Justice from the General Assembly: An International Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine
In February 2022, the Russian Federation invaded the territory of Ukraine, igniting the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. After nearly two years of combat, considerable evidence has emerged that Russian forces have committed a multitude of international crimes throughout occupied Ukraine. While the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed on Ukraine’s territory, it does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. As a consequence, those most responsible for launching the invasion of Ukraine are currently beyond the reach of international justice. In the face of Security Council stalemate and an absence of ICC authority, this Article argues that under the powers articulated in the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution, the General Assembly has the authority to convene an international tribunal capable of prosecuting the crime of aggression in Ukraine. To support this conclusion, this Article proceeds with an analysis of the crime of aggression, prior relevant tribunals and related theories of delegation and conferral, and the General Assembly’s authority in the realm of international peace, security, and justice. It concludes that under a theory of delegated jurisdiction from Ukraine and conferred authority from the General Assembly, the international community has the tools necessary to constitute an international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression in Ukraine.
On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ordering troops arrayed along Ukraine’s northern, western, and southern borders to commence an attack that would shortly turn into Europe’s largest military engagement since World War II.1
Matthew Mpoke Bigg, Russia invaded Ukraine more than 10 months ago. Here is one key development from every month of the war, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2023), https://perma.cc/XFW3-BNNK;John Follain & Andra Timu, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Key Events and How It’s Unfolding, Bloomberg (Feb. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/9QAH-X8TW.
Marc Santora, This is What Trench Warfare on the Front Line Is Like, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2023) https://perma.cc/4Z3C-HCX3;Peter Beaumont, Fighting in east Ukraine descends into trench warfare as Russia seeks breakthrough, The Guardian (Nov. 28, 2022), https://perma.cc/WA9M-2BZR.
Helene Cooper et al., Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. Times (Aug. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/PU44-GWKN(citing U.S. official estimates of 300,000 Russian and 170,000-190,000 Ukrainian casualties).
See, e.g., Lori Hinnant & Jamey Keaten, UN-backed inquiry accuses Russia of war crimes in Ukraine, Associated Press (Mar. 16, 2023), https://perma.cc/E9C8-5V93;Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas, (Apr. 3, 2022), https://perma.cc/7MFP-YAN6.
Press Release, UN Commission concludes that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine, expresses concern about suffering of civilians, U.N. Press Release (Sept. 23, 2022), https://perma.cc/T78U-GZX8.
Jasmine Wright, US declares Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine, CNN Politics (Feb. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/ZFM6-7FCF.
Council of Europe, The forcible transfer and ‘russification’ of Ukrainian children shows evidence of genocide, says PACE [Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe], (Apr. 28, 2023), https://perma.cc/EFF5-HFUY;Alex Hinton, A year on, we have clear evidence of genocide in Ukraine, The Hill (Feb. 19, 2023), https://perma.cc/D855-DF4S.
Press Release, Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issues Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova (Mar. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/2CVL-SMRJ.
The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes in Ukraine pursuant to the Rome Statute, a multilateral treaty adopted in 1998 and which went into effect in 2002.9
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ch. XVIII, art. 126, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law in The Oxford Handbook of Int’l Crim. L. 768 (Kevin Jon Heller et al. ed., 2020).
Ukraine: Situation in Ukraine, ICC-01/22, Investigation (Mar. 2, 2022) https://perma.cc/3NJV-GM52.
Id.
The crime of aggression is defined in the Rome Statute as the “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State” in a manner which, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitutes a “manifest violation” of the U.N. Charter.13
Rome Statute, art. 8 bis.
Id. art. 15.
In response to this dilemma, Ukrainian officials have begun to advocate for an international criminal tribunal specifically covering the crime of aggression.15
Jennifer Hansler, Ukrainians push for US to support special tribunal to prosecute Russian leadership for crime of aggression, CNN Politics (Dec. 14, 2022), https://perma.cc/5ZP7-6JRS.
Id.
Göran Sluiter, The criminal justice response to the war in Ukraine one year later - the arrest warrant against Putin from the ICC and the discussion of a special ‘aggression tribunal’, Rethinking SLIC (Mar. 3, 2023), https://perma.cc/RSV3-JZN4.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 955, (Nov. 8, 1994) (invoking Chapter VII in order to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
This Article therefore examines whether the General Assembly (GA) has the authority, absent UNSC support, to establish an international tribunal for the crime of aggression. While the idea of a special tribunal for Ukraine has been floated and supported by the European Union (which has already established an investigative body),19
Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Ukraine: International Centre for the prosecution of Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine starts operations today, European Commission (July 3, 2023), https://perma.cc/PHM6-36Z3.
Jennifer Hansler, US announces it supports creation of special tribunal to prosecute Russia for ‘crime of aggression in Ukraine, CNN Politics (Mar. 28, 2023), https://perma.cc/H2VS-KKZ9.
Hansler, supra note 15.
See, e.g., Hans Corell, A Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression: The Role of the U.N. GA, Just Security (Feb. 14, 2023), https://perma.cc/Z2T4-VQSX.
See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Jennifer Trahan’s Cambodia Problem, Opinio Juris, (Apr. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/4WDT-XCLH.
See, e.g., European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, https://perma.cc/KMN8-72VP.
The discussion proceeds in four parts. Part II provides background information on the crime of aggression and its unique jurisdictional framework. Part III provides an overview of relevant international tribunals which did not rely on the UNSC and related theories of delegated and conferred jurisdiction. Part IV assesses the GA’s legal authority in the context of international peace, security, and law. While considering relevant Ukrainian law, Part V addresses the competence of the GA to constitute an aggression tribunal for Ukraine and concludes that such a tribunal would be an intra vires assertion of GA authority.
Although aggression is a core crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, its mode of commission and liability are distinct from those of the other crimes covered by the Rome Statute. Generally speaking, international criminal law concerns the protection of individuals from atrocities.25
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson & Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to International criminal Law and Procedure 3 (4th Edition) (2019).
Cryer et al., id., at 3.
Id.
See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n, on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, Art. 16(4) (Jul. 26, 1996).
Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 297.
The crime of aggression was conceived as a tool to target the masterminds of violent conflicts. Article 6(a) of the London Charter—the Allied agreement that laid out the charges to be levied against Nazi war criminals—gave the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) jurisdiction over “crimes against peace,” defined in part as the preparation, planning, and waging of a war of aggression “in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances.”30
Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 280 U.N.T.S. 1951 [hereinafter London Agreement].
Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 22, at 426 (Sept. 30, 1946) https://perma.cc/6UH5-F6LU.
In response to accusations that the Nuremberg IMT was violating the principle of legality by prosecuting German defendants under a novel and uncodified concept of criminal liability, the IMT turned to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 32
Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 2, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat, 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
Id.
Richard Overy, Blood & Ruins: The Last Imperial War, 1931-1945 610 (2021).
Id.
Judgment and Sentences, at 218 (Int’l Mil. Trib. (Nuremberg), Oct. 1, 1946) reprinted in 41 Am. J. of Int’l L. 172, 218 (1947) [hereinafter Judgment and Sentences]; see also Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 298.
In the years since the IMT’s judgment a consensus emerged that, notwithstanding the novelty of the charge at the time of Nuremberg, the crime of aggression had since passed into customary international law and had therefore become binding on States.37
Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 Harv. Int’l L. J. 357, 370 (2012); see also North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (holding that in order for a rule to become part of customary international law “[n]ot only must the acts concerned be a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it [. . .] the states concerned must feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”).
U.N. Charter art 2(4).
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974).
Id. art. 5.
Id.
Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, art. 16 (Jul. 26, 1996).
Scharf, supra note 37, at 370.
Although the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998 and went into force in 2002, it did not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until nearly two decades later. 44
Nu Ri Jung, A Study on the Efficacy of the Kampala Amendments for Suppression of Aggression: Examined by the Case of Armed Conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, 10 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 157, 162 (2013).
Rome Statute, art. 5.
Id.; Juan José Quintana, A Note on the Activation of the ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 17 L. and Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 236, 238 (2018).
Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, States Parties to the Rome Statute have the option to “opt out” of the Court’s jurisdiction as it relates to aggression. First, pursuant to Article 121, in the case of amendments to the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute, “the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory” if the State Party has not accepted the amendment.47
Rome Statute, art. 121.
Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 313.
Quintana, supra note 46, at 243.
Rome Statute, art. 15.
See, e.g., Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19-27, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Nov. 14, 2019).
The structure of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute severely limits the ICC’s reach. As it stands, the ICC would not be able to prosecute Russian nationals for the crime of aggression even though Ukraine has voluntarily accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction. The language of Article 15 bis is unequivocal; the Court has no authority to prosecute non-States Parties with respect to the crime of aggression. Although the law of aggression has matured considerably since the Nuremberg IMT, Russian impunity in the present case illustrates that effective authority over the “ultimate evil or supreme international crime” continues to be greatly restricted.52
Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 313; Nu Ri Jung, A Study on the Efficacy of the Kampala Amendments for Suppression of Aggression: Examined by the Case of Armed Conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, 10 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev 157, 160 (2013).
Since Nuremberg, the international community has created a number of international legal mechanisms. Perhaps most notable among these were the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which were established in the 1990s to prosecute core crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively53
S.C. Res. 827, (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955, (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR).
Id.
Jennifer Trahan, U.N. GA Should Recommend Creation of Crime of Aggression Tribunal for Ukraine: Nuremberg is Not the Model, Just Security (Mar. 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/BM9C-JVYY.
After nearly a decade of violent civil conflict that began in 1991, President Kabbah of Sierra Leone sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the U.N.56
Sarah Kendall, “Hybrid” Justice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 51 Stud. in L., Pol. & Soc’y: Special Issue: Interdisc. Legal Stud.—The Next Generation 1, 8 (2010).
Id.
Id.
S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
Id.
Kendall, supra note 56, at 10–11.
Notably for this analysis, although the UNSC spurred the Secretary-General to action with Resolution 1315, the SCSL’s structure was ultimately not a product of the UNSC, unlike the ICTY or ICTR. The final text of the agreement between the U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone emphasizes the independence of the SCSL from the UNSC, declaring in its preamble that “the Secretary-General of the United Nations . . . and the Government of Sierra Leone . . . have held such negotiations for the establishment of a Special Court.”62
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137.
Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 176.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, (Oct. 4, 2000); Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 80 Int’l. Affs. 311, 316–17 (2004).
Dougherty, id., at 321.
Id.
By endowing itself with jurisdiction over crimes under both Sierra Leonean and international law, the SCSL sought to preempt “any challenge to the Court’s legality on the basis of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.”67
Alison Smith, Sierra Leone: The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice, in Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia 133 (Cesare P.R. Romano, André Nollkaemper, & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2004).
See, e.g., Aly Mokhtar, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege: Aspects and Prospects, 26 Statute L. Rev. 41, 41 (2005).
Id.
Smith, supra note 67, at 133.
Id.
Id.
Notwithstanding efforts to ensure the SCSL’s adherence to the legality principle, the structure and legitimacy of the SCSL was not without its critics. Counsel for Moinina Fofana—a Sierra Leonian commander who was ultimately convicted of war crimes—rejected the principle that the Secretary-General had the authority to conclude an agreement with Sierra Leone and denied the premise that Sierra Leone’s consent was sufficient to bestow the tribunal with binding jurisdiction.73
Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Reply to the Prosecution Response to the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Jurisdiction: Illegal Delegation of Powers by the United Nations, ¶ 7 (Nov. 30, 2003).
Id.
Id.
Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae: Illegal Delegation of Powers by the United Nations, ¶ 18 (May 25, 2004).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 1.
Id.
The SCSL’s sui generis structure, mixed bases of subject-matter jurisdiction, delegated authority, and lack of “institutional links to the [UNSC]” provides a valuable analogy for a potential path forward vis-à-vis Russian aggression in Ukraine, as will be discussed in Part V.80
Dougherty, supra note 64, at 316.
