Striking a Grotian Moment: How the Syria Airstrikes Changed International Law Relating to Humanitarian Intervention
In the years since the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization airstrikes on Serbia to prevent ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians, international law has been moving in fits and starts toward recognition of a limited right of humanitarian intervention in the absence of United Nations Security Council approval. But all the ingredients necessary for the crystallization of customary international law were not present until the April 14, 2018 United States/French/United Kingdom airstrikes on Syrian chemical weapons facilities. This Article examines the distinctive circumstances of the April 2018 airstrikes, including the context of a crisis of historic proportions, the focus on preventing the use of chemical weapons, the collectivity of the action taken, the limited targets and collateral damage, the explicit invocation of humanitarian intervention by the U.K. as the legal justification, and the U.S.’s apparent adoption of that justification. It explores whether these factors have rendered the April 2018 airstrikes a transformative event that may have changed international law concerning humanitarian intervention.
Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in a protracted civil war that began as part of the wave of Arab Spring protests against Middle East tyrants.1
See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, AP (Apr. 10, 2018), http://perma.cc/MA95-UFXT(providing a detailed timeline of events related to Syria’s use of chemical weapons and the U.S./France/U.K. airstrikes).
See generally Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 15 (2016).
Charlotte Alfred, What History Can Teach Us about the Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII, Huffington Post (Sept. 12, 2015), http://perma.cc/L65J-WVC4;U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic (Nov. 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/5M9S-DN3V.
Elsewhere, this author has explored how the use of force by the U.S. and its allies against ISIS in Syria has fundamentally changed the international law of self-defense against non-state actors.4
See generally Scharf, supra note 2.
Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (“‘Customary international law’ means those rules of international law that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted as law.”). Historically, crystallization of new rules of customary international law was viewed as a protracted process that took many decades, if not centuries, to complete. See Manley O. Hudson (Special Rapporteur), Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16 (Mar. 3, 1950).
The U.S., France, and the U.K. have said that they launched the April 2018 airstrikes to prevent the Assad regime from continuing to use chemical weapons against the Syrian population.6
U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr. 14, 2018).
Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 107, 108–9 (2006).
What to make of this change? Was this just a case where international politics aligned against a rogue regime, or did the April 2018 airstrikes constitute a transformative event in customary international and the interpretation of the U.N. Charter? Some scholars have characterized such events as “International Constitutional Moments.”8
Stanford Law Professor Jenny Martinez, for example, has written that the drafting of the U.N. Charter was a “constitutional moment” in the history of international law. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429, 463 (2003). Washington University Law Professor Leila Sadat has similarly described Nuremberg as a “constitutional moment for law.” See Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1200, 1206 (2007).
See generally Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments (2013). The term “Grotian Moment” was first coined by Princeton Professor Richard Falk. See Burns H. Weston et al., International Law and World Order 1265–86 (2006). Grotius (1583–1645) is widely considered to have laid the intellectual architecture for the Peace of Westphalia, which launched the basic rules of modern international law. Hedley Bull et al., Hugo Grotius and International Relations 1, 9 (1990); See generally Hamilton Vreeland Hugo Grotius: The Father of the Modern Science of International Law (1917). While the results of Westphalia may have been simplified by the lens of history, and Grotius’ role may have been exaggerated, Westphalia has unquestionably emerged as a symbolic marker and Grotius as an emblematic figure of changing historical thought. “Grotian Moment” is thus an apt label for transformational events in customary international law.
The Article begins by setting forth the background of the 2018 airstrikes. Next, it discusses the principles and process of customary international law formation and the phenomenon of accelerated development of customary international law. This is followed by an examination of the evolving view of humanitarian intervention, starting with the 1999 NATO airstrikes. Finally, the Article explores the unique aspects of the Syrian airstrikes, including the context of a crisis of historic proportions, the focus on preventing the use of chemical weapons, the collectivity of the action taken, the limited targets and collateral damage, the explicit invocation of humanitarian intervention by the U.K. as the legal justification, and the U.S.’s apparent adoption of that justification. It concludes that these factors may have rendered the April 14, 2018 airstrikes a transformative event that has changed international law concerning humanitarian intervention.
Since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, Syria has presented the international community with monumental challenges to international peace and security.10
See generally U.N. SCOR, supra note 6.
See Sam LaGrone, Russia, Syria Agree on Mediterranean Naval Base Expansion, Refit of Syrian Ships, USNI News (Jan. 20, 2017), http://perma.cc/68QG-4UDQ.
U.N. SCOR, supra note 6, at 8.
In reaction to reports that the Assad regime had amassed chemical weapons, on August 20, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that Syria’s use of chemical weapons would be a “red line.”13
Glen Kessler, President Obama and the ‘Red Line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/UYG2-5U4Q.
Id.
U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the Report of the United Nations Missions to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons on the Incident that Occurred on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus (Sept. 16, 2013); Joby Warrick, More than 1,400 Killed in Syria Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, Wash. Post (Aug. 30, 2013), http://perma.cc/8PSL-X8YE.
In response, President Obama tried and ultimately failed to gain support from Congress and international allies to launch a narrowly tailored attack on Syria.16
Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria, N.Y. Times (Aug. 31, 2013), http://perma.cc/RX2T-E7J5.
Clare Malone, America’s Fickle Relationship with Humanitarian Intervention, FiveThirtyEight (Apr. 10, 2017), http://perma.cc/8KGP-QQ9E.
Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times (Sept. 14, 2013), http://perma.cc/8RHP-X6BF.
It soon became clear that the Russian-brokered deal had failed to prevent Syrian possession and use of chemical weapons. On April 7, 2017, four months after President Donald Trump entered office, the U.S. fired fifty-nine Tomahawk missiles at the Shayrat Airfield in Syria. President Trump said the airstrike was conducted in response to the Assad regime’s use of sarin gas, a chemical weapon, on the town of Khan Sheikhoun—an attack that killed seventy-two people, including a number of children, on April 4.19
Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria, 2017 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 238 (Apr. 6, 2017).
Id.
The United States acted alone, and President Trump did not articulate a legal rationale for the airstrikes, but said that “[i]t is in the vital national security interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons.”21
Id.
Somini Sengupta et al., U.S. Airstrikes in Syria: Fallout Around the World, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/H8CS-SBBW.
