Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty
Spacefaring nations face a growing problem of space debris, from tiny flecks of paint to nonfunctional satellites, littering Earth’s orbit. Without action, this debris could lead to a cascade called the Kessler Syndrome, which would destroy existing objects in orbit and make space inaccessible. At present, no nation or company has begun cleaning the debris, and whether the law requires, or even allows, such a cleanup, is not settled in the literature. This Comment argues that the solution to this problem requires calling upon spacefaring nations to comply with the existing requirements of the space treaty regime, particularly the first principles of the Outer Space Treaty, to preserve the free use of space for all. In order to solve this tragedy of the commons, this Comment recommends regulating the use of this common resource. This Comment argues that space debris is abandoned property by combining the current definition of space debris and the doctrine of abandonment. Finally, the Comment proposes creating a market-share liability regulatory regime requiring abandoners to fund debris cleanup.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union are responsible for the initiation of the current treaty governing outer space activities, which entered into force in 1967.1
G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Encyclopedia Britannica, Outer Space Treaty, https://www.britannica.com/event/Outer-Space-Treaty(last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
Brian Beck, The Next, Small Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the International Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry, 19 Alb. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 1 (2009).
Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 589, 634 (2011); Agatha Akers, To Infinity and Beyond: Orbital Space Debris and How to Clean It Up, 33 U. La Verne L. Rev. 285, 287 (2012); Gabrielle Hollingsworth, Space Junk: Why the United Nations Must Step in to Save Access to Space, Santa Clara L. Rev. 239, 266 (2013); Gunnar Leinberg, Orbital Space Debris, 4 J.L. & Tech. 93, 100, 115–16 (1989); Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 51, 73 (1992).
See Imburgia, supra note 3, 593, 613 (2011); Marc G. Carns, Consent Not Required: Making the Case that Consent is Not Required under Customary International Law for Removal of Outer Space Debris Smaller than 10CM, 77 A.F. L. Rev. 173, 186 (2017); Akers, supra note 3, at 287; Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 255–56; Leinberg, supra note 3, at 100 (1989).
See Carns, supra note 4, at 190–91; Sremeena Sethu & Mandavi Singh, Stuck in Space: The Growing Problem of Space Debris Pollution, 2 U.K. L. Student Rev. 96, 98–99 (2014); Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 256–57.
See Akers, supra note 3, at 303; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 616, 627.
Consequently, many academics have called for a new treaty sensitive to the current state of space activity and the debris problem, or for serious modifications to the current regime.7
See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 4, at 593.
This Comment argues that space debris is abandoned property that creates a negative externality in the common-pool resource of space. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),8
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
This Comment first discusses the current state of the space debris problem in Section II. It then examines the legal obstacles to the creation of an obligation to clean up space debris in Section III. In Section IV, this Comment clarifies the definition of space debris and determines that space debris is abandoned property. Section V examines the obligation of countries to clean up debris based on existing law, and suggests that existing law allows for the creation of a market-share liability regime to fund the cleanup of space debris.
As of January 2017, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network has been tracking about 23,000 pieces of space debris that measure over ten centimeters wide.9
European Space Agency, Space Debris by the Numbers (Jan. 2017), (https://perma.cc/X5ND-XC9R.)
Id.
Joseph Kurt, Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris Crisis Without an International Treaty, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 305, 307 (2015).
European Space Agency, Frequently Asked Questions, https://perma.cc/97U2-BQD7(last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
Space debris can be categorized by how it is created. About twenty percent of trackable debris is “inactive payloads,” primarily consisting of inactive satellites that are no longer controllable.13
See Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 242.
Id.
Id. at 242–43.
Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the General Assembly (UNCOPUOS), U.N. GAOR 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 20, Annex (June 15, 2007) [hereinafter Debris Mitigation Guidelines].
Marlon Sorge & Glenn Peterson, How to Clean Space: Disposal and Active Debris Removal, Crosslink (Dec. 10, 2015), (https://perma.cc/T3SA-CMEX.)
At forty-nine percent of trackable debris, “fragmentation debris,” consisting of small pieces of matter from collisions between space objects or accidental explosions, is the largest source of trackable debris.18
See Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 242.
Emily M. Nevala, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Through the Doctrine of Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1497 (2017); Imburgia, supra note 3, at 593.
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1498.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 309.
In the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (the Guidelines), “space debris” is defined as “all man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional.”22
See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at 47.
See Carns, supra note 5, at 189.
Additional support for this definition can be found in the adoption of similar definitions by other organizations and agencies. The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) define space debris as “all man made [sic] objects including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere that are non functional.”24
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines art. 3.1 (2007), https://perma.cc/YL99-BZSV(last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
NASA Handbook For Limiting Orbital Debris, 8719.14 21 (2008), https://perma.cc/5U5S-WN5B(last visited Mar. 2, 2018). [hereinafter NASA Handbook].
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98 (citing D. McKnight, W. Flury, & H. Sax, IAA Position Paper on Orbital Debris, 31 Acta Astronautica 169 (1993)).
