The Legal Man in the Moon: Exploring Environmental Personhood for Celestial Bodies
The rise of the commercial space industry endangers the preservation of environments, such as the lunar surface and other celestial bodies, with the threat of contamination and resource exploitation. In the coming decades, flights to space will become commonplace—but at present, there is no way to hold outer space polluters accountable. The existing international legal regime is weak, with the United Nations’ space treaties offering limited enforcement mechanisms against offenders. The increasingly popular concept of environmental personhood offers a solution by rethinking the meaning of a juridical person within the text of the United Nations Outer Space, Space Liability, and Moon treaties. Utilizing the International Court of Justice, outer space environmentalists can seek to recognize celestial bodies as juridical persons and gain third-party standing to protect the rights of the Moon and seek damages for environmental degradation. Through the exploration of contentious and advisory avenues within the International Court of Justice, this Comment advances a new way of thinking to save extraterrestrial environments.
Humanity is on the eve of a new era of industry, during which natural resources, manufacturing, and research will be conducted beyond terrestrial boundaries. This will include the mining of asteroids and the transformation or colonization of untouched celestial bodies for economic gain by human actors.1
Brian Higginbotham, The Space Economy: An Industry Takes Off, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/9KCW-7UGN.
This is an important issue as the vast mineral riches of outer space could fundamentally alter Earth’s economy and existing geopolitical rivalries, extending them to outer space like during the Cold War. While it is unknown when and where the first human settlement on another celestial body will occur, the rising number of national and commercial actors interested in achieving such a goal make it seem probable.2
Mike Brown, SpaceX Here’s the Timeline for Getting to Mars and Starting a Colony, Inverse (July 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/JWN5-8JNN; Mars & Beyond: The Road to Making Humanity Multiplanetary, SpaceX, https://perma.cc/8CCK-7NQG; see also The Space Race is Dominated by New Contenders, The Economist (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/J59A-BRWS; (detailing the increasing frequency of Chinese, Indian, and private space launches).
Press Release, The European Space Agency, First Crew Starts Living and Working on the International Space Station, (Oct. 31, 2000), https://perma.cc/YX4Q-9GY4.
Soo Youn & Christine Theodorou, Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos Unveils Plans for Space Colonization, ABC News (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/WQ2T-B4Y8.
David A. Wemer, Can International Cooperation in Space Survive Geopolitical Competition on Earth?, Atlantic council (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/ML99-Y3EA;Stuart Clark, ‘It’s Going to Happen’: Is the World Ready for War in Space?, The Guardian, (Apr. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/PRG7-DD43.
In order to understand the scope of the problem, Parts A and B of Section II of this Comment examine the threat posed by the contamination and exploitation of outer space resources. Part C of Section II discusses how the current international regime is lacking solutions and is unlikely to create a legislative solution given the national incentives to develop space industries. Part D of Section II frames the Comment’s focus: solving the problem of standing for international litigation over extraterrestrial environmental damage. Section III Part A provides a more substantive legal background, first by detailing the relevant U.N. treaties: the Outer Space Treaty, the Space Liability Convention, and the Moon Treaty. Section III Part B introduces the legal concept of environmental personhood, an idea quickly gaining traction as national and local governments seek to preserve natural resources on Earth and protect against climate change. Environmental personhood bestows juridical personhood upon natural features, enabling them to have standing so that other entities or persons can bring claims on their behalf. Finally, Section IV hypothesizes the application of environmental personhood in the realm of outer space and how the existing legal framework can provide a system of regulation and justice for celestial natural resources. The proposed means of incorporating environmental personhood into the international law of space would be a judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), either through an advisory opinion or a contentious case. While there are potential problems and alternative solutions, implementing environmental personhood through a judicial decision represents a rapid solution requiring limited consensus to a problem that could quickly grow beyond control.
The introduction of new national space programs6
Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, India Today (Sept. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZP82-LKT5.
See Higginbotham, supra note 1.
Chloe Cornish, Interplanetary Players: A Who’s Who of Space Mining, Financial Times (Oct. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/KMR6-KEH3;Jeff Foust, A Trillion-Dollar Space Industry Will Require New Markets, Space News (July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/JG8H-MRCW.
Alex Knapp, With Virgin Galactic’s Latest Flight, Has Space Tourism Finally Arrived?, Forbes (Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/CJ4T-HLWQ;Jonathan O’Callaghan, 2019 Is the Year That Space Tourism Finally Becomes a Reality. No, Really, Wired (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/WM96-3XTK.
Jackie Wattles, NASA Wants Astronauts to Go Back to the Moon in 2024. Is It Possible?, CNN Business (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/2AC9-BMFM;National Aeronautics and Space Administration, America to the Moon by 2024, NASA’s FY 2020 Budget Amendment Summary, https://perma.cc/9NWL-SSR3;Olivia Solon, Elon Musk: We Must Colonize Mars to Preserve Our Species in a Third World War, The Guardian (Mar. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8W5B-BH7T; see Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Brown, supra note 2.
Niklas Reinke, No Helium-3 from Moon – Commentary on the Current Moon Debate, in DLR Countdown #3 25 (2007); see also Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in Handbook of Space Law (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
Tiffany Terrell, Physicist Says Asteroid Mining Ventures Will Spawn First Trillionaire, Global Newswire (Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/J75M-87NA.
First, this Section discusses the two main environmental threats associated with new commercial enterprises: exploitation and contamination. Then, this Section explains how the existing legal framework compounds the practical problems, leaving a gap for the articulation and measurement of the environmental harm in the commons of outer space.
Without actions causing direct harms, there is no need for a legal framework to regulate activity and hold bad actors accountable. In order to understand the problem that the legal solution of extraterrestrial environmental personhood is attempting to solve, first this Comment will introduce the practical problems of exploitation and contamination.
1. Exploitation
The risk of exploitation is exponentially rising as the prospect of harnessing resources in outer space becomes commercially viable. Exploitation in this context can be defined as the extraction and consumption of extraterrestrial resources for non-scientific purposes, potentially without research on the long-term impact of such activities. The global space economy currently produces revenues of $350 billion, a number conservatively expected to rise to $1 trillion by 2040.13
Foust, supra note 8; Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, Morgan Stanley (July 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/9FUJ-432V.
Andrea Shalal, Airbus Seeks New Partners to Expand in U.S. Space Market, Reuters (June 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/5TMP-XC9Y;see also Joel Kowsky, From Take Off to Landing, NASA and Boeing Work Together to Launch Commercial Crew, NASA (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/from-take-off-to-landing-nasa-and-boeing-work-together-to-launch-commercial-crew.
Redefining Natural Resources: Why Asteroids, Planetary Recourses, https://perma.cc/363C-ZKKZ.
Meghan Bartels, SpaceX Wants to Send People to Mars. Here’s What the Trip Might Look Like., Space.com (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Y3P-BYCD;see also Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Erik Sofge, The Most Innovative Space Companies of 2020, Fast Company (Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/X8LS-JAYC.
Commercial actors may be less likely to concern themselves with implementing procedures to mitigate or prevent pollution, and they could perform launch operations from jurisdictions with minimal requirements in order to maximize profitability.17
See Caroline Delber, SpaceX Says There Are No Laws on Mars, So Maybe Elon Musk Will Be President, Popular Mechanics (Oct. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/338Z-TY6K(discussing SpaceX’s terms of service which claim Mars is a free planet and that no Earth-based government has authority over Mars).
Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future 51 (2008).
European Space Policy Institute, Towards a European Approach to Space Traffic Management (2020), https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-public-reports/send/2-public-espi-reports/494-espi-report-71-stm.
See Jonathan O’Callaghan, The FCC’s Approval of SpaceX’s Starlink Mega Constellation May Have Been Unlawful, Scientific American (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/GVZ7-J87W(detailing the launch of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system around the Earth has already begun to brighten the sky, inhibiting terrestrial stargazing).
2. Contamination
Human exploration has a long history of contamination, and space is no exception.21
See Megan Garber, The Trash We’ve Left on the Moon, The Atlantic (Dec. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/SCC5-YGPL(listing the many items left from the Apollo missions including human waste). For information about the potential future of contamination, see Margaret S. Race et al., NASA, Planetary Protection Knowledge for Human Extraterrestrial Missions, Workshop Report (2015), https://perma.cc/MF8N-C8GG.
Loren Grush, Why Stowaway Creatures on the Moon Confound International Space Law, The Verge (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/16/20804219/moon-tardigrades-lunar-lander-spaceil-arch-mission-foundation-outer-space-treaty-law.