Despite the lack of a stated legal justification, many of America’s allies defended the missile strikes. The British Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon, said “we fully support this strike, it was limited, it was appropriate, and it was designed to target the aircraft and the equipment that the United States believe were used in the chemical attack and to deter President Assad from carrying out future chemical attacks.”23
Anushka Asthana, Syria Airstrikes: UK Offers Verbal but Not Military Support to US, The Guardian (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/CE7X-RWUL.
Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack, BBC (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/ZSX3-F8UW.
Madison Park, Who’s with the US on Syria Strike and Who Isn’t, CNN (Apr. 8, 2017), http://perma.cc/4GSZ-BNEB.
Of all the states in the world, only Russia, Iran, Bolivia, and Syria opposed the airstrikes. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the strikes “an act of aggression under a completely invented pretext.”26
Id.; Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack, supra note 24.
In 2018, with Russia’s assistance, the Assad regime began the final push to end its civil war, using overwhelming force to punish local populations where insurgents remained active.27
Daniel Brown, A Compelling Theory Explains the Latest Chemical Attack in Syria – and It Looks Like Assad Got What He Wanted, Business Insider (Apr. 9, 2018), http://perma.cc/TP67-Q52A.
“The nations of Britain, France and the United States of America have marshalled their righteous power against barbarism and brutality,” President Trump said in an address from the White House announcing the military action.28
Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack ‘Chemical Weapons Sites’, BBC (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/5H3Q-WW7J.
Id.
Id.
One hundred three missiles were fired from a variety of naval vessels and jets—about double what was launched in April 2017.31
Id.
Gen. Dunford Says Targets Linked to Chem Weapons, AP (Apr. 13, 2018), http://perma.cc/B84U-3DPL.
Id.
Laris Karklis et al., Airstrikes in Syria Hit 3 Chemical Weapons Facilities, Including One in Damascus, Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/6ET6-NUBE.
Lamenting that the international investigators had just arrived in Douma to begin their examination of the suspected use of chemical weapons there, Russia called the airstrikes “an act of aggression” and a “violation of the U.N. Charter and the norms and principles of international law.”35
Alonso G. Dunkelberg et al., Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, Just Security (Apr. 22, 2018,), http://perma.cc/R8BS-DMX9.
See U.N. SCOR, supra note 6, at 3 (noting also Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assertion that “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.”).
See generally Dunkelberg, supra note 35.
Under the conventional view of international law, a state can use military force in another state’s territory only in three situations: (1) with the latter’s consent, (2) with Security Council authorization, or (3) when acting in self-defense against an armed attack.38
Goodman, supra note 7, at 111.
The question this Article addresses is whether the April 2018 airstrikes have crystallized a fourth situation in which force is allowed, namely to respond to and prevent future use of chemical weapons against civilians when the Security Council is blocked from authorizing humanitarian intervention by a Permanent Member’s veto. If this right now exists under customary international law, then such humanitarian intervention would not be in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which only prohibits the use of force that is “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and “inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”39
Richard Ware, The Legal Basis for Air Strikes Against Syrian Government Targets, 7 (House of Commons Libr., Briefing Paper No. 8287, 20198), http://perma.cc/8ZD7-YW48.
Id.
In the 1986 Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice observed that “[r]eliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle [of non-intervention] might, if shared in principle by other States, tend toward a modification of customary international law.”41
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27).
See generally Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L. J. 648 (1955).
See Wood, supra note 5, ¶ 42 (The International Law Commission has recently stated that “[a]bstention from acting, also referred to as a ‘negative practice of States,’ may also count as practice. Inaction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment of rules of customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as acquiescence.”).
Maurice H. Mendelson, Formation of Customary International Law, in Recueil Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 165, 190 (1998).
See supra note 7.
See supra note 8.
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law describes two scenarios where the world has witnessed the accelerated formation of customary international law in the past.47
Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 24 (2006); see Int'l Law Ass'n Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 20 (2000).
Treves, supra note 47.
Treves, supra note 47.
See generally Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments (2013).
As described below, the 2018 airstrikes fall within both scenarios. They were in response to the use of (1) unusual weapons and novel delivery systems, and (2) crimes against humanity. Yet, one must approach the concept of accelerated formation of customary international law with caution. As one author warns, “[i]t is always easy, at times of great international turmoil, to spot a turning point that is not there.”51
Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Alan Murray, Warning Is Sounded as Empire-Building Gains New Cachet, Wall Street J. (July 15, 2003, at A4)).
Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, state sovereignty has been regarded as the fundamental paradigm of international law. Leading scholars have described the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as “the corner-stone of the Charter system.”52
James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 414 (1963); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 732 (2008).
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 203–5 (June 27).
As discussed above, there are only three exceptions to the prohibition against the use of force enumerated in the U.N. Charter.54
Goodman, supra note 7, at 111.
In the last twenty years, the Security Council has significantly broadened what it considers to qualify as a threat to the peace. The Security Council found threats to the peace in situations involving widespread human rights violations and humanitarian atrocities in Southern Rhodesia (1969), South Africa (1977), Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011). In 1992, the president of the Security Council acknowledged this conceptual shift, stating “the mere absence of war and military conflict among States does not itself ensure international peace and security; rather, intrastate humanitarian situations can also become threats to peace and security.”55
Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 469, 470, 495 (2010) (quoting, in part, U.N. President of the S.C., Note dated Jan. 31, 1992, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992)).
See Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, The International Tribunal for Rwanda 58–60 (1998).
The Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999 emerged out of the same historic backdrop of ethnic tensions that had engulfed the former Yugoslavia in a brutal ethnic conflict from 1991 to 1995. Kosovo was a region of Serbia where Serbs constituted a minority and Albanian Muslims constituted the majority of the population.57
See generally Noel Cox, Developments in the Laws of War: NATO Attacks on Yugoslavia and the Use of Force to Achieve Humanitarian Objectives, 2002 N.Z. Armed F. L. Rev. 13 (2002).
U.S. Dep’t of State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo 10 (May 10, 1999), http://perma.cc/CJ7G-6B6B.
In Resolution 1203 of October 24, 1998, the Security Council determined that the Kosovo situation constituted a threat to the peace; insisted upon the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of certain forces and the commitment of the parties to seek a political resolution; and authorized an OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and a NATO Air Verification Mission to monitor compliance with the provisional measures required under Resolution 1199.59
S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1203, at ¶¶ 1–3 (Oct. 24, 1998).