In the latter half of the 1970s, the people inhabiting the territory of present-day Cambodia were subjected to the notoriously violent rule of the Khmer Rouge, a revolutionary guerilla movement that established the short-lived state of Democratic Kampuchea.81
John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 2 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 7.
Rebecca Gidley, Illiberal Transitional Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 81 (2019).
Acknowledging Cambodia’s lack of resources and expertise, the letter sought the U.N.’s assistance in establishing a court similar to the tribunals created for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.85
Id.
G.A. Res. 52/135, ¶ 16 (Feb. 27, 1998).
Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 33.
Id.; G.A. Res. 57/228, art. 1 (Dec. 18, 2002).
Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 33.
Agreement Between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117; Gidley, supra note 84, at 92.
The ECCC has a more “ambiguous legal identity” than the SCSL, namely because it is “the only hybrid court featuring U.N. involvement to be established by an act by a domestic legislature.”91
Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Andrew T. Cayley, Prosecuting Mass Atrocities at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), 11 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev., 445, 446 (2011).
The ECCC’s mixed jurisdiction over international and domestic crimes, compounded by its sui generis status as a quasi-domestic internationalized court, gave rise to objections that mirrored those raised in opposition to the authority of the SCSL. In Case 002—in which multiple defendants were ultimately convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide—the defense argued that because the ECCC was essentially a creature of domestic law, it lacked jurisdiction over international crimes and modes of liability.97
Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 51.
Id.
Much like the SCSL, it was imperative that the ECCC abide by the legality principle; for a court blessed with the imprimatur of the U.N., it was essential that the ECCC adhere to “international standards of justice.”99
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
1. Delegation theory.
While the ECCC, unlike the SCSL, was partially embedded within the domestic legal structure of its home state, it nonetheless placed a similar reliance on the principle of delegated jurisdiction in order to assert authority over crimes established and committed in a domestic context but tried in an internationalized one. From the Nuremberg IMT to the ICC, the concept of delegated jurisdiction has endowed international tribunals with the necessary authority to try cases arising out of crimes committed on the territory of consenting states.102
Monique Cormier, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-States Parties 44–46 (2020).
Id.; Judgment and Sentences, supra note 36 at 218.
Cormier, supra note 102, at 38.
In the modern era, “delegated jurisdiction has largely become the presumed legal basis” by which international courts legitimately exercise jurisdiction over other countries’ nationals.105
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 78 (July 8).
2. Conferral theory.
Delegation is not, however, the only theory upon which international tribunals exercise jurisdiction. Whereas delegated jurisdiction is conceptually limited to the grant of authority by an entity with jurisdiction to one that does not, the concept of conferred jurisdiction is more expansive.107
Lelia N. Sadat, The Conferred Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 1 (2023) (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 23-03-01).
Id.
Id.
Cormier, supra note 102, at 56.
The theory of conferral is, for example, the basis upon which the ICJ exercises its jurisdiction. States established the ICJ “precisely because, by and large, they cannot hear disputes between sovereign States in their national courts.”111
Sadat, supra note 107, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In the Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, the ICJ recognized the validity of the conferral theory. The court determined that “fifty States, representing the vast majority of the Members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone.”116
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (Apr. 11); Cormier, supra note 102, at 56.
Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute,” Pre-Trial Chamber I, ¶ 48 (Sept. 6, 2018) (emphasis added); Cormier, supra note 102, at 56.
The previous section illustrated the capacity of the U.N. to act decisively in the realm of international criminal law even without the UNSC. The successes of the SCSL and ECCC speak to the potential for the U.N. to be an instrument of international justice even where the UNSC has decided it need not—or, in the case of Ukraine, simply will not—act. While the previous section focused primarily on the capacity to build tribunals without the binding authority of a Chapter VII resolution, this section places the focus on the GA itself, assessing its powers and weaknesses within the U.N. system as it relates to issues of security and the administration of international criminal justice generally and with respect to the Uniting for Peace resolution specifically.
Chapter IV of the U.N. Charter establishes the GA as the deliberative body within the U.N. system, and the GA’s relevant authority is defined in Articles 10, 11, 12, 14, and 22. Under Article 10, the GA may “discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter.”118
U.N. Charter art. 10.
Id. art. 11.
Id. art 12; Anne-Cécile Robert & Romuald Sciora, The General Assembly: The Hidden Side of the United Nations, 6 Int’l Pol. Rev. 20, 21 (2018).
U.N. Charter art 14.
Id. art. 22.
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 15 (July 28).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 56.
Simon Chesterman et al., Legal Status, in Law and Practice of the United Nations: Documents and Commentary 113 (2d ed. 2016).
Nonetheless, in addition to its capacity to establish judicial bodies capable of rendering binding judgments, the GA has slowly accreted to itself something resembling legislative power as well. One way in which it has done so is through the adoption of multilateral treaties. This process is initiated when a state or cohort of states introduces a proposal to the GA, whereafter it is sent to a drafting body within the GA, after which the sponsoring state’s draft is subjected to negotiations. This process is finalized once the treaty has been ratified or acceded to by the necessary number of States Parties.128
Id. at 152.
Id. at 154; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 Resolution].
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
In the 1986 Nicaragua case on the use of force, the ICJ was presented with a direct opportunity to address the legal character of the 1970 Resolution.131
Id.
Chesterman et al., supra note 127, at 153.
Nicaragua, supra note 130, ¶ 188, (emphasis added).
Chesterman et al., supra note 127, at 153.
Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan & Saima Ahmed, Dealing with the Rohingya Crisis: The Relevance of the General Assembly and R2P, 5 Asian J. Comp. Pol. 121, 134 (2020).
Article 24 of the U.N. Charter endows the UNSC with primary responsibility for issues relating to international peace and security, however, the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the 1962 Certain Expenses case conclusively established that the UNSC’s authority in this realm is not exclusive.136
Rebecca Barber, Accountability for Crimes against the Rohingya: Possibilities for the General Assembly where the Security Council Fails, 17 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 557, 562 (2019).
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (July 20, 1962).
Id.
Id.
Barber, supra note 136, at 564.