Id.
Hannah Osborne, Thousands of ‘Indestructible’ Tardigrades Could Be Living on the Moon After Crashing on the Lunar Surface, Newsweek (Aug. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8JDY-G8HU.
Chris Taylor, ‘I’m the First Space Pirate!’ How Tardigrades Were Secretly Smuggled to the Moon, Mashable (Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/98W5-JTVY(noting that Spivack considers himself to be the first space pirate after his smuggling of the tardigrades).
Joseph Stromberg, How Does the Tiny Waterbear Survive in Outer Space, Smithsonian Magazine (Sept. 11, 2012), https://perma.cc/FNF2-74DT;Jason Daley, A Crashed Spacecraft Might Have Put Earth’s Most Indestructible Organisms on the Moon, Smithsonian Magazine (Aug. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/KR99-TW6Z.
Ari Shapiro, Thousands of Tardigrades are Stranded on the Moon After a Failed Lunar Mission, NPR (Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/L4GB-J4CD.
Regardless, the actions of the Arch Mission Foundation violate existing planetary protection guidelines, practices set out by the international Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) and national space agencies to prevent cross contamination between planetary bodies.28
COSPAR, The COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection Role, Structure and Activities, 205 Space Rsch. Today 14 (Aug. 2019) (providing an overview of the planetary protection framework and examples of procedures, including the requirement that missions to other planetary bodies “adhere to stringent planetary protection measures to abide the first rationale for planetary protection to not interfere with ‘scientific investigations of possible extraterrestrial life forms, precursors, and remnants’ and not to impose terrestrial biological contamination to these objects of high astrobiological interest”).
While the Earth’s atmosphere has proven to be relatively durable in the face of carbon emissions and other pollutants, the atmospheres of our neighbors are far more fragile. The emissions of twenty Apollo mission landings would have effectively doubled the lunar atmosphere; the Martian atmosphere is similarly tenuous.29
See Manfred Hintz, Environmental Aspects of Settlements on the Moon and Mars Planetary Protection, 34 Proc. L. Outer Space 59, 60 (1991).
Various actors have proposed larger environmental offenses, particularly terraforming, the process by which an Earthlike ecosystem is created on another planet. Already, small steps have been taken to test our ability to bring Earth to other surfaces, such as when China attempted to grow cotton on the Moon.30
Amy Held, China Tried to Grow Cotton on the Moon, but It Didn’t Work, NPR (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/R67A-BF2N.
Doyle Rice, NASA Says We Can’t Terraform Mars. Elon Musk Disagrees, USA Today (Aug. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/PB84-3THS;see also Sissi Cao, Elon Musk Wants to ‘Nuke Mars’ for Humans to Live—But There is One Problem, Observer (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/VSJ7-9NL6.
See, e.g., Lucianne Walkowicz, The Problem with Terraforming Mars: What Do We Lose If We Make the Red Planet Hospitable to Humans?, Slate (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/HM3Y-LV5R;Bruce M. Jakosky & Christopher S. Edwards, Inventory of CO2 available for terraforming Mars, 2 Nature Astronomy 634 (2018).
Some amount of extraterrestrial resource usage is permissible to satisfy human needs for research and scientific gains, but there should be a contamination threshold beyond which there is some sort of legal ramification. The contamination threshold could be determined by considering the value of the contaminated body and the severity of the contamination. The value of the extraterrestrial body can be governed by the categories of planetary protection priority already established by COSPAR based upon the probability that those bodies have life on them.33
See COSPAR, supra note 28.
The potential damage from exploitation and contamination could be mitigated if there was a sufficient regulatory regime or enforcement mechanism to curb the activities of future polluters. As outlined below, the current national and international regulatory regimes fail to control independent actors seeking a profit. Although it may be possible to craft regulations capable of protecting extraterrestrial environments through permitting and planetary protection systems, political capital requirements and national incentives make regulation a less likely solution. Instead, a few environmentally conscious actors can seek judgments through international litigation, lowering the potential political costs and providing a more immediate solution than the drafting of regulations. The issue that this Comment focuses on is how to cure potential defects in standing and causation in potential international litigation over environmental damage to an extraterrestrial environment, such as the Moon.
1. Lacking Regulatory Regime
Despite decades of increasing usage and dependency on outer space as a resource, the international regime governing outer space is weak. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spaces (COPUOS) oversees the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and created the five current U.N. treaties covering outer space.34
Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, https://perma.cc/536N-7FQU.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
Many nations have supplemented the international agreements with their own space regulations. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration oversees the space launch licensing process,37
Licensing Process, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, https://perma.cc/RU2Z-W6Q2.
18 U.S.C. § 7(6).
Frans von der Dunk, The Legal Framework for Space Projects in Europe: Aspects of Applicable Law and Dispute Resolution, in Contracting for Space: Contract Practice in the European Space Sector 357 (Lesley Jane Smith & Ingo Baumann eds., 2011).
Lov om oppskyting av gjenstander fra norsk territorium m.m. ut i verdensrommet, 13 juni 1969 nr. 38 (Nor.).
2 § Lag om rymdverksamhet, (Svensk f-författningssamling [SFS] 1982:963) (Swed.).
Loi relative aux activités de lancement, d’opération de vol ou de guidage d'objets spatiaux of Sept.17, 2005, Moniteur Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Nov.4, 2008 (Belg.).
Wet rimtevaartactiviteiten, 24 januari 2007, Stb. 2007, 80 (Neth.).
Loi 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.][Official Gazette of France], June 4, 2008, p. 9169 (Fr.).
The development of independent national laws is not necessarily beneficial to the protection of celestial environments. Given the vast amount of resources and money at stake, it may be more likely that national legislation leads to a race to the bottom to enable domestic space corporations to engage in riskier but more profitable activities than their international competitors.45
See Tronchetti, supra note 11, at 810.
Seabed mining provides a terrestrial example of this problem. After initial proposals to collect minerals from the sea floor developed in the 1960s,46
Julie Hunter, Pradeep Singh & Julian Aguon, Broadening Common Heritages, Addressing Gaps in the Deep Sea Mining Regulatory Regime, Harv. Env’t L. Rev. Blog (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6XE-8K3H.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
Id. art. 136.
See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Dark Side of The Moon: The Status of the Moon: Public Concepts and Private Enterprise, 40 Proc. L. Outer Space 119, 121–22 (1997) (discussing the application of the “common heritage of mankind” principle to the Moon).
Kirsten F. Thompson et al., Seabed Mining and Approaches to Governance of the Deep Seabed, Frontiers Marine Science (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8BGH-C78E,
Kathryn A. Miller et al., An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development, Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps, Frontiers in Marine Science (Jan. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/P963-2GKQ.
Id. (detailing contracts given to mine off the coast of Africa and Oceania).
See James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea after UNCLOS III, 46 Law and Contemporary Problems 30 (1983) and Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, The Diplomat (May 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/V66U-GE68.
The interaction of actors incentivized to be the first to make a large profit in a risky industry with the lack of real regulation may lead to the contamination or exploitation of celestial resources with potentially irreversible consequences. A historical analogy would be that of the older oil wells in Texas, drilled without long-term concern for environmental impact, which are now leaking contaminants across the state.54
Jim Malewitz, Abandoned Texas Oil Wells Seen as “Ticking Time Bombs” of Contamination, Texas Tribune (Dec. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/6EW2-UGQM.
Id.
2. Unarticulated Basis for International Litigation
In the absence of either a working international regulatory framework or comparable national systems, pursuing environmental damages claims under the existing U.N. space treaties in the ICJ presents a viable path to create accountability and promote extraterrestrial conservation. The language of the treaties, detailed in the following Section, enables a nation to seek monetary damages when space debris from a second nation strikes the territory or property of the first nation. In the extraterrestrial context, the difficulty arises when the damage occurs to another planetary body, which no nation has a territorial claim to protect. There is a gap in the current practice and scholarship on international law to show how a litigant could have standing to sue for damage to extraterrestrial environments, such as that of the Moon. This Comment will focus on answering this problem by using the legal concept of environmental personhood to articulate what is damaged when the Moon is polluted and how third-party standing will hold bad actors accountable.