When the peace negotiations stalled and the brutalities continued, in March 1999 NATO decided to intervene with airstrikes against Serbian government targets in Belgrade and throughout the country.60
Steven Haines, The Influence of Operation Allied Force on the Development of the Jus Ad Bellum, 85 Int’l Aff. 477, 480 (2009).
Patrick T. Egan, The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-Defence, 8 Int’l Peacekeeping 39, 40 (2001).
Fernando R. Tesón, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 2 Amsterdam L. F. 42, 43 (2009).
Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO’s Application of Armed Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 330, 348 (2000).
While their interests were purely humanitarian, the U.S. and U.K. declined to provide a legal rationale based on humanitarian intervention. Instead, they justified their actions on moral necessity. The reason for this was explained by Michael Matheson, the acting legal adviser of the U.S. Department of State at the time of the intervention, in the following terms:
About six months before the actual conflict, at the time when NATO was considering giving an order to threaten the use of force, the political community of NATO got together and had a discussion about what the basis of such threat of force would be. At the end of the discussion, it was clear that there was no common agreement on what might be the justification. There were some NATO members who were prepared to base it on a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention; but most members of the NATO Council were reluctant to adopt a relatively open-ended new doctrine. So at the end of that week, the NATO political community said, here is a list of all of the important reasons why it is necessary for us to threaten the use of force. And at the bottom, it said that under these unique circumstances, we think such actions would be legitimate. There was deliberate evasion of making a “legal” assertion.
And this same process occurred in the U.S. Government. There were some who wanted to articulate that humanitarian intervention in now the basis for U.S. action. There was another theory from the Department of Defense, which wanted to adopt sort of an expanded idea of self-defense based on the general interest of the United States in the region; but on reflection, nobody was really prepared to throw all the eggs into either of those baskets. So we ended up with a formulation similar to that of NATO, where we listed all of the reasons why we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled something about its being justifiable and legitimate but not a precedent.64
64Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis, The Role of International Law and the State Department Legal Adviser 124–25, (2010) (quoting remarks by Michael Matheson).
When the principal state actors assert that their actions are sui generis and not intended to constitute precedent, this does not create a favorable climate for the cultivation of a new rule of customary international law.65
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 20 (1999).
Indep. Int’l Comm’n on Kos., The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 4 (2000).
In the aftermath of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, the issue of humanitarian intervention emerged as an important aspect of Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s reform agenda at the United Nations. When Annan delivered his annual report to the U.N. General Assembly later that year, he presented in stark terms the dilemma facing the international community with respect to the idea of unauthorized humanitarian intervention:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask—not in the context of Kosovo—but in the context of Rwanda: If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?67
67Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136-GA/9596, (Sept. 20, 1999), http://perma.cc/FQ2Y-R9FL.
In his Millennium Report to the General Assembly in 2000, Annan posed a similar question: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”68
U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000).
Rising to the challenge posed by the Secretary-General’s appeal, the government of Canada established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which in December 2001 submitted its report to Secretary-General Annan. The ICISS report, entitled The Responsibility to Protect,69
Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001).
Id. ¶ 2.28–2.29 (2001).
Id. ¶ 2.29 (2001).
Drawing from principles of “just war” theory,72
Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect beyond Borders, 12 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1,10 (2012).
The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 69, ¶ 4.19, 4.32.
On the most important question of who can authorize humanitarian intervention, the ICISS Report emphasizes the primary role of the Security Council. However, should the Security Council fail to react (as when it is paralyzed by a Permanent Member’s veto), the report states that action by the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution74
Adopted in 1950, the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides:
That if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/5/377, Uniting for Peace, ¶ A1 (Nov. 3, 1950).
The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 69, ¶ 6.29–6.30.
The report also mentions the possibility of action by regional organizations, while pointing out that the U.N. Charter requires that they act with authorization of the Security Council.76
Id. ¶ 6.31–6.35.
Id. ¶ 6.35, 6.5.
As to whether individual states or regional organizations can ever legally act without Security Council authorization, the report is intentionally ambiguous. While observing the lack of a global consensus on the issue, the report avoids deeming such interventions illegal.78
Id. ¶ 6.36–6.37.
Id. ¶ 6.37.
Id. ¶ 6.13, 6.20.
Id. ¶. 6.39.
In the case of the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia, a major use of armed force had taken place for humanitarian purposes without Security Council authorization but with widespread support by the international community. According to one scholar, the NATO intervention was “a case that expanded, rather than breached, the law, similar to the Truman proclamation about the Continental Shelf.”82
Fernando R. Teson, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 Amsterdam L. F. 42, 43 (2009).
Heiko Borchert & Mary N. Hampton, The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or Bust for Transatlantic Security?, 46 Orbis 369, 369 (2002).
Moreover, the NATO intervention led to the ICISS’s articulation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, a concept that has been described as the “most dramatic normative development of our time”84
Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G. Weis, R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?, 1 Global Resp. to Protect 22, 22 (2009).
Jeremy Sarkin, Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm of International Law in the post-Libya Era? How its Third Pillar Ought to Be Applied, 1 Groningen J. Int’l L.11, 16 (2012).
The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 69, ¶ 2.24, 6.17.
U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Secretary General's High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights under International Law: Will the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging New Norm "Responsibility to Protect" Make a Difference?, 35 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 353, 373 (2007).
Yet, two roadblocks prevented humanitarian intervention outside the framework of the U.N. from actually ripening into a norm of customary international law following the 1999 NATO intervention and promulgation of the R2P Doctrine. The first impediment was the ambiguity of the initial manifestation of opinio juris that accompanied the acts of the NATO states. The participating NATO states were not comfortable with the idea that the bombing campaign would create a new rule of customary international law justifying a broad notion of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Thus, in July 1999, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stressed that the air strikes were a “unique situation sui generis in the region of the Balkans,” concluding that it was important “not to overdraw the various lessons that come out of it.”90
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Sec’y of State, Press Conference with Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister at Mandarin Hotel, Singapore (July 26, 1999), http://perma.cc/3FXQ-Q78T.
26 Apr. 1999, Parl Deb HC (1999) col. 21 (UK).
The second obstruction had to do with the unfortunate timing of the ICISS Report. Shortly after the Report was issued, in March 2003, the United States and a “coalition of the willing” invaded Iraq without Security Council authorization in part to prevent Iraq from deploying weapons of mass destruction and in part in response to Saddam Hussein’s historic record of atrocities against Iraq’s Kurdish and Shi’ite populations.92
Nanda, supra note 89, at 371–72
A More Secure World, supra note 8769.