See Carns, supra note 5, at 187.
The definition of debris as non-functional man-made objects is useful to handle the threat posed by both fully intact large space objects and small pieces of debris. As scholars suggest, “[t]he function test could prove to be the optimal solution in defining and identifying space debris.”28
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 99.
Debris poses a threat to functioning space objects and astronauts in space, and may cause damage to the earth’s surface upon re-entry.29
See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at 47. In 1978, a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite fell from orbit and broke up, scattering radioactive debris over Canada. Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 101; Jason Koebler, International Space Station Nearly Struck by Space Junk, USNews (March 26, 2012) https://perma.cc/5N7W-V35S(reporting a scare when astronauts had to take shelter because space debris threatened to hit the International Space Station).
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 100.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305; What is an Orbit?, NASA (July 7, 2010), (https://perma.cc/7GC4-QEK9.)
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305; Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 100; Akers, supra note 4, at 293.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305.
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 99–100; Kurt, supra note 11, at 307.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 307.
Id. at 329.
This issue is of growing importance as more nations and companies gain the ability to launch satellites and other objects into space.37
Kristin Houser, Private Companies, Not Governments, Are Shaping the Future of Space Exploration, Futurism (June 12, 2017), (https://perma.cc/P4XY-CJ7U.)
See Akers, supra note 3, at 293–94.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308.
Id.
See Akers, supra note 3, at 292 (citing 10-year Forecast Shows Big Rise in Satellite Launches, Space News (Aug. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/ELP4-GL4L).
In addition to satellites, the rise of commercial space tourism will also increase the number of objects launched into space and thus the amount of debris.42
See Akers, supra note 3, at 295.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305; Akers, supra note 3, at 285–86.
The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines44
Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16. The guidelines include considerations such as:
(1) Limiting debris released during normal operations
(2) Minimizing the potential for break-ups during operational phases
(3) Limiting the probability of accidental collision in orbit
(4) Avoiding intentional destruction and other harmful activities
(5) Minimizing potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy
(6) Limiting the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission
(7) Limiting the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission. Id. at ¶ 4.
Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at ¶ 2.
Id. at Preface.
See Carns, supra note 5, at 189; Kurt, supra note 11, at 317.
The Kessler Syndrome is the biggest concern with space debris. The Kessler Syndrome is a cascade created when debris hits a space object, creating new debris and setting off a chain reaction of collisions that eventually closes off entire orbits.48
See Akers, supra note 3, at 294; Kurt, supra note 11, at 309.
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 100–01.
Id.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 316; National Research Council, Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital debris Programs (2011).
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 316.
Fortunately, a common estimate suggests that the Kessler Syndrome could be avoided if five to ten large pieces of debris were removed per year.53
Id. at 318.
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, National Research Council, Annual Report to Congress 17 (2011).
Countries and companies have devised devices to remove space debris. One solution that could be implemented before launch is a planned controlled re-entry for space vehicles. This maneuver deorbits satellites at the end of their useful life and may prevent harm on the ground by guiding re-entry so any debris falls over uninhabited areas. However, this option requires extra fuel.55
See Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17.
Id. With an expected increase in the number and rate of space objects launched into space, waiting twenty-five years to deorbit space objects would likely lead to the accumulation of space objects, crowding space and increasing the chance for collisions. A shorter period may help relieve the problem.
See Akers, supra note 3, at 308–09. GEO is farther out from the Earth’s surface (at higher altitude) than Low-Earth Orbit so deorbiting satellites from farther out would have to pass through other orbits before passing through Earth’s atmosphere. This would be challenging and is not yet cost-effective. Id.
Id. at 309.
Many solutions involve bringing space debris into a lower orbit in order to facilitate re-entry. An example of this is a “space tug,” which could boost an object into lower orbit or attach a drag enhancement to the object.59
Id.; Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17.
See Akers, supra note 3, at 309.
Id. at 308.
Large debris removal is more expensive and complex, making it more challenging to justify.62
See Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17.
See Akers, supra note 3, at 310.
Id.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 319.
See Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17; Nevala, supra note 19, at 1499.
Many academics have called for a new treaty, which they believe is necessary in order to create a proper legal regime to handle the problem of space debris.67
See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 634.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), Conventions on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Nov. 29, 1971) [hereinafter Convention on International Liability].
G.A. Res 3235 (XXIX), Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, arts. II(1), IV (Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Convention on Registration]; G.A. Res. 62/101, Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects, art. 1(b) (Dec. 17 2007) [hereinafter Registration Recommendations].
Many scholars complain that these treaties are outdated and have resulted in the current debris problem.71
See Beck, supra note 2, at 27; Carns, supra note 5, at 175–76; Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 240; Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98–99.
Mary Button, Note, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a Model for Regulating Orbital Debris, 37 Wm & Mary Envt’l L. & Pol’y Rev. 539, 552 (2013).
See Akers, supra note 3, at 304; Beck, supra note 2, at 28; Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 257.
James D. Rendleman, Non-Cooperative Space Debris Mitigation, 53 Proc. Int’l Inst. Space L., 299, 299-300, 302 (2010).
