and resources? The priority is to bring attention to these issues. There are entities within the U.S. government, and in academia and industry, that focus daily on space and synthetic biology threats, like Space Force and OSTP. However, these are whole of country risks requiring whole of country responses. Policymakers and lawyers need to ask whether each of these threats is receiving the intelligence, policy, and legal attention they require, and whether the agencies responsible for addressing these threats are resourced to provide that attention. The law may be just right, but if the agency charged with issuing licenses or inspecting labs does not have funding or personnel they will not do so, or do so in a timely manner. Absent purposeful decisions, the answer is invariably that agencies are not receiving necessary attention or resources. Utilization of the Imperiale matrix is one way to prioritize the allocation of resources. Identifying single points of failure in space launch resilience is another. 

Is the law coherent and complete -- do decisionmakers have the tools they need? Lawyers should determine if the legal regimes for addressing these threats are coherent and complete. Do policymakers have the authorities they need to protect the United States and if need be act? As noted earlier, the Department of Homeland Security doesn’t think so. Are there safeguards in place to ensure those authorities are used consistent with our legal values and in a way that mitigates risk, but does not stifle innovation and benefit? For example, lawyers with the assistance of microbiologists should ask whether the DURC Policy effectively covers “current understanding” of the full range of synthetic biology risks and threats and whether that understanding has been effectively communicated to relevant governmental, commercial, and academic actors. They might also consider whether the cloud lab reporting mechanisms are adequate to timely identify malign or dangerous DIY developments. One way to determine whether the law is adequate is to stress test its use. The DPA contains many textually expansive authorities, including the authority to conduct industry surveys and to allocate resources.72 But many of these authorities have not been used or used to the apparent limit of the law. Lawyers should consider how these authorities might need to be used in an emergency and determine who will object and why. The wrong time to engage in interagency debates or litigation is in the moment when urgent action is needed. 

Are lawyers asking and answering the hard questions or avoiding them? Lawyers, in consultation with policymakers, should also make purposeful decisions about how to interpret existing law, including treaty law. It is easier to obtain agreement before a real or perceived advantage is achieved than after. Here are a few examples. What constitutes a “deemed export” in the synthetic biology area and how should that interpretation be documented and communicated so that industry and academic actors can rely on that interpretation and be held accountable? What does “peaceful purposes” mean in the OST and is U.S. national security improved or diminished by knowing the answer? How does or should the law of armed conflict apply in space? Are commercial space assets military objects? Given the range of methods to destroy or interfere with satellites what constitutes an armed attack in space and are there deterrent values in stating so?

Is the process for addressing these threats known, practiced, and effective? Prioritization requires a process that will rapidly address, raise, and resolve issues when they arise to the officials with the authority to act. Lawyers and policymakers alike should remember that process, like collegiality, is neither good nor bad. Good process is good. “Process” can be bureaucratic and slow, or efficient and effective. Good process is timely, contextual, and meaningful to the context presented. Both of the threats addressed in this article fall outside typical national security processes. Many of the key players are not normative members of the national security process. Where time is, or could be, of essence, process needs to be identified in advance and practiced to ensure that the right players are in the room and that they know their roles and understand their authorities and responsibilities. Process is challenging, not just because it cuts across many agencies, but also because it necessarily requires the input and participation of private and commercial actors. We better work through these issues now. 

Are national security lawyers prepared to handle the practice pressures that come with national security peril? Part of the interest of national security law is its variety and change. That is also its challenge. Lawyers complain that they have too little time and not enough information while often operating alone and almost always in secret. Welcome aboard. One way to practice at the speed of relevance is to prepare in advance to the extent possible. This is a comment about knowledge, but also about proactively engaging policymakers and specialists to anticipate and think through the hard questions in advance. Prior education buys decision-making time during crises. 

V. Conclusion

RAND President Jason Matheny has been referred to as an apocaloptimist.73 The term captures the gravity of the threats Matheny and others consider, including those presented by a day without space and synthetic biology. Some scenarios are indeed apocalyptic. But the term also recognizes that it is not too late to do something about it. That is a source of optimism. Like the prospect of nuclear war, these threats are real and present, but they are not certain or inevitable. Our duty and responsibility as national security lawyers is to mitigate the risks while permitting and maximizing the benefits of vital dual-use capacities. This requires national security lawyers to use the available law wisely and well, advocate for the law we should have, and practice at the speed of relevance. Time to get to work.