The U.N. is the primary governing authority on international laws and regulations pertaining to outer space. Through the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, the U.N. tracks satellites orbiting the Earth and works to implement the five adopted space treaties. The two treaties most relevant to this Comment are the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. The Outer Space Treaty laid out an initial framework for international ambitions to regulate outer space activity, but it left gaps and ambiguities for subsequent treaties and regulations to fill in or refine. The Outer Space Treaty’s general spirit provides a lodestar for subsequent laws to follow. The Space Liability Convention, for example, built upon the Outer Space Treaty to create a mechanism for nations to seek damages when debris fall into their sovereign territory, an important building block for nations seeking to protect extraterrestrial environments from contamination or exploitation. Finally, the Moon Treaty introduced additional protections for the Moon and represented the most progressive attempt to prevent exploitative usage of extraterrestrial resources.
While the Moon Treaty was less widely adopted, the Outer Space Treaty and Space Liability Convention can work in concert to provide a path for a case to be heard in the ICJ if the court were to adopt an environmental personhood reading of certain provisions of the treaties. The Moon Treaty still provides a persuasive example of where the international legal community might have gone had competitive intentions been removed.
1. The Outer Space Treaty
The Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) was the first attempt to establish an international regime for outer space, ratified just 10 years after Sputnik and two years before the Apollo 11 landing.56
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
The preamble of the Outer Space Treaty recognizes “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”58
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes the broad jurisdiction of the treaty as “[o]uter space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”59
Id. art. I.
Id. art. II.
See Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 359, 366, 370 (1994).
Under Article IX, “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination . . . .”62
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX.
Andrew C. Schuerger, John E. Moores, David J. Smith & Günther Reitz, A Lunar Microbial Survival Model for Predicting the Forward Contamination of the Moon, 19 Astrobiology 730, 752 (2019).
2. The Space Liability Convention
Following the Outer Space Treaty, the U.N. enacted the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Space Liability Convention) in 1972.64
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention].
Id. art. II.
Id. art. I.
Id. art. I(c)(ii).
See Grush, supra note 22; Osborne, supra note 24.
The Space Liability Convention suggests that diplomatic negotiations should be the primary means of settling damages claims. After stating a claim, a party “may also present its claim to the Secretary-General of the United Nations” under Article IX.69
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX
Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954”, Can.-U.S.S.R., 1981 Can. T.S. No. 8, art. 2 [hereinafter Claims Protocol].
‘State-sponsored’ here describes space missions funded or executed by nation states rather than activities done for private profit without the inducement of a national government.
See Dan St. John, Comment, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 40 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y 686, 696 (2012).
Although not discussed in the text of the Space Liability Convention, the consultation of the ICJ appears to be a possible avenue under a recommendation by the Secretary-General. With no precedent demonstrating the mechanics of the Space Liability Convention at a more contentious or substantive procedural point, the Secretary-General would likely look to proven dispute resolution mechanisms. The ICJ would be at the top of the list given its proven record of equitable arbitration,73
Cases, International Court of Justice, https://perma.cc/CZ5G-CHWK(“Between 22 May 1947 and 11 November 2019, 178 cases were entered in the General List.”).
Statute of the International Court of Justice, April 18, 1946, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 148 (Mar. 14).
3. The Moon Treaty
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty)76
Moon Treaty, supra note 36.
Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in Handbook of Space Law, 717, 726 (Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, supra note 6.
Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, The Space Review (Oct. 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/K6JA-GJ43.
The Moon Treaty’s status as the only treaty explicitly about the Moon should still guide behavior and inform any future discussions over the law governing the Moon. Most of the opposition to the Moon Treaty by the spacefaring powers at the time, the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was based upon reaction to the potential requirement to share extracted mineral wealth with other nations.80
See David Everett Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. Nat. Res. & Env’t L. 293, 302–06, 311–13 (1992).
Each of the preambles to the various space treaties refers to the prior agreements and the spirit of law the new treaty seeks to build upon. See Moon Treaty, supra note 35, ¶ 15 (“Recalling the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spaces including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in to Outer Space, the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space . . . .”).
Rescue Agreement, supra note 57.
Article 1 of the Moon Treaty states that the treaty applies to the Moon and also “to other celestial bodies within the solar system other than the earth.”83
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Later sections of the Moon Treaty deal more directly with the importance of environmental preservation. Article 7 § 1 states that “[i]n exploring and using the [M]oon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra-environmental matter or otherwise.”85
Id. art 7.
Id. art. 11 § 1.
See Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 363, 410 (2004).
Article 11 § 3 states that “[n]either the surface nor the subsurface of the [M]oon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State . . . or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”88
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 3.
Juan Francisco Salazar, Antarctica and Outer Space: Relational Trajectories, 7 Polar J. 259, 261 (2017) (detailing how the Antarctic Treaty System and Outer Space Treaties both created “extraterritorial zones” in which no nation could claim sovereign territory).
Article 11 § 5 requires that “States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible.”90
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 5.
Id. art. 11 § 7.
Id. art. 15 § 2–3.
4. Interpreting the U.N. Treaties
While the U.N. outer space treaties provide a legal framework, judicial interpretation of the treaties’ terms can enable greater reach and regulation. In the common law tradition, judges have the power to fill in the gaps of statutes and choose the rules that fulfill the enactor’s intent.93
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 87 (1984) (discussing the interpretive modes judges use to fill gaps in statutes).
1. Introducing the Concept
Protecting nature from exploitation is not a new legal problem: numerous international agreements have sought to promote the conservation of the Earth’s resources,94
See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 48 for more information on the international environmental treaty system. See also Rakhyun E. Kim, The Emergent Network Structure of the Multilateral Environmental Agreement System, 23 Glob. Env’t Change 980 (2013) (finding over 747 international environmental agreements since 1857).
See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter The London Convention].
Environmental personhood was first introduced by Professor Christopher D. Stone in a law review article advocating a reconsideration of humanity’s relationship with nature.97
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 456 (1972).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 741–43.
Stone subsequently expanded upon his initial article in a book of the same name, detailing the inspiration for his idea and the challenges he foresaw.100
See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment (3rd ed. 2010).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
See Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 Colum. J. Env’t L. 49, 50 (2018).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1333 (2000) (arguing for the expansion of standing to animals).
2. Subsequent International Adoption
In the years since Stone introduced his theory, there has been significant discussion of the environmental personhood concept within academic circles, with over 1500 articles citing his original journal article alone. Beyond academic momentum,105
As with many legal concepts, there are both proponents of and detractors from environmental personhood. The merits are not fully discussed in this Comment; the focus is rather on the application of the concept.
See Rights of Nature, Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, https://perma.cc/M65Y-A8RW.
Ecuador and Bolivia are the strongest adopters, implementing national environmental safeguards through juridical personhood. Ecuador adopted a constitutional amendment in 2008 to give nature the right to “exist, persist, maintain, and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions, and its processes in evolution.”107
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008, Sept. 28, 2008, art. 71–74.
Id.; see also Andrew C. Revkin, Ecuador Constitution Grants Rights to Nature, Dot Earth: N.Y. Times Blog (Sept. 29, 2008), https://perma.cc/TTS6-GYP3.
Natalia Greene, The First Successful Case of the Rights of Nature Implementation in Ecuador, Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, https://perma.cc/23DE-AVUA.
Along similar lines, Bolivia introduced legislation granting “Mother Earth” rights equal to those of natural persons in 2010 and 2012.110
Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra, Law 071 (Dec. 2010) (Bol.); La Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, Law 300 (Oct. 2012) (Bol.); see also John Vidal, Bolivia Enshrines Natural World’s Rights with Equal Status for Mother Earth, The Guardian (Apr. 10, 2011), https://perma.cc/XZV2-ARMT.
The U.S. and New Zealand have used a more limited approach, granting juridical personhood to specific environmental features, rather than to the entire environment. Within the U.S., the most notable effort to introduce environmental personhood was the Lake Erie Bill of Rights passed by a ballot measure in the City of Toledo, Ohio.111
Timothy Williams, Legal Rights for Lake Erie? Voters in Ohio City Will Decide, N.Y. Times (Feb. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/4H43-2DY9;see also Dana Zartner, How Giving Legal Rights to Nature Could Help Reduce Toxic Algae Blooms in Lake Erie, Salon (Sept. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/KP2G-X6JH.
Jason Daley, Toledo, Ohio, Just Granted Lake Erie the Same Legal Rights as People, Smithsonian Magazine (Mar. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/BF9D-EBEA.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.011 (West 2019).
Id. Additionally, a farmer filed a lawsuit challenging the Lake Erie Bill of Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, No. 3:19 CV 434, 2019 WL 1254011 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2019).
Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551, 558 (N.D. Ohio 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, OH, No. 20-3368, 2020 WL 3619934 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, OH, No. 20-3361, 2020 WL 3620205 (6th Cir. May 5, 2020).
Gordon, supra note 103, at 58–61.
Te Urewera Act 2014 (N.Z.).
Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (N.Z.); see also Kennedy Warne, A Voice for Nature, National Geographic (Apr. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/HC9L-7XAM.
Just days after the New Zealand parliament granted rights to the Whangangui River, a judicial ruling in India’s Uttarakand High Court extended similar protections to the Ganges River.119
Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 in the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (2017) (India); see also After New Zealand, India’s Ganges Gains Legal Status of a Person, Dhaka Tribune (Mar. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/4RAC-K83R;Rina Chandran, India’s Sacred Ganges and Yamuna Rivers Granted Same Legal Rights as Humans, Reuters (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/45PP-Z29L.
In 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia reached a result similar to that of the Indian court, declaring that the “Atrato River basin possesses rights to ‘protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration.’”120
Press Release, Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, Colombia Constitutional Court Finds Atrato River Possesses Rights (May 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/A9H3-LKCQ.
Nicholas Bryner, Colombian Supreme Court Recognizes Rights of the Amazon River Ecosystem, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (Apr. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/9CSU-ERYV. For the original opinion in Spanish, see Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Civil, abril 5, 2018, M.P.: L. Villabona, STC4360-2018 (Colom.), http://www.cortesuprema.gov.co/corte/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/STC4360-2018-2018-00319-011.pdf.
In 2019, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh issued an even broader decision, granting legal rights to all of Bangladesh’s rivers to protect them from pollution and dredging.122
Rina Chandran, Fears of Evictions as Bangladesh Gives Rivers Legal Rights, Reuters (July 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/4SRX-WSUM.
As can be expected from their extremely strong stances on granting the environment juridical standing within their own borders, Ecuador and Bolivia lead the way in advocating for international adoption of the environmental personhood model. During a 2010 conference in Bolivia, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Nature was drafted with the intention of creating a new international treaty similar to the laws found locally in Bolivia.123
See Andres Schipani, Grassroots Summit Calls for International Climate Court, The Guardian (Apr. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/LSL3-PCQZ;Brandon Keim, Nature to Get Legal Rights in Bolivia, Wired (Apr. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/CE7E-X8TE.
Cormac Cullinan, A Tribunal for Earth: Why it Matters, International Rights of Nature Tribunal, https://perma.cc/68VZ-LK8W.
See Linda Sheehan, No One Is Above Nature’s Rule of Law, Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation, https://perma.cc/68VZ-LK8W;Bolivia’s Leadership, Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, https://perma.cc/RTF8-QYTH.
The legal background for this Comment is bifurcated. Currently, the international treaty regime fails to substantially address what appears to be an imminent problem, creating a grim outlook for extraterrestrial environments. In contrast, the potential solution for extraterrestrial environmental protection appears to be taking off on Earth. The next section hypothesizes the fusion of these two realities.
Utilizing the Outer Space Treaty and the Space Liability Convention, to which all major spacefaring nations are parties, can create a swift and clear result in favor of the environmental rights of celestial bodies. Through the texts of these two treaties, a case can be made that the ability to bring claims on behalf of celestial bodies already exists––it merely needs to be articulated by a judge.
Section A below explains the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the current treaties and environmental claims. Section B explores how a hypothetical plaintiff could have third-party standing in a contentious claim, with the ICJ either explicitly interpreting the term “juridical person” to include environmental person or using a common law approach to apply environmental personhood. Section C discusses the potential appeal for the ICJ to avoid a contentious decision that could be rejected by a defendant and instead issue an advisory opinion at the request of a specialized U.N. agency. The contentious claim is more binding but has less viability when compared to an advisory opinion. Subsections B and C will discuss their possibility of success weighed against their relative strengths. Section D explores the shortcomings of the ICJ adopting environmental personhood, and Section E discusses alternative solutions and their appeal.
Once environmental personhood for outer space bodies is implemented, there will be a deterrent effect of liability for actors that fail to prevent contamination through sufficient planetary protection protocols. A commercial space venture might implement better precautions if it believes precautions are a good investment to prevent or reduce potential liability. As a secondary benefit, the ICJ could order remediation efforts or funds as well, but once a contamination occurs it is hard to stop as we have seen with invasive species on Earth. Similarly, the value gained by exploiting space resources and diminishing the common heritage of mankind must be weighed against a potential judgment.
Under the U.N. Charter, the ICJ has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions and hear contentious cases.126
U.N. Charter arts. 92, 94–96.
Declarations Recognizing Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, Int’l Ct. Just., https://perma.cc/CB6H-8FUD.
Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), Order, 2013 I.C.J. 278 (Sep. 13).
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Provisional Measures, 2007 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 23).
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 150 (Feb. 2).
There is a growing belief that the ICJ can hear and settle disputes involving space law.131
See Frans G. von der Dunk, Space for Dispute Settlement Mechanisms – Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Space? A Few Legal Considerations, Univ. of Neb. College of Law, Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty Publications (2001); see also Viikari, supra note 18, at 287 (noting the availability of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for use by private parties).
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. III, with similar language in the Space Liability Convention.
U.N. Charter art. 33; see also Viikari, supra note 18, at 289–90.
See Viikari, supra note 18, at 307.
The most important part of the case would not necessarily be the merits of the claim, but the underpinning of the plaintiff’s standing. Examination of these processes shows the path toward environmental personhood for celestial bodies. The grounds for a contentious case could be based upon violations of the Outer Space Treaty, particularly the aforementioned language in Article IX directing parties to conduct their exploration and studies of celestial bodies while avoiding harmful contamination. Introducing tardigrades to the surface of the Moon could have negative consequences, as could plans to mine the lunar ice; a plaintiff would need to sue an actor causing some substantial effect of environmental degradation. If a private actor such as SpaceIL or the Arch Mission Foundation did contaminate the lunar environment and substantial environmental damage were subsequently proven, the U.S. would be the nation liable under the Space Liability Convention.
1. Bringing the Claim
A plaintiff-nation such as Ecuador could bring a contentious claim against the U.S. or Israel for their negligence in regulating their space industries and allowing the contamination of the lunar surface with tardigrades. The plaintiff-nation would need to sue the home country of any private actor rather than that actor themselves since the ICJ would not have jurisdiction over non-state parties. The defendant-nation could then seek to collect judgment from the private party responsible for the environmental damage. Ecuador could claim that it has standing based on the violation of the Outer Space Treaty through environmental personhood of the Moon and seek judicial interpretation by the ICJ of the relevant space treaties.
The Outer Space Treaty’s terminology prohibiting “adverse changes in the environment” and “harmful contamination” are largely undefined.135
See Viikari, supra note 77, at 729–30.
2. Deciding a Case Explicitly Under Environmental Personhood
The Statute of the International Court of Justice includes sections determining the competence of the court and guiding the decision-making process.136
ICJ Statute, supra note 74.
Id. art. 38.
Beyond the Outer Space Treaty, the ICJ could look to the Moon Treaty as the starting point for discussions regarding the laws governing the Moon.138
See Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 Ford. J. Int’l L.J. 243, 259 (2009).
See James R. Wilson, Note, Regulation of the Outer Space Environment Through International Accord: The 1979 Moon Treaty, 2 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 173, 176–77 (2011).
See Te Urewera Act, supra note 117; Te Awa Tupua Act, supra note 118.
Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11.
3. Deciding a Case Using a Common Law Approach
Beyond the argument that environmental personhood is becoming an accepted principle, the judges could also be motivated by the even broader idea that the creation of common law principles can be a form of regulation. Professor Fabio Tronchetti, a leading space law expert, has called for the development of a legal regime that can protect the environment through reviewing and even interrupting activity that threatens the environment.142
Tronchetti, supra note 11, at 811.
Id. at 812.
Indeed, the pollution of outer space brings in several familiar situations that may be addressable based on common law tort and property theories. When a river is being polluted upstream, there is an expectation in tort law that someone will be able to show an ex post injury downstream, providing a regulating effect through the plaintiff’s claim. Alternatively, a governmental authority can step in before an injury occurs and create an ex ante regulatory system.144
See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 54 (1991) (discussing the relationship between “private” tort law and “public” statutes in regulatory frameworks).
See generally Brian C. Weeden & Tiffany Chow, Taking a Common-Pool Resources Approach to Space Sustainability: A Framework and Potential Policies, 28 Space Pol’y 166 (2012).