Indeed, consistent with the ICJ’s determination, the GA has in the intervening years become increasingly involved in the realm of international security and justice, passing a variety of resolutions that have radically transformed a space previously thought to be the sole province of the UNSC. These include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document establishing states’ responsibility to protect (“R2P”) their populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.141
Khan & Ahmed, supra note 135, at 133–34.
Barber, supra note 136, at 580.
Michael Ramsden & Tomas Hamilton, Uniting Against Impunity: The UN General Assembly as a Catalyst for Action at the ICC, 66 Int’l Crim. L. Q. 893, 916 (2017).
Furthermore, even though Article 12(1) of the Charter maintains that the GA “shall not make any recommendation with regard” to a dispute or situation that the UNSC is actively engaged in, even this prohibition has slowly eroded over the years.144
Barber, supra note 136, at 564.
Id.
Id.; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 149 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].
Barber, supra note 136, at 564.
In 1997, as a leadup to the creation of the ECCC, the GA created the Group of Experts for Cambodia.148
Michael Kirby, Human Rights, the United Nations and Cambodia, 67 Australian Q. 948, 949 (1999).
Id.; Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 Am. J. Int’l. L. 948, 949 (1999).
Ramsden & Hamilton, supra note 143, at 897.
These commissions have not shied away from making legal determinations on the basis of their inquiries.151
Id. at 898.
Id.
Barber, supra note 136, at 565.
Id.; G.A. Res. 71/258, (2016).
Barber, supra note 136, at 565.
Id.
In 1950, the GA laid the groundwork for a full-scale and deliberate usurpation of UNSC authority with the issuance of Resolution 377, known as “Uniting for Peace” (“U4P”). U4P was first conceptualized as a means of overcoming the Soviet Union’s veto power on the UNSC in light of its obstruction of any U.N. action relating to the Korean War.157
Larry D. Jonhson, “Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?, 108 Am. J. of Int’l L. Unbound 106, 108 (2014).
G.A. Res. 377 (V), Uniting for Peace (Nov. 3, 1950) [hereinafter Uniting for Peace].
If the [UNSC], because of a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the [GA] shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary.159
159Id. at ¶ 1.
U4P is activated under two circumstances: either a member of the UNSC can request the GA to commence a special session, or GA members can do so by a majority vote.160
Id.
Barber, supra note 136, at 568.
Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
First, there must be a lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the UNSC on an issue relating to international peace and security.163
Uniting for Peace, supra note 158.
Barber, supra note 136, at 568.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
Second, there must be a failure on the part of the UNSC to exercise its responsibility for maintaining and protecting international peace and security.167
Id.
Barber, supra note 136, at 568.
Id.; Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
Barber, supra note 136, at 569.
This determination is drawn from one of three conclusions about the U.N. Charter itself. First, “[i]f a veto prevents the Council from responding to a threat to or breach of the peace, it may be argued that the veto was not in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N., thus denoting failure.”171
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Furthermore, any ambiguity as to whether or not a permanent member has wielded an illegitimate veto is clarified by the 2015 “code of conduct regarding [UNSC] action against genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,” which, at its launch, enjoyed the support of 104 U.N. States Parties.175
Id. at 570; G.A. Res. 70/621, Strengthening of the United Nations System, (Dec. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Code of Conduct]; Parliamentarians for Global Action, Launch of the Code of Conduct Regarding UNSC Action Against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes (Oct. 27, 2015) https://perma.cc/3LVS-VJAB.
Code of Conduct, supra note 175, ¶ 2.
Barber, supra note 136, at 571.
Where both conditions of U4P are met, the GA “shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.”178
Uniting for Peace, supra note 158.
Id.; Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
Johnson, supra note 157, at 111.
It is relevant to note that U4P does not necessarily expand the GA’s authority; rather, it is an expression of what the GA considers to be its authority and responsibility within the bounds of the U.N. Charter. U4P is important “not in the sense of creating new powers, but in the sense of revealing a latent potential in the Charter itself, and setting it on a firm foundation.”181
Barber, supra note 136, at 572 (citing Harry Reicher, The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Its Passage, 20 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 48 (1981)).
The previous two sections demonstrate the power of the U.N. system to act in instances where the UNSC is unwilling or unable to do so. Section III analyzed the SCSL and ECCC, two courts established under the auspices of the GA and the Secretariat which illustrate the capacity of the international community to establish courts capable of exercising binding judgments over defendants accused of both domestic and international crimes. In both instances, these courts asserted jurisdiction without the authority of a binding Chapter VII resolution from the UNSC; indeed, in the case of the SCSL, the UNSC explicitly rejected the notion that a Chapter VII resolution was necessary since the territorial state had acquiesced to the creation of the court.182
Id.
Section IV established the considerable authority of the GA to act even in situations involving international peace and security, terrain originally conceived of as the sole province of the UNSC. First, the ICJ has repeatedly demonstrated that the GA has an important and complementary role to play in the realm of international peace, security, and justice. In the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ confirmed that the UNSC’s authority over issues that implicate the Council’s Chapter VII authority is not exclusive; in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ further determined that Article 12 of the U.N. Charter no longer constitutes a complete bar on the GA’s ability to consider issues being deliberated by the UNSC; in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ confirmed that GA resolutions may be more than merely declarative or clarificatory; in the Effect of Awards Advisory Opinion, the ICJ upheld the GA’s authority to establish an adjudicatory tribunal under Article 22 of the U.N. Charter. Together, these precedents provide support for the notion that GA resolutions can assume “binding effect where this reflects the will of the U.N. membership to confer on [a] body authoritative competencies.”183
Ramsden & Hamilton, supra note 143, at 916.
Id. at 921.
With these arguments in mind, Section V lays out the means by which the GA may constitute a binding international court with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in Ukraine.
That U4P is applicable in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is of little doubt. On February 27, 2022, merely three days after Russia invaded, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2623.185
S.C. Res. 2623 (Feb. 27, 2022).
