Ending the Race to the Bottom: Analyzing A Recent Global Agreement on Corporate Taxation
Globalization has led to a race to the bottom in corporate taxation, with countries slashing tax rates in order to attract investments from multinational companies. However, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted deep inequalities in countries across the globe, spurring a movement to fight corporate tax avoidance. In October 2021, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) announced a global tax agreement that creates a territorial tax system and imposes a 15% global minimum tax. These measures, which were endorsed by more than 130 countries, are expected to help ensure that companies pay tax in countries in which they generate sales, regardless of whether they have a physical presence in those countries. In addition, the 15% minimum tax rate is the first of its kind in international taxation and may put pressure on jurisdictions with little to no taxes on corporations. This Comment analyzes the OECD agreement by using case studies of previous multilateral tax proposals to provide historical context and by delving into various criticisms of the agreement. While the Comment lauds the agreement as a groundbreaking first step in combatting tax avoidance, it stresses that more needs to be done to address its deficiencies, such as its political infeasibility and lack of developing country involvement. As OECD negotiators are currently working on creating rules to implement this agreement, this Comment is a timely addition to the ongoing discussion.
As globalization has pushed countries to attract investments from multinational corporations, governments have tried to lure businesses in a myriad of ways. One approach taken by several countries is to have little to no taxation on corporate profits.1
See Colleen Essid, The Global Minimum Tax Agreement: An End to Corporate Tax Havens?, 73 St. Louis U. L. J. Online, ¶ 1 (2021).
See id. ¶ 3.
Sheltering profits in a tax haven is a common mechanism for large multinational companies to engage in legal tax avoidance.3
See Will Fitzgibbon & Ben Hallam, What Is a Tax Haven? Offshore Finance, Explained, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Apr. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/W35M-NUMY.
For the purposes of this Comment, the terms “company” and “corporation” are used interchangeably. However, it is important to note that the agreement this Comment covers is focused exclusively on corporate taxation. Companies that are flow-through entities, like partnerships and certain limited liability companies, would not be affected by this agreement because they are not taxed at the entity level.
See Fitzgibbon & Hallam, supra note 3.
See id.
For example, Apple—one of the world’s most valuable companies7
Hardika Singh, Apple Is No Longer World’s Most Valuable Company, Wall St. J. (May 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/8TLT-J9DG.
Kim Lyons, Ireland’s status as tax haven for tech firms like Google, Facebook, and Apple is ending, The Verge (Oct. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/EZ6X-LA3Z.
See id.
Although using low tax rates to attract business investment was once seen as a legitimate form of tax competition among economies,10
Bruce Zagaris, The G7 agreement on a global minimum tax will further squeeze the Caribbean, Global Americans(Jun. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/B6FC-DYEQ(quoting U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill, who discouraged OECD interference with the tax architecture of other countries and characterized tax havens as merely engaged in “tax competition”).
See Tove Maria Ryding & Alex Voorhoeve, Is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 2021 Tax Deal Fair?, 2 LSE Public Policy Review 4 (2022).
William Horobin & Christopher Condon, The Global Tax Revolution for Tech Giants is Delayed to 2024, Bloomberg (Jul. 11, 2022), https://perma.cc/R6ZB-NBSV.
In addition, a separate problem has resulted from the growing digitalization of the global marketplace. This had led to many multinational technological companies being able to earn significant profits in countries where they have little physical presence.13
Alan Rappeport, U.S. agrees to drop tariffs on countries that imposed digital services taxes as a global tax overhaul moves ahead, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/T4BV-VQUK.
See Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of Consumption Tax Debate, 72 Ala L. Rev 131, 133 (2019).
See id. at 131–135.
Id.
The prevalence of multinational companies with minimal physical presence has led to pushback, most notably from EU countries, many of which instituted digital services taxes.17
See Rappeport, supra note 13.
Id.
The Trump Administration’s retaliatory tariffs targeted French wine and cheese in particular. See Jim Tankersley et al., U.S. Will Impose Tariffs on French Goods in Response to Tech Tax, N.Y. Times (Jul. 10, 2020) https://perma.cc/G4AZ-LM32.
In the midst of this conflict over digital services taxes and broader discussion over ways to combat global tax avoidance, the COVID-19 pandemic struck in 2020. The pandemic upended the global economic order, forcing governments to spend more than $13 trillion to protect businesses and individuals suffering under pandemic-induced lockdowns.20
See The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis and recovery across levels of government, OECD (May 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/9YHP-UDUX.
See Francisco H. G. Ferreira, Inequality in the Time of COVID-19, IMF (2021), https://perma.cc/KA9Y-ZCFQ.See also Jim Tankersley et al., Biden’s Economic Team Suggests Focus on Workers and Income Equality, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/FMB4-Q4TA.
Id.
In response to these trends, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which had already been leading discussions on efforts to coordinate global tax policy since 2016,23
See Adinda Wisse, et al.,Report on the B.E.P.S. Inclusive Framework of the OECD, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, 3–4 (2021).
Alan Rappeport, Pastries and Persuasion: How a Global Tax Deal Got Done, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/353K-MHE9.
Although the agreement has been agreed to by more than 130 countries, these countries have only endorsed a basic framework for the agreement. Because there are additional details relating to implementation that still need to be developed, no country has yet formally signed and ratified the agreement. The OECD originally planned to create a multilateral convention with a signing ceremony in 2022 followed by ratification in 2023. However, the signing ceremony has not yet occurred, and the organization announced in July 2022 that it is delaying the ratification process to 2024. See Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, OECD (2021), https://perma.cc/E235-G3HD. See also Alan Rappeport, A global deal to tax large corporations is delayed a year, N.Y. Times (Jul. 11, 2022), https://perma.cc/GDV5-WTXK.