See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. I (d); Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. I(b); Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at ¶ 1; Lawrence Li, Space Debris Mitigation as an International Law Obligation, Int’l Community L. Rev., 297, 312 (2015) (describing how the Liability Convention’s definition of space debris is encompassed within space objects); Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98; Imburgia, supra note 4, at 593.
The fear that nations may have of creating a dispute over their interference with another nation’s space object, absent a clear legal right to do so, may be a major hindrance to unilateral space debris cleanup.76
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 316–19.
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500.
See Section II.D, supra.
The Outer Space Treaty sets out basic principles for countries operating in space.80
See Akers, supra note 3, at 302. While countries are the parties to treaties they bear international responsibility for both governmental and nongovernmental activities carried out by that country. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI.
See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. I ¶ c; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. X.
The strong property interest in space objects is evinced in the Liability Convention82
Convention on International Liability, supra note 69.
Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. 1(b).
See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. I (d); Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. I(b).
The continuous nature of ownership is also reflected in the space object registration system. Launching states must register launched objects with the Secretary-General of the U.N. in a registry including basic information about the object and its location, updated to include the time that the object is no longer in orbit or no longer functional.85
Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. II(1), IV.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 7.
See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. II; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 8. In order to recover a state that suffered damage presents the claim within a year of the occurrence or diligent discovery of the damage to the launching state through diplomatic channels or through the U.N. Secretary General. Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. VIII–X. Compensation will be determined with the goal of returning the state to the condition as if the damage had not occurred, if diplomatic negotiations don’t lead to settlement within a year the parties request a Claims Commission to make a final and binding decision on the merits, perhaps with assistance from the Secretary General. Id. At arts. XII-XIX.
One view is that space debris must be considered a space object.88
Li, supra note 75; Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 615–18.
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98.
See Li, supra note 75 (describing how the Liability Convention’s definition of space debris is encompassed within space objects); Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98; Imburgia, supra note 4, at 615.
The problem with considering space debris to be a space object is that this term brings with it a strict property regime by which ownership extends to tiny fragments that may not be traceable to their original owners. Some have argued that this regime creates a barrier to unilateral space debris cleanup as the many unidentifiable objects would either be viewed by a nation as not their responsibility or as something to be avoided in case another nation later claimed ownership.91
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500.
This Comment argues that the ownership of space debris should be treated differently than the ownership of space objects. In order to move past the current state of inaction, countries must not be concerned about the ownership of individual pieces of debris in ways that hinder cleanup. An appropriate solution would find a way to incentivize cleanup and impose liability without needing to identify the ownership of small pieces of debris.
This Section of the Comment proposes, first, that there is an internationally accepted definition of space debris as non-functional, no longer useful, manmade objects in space.92
See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16.
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1528–30.
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355, 363–64 (2010).
Id.; Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 U. Mich. L. Rev. 191, 204, 208 (2010).
Abandonment is an often-overlooked idea in property law scholarship.96
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 358; Peñalver, supra note 95, at 192.
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94; Peñalver, supra note 95.
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94.
Id. at 360.
As Strahilevitz recognizes, confusion about whether property has been abandoned creates social costs, as finders may be deterred from claiming or destroying property given the potential existence of another owner with superior title. This can be seen in the current levels of inaction on the cleanup of space debris and concerns voiced in the literature.100
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500; Rendleman, supra note 74, at 299–302.
Despite Strahilevitz’s general view that chattel property can be unilaterally abandoned, he recognizes an exception for property without subjective or market value. 101
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 364
See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 203–04; Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363–64.
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 360.
Id. at 364.
Property without subjective or market value—like trash, pollution, or, as this Comment argues, space debris—imposes costs on society if it is unilaterally abandoned.105
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363.
Id.
See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 204–05.
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363. In the U.S., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates hazardous waste with permit requirements and corrective action requirements. J. Stanton Curry et al., The Tug-of-War between RCRA and CERCLA at Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities, 23 Ariz. St. L.J. 359, 360–61 (1991). Additionally the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) identifies and requires remedial action for contaminated sites, which can be performed by the liable party, a third party, or the government to be paid for the liable party or if none can be found a special government fund. Id. at 361, 367–70.
The treatment of this type of debris also aligns with Professor Eduardo Peñalver’s view that unilateral abandonment is not the legal norm.109
See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 195–96.
See Peñalver, supra note 95.
Id. at 204, 208.
One way of dealing with this problem is to adopt Strahilevitz’s view; once chattels are abandoned, they are owned by no one112
Id. at 196; Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 376.
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 376.
See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 196.
Debris fragments would be deemed abandoned because the owner either let them go, destroyed an object intentionally, or they were involved in an accident and were not retrieved or disposed of because they were unwanted and no longer valuable. Any intact satellites would be considered abandoned if they were registered but the registry represented that they were no longer functional.115
See Registration Recommendations, supra note 70, at ¶ (2)(b)(ii).