The 2004 High-Level Panel Report (which was endorsed by the U.N. Secretary-General) and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (which was endorsed by the General Assembly and Security Council) were written to reflect a much narrower conception in which humanitarian intervention is only lawful when authorized by the Security Council.94
Id. ¶ 203, 256. Mehrdad Payandeh, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 Yale J. Int'l L. 469, 476 (2010).
Sarkin, supra note 85, at 13.
Madeleine K. Albright, The End of Intervention, N.Y. Times (June 11, 2008), http://perma.cc/L78B-5PZJ.
The issue of whether Responsibility to Protect had been coupled to Security Council authorization was tested in 2008, when Russia cited the R2P Doctrine to justify its use of force to protect threatened Russian populations in the neighboring country of Georgia that year.97
Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the Responsibility to Protect: A Repertoire of Measures including Asylum for Potential Victims, 20 Int’l J. Refugee L. 533, 559 (2008).
Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West 179–88 (2010).
The Responsibility to Protect in Syria and Beyond, NPR (Feb. 6, 2012), http://perma.cc/R9ZD-5R9Y.
Gareth Evans, Russia and the Responsibility to Protect, L.A. Times (Aug. 11, 2008), http://perma.cc/Y6PH-EQMF.
Id.
While the Russian pretextual invocation of the R2P Doctrine for its invasion of Georgia constituted a further setback for the idea that humanitarian intervention can be lawful outside the U.N. framework, developments in Iraq and Syria in 2014–2018 may have supplied the tipping point to finally bring aspects of the law of humanitarian intervention to fruition.
In 2014, a terrorist group known as ISIS took over two-thirds of the territory of Syria and Iraq. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2170, condemning the “continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights” that ISIS was committing against populations that fell under its control.102
S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 1 (Aug. 15, 2014).
Helene Cooper & Michael D. Schear, Militants’ Siege on Mountain in Iraq is Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/B9DU-NXLG;Helene Cooper et al., Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/A3DY-UCBA.
Helene Cooper & Michael D. Schear, supra note 103.
Without authorization by the Iraqi government or U.N. Security Council, President Obama ordered U.S. aircraft to conduct airstrikes on the ISIS forces at the base of the mountain to save the starving Yazidis. Explaining his decision to authorize limited force under the circumstances, President Obama said: “The Yazidis faced a terrible choice: starve on the mountain or be slaughtered on the ground. That’s when America came to help.”105
Erin Dooley, Obama: We Broke the ISIL Siege of Mt. Sinjar, ABC News (Aug. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/593M-BL52.
President Obama had signaled his advocacy for recognition of a right of humanitarian intervention a year earlier in a September 2013 speech to the United Nations General Assembly:
Different nations will not agree on the need for action in every instance, and the principle of sovereignty is at the center of our international order. But sovereignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder, or an excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye. While we need to be modest in our belief that we can remedy every evil, while we need to be mindful that the world is full of unintended consequences, should we really accept the notion that the world is powerless in the face of a Rwanda or Srebrenica? If that’s the world that people want to live in, they should say so, and reckon with the cold logic of mass graves. I believe we can embrace a different future.106
106President Barack Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013), in N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2013, http://perma.cc/EC7E-UAHC.
While the United States would later justify its attacks on ISIS in Syria using a novel theory of self-defense against non-state actors,107
See Scharf, supra note 2.
Cooper et al., supra note 103.
States broadly condoned the April 6, 2017 U.S. airstrikes against Syria, but in the absence of a clear legal rationale, the case was viewed as sui generis—lacking in clear precedential value. In contrast, there were three particularly noteworthy aspects of the April 14, 2018 airstrikes that may have rendered the airstrikes a Grotian Moment.
First, unlike its unilateral airstrikes on April 6, 2017, on April 14, 2018 the U.S. did not act alone. It is harder for critics to argue pretext when a country acts in concert with others for a humanitarian goal.
Second, whereas the U.S. avoided conveying a legal case for the 2017 airstrikes, in 2018 the three countries unequivocally stated that they believed they had a right under international law in these circumstances to undertake the airstrikes. Importantly, they did not suggest that the action was unlawful but legitimate, as some have characterized the 1999 NATO action discussed above.109
Supra note 66, at 4.
In its statement to the Security Council, France asserted that the airstrikes were in compliance with “principles and values of the United Nations Charter,” adding that “they serve the law and our political strategy to put an end to the Syrian tragedy.”110
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
The U.S. told the Security Council, “[w]e acted to deter the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime responsible for its atrocities against humanity…. The responses were justified, legitimate, and proportionate.”111
U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg., Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr. 14, 2018).
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11 (May 31, 2018).
In contrast to its statements following the April 2017 airstrikes, it is significant that the United States did not employ the language of armed reprisal, as this is considered unlawful under international law.114
Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Popular but Unlawful Armed Reprisal, 44 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 325, 338–345 (2018).
Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111.
It is also significant that the U.S. recognized that chemical weapons presented a special case. As President Trump explained after the Syria airstrikes, “[c]hemical weapons are uniquely dangerous not only because they inflict gruesome suffering, but because even small amounts can unleash widespread devastation.”116
2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 16 (May 31, 2018).
Use of chemical weapons was first outlawed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the possession of such weapons was prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention which entered into force in 1997. See The Chemical Weapons Convention at a Glance, Arms Control Ass’n (June 2018), http://perma.cc/L2RE-SHJ6.
See S.C. Res. 2319 (Nov. 17, 2016) (“Condemning again in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing alarm that civilians continue to be killed and injured by toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic); S.C. Res. 2235 (Aug. 7, 2015) (“Condemning in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and noting with outrage that civilians continue to be killed and injured by toxic chemicals as a weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing again that those individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.”); S.C. Res. 2209 (Mar. 6, 2015) (“Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law and reiterating that those individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.”); S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 17, 2013) (“Determining that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”).
April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, supra note 113, at 17.
Monica Hakimi, The Attack on Syria and the Contemporary Jus ad Bellum, Blog of the Eur. J. Int’l L. (Apr. 15, 2018), http://perma.cc/W4QA-7MYA.
Third, the United Kingdom specifically relied on the theory of “humanitarian intervention” in the context of preventing use of chemical weapons to justify the April 2018 airstrikes.121
A policy paper issued by the UK Prime Minister’s Office stated: “The UK is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force is humanitarian intervention….” See Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111, at 6–7.