See OECD, supra note 25.
See Daniel Bunn & Sean Bray, The Latest on the Global Tax Agreement, Tax Foundation (Jun. 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/E27R-WRH2.
Under Pillar One of the agreement, companies with revenues exceeding €20 billion and a profit margin greater than 10% would be required to have a portion of their profits taxed in the jurisdictions in which they have sales.28
See Grant Wardell-Johnson, OECD’s Pillar One and Pillar Two – A Question of Timing, Bloomberg Tax (Jun. 14, 2022), https://perma.cc/D4GC-Y94E.
See Daniel Bunn & Elke Asen, What European Countries Are Doing About Digital Services Taxes, Tax Foundation (Aug. 9, 2022), https://perma.cc/LS8E-ZV4Z.
See id.
See id.
See Wardell-Johnson, supra note 28.
The main proposal of Pillar Two is a global minimum tax rate of 15% that would apply to companies with revenues of more than €750 million.33
See Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/E5F7-FHXH.
See Bunn & Bray, supra note 27.
See id.
This Comment seeks to analyze this agreement by answering two questions. First, how did the OECD agreement even come to fruition in an era where it has been increasingly difficult for countries to coordinate large-scale agreements on most issues? Is there something about tax avoidance or the OECD’s unique negotiating framework that has allowed countries to bridge their differences? Second, how effective is the agreement likely to be in achieving its goals? Are there steps that endorsing countries can take in the implementation process to address various criticisms of the agreements that have arisen thus far? This Comment concludes that while tax avoidance had long been a concern of the OECD, the budgetary holes created by pandemic spending turbocharged the organization’s efforts in this area. With regards to the agreement’s effectiveness, this Comment highlights serious concerns with certain elements of the agreement, namely political feasibility and lack of developing country involvement, but provides suggestions to address those concerns.
The Comment is organized into several parts. Part II provides important context for the OECD agreement, particularly background on international corporate taxation and how globalization has led to different countries using tax incentives to attract investments from multinational corporations.
Part III provides an extended and thorough explanation of the agreement. Part III.A discusses how the negotiations for the agreement started and details the timeline of events that led to the agreement’s adoption. This Part also provides an update on the agreement’s ongoing implementation process and when the agreement is expected to be finalized. Given the current worldwide economic downturn, inflationary pressure, and the Russia-Ukraine war, countries have been distracted and discussions around implementing this agreement have stalled.36
See Michelle Scott, Global Corporate Minimum Tax,Investopedia (Aug. 24, 2022), https://perma.cc/96NS-VZ56.
Part IV will use previous tax agreements or proposals as case studies to analyze the extent to which the Inclusive Framework can build on or improve upon previous attempts to address cross-border tax-shifting. Part IV.B. will examine digital services taxes that were implemented in the past few years by several countries, including India and various countries in Europe.37
See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29. See also USTR Welcomes Agreement with India on Digital Services Taxes, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Nov. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/W684-4C2E.
See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, European Commission, https://perma.cc/TF5J-8VAR.
See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
Part IV.A of this Comment analyzes the Ruding Report and the lessons it provides for negotiators currently crafting the implementing rules for the Inclusive Framework. The Ruding Committee was created by the European Community in the 1990s to come up with proposals to harmonize corporate tax rates among its member states.40
See generally Michael Deveruex, The Ruding Committee Report: An Economic Assessment, 13 Fiscal Studies 96 (1992).
See id. at 106–107.
See Byoung-Inn Bai, The Code of Conduct and the E.U. Corporate Tax Regime: Voluntary Coordination without Harmonization, 15 J. of Int’l & Area Stud. 115, 117–18 (2008).
Part V of the Comment analyzes the various critiques of the Inclusive Framework that have emerged since it was first announced in 2021. This Part responds to these criticisms and suggests ways in which they can be addressed through the agreement’s implementation. The four main criticisms are: the agreement’s political infeasibility; the many exceptions in the agreement that undermine its goals; the possibility that the proposed global minimum tax rate of 15% is too low to have any discernible impact; and lastly, the detrimental impact the agreement could have on developing economies.
Part VI concludes by heralding this agreement as a step in the right direction in the global effort to fight tax avoidance and urges the OECD to use the ongoing implementation process to address the genuine concerns that have been raised thus far.
Globalization is characterized by the increased mobility of economic activity, with companies able to invest in many different countries in a short period of time.43
See Jason Fernando, Globalization in Business With History and Pros and Cons, Investopedia (Mar.28, 2023), https://perma.cc/4F3Y-4L5Y.
See James Hines & Larry Summers, How Globalization Affects Tax Design, NBER Working Paper No. 14664, 2 (2009).
See id. at 9.
Because countries know that companies are making investment choices based on tax rates, their governments then face pressure to lower tax burdens in order to not miss out on international investment.46
See id. at 11.
See id. at 1.
See id. at 7.
This trend has made it difficult for governments to meet their countries’ fiscal needs. Economic models have shown that international tax competition, when taken to its furthest extreme, has resulted in lower government revenue and expenditures.49
See Sam Bucovetsky, Asymmetric tax competition, 30 J. Urb. Econ. 167 (1991).
See Hines & Summers, supra note 44.
See generally Dani Rodrik, Why do more open economies have bigger governments?, 106 J. Pol. Econ.997 (1998).
Data shows that the past four decades have resulted in a race to the bottom in taxation.52
See Hines, supra note 44.