Using abandonment in this way would avoid the fear of potential geopolitical disputes over space property, which may be hindering current cleanup efforts. One proposed solution would check debris and intact satellites against the U.N. registry, other debris tracking mechanisms, and the owners information.116
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1526.
Id. at 1531.
Id. at 1529–30.
R. Cargill Hall, Comments on Salvage and Removal of Man-Made Objects from Outer Space, 9 Proc. on L. Outer Space 117 (1966); Rendleman, supra note 74, at 308.
One may question whether the fear of wrongfully removing owned debris is well-founded, particularly in the case of fragmentary debris, and thus whether it is a real cause of the collective failure to clean up space debris. There seems to be a more pressing need to create the right incentives for parties to undertake the expensive act of cleaning up. Allowing for the continuation of free abandonment and merely clarifying that a third party is allowed to clean it up does not solve this fundamental problem. Neither the article that suggests using the U.N. registry to decide abandonment, nor the literature drawing upon maritime law, argue that there is a legal obligation to clean up debris or propose using market-share liability; they only seek to establish the ability of other parties to clean up debris.
The real cause of the space debris problem is rooted in the fact that space was established as a commons in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and in subsequent treaties as “the province of all mankind,”120
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. I.
Id.; Kurt, supra note 11, at 311.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1969); Kurt, supra note 11, at 310–11.
See Hardin, supra note 122, at 1245.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 311.
Timothy Justin Trapp, Note, Taking Up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with the Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1681, 1696 (2013).
To date, no binding international regulation requiring space debris to be cleaned up has been recognized. One scholar, Lawrence D. Roberts, has argued that regulation and expanded liability should be used to address the tragedy of the commons as it applies to space debris.126
See Roberts, supra note 3, at 73.
See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 204–05; Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363.
There is a general presumption that U.S. law does not apply extraterritorially, which is meant to avoid conflicts with other sovereigns, and doing so would likely be problematic under the Outer Space Treaty.128
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. I, II; Nevala, supra note 19, at 1513-14.
See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722); Stewart v. Gustafson (1998), 171 Sask. R. 27 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 395; Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law 1010 (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012).
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 395 (citing CÓD Civ. art. 2559 (Arg.)).
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 959, https://perma.cc/558N-WFTA;Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 394.
See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 395 (citing Cód. Civ. art. 606 (Chile) & C.C. art. 923 (It.)).
See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1513.
In the next Section, this Comment will make the case that binding regulations to clean up space debris can be found in the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Additionally, the requirement of free access to space can be leveraged to create a market-share liability obligation to pay for space debris cleanup.
While many academics think a new treaty is necessary to create the obligation to clean up space debris,135
See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 3.
The Outer Space Treaty136
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.137
137Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
The Treaty also requires that states “shall conduct all their activities in outer space . . . with due regard for the corresponding interests of all other State Parties.”138
Id. at art. 9.
G.A. Res. 37/92, Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, ¶ 5 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter Principles Governing Television Satellites].
G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, Principle II (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Principles Relating to Remote Sensing].
Additionally, GA Resolution 1721 International Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space states, “[o]uter space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law and are not subject to national appropriation.”141
Id.
U.N. Legal Subcommittee, Some Aspects Concerning the Use of Geostationary Orbit, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/738, annex III (Mar. 31, 2000).
See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at art. 4.
What’s more, some scholars have pointed out that defunct satellites remaining in orbit violate Article 35 of the Recommendation of the International Telecommunication Union Convention and Article 29 of the World Administrative Radio Conference. Both of these treaties prohibit disturbances and interference in radio frequencies, with the latter specifically noting interference by inoperative satellites.144
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 101; The World Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/CRP.4, art. 29 (1979); Recommendations of the International Telecommunication Union Convention, Nairobi, UN Doc. A/AC.105/572, art. 35 (1982).
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102 (noting however that this provision is nonbinding and noncoercive); Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IX.
See Li, supra note 75, at 332; International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, European Union, Draft Version 31, ¶ 4.2 (Mar. 2014).
The same basic principles of operation in space are identified in the fundamental Outer Space Treaty as well as in legal documents governing specific activities in space. The requirement that space activities be exercised with due care for those of other nations and without interfering or restricting their access to space is foundational to legal space operations. Consequently, if spacefaring nations create debris that undermines free access to space, they are in violation of the Outer Space Treaty and likely also at least one treaty relating to a specific use of space, such as those applying to television, radio or remote sensing. For a polluting nation to continue using space, it must regain compliance with the governing treaties by mitigating the creation of space debris and cleaning up the debris it has created.
If one considers the orbital space taken up by debris and the collision threat posed by debris, it becomes hard to claim that states are not violating the basic norms of spacefaring. Debris and other nonfunctional objects serving no useful purpose take up orbital space, which could be used by other nations. If, or when, the Kessler Syndrome cascade is reached, the contributing nations will have made segments of Earth’s orbit unusable for any nation. Thus, according to some scholars, the very existence of space debris is illegal internationally according to the initial Outer Space Treaty of 1967.147
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102.