- There is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief.
- It must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and
- The proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim (i.e., the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose.123
123Prime Minister’s Office, Syria Action – U.K. Government Legal Position, Apr. 14, 2018, http://perma.cc/8C9X-HUY4.
The United Kingdom then detailed why it reasonably believed that the airstrikes met these requirements, concluding “there was no practicable alternative to the truly exceptional use of force to degrade the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capability and deter their further use by the Syrian regime in order to alleviate humanitarian suffering.”124
Id.
This clearly articulated legal rationale distinguishes the 2018 airstrikes from the NATO action in 1999. While the UK had first made public its views on humanitarian intervention in 2014,125
Defence Committee, Written Evidence from the RT Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Foreign Affairs Committee on Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2013–14, HC 5th Special Report (UK).
Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111.
U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, (2001), http://perma.cc/U98H-SQF3(citing international cases where a State’s unequivocal acknowledgment and adoption of another’s position will render the State retroactively responsible for it).
The U.K.’s clear legal rationale may have laid the groundwork for a Grotian Moment, but it takes widespread state action in support to crystallize an emerging rule of customary international law.128
2d Rep. on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 5, ¶ 53, 63, 69.
Fifty-six separate states and NATO (consisting of 28 member states)—for a total of over seventy countries—publicly expressed opinions about the April 14, 2018 airstrikes.129
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111 (Russia told the Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.”).
Asmus, supra note 98.
For a case in which there was not a debate in a large international forum such as the U.N. General Assembly, seventy states from every region of the world is actually a fairly large sample from which to discern widespread state practice. In fact, scholars who have carefully dissected the judgments of the International Court of Justice have concluded that “most customs are found to exist on the basis of practice by fewer than a dozen States.”132
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 757, 767 (2001).
David Koplow, International Legal Standards and the Weaponization of Outer Space, in U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, Security in Space: The Next Generation, Conference Report 31 Mar. – 1 Apr. 2008, at 160; 2d Rep. on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 5, ¶ 42 (“Inaction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment of rules of customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as acquiescence.”).
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
The state reactions to the April 2018 airstrikes can be characterized as falling into four categories. First, there were those states that expressed recognition of the lawful nature of the military action. This was typified of the statements of the U.S., U.K. and France, as described above, which each affirmatively asserted that the airstrikes complied with international law.135
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
Second, nineteen states and NATO (thirty-eight states in all) expressed approval of the airstrikes with implicit statements concerning legality. These states represented Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the Pacific.136
The states of this type included Colombia, Saint Lucia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Japan, South Korea. Id. NATO is made up of 28 States: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See NATO Member Countries, North American Treaty Organization (Jan. 4, 2018, 2:14 PM), http://perma.cc/2ZVM-S7M4.
Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
Id.
Id.
Third, some states expressed disapproval of the airstrikes without a statement concerning illegality. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, said “Brazil reiterates its understanding that the end of the conflict can only be reached through political means, through negotiations undertaken in the framework of the United Nations and based on Security Council resolutions.”140
Id.
Id.
Id.
And finally, eleven states expressed disapproval while including an explicit statement that humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization is contrary to international law.143
States in this category included South Africa, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Venezuela, China, Iran, and Kazakhstan. Id.
Id.
Id.
More significant as evidence of state practice than public statements are a country’s votes in the U.N. Security Council. In this case, only Bolivia, China, and Russia voted in favor of the Russian draft Resolution to condemn the April 14, 2018 airstrikes.146
U.N. S.C., Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2018/355 (Apr. 14, 2018). The text of the Russian draft resolution stated:
The Security Council,
Appalled by the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
Expressing grave concern that the aggression against the sovereign territory of the Syrian Arab Republic took place at the moment when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission team has just begun its work to collect evidence of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma and urging to provide all necessary conditions for the completion of this investigation,
1. Condemns the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
2. Demands that the US and its allies immediately and without delay cease the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and demands also to refrain from any further use of force in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
3. Decides to remain further seized on this matter.
Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111, at 22–23. Russia told the Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.” Id. at 3.
Some commentators have argued that even if the April 14, 2018 airstrikes did represent a newly emergent international law right to humanitarian intervention, customary international law simply cannot prevail over the U.N. Charter.148
See, for example, Dapo Akande, The Legality of the UK’s Air Strikes on the Assad Government in Syria (Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.scribd.com/document/376483861/Akande-Opinion-UK-Government-s-Legal-Position-on-Syria-Strike-April-2018(memo prepared by Oxford Professor for MP Tom Watson, Deputy Leader of the UK Labour Party).
Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 Hou. L. Rev. 972, 1017 (2016).
U.N. Charter Art 1 ¶ 1, 3, and pmbl.
In the years since the 1999 NATO airstrikes on Serbia to prevent the slaughter of the Kosovar Albanians, international law has been moving in fits and starts toward recognition of a limited right of humanitarian intervention. But all the ingredients necessary for a so-called “Grotian Moment” to come to fruition were not present until the April 2018 airstrikes on Syria.
As discussed in this Article, there were several circumstances that made the 2018 airstrikes distinctive. First, for the past seven years, Syria has represented the greatest humanitarian crisis on the planet. As with the changes to international law ushered in by World War II and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s, the urgency created by the Syrian crisis set the stage for rapid development of customary international law. As with the other Grotian Moments identified by the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law discussed in the beginning of this article, this context serves as a kind of accelerating agent, enabling customary international law to form much more rapidly and with less state practice than is normally the case.
Second, the 2018 airstrikes were undertaken collectively, rather than by a single state. Unlike the 2008 Russian invasion of South Ossetia, Georgia,151
See Law Library of Congress, 2008-01474, Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia (2008).
Third, the participating countries asserted the legality of the April 2018 airstrikes and embraced a common justification—humanitarian intervention—rather than cite only factual considerations that render use of force morally defensible. For customary international law to rapidly crystallize, custom pioneers must be consistent in their articulation of the new rule, its contours, and application. Two former State Department legal advisers, Harold Koh and John Bellinger, have criticized the U.S.’s failure to articulate a legal argument for its past humanitarian interventions.152
John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Should Do More to Explain the Legal Basis for the Syrian Airstrikes, Lawfare (Apr. 14, 2018, 4:46 PM), http://perma.cc/F6PH-ZHTG.(“As former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger has said, “when the United States uses military force, especially under controversial circumstances, it should explain the legal basis for its actions. When the United States does not do so, it appears to act lawlessly and invites other countries to act without a legal basis or justification.”); Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain, 41 Yale J. Int’l L. 189 (2016); Koh, supra note 149, at 977 (“I thought it outrageous that the U.S. government would fail to state a legal rationale to justify its use of force.”).