Id.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Calls Emergency Special Session of GA on Ukraine Crisis, Adopting Resolution 2623 (2022) by 11 Votes in Favour, 1 Against, 3 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/14809 (Feb. 27 2022), https://perma.cc/2X68-K9W4.
U4P’s second requirement, that the GA determine for itself whether “there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” was satisfied on March 2, 2022, by GA Resolution ES-11/1.188
G.A. Res. ES-11/1 (Mar. 2, 2022).
Id.
Id.; 1970 Resolution, supra note 129.
Nicaragua, supra note 130, ¶ 188.
The GA has thus established the existence of an act of aggression and threat to the peace sufficient to normally trigger the UNSC’s Chapter VII authority. The failure of the UNSC to act on account of an absence of unanimity, and the subsequent referral of the situation to the GA, thereby satisfied U4P’s two trigger mechanisms, justifying further GA action. Per the language of U4P, the GA is therefore within its rights to “mak[e] appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures.”192
Uniting for Peace, supra note 158.
Id.
In order to establish a tribunal, the GA will have to rely on Article 22. As discussed in Section VI, the ICJ determined in the Effect of Awards case that the GA may create “an independent and truly judicial body [capable of] pronouncing final judgments without appeal within the limited field of its functions.”194
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, supra note 123.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 137, at 163; Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 146, at 163.
Furthermore, the purpose for which the U.N. was created operates as an independent source of authority. The U.N.’s raison d’être is the prevention of the “scourge” of war and ensuring comity between nations; if, therefore, “a particular course of action by the Assembly is essential” in order to maintain international peace and security, “there is a presumption that it is intra vires.”196
Barber, supra note 136, at 580.
In the SCSL and the ECCC, the tribunals did not have jurisdiction over criminal defendants because of some latent coercive power embedded within the authority of the Secretariat or the GA. Rather, the jurisdiction was given to those bodies by the states that had territorial jurisdiction over the crimes being charged: Sierra Leone and Cambodia. Indeed, it is exactly because the SCSL was constituted with the “express cooperation” of Sierra Leone that the UNSC determined that coercive Chapter VII authority was unnecessary to create a binding tribunal in that case, in contrast to the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.197
Dougherty, supra note 64, at 321.
Barber, supra note 136, at 580; Judgment and Sentences, supra note 36.
Furthermore, under the conferral theory, a court created by consensus among members of the GA would be able to overcome issues relating to Head of State immunities that exist at the domestic level. It is well established that personal immunity is an “absolute procedural bar to prosecution of sittings Heads of State in all foreign domestic jurisdictions.”199
Cormier, supra note 102, at 93.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) (discussing the conditions under which traditional immunities may be abrogated consistent with international law).
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Anx1, Judgement in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Evoe-Usuji, Morrison, Jofmański, and Bossa (May 6, 2019).
Id.; Cormier, supra note 102, at 93.
While Section III held up the SCSL and ECCC as examples upon which a tribunal in Ukraine may be based, this analysis was based solely on what the GA and Secretariat could conceivably do in the absence of UNSC support. It did not take into account what Ukraine could do, or how those tribunals would comport with Ukrainian law. A quirk in the Ukrainian constitution likely renders a tribunal like the ECCC impossible. This is because Article 125 of the Ukrainian constitution places a direct bar on courts like the ECCC. Article 125 of the constitution states plainly that the “creation of extraordinary and special courts shall not be permitted.”203
Конституція України [Constitution] Jun. 28, 1996, art. 125 (Ukr.) (hereinafter Ukrainian Constitution).
Cormier, supra note 102, at 74.
Id.; Ukrainian Constitution, supra note 203, arts. 124, 125.
As discussed in Section I, since 1945, the crime of aggression “has . . . ripened into customary international law.”206
Scharf, supra note 37, at 370.
Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, Art. 16 (Jul. 26, 1996); Scharf, supra note 37, at 373.
- Planning, preparation or waging of an aggressive war or armed conflict, or conspiring for any such purposes shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to twelve years.
- Conducting an aggressive war or aggressive military operations shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years.208
208Кримінальний кодекс України [Criminal Code of Ukraine] art. 437 (Ukr.).
Alternative plans for accountability in Ukraine largely rely on customary international law or the Rome Statute’s articulation of aggression as the basis for bringing a potential prosecution. This proposal disagrees. Ukrainian law is not only sufficient and largely analogous to definitions under customary international law, it also ensures a strict adherence to the principle of legality. Russia is one of the states that explicitly did not ratify either the Rome Statute or the Kampala Amendments. As discussed, even the Kampala amendments have an opt-out mechanism for states that do not wish to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC for the crime of aggression. Given this, relying on Ukraine’s crime of aggression appears to comport with the principle of legality more closely. Ukraine is the territorial state, it has undisputed jurisdiction, it is the victim of the crime for which Russian perpetrators would be charged, and its right to try such crimes is unimpeachable.
Furthermore, the reality of charging defendants under the customary definition of aggression is a legal novelty. The closest historical analogy was at the Nuremberg IMT, where defendants were charged with “crimes against peace.”209
Judgment and Sentences, supra note 36, at 218.
Kevin Jon Heller, What Is an International Crime? (A Revisionist History), 58 Harvard Int’l L. J. 353, 368 (2017).
Id.
Id.
The proposal to establish a tribunal competent over the crime of aggression for Ukraine is not novel and has been the subject of rich academic and legal debate both within and without Ukraine. Several of the most prominent proposals are discussed and compared here. In March 2022, the group known as The Elders—established by Nelson Mandela in 2007—suggested the creation of a tribunal for Ukraine that would be “complementary” to other proceedings.213
The Elders Call for a Criminal Tribunal to Investigate Alleged Crime of Aggression in Ukraine, The Elders (Mar. 5, 2022), https://perma.cc/435V-2REX.
Kevin Jon Heller, Jennifer Trahan’s Cambodia Problem, Opinio Juris (Apr. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/8XJM-TJQ5.
Id.
On March 4, 2023, the European Union (EU) agreed to establish an International Centre for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA).216
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the Eur. Comm’n, Statement by President von der Leyen on the Establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression against Ukraine (Mar. 4, 2023), https://perma.cc/A9KA-9QFG.