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration which allows states to exploit their resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, provided that their activities do not cause damage to areas beyond their national jurisdiction. Thus, a defunct satellite or space debris left behind in any orbit violates the Outer Space Treaty because: (a) it does not produce a benefit for mankind; (b) its use is not in the interest of all countries; and (c) it occupies a portion of space, causing national appropriation.149
Id.
Even short of a cascade removing or limiting the availability of space debris can, and indeed has, begun to affect the use of space. As described earlier, debris has caused the ISS and other space objects to use fuel to avoid collisions or risk the destruction of their craft and loss of life.150
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308.
See Beck, supra note 2, at 25.
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308.
Id.
Thus, states creating debris violate other nations’ right to use space as enshrined in the space treaty regime, and they violate their own obligations to not appropriate space.
In this Subsection, this Comment argues for extending the concept of market-share liability and establishing a U.N.-run fund to be distributed to parties for costs incurred when cleaning up space debris. This subsection will introduce market-share liability and then describe how it could be more effectively used not as compensation for loss, but as part of a regulatory device aimed at reducing the amount of existing space debris.
Market-share liability has been suggested as a way to deal with the difficulty of identifying the individual ownership of objects and it could be put to use in the obligation to clean up debris.154
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 106; Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 125 (2000).
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 106–05.
See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 127.
Market-share liability was created in 1980 in the case Sindell v. Abbott Labororatories.157
26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 596, 609.
Id. at 613.
See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 143.
Academics have taken this idea and sought to apply it to space debris, which has similar fungibility and causation issues, but their applications have been limited to a tort-like context.162
Peter T. Limperis, Comment, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: International Law Methods for Prevention and Reduction of Debris, and Liability Regimes for Damage Caused by Debris, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 319 (1998); Roberts, supra note 3 (arguing for a market-share liability pool to be called upon when debris damages another’s space object, building on the Liability Treaty); Sundahl, supra note 154, at 143.
See Limperis, supra note 162, at 340.
Id.
See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 144–45; Beck, supra note 2, at 35; Akers, supra note 3, at 294–95; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 595–97, 599–601, 604.
Without strong buy-in, it may be challenging to get this rarely used domestic tort theory to apply in international space law, especially with the potential for disputes over the proper apportionment of market share.166
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 107–08.
That said, though these nations would be paying the highest cost, this would be proportional to their respective contributions to the problem. Indeed, these nations may welcome this remedy, because their space activity is threatened by the proliferation of space debris and they likely value continuing their extensive and advanced use of space. This solution solves the free rider problem and would compensate any nation or company that cleans up space such that any nation (like the U.S., Russia, or China) fearing the collapse of its space program and unwilling to bear all the cleanup costs itself would see this as an attractive solution. It is even possible that liable states like the U.S. and Russia will be eager to aid in debris identification, so as to add to other states’ liability.167
See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 148.
This regulatory remedy would resolve the current tragedy of the commons. By assigning responsibility for the cost of cleanup, nations or companies would be incentivized to begin cleanup operations, because they would know that others will not freeride on their costly efforts. Instead, they will have guaranteed compensation from those responsible. Obtaining the funds is crucial, particularly since the high cost of deploying existing technology to destroy space debris has been a hindrance thus far.168
See Carns, supra note 5, at 175.
Using market-share liability is also a useful way to compensate victims of debris collisions and to incentivize spacefaring nations to avoid creating new debris in the future.169
See Limperis, supra note 162, at 340.
See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. I, II.
This collection of market-share disposal payments would not simply be a tax on operations or tort compensation for harmful acts. Instead, once liability is apportioned, (and this could be done on an ongoing or periodic basis to reflect new developments), nations or companies undertaking actions to clean up space would be compensated for their costs by the nations responsible according to their percentage of responsibility. The U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) could allocate the percentage of liability, drawing on its role in promoting international cooperation and the peaceful use of outer space, as well as preparing reports and studies.171
Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. Off. Outer Space Aff., https://perma.cc/SD85-SETU(last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
G.A. Res. 47/68, Agreement on Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, Principle 10 (Dec. 14, 1992); Principles Relating to Remote Sensing, supra note 140; Principles Governing Television Satellites, supra note 139, at ¶ 7.
See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. IX; G.A. Res. 34/68, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 15 ¶ 3 (Dec. 5, 1979).
This new regulatory regime can thus be grounded in the existing space treaty regime and administered by existing authorities. It would resolve the incentive problems that exist in the international commons of space through regulation that allocates the cost of debris cleanup to those who have created and continue to create it. The regime can also adapt as the outer space marketplace and the actors who comprise it shift over time, and as the registry of space objects, incidents, and tracking capabilities improves. This regulatory regime also ultimately would allocate cleanup funds to parties who would like to continue to operate in space, removing the disincentive to carry the cost in the face of potential freeriding.
Space debris poses a serious threat to the continued use of space. Many have called for a new treaty to solve the perceived failure of the current space treaty regime to address debris clean up and define space debris.174
See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 3.