See Lily Batchelder, Remarks by Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Lily Batchelder on Global Corporate Tax at the Hutchins Center at Brookings Institute and the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Apr. 15, 2022), https://perma.cc/R8GR-YQEG.
Countries tax multinational companies when they earn profits, either by selling products or services or generating income through investments.54
See Sebastian Beer et al., International Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots, IMF Working Paper No. 168, 5–6 (2018).
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id.
See Steinar Hareide, Where is a company Tax resident?, PWC Norway’s Tax Blog (Mar. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/F34Q-K2GA.
SeeKim, supra note 14, at 143.
There are two kinds of tax systems: territorial and worldwide. Understanding the difference between territorial and worldwide tax systems is important because Pillar One of the Inclusive Framework aims to create a territorial tax system that relaxes traditional rules requiring companies to be physically present or be a resident in order to be taxable in a particular country.60
See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, OECD (2021), https://perma.cc/H9VK-V7JE.
In a territorial system, countries tax companies only if they have active business income in the country.61
See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 5–6.
See id. at 5.
In contrast, countries that have adopted a worldwide system tax a company’s profits even if those profits were generated in another country, so long as the company is a resident of that country.63
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id.
As an example of a worldwide tax system, suppose that a company is based in Country C, which used a worldwide system, and the company generated income in both Country C and Country D. Country C would be able to tax the company’s income in both Country C and Country D. However, Country C would likely provide the company with a foreign tax credit that would reduce the company’s Country C tax by the amount of tax the company paid in Country D. In addition, Country C may also refrain from taxing the company’s Country D profits until the company actually brings the profits back to the company’s resident entities in Country C. This system is used in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, among other countries.66
See id.
What is a Territorial Tax and Does the United States Have One Now?, Tax Policy Center (2020), https://perma.cc/WR47-X9UU.
The International Monetary Fund has identified six major ways in which companies avoid paying taxes in their resident country: (1) transfer mispricing, (2) locating intellectual property in low-tax jurisdictions, (3) debt shifting, (4) treaty shopping, (5) tax deferral, and (6) strategically locating their headquarters.68
See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 6–10.
1. Transfer mispricing.
Multinational corporations complete various transactions between their entities in various jurisdictions, often for legitimate purposes.69
See United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries 2021, UN (2021), https://perma.cc/MDH2-Q6WS.
See id. at 2–3.
See id.
Transfer pricing rules require that when a multinational company engages in transactions between entities in different countries, the company must price the transactions at an arm’s length price that it would have charged were the entity an unrelated third-party.72
See id. at 37–39.
In practice, transfer pricing enforcement is difficult.73
See Beer et al., supra at note 54, at 7.
See id.
See id.
Pillar One of the Inclusive Framework has extensive provisions to address transfer pricing. For example, OECD negotiators currently drafting the agreement’s implementation provisions have stated that they are working to make sure that Pillar One helps eliminate transfer pricing disputes.76
See Pillar One Public Consultation Document, OECD 7 (2022),https://perma.cc/UQQ2-KG8L.
See id.
Tax authorities in different countries use varying methods to determine whether such transactions were priced properly and were conducted for legitimate business purposes as opposed to for tax avoidance.78
See id.
See id.
See id. at 4–5.
2. Locating intellectual property in low-tax jurisdictions.
While a company may conduct its research and development in a high-tax jurisdiction, it can still avoid taxes on the intellectual property resulting from its research by transferring ownership of the intellectual property to an entity in a low-tax jurisdiction.81
See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 8.
See id. at 7.
See Daniel Bunn, Intellectual Property Came Back to U.S. After Tax Reform, but Proposals Could Change That, Tax Foundation (July 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/GLE8-HB84.
Pillar One and the digital services taxes that various European countries have implemented address this form of tax avoidance by taxing companies on the profits they earn in a particular country, even if the company holds its intellectual property elsewhere.84
See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
The rise of highly lucrative tech companies that earn immense profits in regions where they do not have a physical presence has greatly exacerbated tax avoidance globally. It has incentivized countries, such as Ireland, to establish themselves as tax havens.85
See Lyons, supra note 8.
See id.
3. Debt shifting.
As with transfer pricing, a company can avoid taxes by having its entities in low-tax countries issue loans to its entities in high-tax countries.87
See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 9.
The Inclusive Framework does not explicitly address debt shifting. However, debt-shifting is functionally similar to transfer pricing. The only difference is that in transfer pricing, a company’s entities are trading goods and services with each other as opposed to lending and borrowing from each other. Therefore, Pillar One’s transfer pricing considerations discussed above largely apply to debt shifting as well. The OECD will need to make sure its efforts to eliminate transfer pricing disputes and simplify the process address similar issues that arise when a company’s various international entities shift debt to each other.
4. Treaty shopping.
Treaty shopping typically occurs when a company indirectly accesses the benefits of a tax treaty between two countries without being a resident of either country.88
See BEPS Action 6, OECD, https://perma.cc/BHY4-4T6W.
See id.
See Sebastian Beer & Jan Leprick, The Cost and Benefits of Tax Treaties with Investment Hubs, Findings from Sub-Saharan Africa 2 (World Bank Group Policy Rsch., Working Paper No. 8623, 2018).
Bilateral tax treaties may become less important under the Inclusive Framework because the agreement’s negotiators plan to form a multilateral convention that would allow all countries to join regardless of whether they have tax treaties with each other.91
See Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy,supra note 25.
See id.
In addition, the Inclusive Framework has created a minimum standard on treaty abuse that countries have committed to include in their tax treaties.93
See BEPS Action 6, supra note 88.
The goal is that by including such provisions, it will be more difficult for companies to try to game the system by taking advantage of different tax treaties. It is unclear how effective this solution will be—the OECD has said that the minimum standard would be adapted to each country’s specific circumstances,94
See id.