International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, Eur. Union Agency for Crim. Just. Coop. (Sept. 16, 2023) https://perma.cc/YE7E-65PR.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14, 2002).
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (Apr. 11); Cormier, supra note 102, at 56; Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute,’ Pre-Trial Chamber I (Sept. 6, 2018).
Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federal Immediately End Illegal Use of Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops, U.N. Press Release GA/12407 (Mar. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/U28R-ZU28.
On September 7, 2022, the Ukraine Task Force of The Global Accountability Network submitted a proposed resolution for the GA and an accompanying proposal for a statute for a special tribunal for Ukraine on the crime of aggression.221
Hans Corell, A Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression: The Role of the U.N. General Assembly, Just Security (Feb. 14, 2023), https://perma.cc/92VL-Y8VL.
“If the crime of aggression had not been committed,” noted Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin during an April 2023 speech at Columbia Law School, “then there would not be 80,000 war crimes committed by Russians, there would be no thousands and thousands of victims or people who have suffered from this war . . . Every Ukrainian is a victim of this war.”222
Andriy Kostin, Prosecutor General of Ukr., Speech at Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute (Apr. 21, 2023).
In reference to the conscript army that Ukraine has been forced to raise in response to Russia’s invasion, Prosecutor General Kostin observed that
“[t]hese servicemen yesterday were civilians . . . as a matter of justice for them, the act of aggression and people who initiated and executed and implemented it must be punished.”
The GA has the authority to do just that.223
Id.
- 1Matthew Mpoke Bigg, Russia invaded Ukraine more than 10 months ago. Here is one key development from every month of the war, N.Y. Times (Jan. 9, 2023), https://perma.cc/XFW3-BNNK;John Follain & Andra Timu, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Key Events and How It’s Unfolding, Bloomberg (Feb. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/9QAH-X8TW.
- 2Marc Santora, This is What Trench Warfare on the Front Line Is Like, N.Y. Times (Mar. 5, 2023) https://perma.cc/4Z3C-HCX3;Peter Beaumont, Fighting in east Ukraine descends into trench warfare as Russia seeks breakthrough, The Guardian (Nov. 28, 2022), https://perma.cc/WA9M-2BZR.
- 3Helene Cooper et al., Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. Times (Aug. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/PU44-GWKN(citing U.S. official estimates of 300,000 Russian and 170,000-190,000 Ukrainian casualties).
- 4See, e.g., Lori Hinnant & Jamey Keaten, UN-backed inquiry accuses Russia of war crimes in Ukraine, Associated Press (Mar. 16, 2023), https://perma.cc/E9C8-5V93;Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas, (Apr. 3, 2022), https://perma.cc/7MFP-YAN6.
- 5Press Release, UN Commission concludes that war crimes have been committed in Ukraine, expresses concern about suffering of civilians, U.N. Press Release (Sept. 23, 2022), https://perma.cc/T78U-GZX8.
- 6Jasmine Wright, US declares Russia has committed crimes against humanity in Ukraine, CNN Politics (Feb. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/ZFM6-7FCF.
- 7Council of Europe, The forcible transfer and ‘russification’ of Ukrainian children shows evidence of genocide, says PACE [Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe], (Apr. 28, 2023), https://perma.cc/EFF5-HFUY;Alex Hinton, A year on, we have clear evidence of genocide in Ukraine, The Hill (Feb. 19, 2023), https://perma.cc/D855-DF4S.
- 8Press Release, Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issues Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova (Mar. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/2CVL-SMRJ.
- 9Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ch. XVIII, art. 126, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
- 10Christine Schwöbel-Patel, The Core Crimes of International Criminal Law in The Oxford Handbook of Int’l Crim. L. 768 (Kevin Jon Heller et al. ed., 2020).
- 11Ukraine: Situation in Ukraine, ICC-01/22, Investigation (Mar. 2, 2022) https://perma.cc/3NJV-GM52.
- 12Id.
- 13Rome Statute, art. 8 bis.
- 14Id. art. 15.
- 15Jennifer Hansler, Ukrainians push for US to support special tribunal to prosecute Russian leadership for crime of aggression, CNN Politics (Dec. 14, 2022), https://perma.cc/5ZP7-6JRS.
- 16Id.
- 17Göran Sluiter, The criminal justice response to the war in Ukraine one year later - the arrest warrant against Putin from the ICC and the discussion of a special ‘aggression tribunal’, Rethinking SLIC (Mar. 3, 2023), https://perma.cc/RSV3-JZN4.
- 18See, e.g., S.C. Res. 955, (Nov. 8, 1994) (invoking Chapter VII in order to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
- 19Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Ukraine: International Centre for the prosecution of Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine starts operations today, European Commission (July 3, 2023), https://perma.cc/PHM6-36Z3.
- 20Jennifer Hansler, US announces it supports creation of special tribunal to prosecute Russia for ‘crime of aggression in Ukraine, CNN Politics (Mar. 28, 2023), https://perma.cc/H2VS-KKZ9.
- 21Hansler, supra note 15.
- 22See, e.g., Hans Corell, A Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression: The Role of the U.N. GA, Just Security (Feb. 14, 2023), https://perma.cc/Z2T4-VQSX.
- 23See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Jennifer Trahan’s Cambodia Problem, Opinio Juris, (Apr. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/4WDT-XCLH.
- 24See, e.g., European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, https://perma.cc/KMN8-72VP.
- 25See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson & Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to International criminal Law and Procedure 3 (4th Edition) (2019).
- 26Cryer et al., id., at 3.
- 27Id.
- 28See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n, on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, Art. 16(4) (Jul. 26, 1996).
- 29Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 297.
- 30Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, art. 6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 280 U.N.T.S. 1951 [hereinafter London Agreement].
- 31Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 22, at 426 (Sept. 30, 1946) https://perma.cc/6UH5-F6LU.
- 32Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 2, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat, 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
- 33Id.
- 34Richard Overy, Blood & Ruins: The Last Imperial War, 1931-1945 610 (2021).
- 35Id.