This Comment has provided an avenue for bringing practice and understanding into accordance with the existing legal regime in international space law. An obligation to clean up is critical for the removal of the debris that already exists in space and, in line with the Debris Mitigation Guidelines, preventing the creation of any new debris. The Outer Space Treaty establishes space as a common resource. In order to preserve this common resource for all, spacefaring nations must be held to regulations that make them internalize the costs created by their debris. 175
See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308 (describing the costs created by space debris).
- 1G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Encyclopedia Britannica, Outer Space Treaty, https://www.britannica.com/event/Outer-Space-Treaty(last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
- 2Brian Beck, The Next, Small Step for Mankind: Fixing the Inadequacies of the International Space Law Treaty Regime to Accommodate the Modern Space Flight Industry, 19 Alb. L. J. Sci. & Tech. 1 (2009).
- 3Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 589, 634 (2011); Agatha Akers, To Infinity and Beyond: Orbital Space Debris and How to Clean It Up, 33 U. La Verne L. Rev. 285, 287 (2012); Gabrielle Hollingsworth, Space Junk: Why the United Nations Must Step in to Save Access to Space, Santa Clara L. Rev. 239, 266 (2013); Gunnar Leinberg, Orbital Space Debris, 4 J.L. & Tech. 93, 100, 115–16 (1989); Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 51, 73 (1992).
- 4See Imburgia, supra note 3, 593, 613 (2011); Marc G. Carns, Consent Not Required: Making the Case that Consent is Not Required under Customary International Law for Removal of Outer Space Debris Smaller than 10CM, 77 A.F. L. Rev. 173, 186 (2017); Akers, supra note 3, at 287; Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 255–56; Leinberg, supra note 3, at 100 (1989).
- 5See Carns, supra note 4, at 190–91; Sremeena Sethu & Mandavi Singh, Stuck in Space: The Growing Problem of Space Debris Pollution, 2 U.K. L. Student Rev. 96, 98–99 (2014); Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 256–57.
- 6See Akers, supra note 3, at 303; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 616, 627.
- 7See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 4, at 593.
- 8See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
- 9European Space Agency, Space Debris by the Numbers (Jan. 2017), (https://perma.cc/X5ND-XC9R.)
- 10Id.
- 11Joseph Kurt, Triumph of the Space Commons: Addressing the Impending Space Debris Crisis Without an International Treaty, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 305, 307 (2015).
- 12European Space Agency, Frequently Asked Questions, https://perma.cc/97U2-BQD7(last visited Apr. 27, 2018).
- 13See Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 242.
- 14Id.
- 15Id. at 242–43.
- 16Rep. of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to the General Assembly (UNCOPUOS), U.N. GAOR 62nd Sess., Supp. No. 20, Annex (June 15, 2007) [hereinafter Debris Mitigation Guidelines].
- 17Marlon Sorge & Glenn Peterson, How to Clean Space: Disposal and Active Debris Removal, Crosslink (Dec. 10, 2015), (https://perma.cc/T3SA-CMEX.)
- 18See Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 242.
- 19Emily M. Nevala, Waste in Space: Remediating Space Through the Doctrine of Abandonment and the Law of Capture, 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1497 (2017); Imburgia, supra note 3, at 593.
- 20See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1498.
- 21See Kurt, supra note 11, at 309.
- 22See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at 47.
- 23See Carns, supra note 5, at 189.
- 24Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines art. 3.1 (2007), https://perma.cc/YL99-BZSV(last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
- 25NASA Handbook For Limiting Orbital Debris, 8719.14 21 (2008), https://perma.cc/5U5S-WN5B(last visited Mar. 2, 2018). [hereinafter NASA Handbook].
- 26See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98 (citing D. McKnight, W. Flury, & H. Sax, IAA Position Paper on Orbital Debris, 31 Acta Astronautica 169 (1993)).
- 27See Carns, supra note 5, at 187.
- 28See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 99.
- 29See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at 47. In 1978, a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite fell from orbit and broke up, scattering radioactive debris over Canada. Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 101; Jason Koebler, International Space Station Nearly Struck by Space Junk, USNews (March 26, 2012) https://perma.cc/5N7W-V35S(reporting a scare when astronauts had to take shelter because space debris threatened to hit the International Space Station).
- 30See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 100.
- 31See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305; What is an Orbit?, NASA (July 7, 2010), (https://perma.cc/7GC4-QEK9.)
- 32See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305; Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 100; Akers, supra note 4, at 293.
- 33See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305.
- 34See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 99–100; Kurt, supra note 11, at 307.
- 35See Kurt, supra note 11, at 307.
- 36Id. at 329.
- 37Kristin Houser, Private Companies, Not Governments, Are Shaping the Future of Space Exploration, Futurism (June 12, 2017), (https://perma.cc/P4XY-CJ7U.)
- 38See Akers, supra note 3, at 293–94.
- 39See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308.
- 40Id.
- 41See Akers, supra note 3, at 292 (citing 10-year Forecast Shows Big Rise in Satellite Launches, Space News (Aug. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/ELP4-GL4L).