Fourth, the underlying humanitarian need in the case of the April 2018 airstrikes was to stop the use of chemical weapons against a civilian population—a jus cogens norm.153
Charlie Dunlap, Do the Syria Strikes Herald a New Norm of International Law?, Lawfare, (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/5R5T-Y5K6.The term jus cogens designates a peremptory principle or norm from which no derogation is permitted. Jus cogens norms are recognized as being fundamental to the maintenance of the international legal order.
The 1999 NATO airstrikes comprised a 78-day bombing campaign of Serbia’s infrastructure, military targets, and government buildings. The April 2017 airstrikes targeted an airbase in general use. See supra notes 104 and 26.
Jan Lemnitzer, Syria Strikes Violated International Law – Are the Rules of Foreign Intervention Changing?, The Conversation (Apr.18, 2018), http://perma.cc/463B-76GG.
Finally, many states from all parts of the globe expressed support, while only a handful opposed the airstrikes. Russia’s opposition was undermined by its argument that Syria’s responsibility for the chemical attack had not been sufficiently proved and the fact that it had itself invoked the right of humanitarian intervention in the South Ossetia case. Its draft Resolution condemning the April 2018 airstrikes was soundly defeated by the Security Council.
While these circumstances render this a strong case for a Grotian Moment, writing only a few months after the April 2018 airstrikes the author is mindful of the risk, identified earlier in the article, of making too quick a judgment without the benefit of historic hindsight.156
Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1, 30 (2004).
- 1See Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, AP (Apr. 10, 2018), http://perma.cc/MA95-UFXT(providing a detailed timeline of events related to Syria’s use of chemical weapons and the U.S./France/U.K. airstrikes).
- 2See generally Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 15 (2016).
- 3Charlotte Alfred, What History Can Teach Us about the Worst Refugee Crisis Since WWII, Huffington Post (Sept. 12, 2015), http://perma.cc/L65J-WVC4;U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic (Nov. 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/5M9S-DN3V.
- 4See generally Scharf, supra note 2.
- 5Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014) (“‘Customary international law’ means those rules of international law that derive from and reflect a general practice accepted as law.”). Historically, crystallization of new rules of customary international law was viewed as a protracted process that took many decades, if not centuries, to complete. See Manley O. Hudson (Special Rapporteur), Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16 (Mar. 3, 1950).
- 6U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr. 14, 2018).
- 7Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 107, 108–9 (2006).
- 8Stanford Law Professor Jenny Martinez, for example, has written that the drafting of the U.N. Charter was a “constitutional moment” in the history of international law. See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429, 463 (2003). Washington University Law Professor Leila Sadat has similarly described Nuremberg as a “constitutional moment for law.” See Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1200, 1206 (2007).
- 9See generally Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments (2013). The term “Grotian Moment” was first coined by Princeton Professor Richard Falk. See Burns H. Weston et al., International Law and World Order 1265–86 (2006). Grotius (1583–1645) is widely considered to have laid the intellectual architecture for the Peace of Westphalia, which launched the basic rules of modern international law. Hedley Bull et al., Hugo Grotius and International Relations 1, 9 (1990); See generally Hamilton Vreeland Hugo Grotius: The Father of the Modern Science of International Law (1917). While the results of Westphalia may have been simplified by the lens of history, and Grotius’ role may have been exaggerated, Westphalia has unquestionably emerged as a symbolic marker and Grotius as an emblematic figure of changing historical thought. “Grotian Moment” is thus an apt label for transformational events in customary international law.
- 10See generally U.N. SCOR, supra note 6.
- 11See Sam LaGrone, Russia, Syria Agree on Mediterranean Naval Base Expansion, Refit of Syrian Ships, USNI News (Jan. 20, 2017), http://perma.cc/68QG-4UDQ.
- 12U.N. SCOR, supra note 6, at 8.
- 13Glen Kessler, President Obama and the ‘Red Line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Wash. Post (Sept. 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/UYG2-5U4Q.
- 14Id.
- 15U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Security Council on the Report of the United Nations Missions to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons on the Incident that Occurred on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus (Sept. 16, 2013); Joby Warrick, More than 1,400 Killed in Syria Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, Wash. Post (Aug. 30, 2013), http://perma.cc/8PSL-X8YE.
- 16Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria, N.Y. Times (Aug. 31, 2013), http://perma.cc/RX2T-E7J5.
- 17Clare Malone, America’s Fickle Relationship with Humanitarian Intervention, FiveThirtyEight (Apr. 10, 2017), http://perma.cc/8KGP-QQ9E.
- 18Michael R. Gordon, U.S. and Russia Reach Deal to Destroy Syria’s Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times (Sept. 14, 2013), http://perma.cc/8RHP-X6BF.
- 19Remarks on United States Military Operations in Syria, 2017 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 238 (Apr. 6, 2017).
- 20Id.
- 21Id.
- 22Somini Sengupta et al., U.S. Airstrikes in Syria: Fallout Around the World, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/H8CS-SBBW.
- 23Anushka Asthana, Syria Airstrikes: UK Offers Verbal but Not Military Support to US, The Guardian (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/CE7X-RWUL.
- 24Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack, BBC (Apr. 7, 2017), http://perma.cc/ZSX3-F8UW.
- 25Madison Park, Who’s with the US on Syria Strike and Who Isn’t, CNN (Apr. 8, 2017), http://perma.cc/4GSZ-BNEB.
- 26Id.; Syria War: World Reaction to US Missile Attack, supra note 24.
- 27Daniel Brown, A Compelling Theory Explains the Latest Chemical Attack in Syria – and It Looks Like Assad Got What He Wanted, Business Insider (Apr. 9, 2018), http://perma.cc/TP67-Q52A.
- 28Syria Air Strikes: US and Allies Attack ‘Chemical Weapons Sites’, BBC (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/5H3Q-WW7J.
- 29Id.
- 30Id.
- 31Id.
- 32Gen. Dunford Says Targets Linked to Chem Weapons, AP (Apr. 13, 2018), http://perma.cc/B84U-3DPL.
- 33Id.