These common law principles begin to work again when environmental personhood is introduced. Recognizing the juridical personhood of the Moon would allow individual or organizational custodians to sue on behalf of the damaged ecosystem. While it would be necessary for another nation to bring the claim, such as Ecuador, the ICJ could grant a custodianship to an organization or select group of individuals. This is consistent with the models pioneered in India,146
See Chandran, supra note 122.
See Warne, supra note 118.
See Bryner, supra note 121.
Grounding a decision in the tradition of the common law might be more appealing to ICJ justices. Rather than be accused of implementing a relatively new legal concept without international proof of concept and giving substantial power to single state-plaintiffs, the common law method is a smaller leap forward in judicial reasoning. The ICJ would be much closer to the customary international law sources of precedent in national courts and could draw on deeper wells of international precedent in the environmental and tort areas of law, demonstrated by Costa Rica v. Nicaragua and the Russian-Canadian settlement.
4. Prospect of Success
The potential of the contentious case strategy can be evaluated on two factors: the probability of securing a favorable judgment in the law and the ability to secure the desired remedy. Monetary damages are likely the best remedy for a claim of lunar environmental degradation. This form of penalization gives polluters an economic choice between adopting precautions and paying for remediation. Alternatively, an injunction would be too hard for the ICJ to enforce given that a defendant might choose to ignore the decision, knowing the ICJ lacks serious enforcement power. The contentious case strategy is weaker in its likelihood of success but stronger in its ability to provide a substantive remedy.
The probability of securing a judgment is undermined by the fact that it requires a plaintiff nation who is willing to finance the litigation, risk the diplomatic consequences of suing a powerful spacefaring nation, and lose future space industry revenue as a result of an anti-space industry reputation. Although Ecuador or Bolivia might be willing to take this step given their constitutional dedication to the environment and present lack of a space industry, the ICJ might be concerned about the legitimacy costs of adopting such a new concept. But, grounding the decision as common law progress could mitigate this concern.
Given the history of damages awarded in recent international environmental cases, the contentious case strategy provides a useful avenue to secure the desired remedy. The compensation paid to Canada by Russia evidences that monetary damages can be appropriate compensation for damage in space.149
Claims Protocol, supra note 70.
Id.
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 150 (Feb. 2).
During contentious cases, States Parties not represented in the composition of the ICJ’s bench have the opportunity to appoint an ad hoc judge pursuant to Article 31 of the Statute of the ICJ. Even if the court were to dismiss a case on the merits and not discuss the element of standing through environmental personhood, a judge appointed by the environmentalist nation bringing the claim could issue a dissenting or concurring opinion. An opinion approvingly citing environmental personhood would create kindling for future claims in the same manner as Justice Douglas in Morton.
Alternatively, the ICJ could reach a similar conclusion without the use of a contentious case through its capacity to issue advisory opinions. The advisory opinion offers several benefits: it would not require a single nation to initiate the process, it would avoid creating an immediate loser, and it would offer an opportunity to create a legal regime without limiting the ICJ to a presented set of facts. Advisory opinions are not binding, but the requesting agency or organ can adopt the opinion to make it international law.152
How the Court Works, Int’l Ct. Just., https://perma.cc/H85W-XHK7.
1. Requesting an Advisory Opinion
Article 96 of the U.N. Charter says that “[t]he General Assembly or the Security Council may request the [ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.”153
U.N. Charter art. 96.
Id.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 93 (July 8).
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion, 1960 I.C.J. 43 (June 8).
The most relevant part of the U.N., COPUOS, would likely be an entity capable of asking for an advisory opinion as it operates as a subcommittee of the General Assembly. In order to bring a claim, members of the committee would need to pass a resolution asking the ICJ to clarify whether the term “juridical person” from Article I of the Space Liability Convention extends to environmental persons.157
Space Liability Convention, supra note 64, art. I.
Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies and Others, U.N., https://perma.cc/4BME-UKSB.
The opinion would ideally come from an agency first requesting clarification as to whether the term “juridical person” in the various treaties could be interpreted as including environmental persons. The most important treaty for this part of the advisory opinion might be the Space Liability Treaty as it would then give rise to claims for damages. The next part of a request for an advisory opinion would seek to understand who can bring suit on behalf of juridical persons within the ICJ. While the ordinary answer might be based on the nationality of the juridical person, the space treaties would already prohibit the celestial bodies as being considered part of any country. The ICJ may recognize that any state party to the Outer Space or Space Liability treaties would have standing to bring a claim against a violator. It is possible that the ICJ would recognize the ability of natural persons to also bring suits on behalf of environmental persons under the idea of “common heritage” similar to the New Zealand example discussed previously, but this seems unlikely as the ICJ would probably caution against a deluge of claims from individuals. Beyond states parties, the next best plaintiffs would likely be the U.N. agencies themselves.
2. Advantages and Relative Value of an Advisory Opinion
In the context of an advisory opinion, the ICJ might be more willing to take a bigger leap in protecting the environmental futures of celestial bodies. The ICJ would be less afraid of losing legitimacy or seeing the immediate withdrawal of nations from its jurisdiction. Furthermore, issuing an advisory opinion is an inherently prospective exercise; it does not require adjudication between states parties and therefore avoids the potentially undesirable optics of creating an immediate loser in an area of previous legal uncertainty.
In comparison to a favorable contentious case opinion, securing a favorable advisory opinion is less valuable. The advisory opinion is not binding on specific parties and fails to deliver the precedent of monetary damages for extraterrestrial environmental damage. Partially redeeming the value of the advisory opinion is the limitation of the risk for the ICJ, with fewer political consequences for generating a potentially controversial ruling. Weighing the comparative benefits and risks, the contentious case likely offers the better strategy for environmentalists to attract significant international attention to the problem and potentially secure a remedy.
Implementing environmental personhood for celestial bodies would be a substantial step forward for the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Ordering substantial damages or administrative action would likely stretch the boundaries of the court’s power. A stronger ICJ may be necessary as the world becomes more connected and some authority over space becomes essential to avoiding international conflict. In the absence of the international committee envisioned by the Moon Treaty, the ICJ may not be a perfect solution, but it might be one of the only available solutions at present. This Section will discuss several of the difficulties associated with the proposed solution: national opposition, limits on institutional capacity, and alternative interpretation of the outer space treaties.
1. National Opposition
Nations are clearly interested in promoting the development of their space industries to grow their economies and acquire early dominance. The U.S. has repeatedly introduced legislation to economically incentivize the development of its space industry159
See Space Frontier Act of 2019, S. 919, 116th Cong. (2018); Invest in Space Now Act, H.R. 2358, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
See Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 23 (2005) (discussing how the current space regime does not provide for property rights, a major impediment for space exploration, exploitation, and development).
After the ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua in Nicaragua v. United States,161
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Nov. 26).
See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1445 (1985) (noting that in 1985, the U.S. terminated its Declaration of Aug. 26, 1946, which had provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ).
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
Tannenwald, supra note 87, at 421.
2. Institutional Capacity
Currently, there are a limited number of spacecraft and the focus of commercial spaceflight is on low Earth orbit, so it is conceivable to employ the ICJ and state plaintiffs to establish an early common law system for governing outer space environmental liability. More space traffic is undoubtedly coming as outlined in prior sections, which may call into question the efficacy of using a litigation-based regime. Hoping for environmentally virtuous nations to bring claims requires that they track the movements of potentially thousands of spaceflights and mining activities and then fund their claims at the ICJ. Even asking for a U.N. body to perform a regulatory capacity of this magnitude could quickly strain the resources of the U.N.
One possible remedy is to implement a regime of plaintiff’s attorney fees for bringing a successful claim on behalf of the environment to incentivize nations or organizations with standing to bring good claims. Attorney fees are common in international commercial arbitration,165
John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial Arbitrations, 21 Mich J. Int’l L. 1, 4 (1999).
Turning from international arbitration to the custom in domestic legal systems, the English rule of loser pays is nearly universal outside the U.S.166
Jarno Vanto, Attorneys’ Fees as Damages in International Commercial Litigation, 15 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 203, 204 (2003).
There would be significant complications for a “polluter pays” liability regime as it is hard to track debris and other contaminants to the particular space craft depositing them.167
See Viikari, supra note 77, at 764.
Id.