- 36Judgment and Sentences, at 218 (Int’l Mil. Trib. (Nuremberg), Oct. 1, 1946) reprinted in 41 Am. J. of Int’l L. 172, 218 (1947) [hereinafter Judgment and Sentences]; see also Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 298.
- 37Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression, 53 Harv. Int’l L. J. 357, 370 (2012); see also North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (holding that in order for a rule to become part of customary international law “[n]ot only must the acts concerned be a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule requiring it [. . .] the states concerned must feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”).
- 38U.N. Charter art 2(4).
- 39G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974).
- 40Id. art. 5.
- 41Id.
- 42Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, art. 16 (Jul. 26, 1996).
- 43Scharf, supra note 37, at 370.
- 44Nu Ri Jung, A Study on the Efficacy of the Kampala Amendments for Suppression of Aggression: Examined by the Case of Armed Conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, 10 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 157, 162 (2013).
- 45Rome Statute, art. 5.
- 46Id.; Juan José Quintana, A Note on the Activation of the ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 17 L. and Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 236, 238 (2018).
- 47Rome Statute, art. 121.
- 48Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 313.
- 49Quintana, supra note 46, at 243.
- 50Rome Statute, art. 15.
- 51See, e.g., Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19-27, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Nov. 14, 2019).
- 52Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 313; Nu Ri Jung, A Study on the Efficacy of the Kampala Amendments for Suppression of Aggression: Examined by the Case of Armed Conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, 10 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev 157, 160 (2013).
- 53S.C. Res. 827, (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C. Res. 955, (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR).
- 54Id.
- 55Jennifer Trahan, U.N. GA Should Recommend Creation of Crime of Aggression Tribunal for Ukraine: Nuremberg is Not the Model, Just Security (Mar. 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/BM9C-JVYY.
- 56Sarah Kendall, “Hybrid” Justice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 51 Stud. in L., Pol. & Soc’y: Special Issue: Interdisc. Legal Stud.—The Next Generation 1, 8 (2010).
- 57Id.
- 58Id.
- 59S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
- 60Id.
- 61Kendall, supra note 56, at 10–11.
- 62Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137.
- 63Cryer et al., supra note 25, at 176.
- 64U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915, (Oct. 4, 2000); Beth K. Dougherty, Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 80 Int’l. Affs. 311, 316–17 (2004).
- 65Dougherty, id., at 321.
- 66Id.
- 67Alison Smith, Sierra Leone: The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice, in Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia 133 (Cesare P.R. Romano, André Nollkaemper, & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2004).
- 68See, e.g., Aly Mokhtar, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege: Aspects and Prospects, 26 Statute L. Rev. 41, 41 (2005).
- 69Id.
- 70Smith, supra note 67, at 133.
- 71Id.
- 72Id.
- 73Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Reply to the Prosecution Response to the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Jurisdiction: Illegal Delegation of Powers by the United Nations, ¶ 7 (Nov. 30, 2003).
- 74Id.
- 75Id.
- 76Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae: Illegal Delegation of Powers by the United Nations, ¶ 18 (May 25, 2004).
- 77Id. at 16.
- 78Id. at 1.
- 79Id.
- 80Dougherty, supra note 64, at 316.
- 81John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 2 (2014).
- 82Id.
- 83Id. at 7.
- 84Rebecca Gidley, Illiberal Transitional Justice and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 81 (2019).
- 85Id.
- 86G.A. Res. 52/135, ¶ 16 (Feb. 27, 1998).
- 87Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 33.
- 88Id.; G.A. Res. 57/228, art. 1 (Dec. 18, 2002).
- 89Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 33.
- 90Agreement Between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117; Gidley, supra note 84, at 92.
- 91Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 42.
- 92Id.
- 93Id.
- 94Id.
- 95Id.
- 96Andrew T. Cayley, Prosecuting Mass Atrocities at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), 11 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev., 445, 446 (2011).
- 97Ciorciari & Heindel, supra note 81, at 51.
- 98Id.
- 99Id. at 31.
- 100Id.
- 101Id.
- 102Monique Cormier, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-States Parties 44–46 (2020).
- 103Id.; Judgment and Sentences, supra note 36 at 218.
- 104Cormier, supra note 102, at 38.
- 105Id. at 50.
- 106Id. at 53; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 78 (July 8).
- 107Lelia N. Sadat, The Conferred Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 1 (2023) (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 23-03-01).
- 108Id.
- 109Id.
- 110Cormier, supra note 102, at 56.
- 111Sadat, supra note 107, at 5.
- 112Id.
- 113Id.
- 114Id.
- 115Id.
- 116Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (Apr. 11); Cormier, supra note 102, at 56.
- 117Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Case No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute,” Pre-Trial Chamber I, ¶ 48 (Sept. 6, 2018) (emphasis added); Cormier, supra note 102, at 56.
- 118U.N. Charter art. 10.
- 119Id. art. 11.
- 120Id. art 12; Anne-Cécile Robert & Romuald Sciora, The General Assembly: The Hidden Side of the United Nations, 6 Int’l Pol. Rev. 20, 21 (2018).
- 121U.N. Charter art 14.
- 122Id. art. 22.
- 123Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 15 (July 28).
- 124Id. at 53.
- 125Id. at 53.
- 126Id. at 56.
- 127Simon Chesterman et al., Legal Status, in Law and Practice of the United Nations: Documents and Commentary 113 (2d ed. 2016).
- 128Id. at 152.
- 129Id. at 154; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 Resolution].
- 130Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
- 131Id.
- 132Chesterman et al., supra note 127, at 153.
- 133Nicaragua, supra note 130, ¶ 188, (emphasis added).
- 134Chesterman et al., supra note 127, at 153.
- 135Mohammad Tanzimuddin Khan & Saima Ahmed, Dealing with the Rohingya Crisis: The Relevance of the General Assembly and R2P, 5 Asian J. Comp. Pol. 121, 134 (2020).
- 136Rebecca Barber, Accountability for Crimes against the Rohingya: Possibilities for the General Assembly where the Security Council Fails, 17 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 557, 562 (2019).