- 34Laris Karklis et al., Airstrikes in Syria Hit 3 Chemical Weapons Facilities, Including One in Damascus, Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/6ET6-NUBE.
- 35Alonso G. Dunkelberg et al., Mapping States’ Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, Just Security (Apr. 22, 2018,), http://perma.cc/R8BS-DMX9.
- 36See U.N. SCOR, supra note 6, at 3 (noting also Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assertion that “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.”).
- 37See generally Dunkelberg, supra note 35.
- 38Goodman, supra note 7, at 111.
- 39Richard Ware, The Legal Basis for Air Strikes Against Syrian Government Targets, 7 (House of Commons Libr., Briefing Paper No. 8287, 20198), http://perma.cc/8ZD7-YW48.
- 40Id.
- 41Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 207 (June 27).
- 42See generally Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 Yale L. J. 648 (1955).
- 43See Wood, supra note 5, ¶ 42 (The International Law Commission has recently stated that “[a]bstention from acting, also referred to as a ‘negative practice of States,’ may also count as practice. Inaction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment of rules of customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as acquiescence.”).
- 44Maurice H. Mendelson, Formation of Customary International Law, in Recueil Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 165, 190 (1998).
- 45See supra note 7.
- 46See supra note 8.
- 47Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 24 (2006); see Int'l Law Ass'n Comm. on Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law 20 (2000).
- 48Treves, supra note 47.
- 49Treves, supra note 47.
- 50See generally Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing Grotian Moments (2013).
- 51Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1, 30 (2004) (quoting Alan Murray, Warning Is Sounded as Empire-Building Gains New Cachet, Wall Street J. (July 15, 2003, at A4)).
- 52James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 414 (1963); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 732 (2008).
- 53Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 203–5 (June 27).
- 54Goodman, supra note 7, at 111.
- 55Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 469, 470, 495 (2010) (quoting, in part, U.N. President of the S.C., Note dated Jan. 31, 1992, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992)).
- 56See Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, The International Tribunal for Rwanda 58–60 (1998).
- 57See generally Noel Cox, Developments in the Laws of War: NATO Attacks on Yugoslavia and the Use of Force to Achieve Humanitarian Objectives, 2002 N.Z. Armed F. L. Rev. 13 (2002).
- 58U.S. Dep’t of State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo 10 (May 10, 1999), http://perma.cc/CJ7G-6B6B.
- 59S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1203, at ¶¶ 1–3 (Oct. 24, 1998).
- 60Steven Haines, The Influence of Operation Allied Force on the Development of the Jus Ad Bellum, 85 Int’l Aff. 477, 480 (2009).
- 61Patrick T. Egan, The Kosovo Intervention and Collective Self-Defence, 8 Int’l Peacekeeping 39, 40 (2001).
- 62Fernando R. Tesón, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 2 Amsterdam L. F. 42, 43 (2009).
- 63Dino Kritsiotis, The Kosovo Crisis and NATO’s Application of Armed Force Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 49 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 330, 348 (2000).
- 64Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis, The Role of International Law and the State Department Legal Adviser 124–25, (2010) (quoting remarks by Michael Matheson).
- 65Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 20 (1999).
- 66Indep. Int’l Comm’n on Kos., The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 4 (2000).
- 67Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136-GA/9596, (Sept. 20, 1999), http://perma.cc/FQ2Y-R9FL.
- 68U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000).
- 69Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001).
- 70Id. ¶ 2.28–2.29 (2001).
- 71Id. ¶ 2.29 (2001).
- 72Luke Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect beyond Borders, 12 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1,10 (2012).
- 73The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 69, ¶ 4.19, 4.32.
- 74Adopted in 1950, the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides:
That if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/5/377, Uniting for Peace, ¶ A1 (Nov. 3, 1950).
- 75The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 69, ¶ 6.29–6.30.
- 76Id. ¶ 6.31–6.35.
- 77Id. ¶ 6.35, 6.5.
- 78Id. ¶ 6.36–6.37.
- 79Id. ¶ 6.37.
- 80Id. ¶ 6.13, 6.20.
- 81Id. ¶. 6.39.
- 82Fernando R. Teson, Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 Amsterdam L. F. 42, 43 (2009).
- 83Heiko Borchert & Mary N. Hampton, The Lessons of Kosovo: Boon or Bust for Transatlantic Security?, 46 Orbis 369, 369 (2002).
- 84Ramesh Thakur & Thomas G. Weis, R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action?, 1 Global Resp. to Protect 22, 22 (2009).
- 85Jeremy Sarkin, Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm of International Law in the post-Libya Era? How its Third Pillar Ought to Be Applied, 1 Groningen J. Int’l L.11, 16 (2012).
- 86The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 69, ¶ 2.24, 6.17.
- 87U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Secretary General's High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
- 88U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
- 89Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights under International Law: Will the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging New Norm "Responsibility to Protect" Make a Difference?, 35 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 353, 373 (2007).
- 90Madeleine Albright, U.S. Sec’y of State, Press Conference with Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister at Mandarin Hotel, Singapore (July 26, 1999), http://perma.cc/3FXQ-Q78T.
- 9126 Apr. 1999, Parl Deb HC (1999) col. 21 (UK).
- 92Nanda, supra note 89, at 371–72
- 93A More Secure World, supra note 8769.
- 94Id. ¶ 203, 256. Mehrdad Payandeh, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International Lawmaking, 35 Yale J. Int'l L. 469, 476 (2010).
- 95Sarkin, supra note 85, at 13.
- 96Madeleine K. Albright, The End of Intervention, N.Y. Times (June 11, 2008), http://perma.cc/L78B-5PZJ.
- 97Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the Responsibility to Protect: A Repertoire of Measures including Asylum for Potential Victims, 20 Int’l J. Refugee L. 533, 559 (2008).
- 98Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West 179–88 (2010).
- 99The Responsibility to Protect in Syria and Beyond, NPR (Feb. 6, 2012), http://perma.cc/R9ZD-5R9Y.
- 100Gareth Evans, Russia and the Responsibility to Protect, L.A. Times (Aug. 11, 2008), http://perma.cc/Y6PH-EQMF.
- 101Id.
- 102S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 1 (Aug. 15, 2014).
- 103Helene Cooper & Michael D. Schear, Militants’ Siege on Mountain in Iraq is Over, Pentagon Says, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/B9DU-NXLG;Helene Cooper et al., Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/A3DY-UCBA.
- 104Helene Cooper & Michael D. Schear, supra note 103.