• 1Dr. John F. Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces: Fiscal Year 2025 National Security Space Programs 4 (May 1, 2024).
• 2General Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, Remarks during the AFA Air Warfare Symposium’s Great Power Competition Senior Leader Panel (Feb. 12, 2014) in United States Air Force: News (Feb. 20, 2024) https://perma.cc/P2H8-9BV2.
• 3Office Of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 15 (2025).
• 4Id. at 32.
• 5Jason Matheny, Challenges to U.S. National Security and Competitiveness Posed by AI, RAND: Testimony presented before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (Mar. 8, 2023).  
• 6Satellites by Countries and Organizations, N2YO.com, https://perma.cc/96Y7-3QSF.
• 7USC Satellite Database: Union of Concerned Scientists (last updated May 1, 2023) https://perma.cc/QS97-ZD4F.
• 8Tereza Pultarova, Starlink Satellites: Facts, Tracking and Impact on Astronomy, SPACE.com, https://perma.cc/MHZ3-DP5M (Jan. 9, 2025).
• 9Christopher Stone, The US Needs to get Real About Maneuver Warfare in Space, Breaking Defense (Nov. 8, 2024, 10:41 AM), https://perma.cc/MZ66-5VJP. 
• 10See, e.g., Bingen, et al., Space Threat Assessment 2023, Center for Strategic and Int’l Studies 16–20 (2023), https://perma.cc/5843-V8SY; Michael Connell, The Role of Space in Russia’s Operations in Ukraine, Center for Naval Analysis (November 2023), https://perma.cc/PL2S-BKG2; How the War in Ukraine is Affecting Space Activities: New Challenges and Opportunities, OECD (Nov. 15, 2022),
• 11Michael Connell, supra note 10; How the War in Ukraine is Affecting Space Activities: New Challenges and Opportunities, OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD (Nov. 15, 2022; Debra Werner, Ukraine’s Lessons for Military Space, SpaceNews (Apr. 19, 2023), https://perma.cc/AF8J-55EX; Theodora Ogden, et al., The Role of the Space Domain in the Russia-Ukraine War: The Impact of Converging Space and AI Technologies, CETAS (Feb. 23, 2024).
• 12Kari Bingen & Heather Williams, Is This a Sputnik Moment?, The New York Times (Feb. 17, 2024), https://perma.cc/YN63-WLKD.
• 13David E. Sanger & Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Fears Russia Might Put a Nuclear Weapon in Space, The New York Times (Feb. 17, 2024), https://perma.cc/DC7W-A4ZL.
• 14See Plumb, supra note 1.
• 15Space Debris From Anti-Satellite Weapons, Fact Sheet, Union of Concerned Scientists (Apr. 2008); Greg Hadley, Saltzman: China’s ASAT Test was ‘Pivot Point’ in Space Operations, Air & Space Forces Magazine (Jan. 13 2023), https://perma.cc/R3ME-WX3B; Ashley Tellis, India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Apr. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/D3HY-N3TF; Russian Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Test Creates Significant, Long-lasting Space Debris, U.S. Space Command Public Affairs Office, (Nov. 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/R6RV-SRQW.
• 16Clayton Swope, et. al., Space Threat Assessment 2024, 29, in The Report of the Aerospace Security Project: CSIS (April 2024).
• 17United States Air Force, X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle Concludes Seventh Successful Mission (Mar. 13, 2025); Andrew Jones, China’s secretive reusable spaceplane lands after 267 days in orbit, Spacenews, (Sep. 6, 2024), https://perma.cc/8VXX-JCEH.
• 18Swope, supra note 16.
• 19NASA, Ariel 1, Space Science Data Coordinated Archive (Apr. 22, 2015), perma.cc/2BGD-N7MA; E.G. Stassinopoulos, The STARFISH Exo-Atmospheric, High-altitude Nuclear Weapons Test, (Apr. 22, 2015) https://perma.cc/XK6B-WATX.
• 20Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Article 1, 480 UNTS 43, [1963] ATS 26, 14 UST 1313, 2 ILM 889 (1963).
• 21Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy: A Conversation with HPSCI Chairman Mike Turner, CSIS Transcript of June (Jun. 20, 2024), https://perma.cc/XCH4-SEQD.
• 22Id.
• 23Plumb, supra note 1, at 4.
• 24Plumb, supra note 1, at 7.
• 25Eric Lipton, Intelligence About Russia Puts Focus on New U.S. Satellite Push, N.Y.Times (Feb. 15, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/15/us/politics/satellites-russia-us-intelligence.html.
• 26Brian Barker, et. al, Overview of the GPS M Code Signal, Dode M-Code. https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/betz_overview.pdf
• 27Plumb, supra note 1, at 7.
• 28See, Jacob Brogan, What Exactly is Synthetic Biology, Slate (Apr. 3, 2017) https://perma.cc/4C5W-AZHC; Gigi Gronvall, The Security Implications of Synthetic Biology, 60 Glob. Politics and Strategy (2018).
• 29Bill Drexel & Caleb Withers, AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions, CNAS (Aug. 13, 2024), https://perma.cc/4HBW-KCA3.
• 30Id.
• 31Synthetic Biology and National Security: Risks and Opportunities (Part 1 of 2), CSIS Transcript of April 14, 2020, https://perma.cc/6EWM-ADUW. 
• 32Department of Homeland Security Report on Reducing the Risks at the Intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats 11 (2024).
• 33Global Pandemics: Gain-of-Function Research of Concern, CRS (updated Nov. 21, 2022).
