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Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to transform public international lawyering in at least five ways: (i) helping to identify the contents of international law; (ii) interpreting existing international law; (iii) formulating and drafting proposals for new legal instruments or negotiating positions; (iv) assessing the international legality of specific acts; and (v) collating and distilling large datasets for international courts, tribunals, and treaty bodies. This Article uses two case studies to show how LLMs may work in international legal practice. First, it uses LLMs to identify whether particular behavioral expectations rise to the level of customary international law. In doing so, it tests LLMs’ ability to identify persistent objectors and a more egalitarian collection of state practice, as well as their proclivity to produce inaccurate answers. Second, it explores how LLMs perform in producing draft treaty texts, ranging from a U.S.-China extradition treaty to a treaty banning the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control systems. Based on these analyses, the Article identifies four roles for LLMs in international law: as collaborator, confounder, creator, or corruptor. In some cases, LLMs will be collaborators, complementing existing international lawyering by drastically improving the scope and speed with which users can assemble and analyze materials and produce new texts. At the same time, without careful prompt engineering and curation of results, LLMs may generate confounding outcomes, leading international lawyers down inaccurate or ambiguous paths. This is particularly likely when LLMs fail to accurately explain particular conclusions. Further, LLMs hold surprising potential to help to create new law by offering inventive proposals for treaty language or negotiating positions. Most importantly, LLMs hold the potential to corrupt international law by fostering automation bias in users. That is, even where analog work by international lawyers would produce different results, humans may soon perceive LLM results to accurately reflect the contents of international law. The implications of this potential are profound. LLMs could effectively realign the contents and contours of international law based on the datasets they employ. The widespread use of LLMs may even incentivize states and others to push their desired views into those datasets to corrupt LLM outputs. Such risks and rewards lead us to conclude with a call for further empirical and theoretical research on LLMs’ potential to assist, reshape, or redefine international legal practice and scholarship.

For a quarter-century, a consensus has prevailed that territorial sovereignty applies online as it does offline. Since practically all the Internet’s infrastructure and its billions of users reside on the territory of states, conventional wisdom holds that sovereignty must extend to cyberspace. Such accounts ignore how people experience cyberspace as a distinctive place, and how current international law lacks safeguards to prevent states from exercising their sovereignty to splinter the Internet into a set of national networks. Territorial sovereignty is also hard to square with pledges by the world’s democracies to keep the Internet free, open, and global; yet it is not the only way that international law knows to define the powers of a state. Drawing from the law of the sea, this Article argues that we should anchor the nature of state authority in cyberspace in the limited sovereign rights that coastal states possess in the waters off their shores. Unlike the plenary powers that sovereignty vests in states over their entire land territory, a coastal state’s sovereign rights weaken the further one goes out to sea, and they are subject to the rights of other states (and of their nationals) to engage in certain peaceful uses of such waters. By redefining state authority over cyberspace in terms of layers of sovereign rights that are subject to the digital rights of others, states can enact legitimate online regulations within international legal constraints that preserve the Internet’s free, open, and global character.

The American Declaration of Independence kindled the first successful decolonial movement in the modern world, culminating in the enactment of the United States Constitution. From colony to sovereign state to great power, the United States modeled for subordinated peoples abroad how to win their own battles for sovereignty. Since the end of the Second World War, however, America’s eighteenth-century precedent of revolutionary self-determination is no longer the prevailing path to decolonization. The traditional warmaking toolkit for winning independence—revolution, illegality, and violence—has been replaced by more orderly tactics consonant with the rule of law. Evolution, lawfulness, and continuity are the touchstones in the new global model of decolonial constitutionalism that now lights the path to self-determination. Decolonial constitutionalism is the use of legal, legitimate, and non-violent means to assert sovereignty, to secure rights, or to achieve recognition for a people, nation, or state that is legally or politically subordinate to domestic or foreign actors. In contrast to the American model of revolutionary self-determination, this new global model of decolonial constitutionalism has pluralized actors and sites of contestation, though the decisive objective of decolonization remains the same. Once won in the theatre of war, decolonization is now prosecuted in parliaments, courts of law, and the public square. The protagonists are no longer soldiers and generals; they are politicians, lawyers, judges, and civil society. Nor does self-determination today necessarily entail establishing a new state in the international order and taking a seat among equals alongside the countries of the world. In our new era of non-violent claims to sovereignty, decolonial movements choose instead to write new constitutions for existing states, to amend enduring constitutions, to enforce treaty rights, to promulgate multilateral agreements, or to pursue analogous courses of disruptive constitutional activity well short of declarations of independence. Decolonial constitutionalism therefore refers to a suite of strategies to exercise self-determination, defined expansively to comprise a broad scope of decolonial objectives consistent with the rule of law. In this Article, I introduce, illustrate, and theorize decolonial constitutionalism as the modern form of self-determination. Drawing from historical and modern decolonial movements, I show how subordinated peoples have seized the levers of law and politics to innovate new paths to self-determination without taking up arms, in the process showing similarly situated peoples how to achieve their own goals of independence, nationhood, or constitution-making in a manner that reinforces rather than undermines the rule of law. These strategies have proven ultimately more productive for decolonial movements to free their peoples from bondage in law or politics, to attract ideologically aligned partners at home and abroad, and to more effectively communicate to internal and external audiences the moral legitimacy of their claims to self-determination.