5. Tax deferral.
As discussed in Part II, countries that use a worldwide taxation system generally only tax a resident company’s foreign earnings once those earnings are repatriated to the resident country.95
See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 10.
Tae Kim, It Looks like Apple is Bringing Back Home Nearly All of its $250 Billion in Foreign Cash, CNBC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/DHM3-89V6.
See id.
See id.
Given that Pillar One of the Inclusive Framework is pushing countries towards more territorial tax-based systems, tax deferrals may become less advantageous for multinational companies. Tax deferrals are only relevant in worldwide tax systems—countries that have territorial tax systems do not tax a company’s income earned outside their borders. Therefore, companies will have less incentive to keep their foreign-earned income abroad and will be more likely to repatriate that money domestically.
6. Strategically locating headquarters.
Multinational companies can also reduce their tax burden by strategically locating their headquarters in countries with lower tax rates.99
See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 10.
See id.
See id.
By making corporate inversions less beneficial, companies may start to choose their headquarters’ location based on business needs unrelated to tax considerations, such as access to a talented workforce. This is a positive ancillary benefit of Pillar One because, as with many other parts of the Inclusive Framework, it incentivizes companies to make business decisions based on factors other than the ability to engage in tax avoidance.
The Inclusive Framework is meant to address many of the tax-shifting problems discussed in Part II.C. The agreement, which is the first of its kind, was formally endorsed by members of the OECD on October 8, 2021102
Alan Rappeport & Liz Alderman, Global Deal to End Tax Havens Moves Ahead as Nations Back 15% Rate, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2021),https://perma.cc/LNV9-T3NV.
See Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra note 25.
The OECD first adopted the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan in 2013 to address the problems associated with global tax avoidance that countries were starting to recognize.104
See OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BPA Progress Report September 2021 – September 2022, OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/3K68-7Q79.
The 2017 U.S. Tax Acts and Jobs Act had several provisions targeting companies that shifted profits overseas through tax avoidance mechanisms, such as moving intellectual property to low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland.105
Cliff Taylor, Trump’s U.S. Tax Reform a Significant Challenge for Ireland, The Irish Times (Nov. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/55H5-PANT.
See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, supra note 38.
See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
The impact of these European digital services taxes was largely felt by U.S. technological firms, leading the Trump Administration at one point to impose retaliatory tariffs on countries, such as France, that imposed digital services taxes.108
See Rappeport, supra note 13.
See Batchelder, supra note 53.
See id.
As discussed earlier, the COVID-19 pandemic, along with the election of Joe Biden as U.S. president in 2020, led to a renewed push for a global agreement on taxation. Many developed nations recognized the need to raise additional tax revenue to pay for social programs to address income inequality.
To further this goal, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in July 2021 met with Irish Finance Minister Paschal Donohoe to lobby Ireland to join efforts to combat tax-shifting.111
See Rappeport, supra note 24.
See id.
Three months after the meeting between Yellen and Donohoe and after several rounds of negotiations, a final consensus on the basic outlines of the agreement was announced at the G20 meeting in Rome on October 8, 2021.113
See id.
The purpose of Pillar One of the Inclusive Framework is to create a territorial tax system that ensures that companies pay taxes in jurisdictions in which they have sales, regardless of whether they actually have a physical presence there.114
See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
See Joint Statement from the United States, Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, Regarding a Compromise on a Transitional Approach to Existing Unilateral Measures During the Interim Period Before Pillar 1 is in Effect, U.S. Department of the Treasury (October 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/TTR3-MGUS.
See Batchelder, supra note 53.
Pillar One’s implementation is expected to occur in five steps: (1) determining whether the company is within the scope of Pillar One, (2) determining which countries can tax the company, (3) determining which jurisdictions can tax the company, (4) determining taxable profit, and (5) eliminating double taxation.117
See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
1. Determining whether the company is within the scope of pillar one.
For a company to fall within the scope of Pillar One, it would need to have revenues in excess of €20 billion and have a profit margin exceeding 10%. If the tax period of the company is less than twelve months, the €20 billion revenue requirement is proportionally reduced by the length of the period. Pillar One includes exceptions that place companies that engage in extractive activities, such as mining and oil and gas, outside the scope of the Inclusive Framework.118
See Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One: Two-Pillar Solution To the Tax Challenges Of the Digitalization Of the Economy, OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/Q67V-XNA6.
2. Determining which countries can tax the company.
A country can tax a company that falls under Pillar One if the company generated revenue of more than €1 million from that country.119
See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
See id.
3. Determining which jurisdictions can tax the company.
Companies will need to determine which countries they will need to pay taxes to under Pillar One. There are two methods to determine a company’s tax base: (1) the nexus test and (2) revenue sourcing rules.121
See Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One: Two-Pillar Solution To the Tax Challenges Of the Digitalization Of the Economy, supra note 118.
See id.
The nexus test relies on a company’s revenues in specific jurisdictions, and so the revenue sourcing rules are key to determining when a company’s revenues are said to be generated in a particular jurisdiction. Revenue can be classified as coming from a specific country if it is derived from the sale of a finished good to a customer in that country, location specific services to customers in that country, and licensing of intangible property that relates to finished goods sold in the country, among many other categories.123
See id.
Pillar One’s nexus test and revenue sourcing rules ensure that companies that generate a significant amount of revenue in a country cannot avoid taxation, while at the same time protecting companies from burdensome taxation in jurisdictions in which they have little presence. These rules are a core component enabling Pillar One’s primary goal of ensuring that companies pay tax in the jurisdictions in which they generate revenue, regardless of whether they have a presence there.