- 137Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (July 20, 1962).
- 138Id.
- 139Id.
- 140Barber, supra note 136, at 564.
- 141Khan & Ahmed, supra note 135, at 133–34.
- 142Barber, supra note 136, at 580.
- 143Michael Ramsden & Tomas Hamilton, Uniting Against Impunity: The UN General Assembly as a Catalyst for Action at the ICC, 66 Int’l Crim. L. Q. 893, 916 (2017).
- 144Barber, supra note 136, at 564.
- 145Id.
- 146Id.; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 149 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].
- 147Barber, supra note 136, at 564.
- 148Michael Kirby, Human Rights, the United Nations and Cambodia, 67 Australian Q. 948, 949 (1999).
- 149Id.; Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 Am. J. Int’l. L. 948, 949 (1999).
- 150Ramsden & Hamilton, supra note 143, at 897.
- 151Id. at 898.
- 152Id.
- 153Barber, supra note 136, at 565.
- 154Id.; G.A. Res. 71/258, (2016).
- 155Barber, supra note 136, at 565.
- 156Id.
- 157Larry D. Jonhson, “Uniting for Peace”: Does it Still Serve Any Useful Purpose?, 108 Am. J. of Int’l L. Unbound 106, 108 (2014).
- 158G.A. Res. 377 (V), Uniting for Peace (Nov. 3, 1950) [hereinafter Uniting for Peace].
- 159Id. at ¶ 1.
- 160Id.
- 161Barber, supra note 136, at 568.
- 162Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
- 163Uniting for Peace, supra note 158.
- 164Barber, supra note 136, at 568.
- 165Id.
- 166Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
- 167Id.
- 168Barber, supra note 136, at 568.
- 169Id.; Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
- 170Barber, supra note 136, at 569.
- 171Id.
- 172Id.
- 173Id.
- 174Id.
- 175Id. at 570; G.A. Res. 70/621, Strengthening of the United Nations System, (Dec. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Code of Conduct]; Parliamentarians for Global Action, Launch of the Code of Conduct Regarding UNSC Action Against Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity or War Crimes (Oct. 27, 2015) https://perma.cc/3LVS-VJAB.
- 176Code of Conduct, supra note 175, ¶ 2.
- 177Barber, supra note 136, at 571.
- 178Uniting for Peace, supra note 158.
- 179Id.; Johnson, supra note 157, at 107.
- 180Johnson, supra note 157, at 111.
- 181Barber, supra note 136, at 572 (citing Harry Reicher, The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Its Passage, 20 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 48 (1981)).
- 182Id.
- 183Ramsden & Hamilton, supra note 143, at 916.
- 184Id. at 921.
- 185S.C. Res. 2623 (Feb. 27, 2022).
- 186Id.
- 187Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Calls Emergency Special Session of GA on Ukraine Crisis, Adopting Resolution 2623 (2022) by 11 Votes in Favour, 1 Against, 3 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/14809 (Feb. 27 2022), https://perma.cc/2X68-K9W4.
- 188G.A. Res. ES-11/1 (Mar. 2, 2022).
- 189Id.
- 190Id.; 1970 Resolution, supra note 129.
- 191Nicaragua, supra note 130, ¶ 188.
- 192Uniting for Peace, supra note 158.
- 193Id.
- 194Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, supra note 123.
- 195Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 137, at 163; Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 146, at 163.
- 196Barber, supra note 136, at 580.
- 197Dougherty, supra note 64, at 321.
- 198Barber, supra note 136, at 580; Judgment and Sentences, supra note 36.
- 199Cormier, supra note 102, at 93.
- 200Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14) (discussing the conditions under which traditional immunities may be abrogated consistent with international law).
- 201Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Anx1, Judgement in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Evoe-Usuji, Morrison, Jofmański, and Bossa (May 6, 2019).
- 202Id.; Cormier, supra note 102, at 93.
- 203Конституція України [Constitution] Jun. 28, 1996, art. 125 (Ukr.) (hereinafter Ukrainian Constitution).
- 204Cormier, supra note 102, at 74.
- 205Id.; Ukrainian Constitution, supra note 203, arts. 124, 125.
- 206Scharf, supra note 37, at 370.
- 207Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, Art. 16 (Jul. 26, 1996); Scharf, supra note 37, at 373.
- 208Кримінальний кодекс України [Criminal Code of Ukraine] art. 437 (Ukr.).
- 209Judgment and Sentences, supra note 36, at 218.
- 210Kevin Jon Heller, What Is an International Crime? (A Revisionist History), 58 Harvard Int’l L. J. 353, 368 (2017).
- 211Id.
- 212Id.
- 213The Elders Call for a Criminal Tribunal to Investigate Alleged Crime of Aggression in Ukraine, The Elders (Mar. 5, 2022), https://perma.cc/435V-2REX.
- 214Kevin Jon Heller, Jennifer Trahan’s Cambodia Problem, Opinio Juris (Apr. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/8XJM-TJQ5.
- 215Id.
- 216Ursula von der Leyen, President of the Eur. Comm’n, Statement by President von der Leyen on the Establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of Crimes of Aggression against Ukraine (Mar. 4, 2023), https://perma.cc/A9KA-9QFG.
- 217International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, Eur. Union Agency for Crim. Just. Coop. (Sept. 16, 2023) https://perma.cc/YE7E-65PR.
- 218Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 61 (Feb. 14, 2002).
- 219Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 185 (Apr. 11); Cormier, supra note 102, at 56; Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute,’ Pre-Trial Chamber I (Sept. 6, 2018).
- 220Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Overwhelmingly Adopts Resolution Demanding Russian Federal Immediately End Illegal Use of Force in Ukraine, Withdraw All Troops, U.N. Press Release GA/12407 (Mar. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/U28R-ZU28.
- 221Hans Corell, A Special Tribunal for Ukraine on the Crime of Aggression: The Role of the U.N. General Assembly, Just Security (Feb. 14, 2023), https://perma.cc/92VL-Y8VL.
- 222Andriy Kostin, Prosecutor General of Ukr., Speech at Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute (Apr. 21, 2023).
- 223Id.