• 34Id.
• 35Bill Drexel & Caleb Withers, AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions, CNAS, at 5 (Aug. 13, 2024), https://perma.cc/H22D-MPTC.
• 36Id at 5.
• 37Office of the Director of National Intelligence, supra note 3.
• 38Ashish K. Jha, et al., The U.S. Could Soon Face a Threat ‘More Powerful’ Than Nuclear Weapons: Researchers Around the Globe are Tinkering With Viruses far Deadlier than Covid-19, The Washington Post (Nov. 11, 2024), https://perma.cc/L62E-XYYF.
• 39Id.
• 40Katarzyna Adamala, et. al., Confronting Risks of Mirror Life, Science 1351–1355 (Dec. 12, 2024).
• 41See Jonah Bromwich, Death of Biohacker, The New York Times (May 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/F8C2-AEX2.
• 42This is a reference to Secretary of State Jim Baker’s warning to Iraqi Foreign Minister prior to the start of the First Gulf War promising decisive retaliation, hinting at nuclear weapons, if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons. Baker also conveyed a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein conveying a similar message. From Baker’s biography: “There is one more point on what I would characterize is the dark side of this issue before we proceed to the other side. The point is this: if conflict ensues, and you use chemical or biological weapons against US forces, the American people will demand vengeance. And we have the means to exact it. Let me say with regard to this part of my presentation, this is not a threat, it is a promise.” James E. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, Eaton Books, at __ (1995).
• 43Jha, et al., supra note 38.
• 44Jeff Alstott, Preparing in the Federal Response to Advanced Technologies, RAND: Testimony presented before the committee on homeland security and gov’t. affairs, subcommittee on emerging threats and spending oversight, united states senate 2 (Sept. 19, 2023).
• 45National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, et al. Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, 3 (2018).
• 46Id. at 1.
• 47See Committee on Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology, Michael Imperiale, Chair, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, Consensus Study Report, NAS (June 2018). See also National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, supra note 45.
• 48Department of Homeland Security, Report: Reducing the Risks at the Intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats, 5 (Apr. 16, 2024).
• 49See, Jack D. Fulmer, Space Doctrine Note, U.S. Space Force (Jan. 2022); Shawn N. Bratton, Space Doctrine Publication 3-0, U.S. Space Force (Jul. 19, 2023); Shawn N. Bratton, Space Doctrine Publication 4-0, U.S. Space Force (Dec. 2022).
• 50White House, FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Advances National Security Norms in Space (Apr. 18, 2022), perma.cc/X8NU-HX5K.
• 51Eric Lipton, Departing Air Force Secretary will Leave Space Weaponry as a Legacy, The New York Times (Dec. 29, 2024), https://perma.cc/WC5B-YJQD.
• 52See, Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (1983) (recounting the role of RAND and academia in shaping U.S. nuclear policy and deterrence policy).
• 53Mark Bowden, The Crumbling Foundation of America’s Military, The Atlantic (Dec. 17, 2024), https://perma.cc/DYV3-N8VU.
• 54Nadia Drake, Blue Origin's New Glenn Rocket Finally Takes Flight, Scientific American (Jan. 16, 2025), https://perma.cc/H9J4-AHRA.
• 55Lara Seligman, The New Space Race, Foreign Policy (May 14, 2019, 8:20 AM), perma.cc/8F8N-7FZU; Daniel Oberhaus, The U.S. Hitches its Final Ride to Space from Russia – For Now, Wired (Apr. 8, 2020, 6:23 PM), perma.cc/TCT3-233K.
• 56Bowden, supra note 53.
• 57The Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
• 58See Wedenig, Stefan-Michael & Nelson, Jack, The Moon Agreement: Hanging by a Thread?, McGill Institute of Air & Space Law (Jan. 26, 2023), https://perma.cc/HK9B-NTFX; Timothy Nelson, The Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons from Investment Law, 17(2) ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law (2011).
• 59National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190 (amended through P.L. 118–5, enacted June 3, 2023).
• 6040 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2012).
• 6142 U.S.C. §§18322, 18351, 18353 and 18354 and 51 U.S.C. §§50902, 50914 and 50918 Chapter 509.
• 6210 U.S.C. § 9081.
• 63Office Of Science and Tech., Exec. Office of the President, United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential 2 (2024).
• 64Id. at 5
• 65Id. at 12
• 66See, e.g., Syracuse University, Office of Compliance, Export Control, https://perma.cc/P8K8-WQYY.
• 6750 U.S.C. §4565 et seq.
• 68
• 69Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, art. 1, 1015 UNTS 163 (10 April 1972).
• 70Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208.
• 71Rule 2.1: Advisor American Bar Association (last accessed April 27, 2025) https://perma.cc/NXQ6-7QLG.
• 7250 U.S.C. §4555.
• 73Jason Matheny, ‘The Future Could Be Brilliant’: Rand’s CEO Is an ‘Apocaloptimist’, RAND (Aug. 4, 2022), https://perma.cc/23VP-ZEFP.