This article investigates the concept of tenure security within international law, emphasizing the global legal architectures that influence and shape land tenure governance at the intersections of international human rights law and development. By tracing the evolution of tenure security from colonial practices to modern development paradigms, the article contends that international development and human rights frameworks often perpetuate dispossession and inequality. It critiques the convergence of human rights and development narratives around the formalization of land tenure, demonstrating how this practice reinforces Western legal frameworks and ontologies of land. The article examines a range of instruments including various UN CESCR General Comments, Reports and Guidelines issued by UN Special Rapporteurs, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, and the Sustainable Development Goals and indicators. It explores the mechanisms through which these international frameworks propose solutions for securing land tenure based on a resource ontology, highlighting how they perpetuate land commodification, marginalize and displace vulnerable populations, and contribute to the proliferation of racial capitalism. It further underscores the limitations of international human rights law mechanisms in addressing the complexities of land tenure security, dispossession, and the neoliberal agendas underlying and driving global land governance. Advocating for a decolonial approach, it challenges some of the foundational assumptions of international law and calls for the unsettling of Eurocentric and capitalist ontologies of land embraced by international development and international human rights law alike.

Bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) aim to facilitate the movement of temporary migrant workers between countries. So far, studies of BLAs have focused on whether they have effects on migration flows. Despite countries entering hundreds of BLAs, evidence for their effects on migration flows remains limited. Yet, even if BLAs have limited material effects, they may still have important symbolic effects. On this topic, this Comment highlights BLAs’ potential to change rhetoric about international migration among heads of state. Drawing on an original empirical analysis focused on BLAs with the Philippines, the Comment analyzes how BLAs may influence leaders’ expressed attitudes toward international migration during United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) debates. Results reveal significant positive shifts in sentiment about international migration after countries form BLAs with the Philippines. The improved sentiment has a limited duration, however, diminishing after initial surges. Considering these findings, the Comment contributes to three bodies of legal scholarship, namely, those dealing with (1) the need for more social science research in international law, (2) the socioeconomic and political effects of BLAs, and (3) the utility of international agreements to constrain or prompt change in state action. Ultimately, the Comment calls for a comprehensive assessment of international agreements, recognizing their ability to affect not only intended outcomes but also high-profile symbolic outcomes.

The 2011 Arab Spring was an inflection point for the Middle East and North Africa region, representing an opportunity for democracies in countries that have only experienced authoritarianism as sovereign nations. Both Tunisia and Egypt drafted and ratified new constitutions in the wake of their revolutions. Among the chief worries that citizens and onlookers had in their drafting processes was the role that Islamists would have, particularly in human rights and minority protections. As more citizens wanted fundamental rights protected in their constitutions, the drafters had the task of incorporating them with the Islamic identity of the state. Compromises by the Tunisian Islamists and secular groups led to a more well-received constitution by minority groups, while the opposite happened in Egypt. This Comment argues, based on the comparative success of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution, that religious-based democratic states will need to include more protections for minority and historically marginalized groups to increase their acceptance and longevity.

Experts predict that millions of people will need to migrate internally and across borders due to global warming. Currently, international legal frameworks do not extend the same legal protections to climate migrants as are afforded refugees and asylum seekers. While international law recognizes the right to asylum based on political persecution, there is no international right to migrate based on climate-based harms that states are legally bound to observe. This Comment proposes a climate migration lottery (CML) that would be administered internationally to address current and future climate-based migration. Under this proposal, receiving states would agree via a treaty to admit their fair share of the total pool of climate migrants selected through the lottery. Migrants from countries with a high susceptibility to having large portions of territory rendered uninhabitable by climate change would be eligible to enter the CML. This comment argues that a CML can alleviate the strain on regions in developing states that must accommodate internally displaced persons as well as the burden on countries that are near low-lying Pacific island states that will experience significant rates of displacement due to sea level rises.

Companies rely on creditors for funding to operate, making it crucial to have legislative and procedural frameworks that protect the interests of these creditors. This article engages in a comparative analysis of corporate creditors’ protection rights on a global scale, emphasizing the Ethiopian case. The study contends that while countries may adopt distinct approaches to safeguard corporate creditors, and variations may exist in the strictness of rules across different strategies, nations have a universal commitment to implement strategies to ensure adequate protection for creditors’ interests.