4. Determining taxable profit and how to allocate among jurisdictions.
A company’s taxable profit is calculated by taking its profit as reported on its financial statements, then modifying the profit by a variety of book-to-tax adjustments.124
See id.
See id.
See id.
5. Eliminating double taxation.
After Step Four allocates a company’s taxable profit among various jurisdictions, Step Five of the Inclusive Framework eliminates double taxation through a variety of mechanisms that apply in situations when a company is overtaxed on the same stream of taxable income in multiple jurisdictions.127
See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
The OECD has noted that this step is still currently being developed and that work is on-going to make sure that it truly does help ensure that companies are not subject to double taxation.128
See Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One: Two-Pillar Solution To the Tax Challenges Of the Digitalization Of the Economy, supra note 118.
C. Pillar Two – Minimum Tax
TOPPillar Two of the agreement is designed to ensure that companies pay a minimum level of tax in the jurisdictions in which they operate. This pillar imposes a 15% minimum tax that only applies to companies that have more than €750 million in revenue.129
See Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), supra note 33.
See id.
The minimum tax rate is implemented by first having the company calculate its effective tax rate in every jurisdiction in which it operates.131
See id.
See id.
Pillar Two also has an international coordination mechanism to enforce the minimum tax rate. Countries that are part of the agreement have agreed to impose additional taxes on companies in their jurisdiction if those companies have effective tax rates below 15% in any jurisdiction.133
See Batchelder, supra note 53.
See id.
In addition, the OECD plans to create a standardized information return that companies would need to fill out to report the tax rates they fall under in each country they pay taxes in.135
See Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), supra note 33.
The OECD is also considering ways to make sure that implementing Pillar Two does not pose an administrative burden for governments. For example, it plans to add provisions to Pillar Two that would make certain companies automatically subject to taxation above a minimum rate. This means that for those companies, governments will not have to engage in significant effort to determine whether the company falls within the scope of Pillar Two.136
See id.
Pillar Two’s 15% minimum tax rate is a good first step to setting a benchmark floor for corporate tax rates. But as will be discussed in Part V.C, there are valid concerns that the rate is too low and should leave room for increases in the future.
D. Ongoing Negotiations for the Agreement’s Implementation
TOPNegotiations over how to implement the agreement are ongoing, but the details discussed above are the main agreed-upon elements thus far. While the agreement was originally targeted to be enacted by 2023, the timeline has been pushed by a year.137
See Rappeport, supra note 25.
See OECD Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/DS3V-W268.
See id. at 4.
Cormann also noted that the OECD is trying to include developing countries in the rule development process, for example, by electing a Jamaican official as the Inclusive Framework’s co-chair.140
See id.
See id.
A draft of the Inclusive Framework task force’s most recent consensus on Pillar One was released in October of 2023.142
See International Tax Reform: Multilateral Convention to Implement Amount A of Pillar One, OECD (2023), https://perma.cc/8683-YQWN.
See id.
There are two main European proposals and existing agreements that this Part will discuss to better understand the current global tax agreement: the European Commission’s 1992 proposal for a minimum corporate tax rate144
See Bai, supra note 42, at 118.
See Blum & Asen, supra note 29.
During the late 1980s, as the European Community moved to expand the common market and further liberalize the movement of capital between member states, members states looked at ways to harmonize tax rates between each other.146
See Devereux, supra note 40, at 97.
See id. at 96.
To address this concern, the European Commission in 1990 appointed a panel of experts led by Onno Ruding, a former Dutch finance minister, to consider ways to harmonize tax rates across the European Community.148
See Bai, supra note 42, at 118.
See Devereux, supra note 40, at 96.
See id.
See id.
See id.
1. Effect of tax rates on economic distortions.
The panel found that differences in taxes among European Community members were causing distortions in the common market. It found that companies were making investment decisions based on a country’s tax rate as opposed to productivity related reasons, such as whether the country has a talented workforce. This is important because the European Community at the time had large range of tax rates—with Ireland having a 10% rate and Germany having a top marginal rate of 50%.153
See Franz Vanistendael, The Ruding Committee Report: A Personal View, 13 Fiscal Stud. 85, 86 (1992).
The Ruding Committee’s modeling suggested that withholding taxes on cross-border dividends caused the most economic distortions between member states.154
See id at 89.
See id.
2. Ability of tax competition to address economic distortions.
Given that tax rate differentials could lead to economic distortions, the panel found that competition for physical capital—like factories and equipment—would likely not be affected by tax competition because it is difficult to move such types of assets across borders. However, because paper capital such as equity or debt is highly mobile, it would be strongly impacted by tax competition between different countries.156
See Devereux, supra note 40, at 100.
The panel also noted that tax competition could lead to substantive decreases in tax rates that would not necessarily lead to an equilibrium minimum tax rate.157
See id. at 102.
3. Proposed steps to address economic distortions.
The Ruding Committee found three ways in which economic distortions could result from differences in tax rates between member states: (1) variation in withholding taxes on dividend payments between countries, (2) the way in which countries tax corporations’ foreign source income, and (3) differences in the domestic structure of different countries’ tax systems.158
See id. at 103–04.
To address these concerns, the committee proposed a minimum community-wide tax rate of 30% and a maximum of 40%.159
See id. at 105.
Although the biggest proposal was the minimum tax rate, the committee also proposed other tax measures, including establishing a commission to review transfer pricing issues, developing a European Community-wide policy on how to address tax issues with non-European countries, and fostering bilateral tax treaties between member states.160
See id. at 104.