3. Interpreting the Treaties’ Gaps as Enabling Mining
A final issue would be a defensive claim that mining the Moon is legal under international law. The language of the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaties can be construed as allowing the extraction of resources from celestial bodies. While lunar resources cannot be claimed as property while still in the Moon, it could be argued that extracted resources are claimable.169
See Bilder, supra note 138, at 268.
While it is conceivable that the text of the treaties could be used to enable private property, it requires creative and generous interpretation of the U.N. treaties to find sufficient loopholes. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that “[o]uter space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”170
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. II.
Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Space Law: Is Asteroid Mining Legal?, Wired (May 1, 2012), https://perma.cc/CNN6-FK2C.
Nemitz v. NASA, 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. NASA, 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
In practice, the U.S. and other spacefaring nations have taken possession of samples from outer space bodies, representing a form of property for national governments. Unlike the proposed large-scale mining operations, the samples taken by national space agencies thus far are relatively small amounts of material taken for scientific purposes with strict cross-contamination prevention protocols. Extraterrestrial sample collecting runs parallel with the scientific presence in Antarctica, pursuing scientific goals to benefit all with the resources belonging to the “common heritage of mankind.” Private exploitation and profit-seeking colonization does not fit within the spirit or straightforward reading of the U.N. space treaties.
Even if the ICJ or another body were to clearly state that the current outer space regime enables private property rights in what is meant to be an extraterritorial zone, the environmental personhood argument remains valid. Rather than deny the existence of private property rights in outer space, the juridical personhood of the Moon would enforce a common property right to lunar resources. Bringing claims on behalf of the Moon would vindicate these rights and collect damages for restoration or conservation efforts equal to what the individual infringer has taken from the commons. Private actors would retain rights to technology developed on the Moon, but any contamination caused by research would be grounds for a judgment for restoration of the natural state of the lunar environment.
1. Establishing a Moon Authority
Many of the issues discussed in this paper, as well as other outer space legal problems, could be solved by the establishment of a lunar authority.174
Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1367, 1403–04 (2011).
Id. at 1404.
This refers to the idea that regulatory agencies can be “captured” by the influence of lobbyists from the industries they seek to regulate in order to coopt them to meet the industry’s goals.
2. Permanent Court of Arbitration
An often-discussed alternative to ICJ dispute resolution is the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Unlike the ICJ, the PCA can hear claims by private parties, eliminating the need for a state to agree to bring a claim in the ICJ.177
Dispute Resolution Services, Permanent Court of Arbitration, https://perma.cc/8VHG-MSVG.
Even if a requested advisory opinion was not sufficiently clear on the issue of standing or a contentious claim failed on the merits, the act of bringing such a claim could lead to action within the international community. Faced with the possibility of liability for their extraterrestrial exploits, nations and private actors may begin to independently craft their own legal regime. While law enacted with the defendants might not be as appealing as a judicially crafted form of environmental justice, the discussion around a regulatory or legislative framework would at least bring attention to the risks already present. The U.S. and other nations may become more comfortable with the Moon Treaty if the alternative is a less predictable form of ICJ decision.
More broadly, outer space presents a carte blanche to explore a new way of considering humanity’s relationship with nature. On Earth, we are tethered to tradition and fear the costs of moving away from the known principles of standing and torts. Yet, just as a pair of daring nations reached for the stars, now a few bold nations are reconsidering what it means to exist with nature. Embracing environmental personhood offers humanity an opportunity to test the legal concept as a way to preserve the environment and imagine a new way of coexisting with nature, rather than destroying it.
While the dividends of protecting celestial bodies may not be appreciated by extraterrestrial human inhabitants for generations, there is a potential collateral benefit to the adoption of environmental personhood of the Moon. It is possible that a ruling by the ICJ in favor for environmental personhood spawns a reflective impact on the international community of Earth. Nations may view environmental personhood as a new international norm to which they should conform. Alternatively, the success of an outer space regime for environmental regulation could provide a roadmap for the establishment of systems to combat climate change on Earth. The Paris Agreement sought to take an untested leap forward, but perhaps an experiment in space will provide an example of international environmental cooperation that can be replicated at home.
- 1Brian Higginbotham, The Space Economy: An Industry Takes Off, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/9KCW-7UGN.
- 2Mike Brown, SpaceX Here’s the Timeline for Getting to Mars and Starting a Colony, Inverse (July 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/JWN5-8JNN; Mars & Beyond: The Road to Making Humanity Multiplanetary, SpaceX, https://perma.cc/8CCK-7NQG; see also The Space Race is Dominated by New Contenders, The Economist (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/J59A-BRWS; (detailing the increasing frequency of Chinese, Indian, and private space launches).
- 3Press Release, The European Space Agency, First Crew Starts Living and Working on the International Space Station, (Oct. 31, 2000), https://perma.cc/YX4Q-9GY4.
- 4Soo Youn & Christine Theodorou, Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos Unveils Plans for Space Colonization, ABC News (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/WQ2T-B4Y8.
- 5David A. Wemer, Can International Cooperation in Space Survive Geopolitical Competition on Earth?, Atlantic council (Nov. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/ML99-Y3EA;Stuart Clark, ‘It’s Going to Happen’: Is the World Ready for War in Space?, The Guardian, (Apr. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/PRG7-DD43.
- 6Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, India Today (Sept. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZP82-LKT5.
- 7See Higginbotham, supra note 1.
- 8Chloe Cornish, Interplanetary Players: A Who’s Who of Space Mining, Financial Times (Oct. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/KMR6-KEH3;Jeff Foust, A Trillion-Dollar Space Industry Will Require New Markets, Space News (July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/JG8H-MRCW.
- 9Alex Knapp, With Virgin Galactic’s Latest Flight, Has Space Tourism Finally Arrived?, Forbes (Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/CJ4T-HLWQ;Jonathan O’Callaghan, 2019 Is the Year That Space Tourism Finally Becomes a Reality. No, Really, Wired (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/WM96-3XTK.
- 10Jackie Wattles, NASA Wants Astronauts to Go Back to the Moon in 2024. Is It Possible?, CNN Business (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/2AC9-BMFM;National Aeronautics and Space Administration, America to the Moon by 2024, NASA’s FY 2020 Budget Amendment Summary, https://perma.cc/9NWL-SSR3;Olivia Solon, Elon Musk: We Must Colonize Mars to Preserve Our Species in a Third World War, The Guardian (Mar. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8W5B-BH7T; see Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Brown, supra note 2.
- 11Niklas Reinke, No Helium-3 from Moon – Commentary on the Current Moon Debate, in DLR Countdown #3 25 (2007); see also Fabio Tronchetti, Legal Aspects of Space Resource Utilization, in Handbook of Space Law (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
- 12Tiffany Terrell, Physicist Says Asteroid Mining Ventures Will Spawn First Trillionaire, Global Newswire (Jan. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/J75M-87NA.
- 13Foust, supra note 8; Space: Investing in the Final Frontier, Morgan Stanley (July 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/9FUJ-432V.
- 14Andrea Shalal, Airbus Seeks New Partners to Expand in U.S. Space Market, Reuters (June 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/5TMP-XC9Y;see also Joel Kowsky, From Take Off to Landing, NASA and Boeing Work Together to Launch Commercial Crew, NASA (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/feature/from-take-off-to-landing-nasa-and-boeing-work-together-to-launch-commercial-crew.
- 15Redefining Natural Resources: Why Asteroids, Planetary Recourses, https://perma.cc/363C-ZKKZ.
- 16Meghan Bartels, SpaceX Wants to Send People to Mars. Here’s What the Trip Might Look Like., Space.com (May 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Y3P-BYCD;see also Youn & Theodorou, supra note 4; Erik Sofge, The Most Innovative Space Companies of 2020, Fast Company (Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/X8LS-JAYC.
- 17See Caroline Delber, SpaceX Says There Are No Laws on Mars, So Maybe Elon Musk Will Be President, Popular Mechanics (Oct. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/338Z-TY6K(discussing SpaceX’s terms of service which claim Mars is a free planet and that no Earth-based government has authority over Mars).
- 18Lotta Viikari, The Environmental Element in Space Law: Assessing the Present and Charting the Future 51 (2008).
- 19European Space Policy Institute, Towards a European Approach to Space Traffic Management (2020), https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-public-reports/send/2-public-espi-reports/494-espi-report-71-stm.
- 20See Jonathan O’Callaghan, The FCC’s Approval of SpaceX’s Starlink Mega Constellation May Have Been Unlawful, Scientific American (Jan. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/GVZ7-J87W(detailing the launch of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite system around the Earth has already begun to brighten the sky, inhibiting terrestrial stargazing).