- 42See Akers, supra note 3, at 295.
- 43See Kurt, supra note 11, at 305; Akers, supra note 3, at 285–86.
- 44Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16. The guidelines include considerations such as:
(1) Limiting debris released during normal operations
(2) Minimizing the potential for break-ups during operational phases
(3) Limiting the probability of accidental collision in orbit
(4) Avoiding intentional destruction and other harmful activities
(5) Minimizing potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy
(6) Limiting the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission
(7) Limiting the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission. Id. at ¶ 4.
- 45Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at ¶ 2.
- 46Id. at Preface.
- 47See Carns, supra note 5, at 189; Kurt, supra note 11, at 317.
- 48See Akers, supra note 3, at 294; Kurt, supra note 11, at 309.
- 49See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 100–01.
- 50Id.
- 51See Kurt, supra note 11, at 316; National Research Council, Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital debris Programs (2011).
- 52See Kurt, supra note 11, at 316.
- 53Id. at 318.
- 54National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, National Research Council, Annual Report to Congress 17 (2011).
- 55See Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17.
- 56Id. With an expected increase in the number and rate of space objects launched into space, waiting twenty-five years to deorbit space objects would likely lead to the accumulation of space objects, crowding space and increasing the chance for collisions. A shorter period may help relieve the problem.
- 57See Akers, supra note 3, at 308–09. GEO is farther out from the Earth’s surface (at higher altitude) than Low-Earth Orbit so deorbiting satellites from farther out would have to pass through other orbits before passing through Earth’s atmosphere. This would be challenging and is not yet cost-effective. Id.
- 58Id. at 309.
- 59Id.; Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17.
- 60See Akers, supra note 3, at 309.
- 61Id. at 308.
- 62See Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17.
- 63See Akers, supra note 3, at 310.
- 64Id.
- 65See Kurt, supra note 11, at 319.
- 66See Sorge & Peterson, supra note 17; Nevala, supra note 19, at 1499.
- 67See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 634.
- 68See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
- 69G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), Conventions on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Nov. 29, 1971) [hereinafter Convention on International Liability].
- 70G.A. Res 3235 (XXIX), Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, arts. II(1), IV (Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Convention on Registration]; G.A. Res. 62/101, Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects, art. 1(b) (Dec. 17 2007) [hereinafter Registration Recommendations].
- 71See Beck, supra note 2, at 27; Carns, supra note 5, at 175–76; Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 240; Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98–99.
- 72Mary Button, Note, Cleaning Up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty as a Model for Regulating Orbital Debris, 37 Wm & Mary Envt’l L. & Pol’y Rev. 539, 552 (2013).
- 73See Akers, supra note 3, at 304; Beck, supra note 2, at 28; Hollingsworth, supra note 3, at 257.
- 74James D. Rendleman, Non-Cooperative Space Debris Mitigation, 53 Proc. Int’l Inst. Space L., 299, 299-300, 302 (2010).
- 75See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. I (d); Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. I(b); Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at ¶ 1; Lawrence Li, Space Debris Mitigation as an International Law Obligation, Int’l Community L. Rev., 297, 312 (2015) (describing how the Liability Convention’s definition of space debris is encompassed within space objects); Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98; Imburgia, supra note 4, at 593.
- 76See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500.
- 77See Kurt, supra note 11, at 316–19.
- 78See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500.
- 79See Section II.D, supra.
- 80See Akers, supra note 3, at 302. While countries are the parties to treaties they bear international responsibility for both governmental and nongovernmental activities carried out by that country. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. VI.
- 81See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. I ¶ c; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. X.
- 82Convention on International Liability, supra note 69.
- 83Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. 1(b).
- 84See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. I (d); Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. I(b).
- 85Convention on Registration, supra note 70, at art. II(1), IV.
- 86Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 7.
- 87See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. II; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 8. In order to recover a state that suffered damage presents the claim within a year of the occurrence or diligent discovery of the damage to the launching state through diplomatic channels or through the U.N. Secretary General. Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. VIII–X. Compensation will be determined with the goal of returning the state to the condition as if the damage had not occurred, if diplomatic negotiations don’t lead to settlement within a year the parties request a Claims Commission to make a final and binding decision on the merits, perhaps with assistance from the Secretary General. Id. At arts. XII-XIX.
- 88Li, supra note 75; Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 615–18.
- 89See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98.
- 90See Li, supra note 75 (describing how the Liability Convention’s definition of space debris is encompassed within space objects); Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 98; Imburgia, supra note 4, at 615.
- 91See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500.
- 92See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16.
- 93See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1528–30.
- 94See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355, 363–64 (2010).
- 95Id.; Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 U. Mich. L. Rev. 191, 204, 208 (2010).
- 96See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 358; Peñalver, supra note 95, at 192.
- 97See Strahilevitz, supra note 94; Peñalver, supra note 95.
- 98See Strahilevitz, supra note 94.
- 99Id. at 360.
- 100See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1500; Rendleman, supra note 74, at 299–302.
- 101See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 364
- 102See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 203–04; Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363–64.