4. Legacy of the Ruding Report.
While the European Community never adopted a minimum corporate tax rate, the EU did pass a measure in 2003 to improve information sharing between member states on interest and dividend payments.161
See Council Directive 2003/48/EC, on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, 2003 O.J. (L 157).
See Council Directive 2014/107/EU, Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 2014 O.J. (L 359).
The legacy of the Ruding Report is that while countries are willing to make changes to address tax distortions, they are unwilling to substantially give up their autonomy over fiscal policies. Because the withholding tax was limited to information sharing and targeted a specific subset of income, it was much easier to adopt. In addition, the Ruding Report noted that the lack of coordination on withholding taxes caused the greatest amount of economic distortion, and so was a greater priority than some of the committee’s other proposals.163
See Vanistendael, supra note 153.
Although the European Community—and later the EU—was unable to successfully push for a wider minimum tax rate that applied across member states, the European Commission instead created a Code of Conduct for member states to follow.164
See Bai, supra note 42, at 128.
See id. at 119.
The challenges that the European Community faced in going from the Ruding Report to actually implementing a minimum tax in practice are lessons that the implementers of the OECD’s Inclusive Framework can learn from. The European Community struggled to convince member states to relinquish their autonomy to set tax rates, an effort made more difficult by the fact that the organization had a unanimous voting rule on tax matters.166
See Vanistendael, supra note 153, at 93.
See id. at 94.
For example, most Dutch companies tended to have multinational corporate structures because the Netherlands has a relatively small domestic market.168
See id.
See id.
See id.
The difficulties faced by the European Community in implementing the Ruding Committee’s recommendations shows that one potential reason why the Inclusive Framework was able to obtain buy-in from a large number of countries is because it does not unduly interfere with countries’ ability to set their own tax policies. The global minimum rate of 15% introduced by Pillar Two is lower than the corporate tax rates of most countries, and the territorial system mandated by Pillar One is something that many countries have gradually been moving towards anyway in the form of digital services taxes and other mechanisms. However, the devil is in the details, and the negotiators working on developing rules for the agreement will have to be careful to not step on governments’ toes and avoid restricting countries’ autonomy to set their own tax policies.
The current existing digital services taxes are important to understand because Pillar One of the Inclusive Framework was expressly created to address this issue.171
See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
This is a divergence from international norms of taxation because, for a company to typically be taxed in a country, it is required to have nexus in that country.172
See Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar One Blueprint : Inclusive Framework on BEPS, ¶ 186–215 (2020), https://perma.cc/9EZC-UDWZ.
See id.
See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
Unlike income taxes, digital services taxes are often based on revenue alone.175
See id.
1. European Commission proposal for digital services taxes.
In 2018, the European Commission proposed new rules meant to tax earnings from companies that earned sales from digital businesses in the EU.176
See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, supra note 38.
See id.
Proposal One
Under the first proposal, a company was said to have a digital presence if it fulfills one of the following three criteria: (1) exceeds €7 million in annual revenues generated in the member state, (2) has more than 100,000 digital users in the member state, and (3) has over 3,000 business contracts with business users in the member state.178
See id.
In addition, the proposal allocated profits to member states based on where the customer was when they used the company’s digital service. When allocating profits, the Commission would have taken into account the market value of the user data the company obtains in the member state, the company’s services connecting users in the country, and other digital services provided by the company, such as subscriptions, used by customers in the jurisdiction.179
See id.
Proposal Two
The interim tax to cover digital activities not currently being taxed was proposed as an interim measure while the member states worked out how to implement Proposal One. The tax would have been levied on 3% of revenues for companies with worldwide revenues of €750 million and EU revenues of €50 million. The tax would have been focused on companies that generated revenue from online placement of advertising, sales of data collected on users, and digital platforms that connected users with each other.180
See id.
The Commission was likely concerned that without this interim tax, EU member states would institute their own unilateral digital services taxes. This could lead to the emergence of a medley of varied regulations that would undermine the EU’s Common Market by having companies be subject to different rules in different member states.
Takeaways from European Commission Proposals
Ultimately, the European Commission’s fear of countries implementing their own digital services taxes was borne out because the EU failed to adopt these two proposals. Instead, various EU member states, such as Austria, France, Italy, and Spain, passed their own digital services taxes. And as predicted by the European Commission, many of the member states with digital services taxes have different requirements. For example, the Austrian digital services tax kicks in when a company earns more than €25 million in domestic revenue, while the Italian tax applies at a much lower threshold of €5 million in domestic revenue.181
See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
Understanding the EU proposal and the current digital services taxes is important because the logic underlying these proposals and taxes are a core part of Pillar One of the Inclusive Framework. As discussed in Part III, Pillar One’s territorial tax system is designed to ensure that companies pay tax in a jurisdiction regardless of their lack of physical presence. Much like the digital services taxes currently in place, a key motivation behind Pillar One is to target tax avoidance by tech companies.
Various countries have agreed to delay imposing their digital services taxes until December 31, 2024.182
See Josh White, OECD extends pillar one timeline in outcome statement, Int’l Tax Rev. (July 12, 2023), https://perma.cc/R6WK-8DD8.
Id.
Various criticisms of the Inclusive Framework have emerged, including that the agreement is not politically feasible, the agreement is undermined by the many exceptions and carve outs contained in its text, the agreement’s minimum tax rate of 15% is too low, and that the agreement has a detrimental impact on developing economies.
This Part of the Comment analyzes these various critiques and provides possible solutions or responses to them that could be taken into account by negotiators as they work through developing the rules for the agreement. And given that implementation for the agreement has been pushed back until 2024,184
See Rappeport, supra note 24.