- 21See Megan Garber, The Trash We’ve Left on the Moon, The Atlantic (Dec. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/SCC5-YGPL(listing the many items left from the Apollo missions including human waste). For information about the potential future of contamination, see Margaret S. Race et al., NASA, Planetary Protection Knowledge for Human Extraterrestrial Missions, Workshop Report (2015), https://perma.cc/MF8N-C8GG.
- 22Loren Grush, Why Stowaway Creatures on the Moon Confound International Space Law, The Verge (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/16/20804219/moon-tardigrades-lunar-lander-spaceil-arch-mission-foundation-outer-space-treaty-law.
- 23Id.
- 24Hannah Osborne, Thousands of ‘Indestructible’ Tardigrades Could Be Living on the Moon After Crashing on the Lunar Surface, Newsweek (Aug. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8JDY-G8HU.
- 25Chris Taylor, ‘I’m the First Space Pirate!’ How Tardigrades Were Secretly Smuggled to the Moon, Mashable (Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/98W5-JTVY(noting that Spivack considers himself to be the first space pirate after his smuggling of the tardigrades).
- 26Joseph Stromberg, How Does the Tiny Waterbear Survive in Outer Space, Smithsonian Magazine (Sept. 11, 2012), https://perma.cc/FNF2-74DT;Jason Daley, A Crashed Spacecraft Might Have Put Earth’s Most Indestructible Organisms on the Moon, Smithsonian Magazine (Aug. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/KR99-TW6Z.
- 27Ari Shapiro, Thousands of Tardigrades are Stranded on the Moon After a Failed Lunar Mission, NPR (Aug. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/L4GB-J4CD.
- 28COSPAR, The COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection Role, Structure and Activities, 205 Space Rsch. Today 14 (Aug. 2019) (providing an overview of the planetary protection framework and examples of procedures, including the requirement that missions to other planetary bodies “adhere to stringent planetary protection measures to abide the first rationale for planetary protection to not interfere with ‘scientific investigations of possible extraterrestrial life forms, precursors, and remnants’ and not to impose terrestrial biological contamination to these objects of high astrobiological interest”).
- 29See Manfred Hintz, Environmental Aspects of Settlements on the Moon and Mars Planetary Protection, 34 Proc. L. Outer Space 59, 60 (1991).
- 30Amy Held, China Tried to Grow Cotton on the Moon, but It Didn’t Work, NPR (Jan. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/R67A-BF2N.
- 31Doyle Rice, NASA Says We Can’t Terraform Mars. Elon Musk Disagrees, USA Today (Aug. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/PB84-3THS;see also Sissi Cao, Elon Musk Wants to ‘Nuke Mars’ for Humans to Live—But There is One Problem, Observer (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/VSJ7-9NL6.
- 32See, e.g., Lucianne Walkowicz, The Problem with Terraforming Mars: What Do We Lose If We Make the Red Planet Hospitable to Humans?, Slate (Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/HM3Y-LV5R;Bruce M. Jakosky & Christopher S. Edwards, Inventory of CO2 available for terraforming Mars, 2 Nature Astronomy 634 (2018).
- 33See COSPAR, supra note 28.
- 34Roles and Responsibilities, U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, https://perma.cc/536N-7FQU.
- 35Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
- 36Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
- 37Licensing Process, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Commercial Space Transportation, https://perma.cc/RU2Z-W6Q2.
- 3818 U.S.C. § 7(6).
- 39Frans von der Dunk, The Legal Framework for Space Projects in Europe: Aspects of Applicable Law and Dispute Resolution, in Contracting for Space: Contract Practice in the European Space Sector 357 (Lesley Jane Smith & Ingo Baumann eds., 2011).
- 40Lov om oppskyting av gjenstander fra norsk territorium m.m. ut i verdensrommet, 13 juni 1969 nr. 38 (Nor.).
- 412 § Lag om rymdverksamhet, (Svensk f-författningssamling [SFS] 1982:963) (Swed.).
- 42Loi relative aux activités de lancement, d’opération de vol ou de guidage d'objets spatiaux of Sept.17, 2005, Moniteur Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Nov.4, 2008 (Belg.).
- 43Wet rimtevaartactiviteiten, 24 januari 2007, Stb. 2007, 80 (Neth.).
- 44Loi 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.][Official Gazette of France], June 4, 2008, p. 9169 (Fr.).
- 45See Tronchetti, supra note 11, at 810.
- 46Julie Hunter, Pradeep Singh & Julian Aguon, Broadening Common Heritages, Addressing Gaps in the Deep Sea Mining Regulatory Regime, Harv. Env’t L. Rev. Blog (Apr. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6XE-8K3H.
- 47United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
- 48Id. art. 136.
- 49See Frans G. von der Dunk, The Dark Side of The Moon: The Status of the Moon: Public Concepts and Private Enterprise, 40 Proc. L. Outer Space 119, 121–22 (1997) (discussing the application of the “common heritage of mankind” principle to the Moon).
- 50Kirsten F. Thompson et al., Seabed Mining and Approaches to Governance of the Deep Seabed, Frontiers Marine Science (Dec. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/8BGH-C78E,
- 51Kathryn A. Miller et al., An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development, Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps, Frontiers in Marine Science (Jan. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/P963-2GKQ.
- 52Id. (detailing contracts given to mine off the coast of Africa and Oceania).
- 53See James L. Malone, The United States and the Law of the Sea after UNCLOS III, 46 Law and Contemporary Problems 30 (1983) and Roncevert Ganan Almond, U.S. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, The Diplomat (May 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/V66U-GE68.
- 54Jim Malewitz, Abandoned Texas Oil Wells Seen as “Ticking Time Bombs” of Contamination, Texas Tribune (Dec. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/6EW2-UGQM.
- 55Id.
- 56Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.
- 57Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
- 58Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35.
- 59Id. art. I.
- 60Id. art. II.
- 61See Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 359, 366, 370 (1994).
- 62Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX.
- 63Andrew C. Schuerger, John E. Moores, David J. Smith & Günther Reitz, A Lunar Microbial Survival Model for Predicting the Forward Contamination of the Moon, 19 Astrobiology 730, 752 (2019).
- 64Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention].
- 65Id. art. II.
- 66Id. art. I.
- 67Id. art. I(c)(ii).
- 68See Grush, supra note 22; Osborne, supra note 24.
- 69Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. IX
- 70Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s Claim for Damages Caused by “Cosmos 954”, Can.-U.S.S.R., 1981 Can. T.S. No. 8, art. 2 [hereinafter Claims Protocol].
- 71‘State-sponsored’ here describes space missions funded or executed by nation states rather than activities done for private profit without the inducement of a national government.
- 72See Dan St. John, Comment, The Trouble with Westphalia in Space: The State-Centric Liability Regime, 40 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y 686, 696 (2012).
- 73Cases, International Court of Justice, https://perma.cc/CZ5G-CHWK(“Between 22 May 1947 and 11 November 2019, 178 cases were entered in the General List.”).
- 74Statute of the International Court of Justice, April 18, 1946, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
- 75Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 148 (Mar. 14).
- 76Moon Treaty, supra note 36.
- 77Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in Handbook of Space Law, 717, 726 (Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015).
- 78Chandrayaan-2 Days Away from Moon’s Orbit. What Next, supra note 6.
- 79Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the Shadows?, The Space Review (Oct. 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/K6JA-GJ43.
- 80See David Everett Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J. Nat. Res. & Env’t L. 293, 302–06, 311–13 (1992).
- 81Each of the preambles to the various space treaties refers to the prior agreements and the spirit of law the new treaty seeks to build upon. See Moon Treaty, supra note 35, ¶ 15 (“Recalling the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spaces including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in to Outer Space, the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space . . . .”).
- 82Rescue Agreement, supra note 57.
- 83Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 1.
- 84Id. art. 2.
- 85Id. art 7.
- 86Id. art. 11 § 1.
- 87See Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 363, 410 (2004).
- 88Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 3.
- 89Juan Francisco Salazar, Antarctica and Outer Space: Relational Trajectories, 7 Polar J. 259, 261 (2017) (detailing how the Antarctic Treaty System and Outer Space Treaties both created “extraterritorial zones” in which no nation could claim sovereign territory).
- 90Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11 § 5.
- 91Id. art. 11 § 7.
- 92Id. art. 15 § 2–3.
- 93See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 87 (1984) (discussing the interpretive modes judges use to fill gaps in statutes).