- 103See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 360.
- 104Id. at 364.
- 105See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363.
- 106Id.
- 107See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 204–05.
- 108See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363. In the U.S., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates hazardous waste with permit requirements and corrective action requirements. J. Stanton Curry et al., The Tug-of-War between RCRA and CERCLA at Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities, 23 Ariz. St. L.J. 359, 360–61 (1991). Additionally the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) identifies and requires remedial action for contaminated sites, which can be performed by the liable party, a third party, or the government to be paid for the liable party or if none can be found a special government fund. Id. at 361, 367–70.
- 109See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 195–96.
- 110See Peñalver, supra note 95.
- 111Id. at 204, 208.
- 112Id. at 196; Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 376.
- 113See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 376.
- 114See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 196.
- 115See Registration Recommendations, supra note 70, at ¶ (2)(b)(ii).
- 116See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1526.
- 117Id. at 1531.
- 118Id. at 1529–30.
- 119R. Cargill Hall, Comments on Salvage and Removal of Man-Made Objects from Outer Space, 9 Proc. on L. Outer Space 117 (1966); Rendleman, supra note 74, at 308.
- 120See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. I.
- 121Id.; Kurt, supra note 11, at 311.
- 122Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1969); Kurt, supra note 11, at 310–11.
- 123See Hardin, supra note 122, at 1245.
- 124See Kurt, supra note 11, at 311.
- 125Timothy Justin Trapp, Note, Taking Up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with the Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1681, 1696 (2013).
- 126See Roberts, supra note 3, at 73.
- 127See Peñalver, supra note 95, at 204–05; Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 363.
- 128See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. I, II; Nevala, supra note 19, at 1513-14.
- 129See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722); Stewart v. Gustafson (1998), 171 Sask. R. 27 (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
- 130See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 395; Cases, Materials and Text on Property Law 1010 (Sjef van Erp & Bram Akkermans eds., 2012).
- 131See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 395 (citing CÓD Civ. art. 2559 (Arg.)).
- 132Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 959, https://perma.cc/558N-WFTA;Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 394.
- 133See Strahilevitz, supra note 94, at 395 (citing Cód. Civ. art. 606 (Chile) & C.C. art. 923 (It.)).
- 134See Nevala, supra note 19, at 1513.
- 135See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 3.
- 136See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
- 137Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
- 138Id. at art. 9.
- 139G.A. Res. 37/92, Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, ¶ 5 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter Principles Governing Television Satellites].
- 140G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, Principle II (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Principles Relating to Remote Sensing].
- 141Id.
- 142U.N. Legal Subcommittee, Some Aspects Concerning the Use of Geostationary Orbit, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/738, annex III (Mar. 31, 2000).
- 143See Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 16, at art. 4.
- 144See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 101; The World Administrative Radio Conference, Geneva, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/CRP.4, art. 29 (1979); Recommendations of the International Telecommunication Union Convention, Nairobi, UN Doc. A/AC.105/572, art. 35 (1982).
- 145See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102 (noting however that this provision is nonbinding and noncoercive); Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IX.
- 146See Li, supra note 75, at 332; International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, European Union, Draft Version 31, ¶ 4.2 (Mar. 2014).
- 147See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1.
- 148See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102.
- 149Id.
- 150See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308.
- 151See Beck, supra note 2, at 25.
- 152See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308.
- 153Id.
- 154See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 106; Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 125 (2000).
- 155See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 106–05.
- 156See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 127.
- 15726 Cal. 3d 588 (1980).
- 158Id. at 594.
- 159Id. at 596, 609.
- 160Id. at 613.
- 161See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 143.
- 162Peter T. Limperis, Comment, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: International Law Methods for Prevention and Reduction of Debris, and Liability Regimes for Damage Caused by Debris, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 319 (1998); Roberts, supra note 3 (arguing for a market-share liability pool to be called upon when debris damages another’s space object, building on the Liability Treaty); Sundahl, supra note 154, at 143.
- 163See Limperis, supra note 162, at 340.
- 164Id.
- 165See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 144–45; Beck, supra note 2, at 35; Akers, supra note 3, at 294–95; Imburgia, supra note 3, at 595–97, 599–601, 604.
- 166See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 107–08.
- 167See Sundahl, supra note 154, at 148.
- 168See Carns, supra note 5, at 175.
- 169See Limperis, supra note 162, at 340.
- 170See Sethu & Singh, supra note 5, at 102; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. I, II.
- 171Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. Off. Outer Space Aff., https://perma.cc/SD85-SETU(last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
- 172G.A. Res. 47/68, Agreement on Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, Principle 10 (Dec. 14, 1992); Principles Relating to Remote Sensing, supra note 140; Principles Governing Television Satellites, supra note 139, at ¶ 7.
- 173See Convention on International Liability, supra note 69, at art. IX; G.A. Res. 34/68, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 15 ¶ 3 (Dec. 5, 1979).
- 174See Akers, supra note 3; Imburgia, supra note 3.
- 175See Kurt, supra note 11, at 308 (describing the costs created by space debris).