The agreement is facing domestic pushback from several major players who are key to its success. For example, the U.S. Senate has thus far been unable to come together to pass the spending proposals that would be necessary to implement the agreement.185
Alan Rappeport, A Tax Deal, in Trouble, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/35YW-QTSZ.
See id.
The implementation of the agreement largely relies on countries to pass laws domestically, which could run into trouble in countries with federal systems that often have multiple jurisdictions imposing various different taxes.187
Joseph W. Sullivan, A Global Minimum Corporate Tax Is a Bad Idea Whose Time Hasn’t Come, Foreign Pol’y (April 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/7F8R-J7WK.
Id.
While there are some concerns about Poland, the EU is likely to move forward with the agreement. Some analysts have suggested that Poland’s current intransigence on the agreement has more to do with other concessions it would like that are not related to the Inclusive Framework.189
See Rappeport, supra note 185.
With regards to the U.S., it does seem unlikely that its Congress would be able to pass the necessary legislation. This is primarily because the 2022 midterm elections gave the Republicans control of the House of Representatives.190
See German Lopez, Still Undecided, N.Y. Times (Nov. 9, 2022), https://perma.cc/99FD-VYAZ.
See Brady: OECD/G20 Global Minimum Tax is a Dangerous Economic Surrender,G.O.P. House Ways and Means (Jul. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/G6M6-A764.
Even if the agreement were to potentially lose the U.S., the fact that the EU and many other large economies, such as China and India, have signed on to the agreement makes it more likely that it will move forward.192
SeeMembers of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD (July 9, 2023), https://perma.cc/Z3VD-PYVV.
To make matters worse, Pillar Two has an enforcement mechanism that ensures that if a company pays an effective tax rate lower than 15% in any country, including the U.S., it will have to pay top-up taxes to other countries to make up the difference.193
See Batchelder, supra note 53.
Given these points, despite the obstacles that the Inclusive Framework faces from certain countries that have domestic opposition to it, it is likely that they can be resolved. There may be additional delays in implementation due to the various global issues that are distracting countries, such as the Russia-Ukraine War. But one way or another, this agreement will come to fruition.
The Inclusive Framework has a variety of exceptions and carve-outs, including for financial services and extractive industries. The financial services exclusion was reportedly added following lobbying from countries with large financial systems, such as the U.K.194
Jeff Stein, As Wealthy Nations Back Yellen’s Call for Global Taxation, Fears About National Differences Quietly Persist, Wash. Post (Oct. 31, 2021) https://perma.cc/347P-G2LA.
See id.
Under the Inclusive Framework’s Financial Services Exclusion, regulated financial institutions such as deposit institutions, mortgage institutions, investment banks, insurance companies, and asset managers are exempt from Pillar One’s territorial taxation requirements.196
See Pillar One – Amount A: Regulated Financial Services Exclusion, OECD (2022) https://perma.cc/PU4V-4X6J.
Id.
For the agreement’s Extractive Exclusion to apply, the company has to meet the exclusion’s product test and activities test.198
See id.
Id.
Id.
It is unclear whether these two exclusions will lead to any significant reductions in revenue for countries that are participating in the agreement. However, it does appear that there are legitimate economic reasons behind these exceptions. For example, the OECD notes that financial institutions are subject to unique forms of regulation, such as capital reserve requirements, that help make sure that profits are aligned with the market they are generated in.201
See id.
See Pillar One – Amount A: Extractives Exclusion, supra note 196.
Similar reasoning underpins the Extractive Exclusion. Most extractive industries are location specific, and due to the nature of the industry it is relatively easy for a country to make sure the tax on the extracted resource is paid in the source jurisdiction.203
See id.
Id.
While it is generally inadvisable for an agreement to have excessive carve-outs that ultimately render the agreement useless, that does not appear to be the case here. Both of these carve-outs seems to have legitimate industry-specific justifications and would likely not unduly undermine the agreement.
This agreement has for the first time in history set a minimum global corporate tax rate. Critics argue that by setting the rate at 15%, it does not really force already low-tax jurisdictions, such as Ireland and Singapore, to drastically change their tax systems. For reference, Singapore’s corporate tax rate is 17%,205
See Singapore Taxes on Corporate Income,PWC, LLP (May 4, 2023), https://perma.cc/YF2A-QPCH.
See Ireland Taxes on Corporate Income, PWC, LLP (Jul. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/F3HD-N5WV.
See Press Release, Oxfam, OECD tax deal is mockery of fairness (Oct 8. 2021), https://perma.cc/Q58Y-4FXV.
See Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development, Fin. Accountability Transparency & Integrity Panel, 25 (2021), https://perma.cc/3THN-R7JU.
Although there are criticisms that the tax rate is too low, the agreement is still a major blow209
Gary Silverman, Bermuda Digs in Against Global Corporate Tax Deal, Irish Times (June 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/P836-QPA5.
See Bermuda Taxes on Corporate Income, PWC, LLP, (Jun. 29, 2023), https://perma.cc/7C5H-UYXY.
To the extent that 15% is still too low, a possible solution is for the agreement to clarify that the minimum tax rate should be at least 15%. That was what the original language in the agreement was going to be, but the words “at least” were removed at Ireland’s insistence.211
See Rappeport, supra note 24.
A major critique of the agreement is that it leaves out the Global South, with some estimates suggesting that 60% of the additional tax revenue that would be generated by this agreement would go to the G-7 developed economies.212
See Julie McCarthy, The New Global Tax is Bad for Development, Brookings Inst. (May 16, 2022), https://perma.cc/7C5H-UYXY.
See id.
See Carlos Mureithi, Why Kenya and Nigeria Haven’t Agreed to a Historic Global Corporate Tax Deal, Quartz (Nov. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/5ZF7-JF3V.