- 94See Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 48 for more information on the international environmental treaty system. See also Rakhyun E. Kim, The Emergent Network Structure of the Multilateral Environmental Agreement System, 23 Glob. Env’t Change 980 (2013) (finding over 747 international environmental agreements since 1857).
- 95See Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
- 96See Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter The London Convention].
- 97Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 456 (1972).
- 98Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
- 99Id. at 741–43.
- 100See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment (3rd ed. 2010).
- 101Id. at 2.
- 102Id. at 8.
- 103See Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 Colum. J. Env’t L. 49, 50 (2018).
- 104See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1333 (2000) (arguing for the expansion of standing to animals).
- 105As with many legal concepts, there are both proponents of and detractors from environmental personhood. The merits are not fully discussed in this Comment; the focus is rather on the application of the concept.
- 106See Rights of Nature, Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, https://perma.cc/M65Y-A8RW.
- 107Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008, Sept. 28, 2008, art. 71–74.
- 108Id.; see also Andrew C. Revkin, Ecuador Constitution Grants Rights to Nature, Dot Earth: N.Y. Times Blog (Sept. 29, 2008), https://perma.cc/TTS6-GYP3.
- 109Natalia Greene, The First Successful Case of the Rights of Nature Implementation in Ecuador, Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, https://perma.cc/23DE-AVUA.
- 110Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra, Law 071 (Dec. 2010) (Bol.); La Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, Law 300 (Oct. 2012) (Bol.); see also John Vidal, Bolivia Enshrines Natural World’s Rights with Equal Status for Mother Earth, The Guardian (Apr. 10, 2011), https://perma.cc/XZV2-ARMT.
- 111Timothy Williams, Legal Rights for Lake Erie? Voters in Ohio City Will Decide, N.Y. Times (Feb. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/4H43-2DY9;see also Dana Zartner, How Giving Legal Rights to Nature Could Help Reduce Toxic Algae Blooms in Lake Erie, Salon (Sept. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/KP2G-X6JH.
- 112Jason Daley, Toledo, Ohio, Just Granted Lake Erie the Same Legal Rights as People, Smithsonian Magazine (Mar. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/BF9D-EBEA.
- 113Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.011 (West 2019).
- 114Id. Additionally, a farmer filed a lawsuit challenging the Lake Erie Bill of Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, No. 3:19 CV 434, 2019 WL 1254011 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2019).
- 115Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, 441 F. Supp. 3d 551, 558 (N.D. Ohio 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, OH, No. 20-3368, 2020 WL 3619934 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom. Drewes Farms P’ship v. City of Toledo, OH, No. 20-3361, 2020 WL 3620205 (6th Cir. May 5, 2020).
- 116Gordon, supra note 103, at 58–61.
- 117Te Urewera Act 2014 (N.Z.).
- 118Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (N.Z.); see also Kennedy Warne, A Voice for Nature, National Geographic (Apr. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/HC9L-7XAM.
- 119Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL) No. 126 of 2014 in the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (2017) (India); see also After New Zealand, India’s Ganges Gains Legal Status of a Person, Dhaka Tribune (Mar. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/4RAC-K83R;Rina Chandran, India’s Sacred Ganges and Yamuna Rivers Granted Same Legal Rights as Humans, Reuters (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/45PP-Z29L.
- 120Press Release, Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, Colombia Constitutional Court Finds Atrato River Possesses Rights (May 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/A9H3-LKCQ.
- 121Nicholas Bryner, Colombian Supreme Court Recognizes Rights of the Amazon River Ecosystem, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (Apr. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/9CSU-ERYV. For the original opinion in Spanish, see Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Civil, abril 5, 2018, M.P.: L. Villabona, STC4360-2018 (Colom.), http://www.cortesuprema.gov.co/corte/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/STC4360-2018-2018-00319-011.pdf.
- 122Rina Chandran, Fears of Evictions as Bangladesh Gives Rivers Legal Rights, Reuters (July 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/4SRX-WSUM.
- 123See Andres Schipani, Grassroots Summit Calls for International Climate Court, The Guardian (Apr. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/LSL3-PCQZ;Brandon Keim, Nature to Get Legal Rights in Bolivia, Wired (Apr. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/CE7E-X8TE.
- 124Cormac Cullinan, A Tribunal for Earth: Why it Matters, International Rights of Nature Tribunal, https://perma.cc/68VZ-LK8W.
- 125See Linda Sheehan, No One Is Above Nature’s Rule of Law, Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation, https://perma.cc/68VZ-LK8W;Bolivia’s Leadership, Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature, https://perma.cc/RTF8-QYTH.
- 126U.N. Charter arts. 92, 94–96.
- 127Declarations Recognizing Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, Int’l Ct. Just., https://perma.cc/CB6H-8FUD.
- 128Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), Order, 2013 I.C.J. 278 (Sep. 13).
- 129Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Provisional Measures, 2007 I.C.J. 3 (Jan. 23).
- 130Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 150 (Feb. 2).
- 131See Frans G. von der Dunk, Space for Dispute Settlement Mechanisms – Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Space? A Few Legal Considerations, Univ. of Neb. College of Law, Space, Cyber, and Telecommunications Law Program Faculty Publications (2001); see also Viikari, supra note 18, at 287 (noting the availability of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for use by private parties).
- 132Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. III, with similar language in the Space Liability Convention.
- 133U.N. Charter art. 33; see also Viikari, supra note 18, at 289–90.
- 134See Viikari, supra note 18, at 307.
- 135See Viikari, supra note 77, at 729–30.
- 136ICJ Statute, supra note 74.
- 137Id. art. 38.
- 138See Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon: U.S. Policy Options, 33 Ford. J. Int’l L.J. 243, 259 (2009).
- 139See James R. Wilson, Note, Regulation of the Outer Space Environment Through International Accord: The 1979 Moon Treaty, 2 Fordham Env’t L. Rev. 173, 176–77 (2011).
- 140See Te Urewera Act, supra note 117; Te Awa Tupua Act, supra note 118.
- 141Moon Treaty, supra note 36, art. 11.
- 142Tronchetti, supra note 11, at 811.
- 143Id. at 812.
- 144See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 54 (1991) (discussing the relationship between “private” tort law and “public” statutes in regulatory frameworks).
- 145See generally Brian C. Weeden & Tiffany Chow, Taking a Common-Pool Resources Approach to Space Sustainability: A Framework and Potential Policies, 28 Space Pol’y 166 (2012).
- 146See Chandran, supra note 122.
- 147See Warne, supra note 118.
- 148See Bryner, supra note 121.
- 149Claims Protocol, supra note 70.
- 150Id.
- 151Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 150 (Feb. 2).
- 152How the Court Works, Int’l Ct. Just., https://perma.cc/H85W-XHK7.
- 153U.N. Charter art. 96.
- 154Id.
- 155Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 93 (July 8).
- 156Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion, 1960 I.C.J. 43 (June 8).
- 157Space Liability Convention, supra note 64, art. I.
- 158Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies and Others, U.N., https://perma.cc/4BME-UKSB.
- 159See Space Frontier Act of 2019, S. 919, 116th Cong. (2018); Invest in Space Now Act, H.R. 2358, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
- 160See Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 23 (2005) (discussing how the current space regime does not provide for property rights, a major impediment for space exploration, exploitation, and development).
- 161Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Nov. 26).
- 162See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1445 (1985) (noting that in 1985, the U.S. terminated its Declaration of Aug. 26, 1946, which had provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ).
- 163Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
- 164Tannenwald, supra note 87, at 421.
- 165John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial Arbitrations, 21 Mich J. Int’l L. 1, 4 (1999).
- 166Jarno Vanto, Attorneys’ Fees as Damages in International Commercial Litigation, 15 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 203, 204 (2003).
- 167See Viikari, supra note 77, at 764.
- 168Id.
- 169See Bilder, supra note 138, at 268.
- 170Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. II.
- 171Berin Szoka & James Dunstan, Space Law: Is Asteroid Mining Legal?, Wired (May 1, 2012), https://perma.cc/CNN6-FK2C.
- 172Nemitz v. NASA, 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
- 173Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030599-HDM (RAM), 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Nemitz v. NASA, 126 F. App’x 343 (9th Cir. 2005).
- 174Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1367, 1403–04 (2011).
- 175Id. at 1404.
- 176This refers to the idea that regulatory agencies can be “captured” by the influence of lobbyists from the industries they seek to regulate in order to coopt them to meet the industry’s goals.
- 177Dispute Resolution Services, Permanent Court of Arbitration, https://perma.cc/8VHG-MSVG.