- 105Erin Dooley, Obama: We Broke the ISIL Siege of Mt. Sinjar, ABC News (Aug. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/593M-BL52.
- 106President Barack Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2013), in N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2013, http://perma.cc/EC7E-UAHC.
- 107See Scharf, supra note 2.
- 108Cooper et al., supra note 103.
- 109Supra note 66, at 4.
- 110Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
- 111U.N. SCOR, 73d Sess., 8233d mtg., Provisional Verbatim Record of the Security Council, Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, U.N. Doc. S/PV.8233 (Apr. 14, 2018).
- 112Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
- 113April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 11 (May 31, 2018).
- 114Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Popular but Unlawful Armed Reprisal, 44 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 325, 338–345 (2018).
- 115Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111.
- 1162018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1, 16 (May 31, 2018).
- 117Use of chemical weapons was first outlawed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the possession of such weapons was prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention which entered into force in 1997. See The Chemical Weapons Convention at a Glance, Arms Control Ass’n (June 2018), http://perma.cc/L2RE-SHJ6.
- 118See S.C. Res. 2319 (Nov. 17, 2016) (“Condemning again in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing alarm that civilians continue to be killed and injured by toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic); S.C. Res. 2235 (Aug. 7, 2015) (“Condemning in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and noting with outrage that civilians continue to be killed and injured by toxic chemicals as a weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing again that those individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.”); S.C. Res. 2209 (Mar. 6, 2015) (“Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law and reiterating that those individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.”); S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 17, 2013) (“Determining that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”).
- 119April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities, supra note 113, at 17.
- 120Monica Hakimi, The Attack on Syria and the Contemporary Jus ad Bellum, Blog of the Eur. J. Int’l L. (Apr. 15, 2018), http://perma.cc/W4QA-7MYA.
- 121A policy paper issued by the UK Prime Minister’s Office stated: “The UK is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force is humanitarian intervention….” See Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
- 122Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111, at 6–7.
- 123Prime Minister’s Office, Syria Action – U.K. Government Legal Position, Apr. 14, 2018, http://perma.cc/8C9X-HUY4.
- 124Id.
- 125Defence Committee, Written Evidence from the RT Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Foreign Affairs Committee on Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 2013–14, HC 5th Special Report (UK).
- 126Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111.
- 127U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, (2001), http://perma.cc/U98H-SQF3(citing international cases where a State’s unequivocal acknowledgment and adoption of another’s position will render the State retroactively responsible for it).
- 1282d Rep. on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 5, ¶ 53, 63, 69.
- 129Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
- 130Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111 (Russia told the Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.”).
- 131Asmus, supra note 98.
- 132Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 757, 767 (2001).
- 133David Koplow, International Legal Standards and the Weaponization of Outer Space, in U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Research, Security in Space: The Next Generation, Conference Report 31 Mar. – 1 Apr. 2008, at 160; 2d Rep. on the Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 5, ¶ 42 (“Inaction by States may be central to the development and ascertainment of rules of customary international law, in particular when it qualifies (or is perceived) as acquiescence.”).
- 134S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
- 135Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
- 136The states of this type included Colombia, Saint Lucia, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Turkey, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Japan, South Korea. Id. NATO is made up of 28 States: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See NATO Member Countries, North American Treaty Organization (Jan. 4, 2018, 2:14 PM), http://perma.cc/2ZVM-S7M4.
- 137Dunkelberg et al., supra note 35.
- 138Id.
- 139Id.
- 140Id.
- 141Id.
- 142Id.
- 143States in this category included South Africa, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Venezuela, China, Iran, and Kazakhstan. Id.
- 144Id.
- 145Id.
- 146U.N. S.C., Russian Federation: Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2018/355 (Apr. 14, 2018). The text of the Russian draft resolution stated:
The Security Council,
Appalled by the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
Expressing grave concern that the aggression against the sovereign territory of the Syrian Arab Republic took place at the moment when the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission team has just begun its work to collect evidence of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma and urging to provide all necessary conditions for the completion of this investigation,
1. Condemns the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the US and its allies in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
2. Demands that the US and its allies immediately and without delay cease the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic and demands also to refrain from any further use of force in violation of international law and the UN Charter,
3. Decides to remain further seized on this matter.
- 147Threats to International Peace and Security: The Situation in the Middle East, supra note 111, at 22–23. Russia told the Security Council, “Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria’s Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent.” Id. at 3.
- 148See, for example, Dapo Akande, The Legality of the UK’s Air Strikes on the Assad Government in Syria (Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.scribd.com/document/376483861/Akande-Opinion-UK-Government-s-Legal-Position-on-Syria-Strike-April-2018(memo prepared by Oxford Professor for MP Tom Watson, Deputy Leader of the UK Labour Party).
- 149Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 Hou. L. Rev. 972, 1017 (2016).
- 150U.N. Charter Art 1 ¶ 1, 3, and pmbl.
- 151See Law Library of Congress, 2008-01474, Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia (2008).
- 152John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Should Do More to Explain the Legal Basis for the Syrian Airstrikes, Lawfare (Apr. 14, 2018, 4:46 PM), http://perma.cc/F6PH-ZHTG.(“As former State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger has said, “when the United States uses military force, especially under controversial circumstances, it should explain the legal basis for its actions. When the United States does not do so, it appears to act lawlessly and invites other countries to act without a legal basis or justification.”); Harold Hongju Koh, The Legal Adviser’s Duty to Explain, 41 Yale J. Int’l L. 189 (2016); Koh, supra note 149, at 977 (“I thought it outrageous that the U.S. government would fail to state a legal rationale to justify its use of force.”).
- 153Charlie Dunlap, Do the Syria Strikes Herald a New Norm of International Law?, Lawfare, (Apr. 14, 2018), http://perma.cc/5R5T-Y5K6.The term jus cogens designates a peremptory principle or norm from which no derogation is permitted. Jus cogens norms are recognized as being fundamental to the maintenance of the international legal order.
- 154The 1999 NATO airstrikes comprised a 78-day bombing campaign of Serbia’s infrastructure, military targets, and government buildings. The April 2017 airstrikes targeted an airbase in general use. See supra notes 104 and 26.
- 155Jan Lemnitzer, Syria Strikes Violated International Law – Are the Rules of Foreign Intervention Changing?, The Conversation (Apr.18, 2018), http://perma.cc/463B-76GG.
- 156Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion of Iraq in Context, 18 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1, 30 (2004).