Oxfam, a charity that focuses on global poverty, conducted an impact assessment of the Inclusive Framework’s Pillar One and found that developing countries would earn $1.66 billion less from Pillar One than they would have earned from a 3% digital services tax.215
See id.
Tax authorities in Kenya and Nigeria have expressed skepticism as to whether the allocations they would get under Pillar One would be the same or greater than what their countries could earn under their own digital services taxes.216
See id.
See The Effect of the OECD’s Pillar 1 Proposal on Developing Countries – An Impact Assessment, Oxfam (2022), https://perma.cc/DB84-EB82.
Developing countries have also criticized Pillar Two of the Inclusive Framework. Some analysts have argued that developed countries get priority in levying top up taxes on companies that countries can collect when a company pays below a 15% effective tax rate in a particular jurisdiction.218
See McCarthy, supra note 212.
See A New Era Of International Taxation Rules – What Does This Mean For Africa?, Afr. Tax Admin. F. (2021), https://perma.cc/M2FY-3GJZ.
A more fundamental criticism of the Inclusive Framework, apart from its substantive provisions, is that the process by which it was created was undemocratic and lacks legitimacy.220
Sissie Fung, The Questionable Legitimacy of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, 2 Erasmus L. Rev. 76 (2017).
The OECD defends this because the G20 represents 85% of global gross domestic product and 75% of world trade.221
See About the G20, G20, https://perma.cc/P2RR-VK52.
Id.
One remedy to address the lack of representation for developing countries in the creation of the global tax agreement is to convene a United Nations convention on the topic.223
See Mccarthy, supra note 212.
See Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development, supra note 208.
Despite the fact that a U.N. convention could address the concerns that developing countries have and provide them a voice in the discussion, it is ultimately unrealistic and would unnecessarily extend the time it takes to actually implement the agreement. Instead, the OECD should make it easier for developing countries, such as those represented by ATAF, to bring up their concerns regarding Pillar One’s allocation system and Pillar Two’s low minimum tax rate. This can be done by more actively integrating developing country officials into the ongoing negotiations over the Inclusive Framework’s implementation. The consensus on the agreement that was announced in 2021 was just a broad outline; this means that developing countries can have a much larger impact on the Inclusive Framework by shaping how it is eventually implemented.
The OECD’s Inclusive Framework is a historic agreement that has the potential to change the way countries approach international tax issues. The territorial taxation system implemented by Pillar One and the 15% global minimum tax mandated by Pillar Two are groundbreaking proposals that have the potential to help many countries recover revenue lost to tax avoidance. However, the devil is in the details. As OECD negotiators continue to work on developing the implementing rules for the agreement, they will have to keep in mind several important issues.
First, as demonstrated by the obstacles faced by the Ruding Committee in the European Community in the 1990s, countries will always be hesitant to give up their autonomy over tax issues. Therefore, negotiators will have to tread a fine line in creating rules that are actually effective and yet do not unduly step on governments’ toes.
Second, there are serious concerns that major players in the agreement, such as the U.S., do not have the political support to pass the domestic legislation needed to implement the agreement. Negotiators will have to figure out if the agreement’s top-up mechanism is enough to make the non-participation of major economies irrelevant to the agreement’s success. If not, negotiators will have to work hard to keep other countries in line and come up with alternative mechanisms to ensure the agreement can still achieve its goals with regards to tax avoidance.
Third, developing countries have raised legitimate concerns regarding their lack of involvement in the creation of the agreement, and negotiators should either modify the agreement to address their concerns, or acquiesce to the creation of a U.N. convention on tax. Given the unrealistic nature of a U.N. convention, the OECD should engage in genuine efforts to make the Inclusive Framework more legitimate in the eyes of developing countries and ensure that developing countries’ interests are protected.
All in all, we will see how the finalized agreement looks in 2024. But regardless of the final outcome, the fact that all of these countries have been able to come together on this issue, in a time when it has been quite difficult to pursue multilateral agreements, is a success in and of itself.
- 1See Colleen Essid, The Global Minimum Tax Agreement: An End to Corporate Tax Havens?, 73 St. Louis U. L. J. Online, ¶ 1 (2021).
- 2See id. ¶ 3.
- 3See Will Fitzgibbon & Ben Hallam, What Is a Tax Haven? Offshore Finance, Explained, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Apr. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/W35M-NUMY.
- 4For the purposes of this Comment, the terms “company” and “corporation” are used interchangeably. However, it is important to note that the agreement this Comment covers is focused exclusively on corporate taxation. Companies that are flow-through entities, like partnerships and certain limited liability companies, would not be affected by this agreement because they are not taxed at the entity level.
- 5See Fitzgibbon & Hallam, supra note 3.
- 6See id.
- 7Hardika Singh, Apple Is No Longer World’s Most Valuable Company, Wall St. J. (May 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/8TLT-J9DG.
- 8Kim Lyons, Ireland’s status as tax haven for tech firms like Google, Facebook, and Apple is ending, The Verge (Oct. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/EZ6X-LA3Z.
- 9See id.
- 10Bruce Zagaris, The G7 agreement on a global minimum tax will further squeeze the Caribbean, Global Americans(Jun. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/B6FC-DYEQ(quoting U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill, who discouraged OECD interference with the tax architecture of other countries and characterized tax havens as merely engaged in “tax competition”).
- 11See Tove Maria Ryding & Alex Voorhoeve, Is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 2021 Tax Deal Fair?, 2 LSE Public Policy Review 4 (2022).
- 12William Horobin & Christopher Condon, The Global Tax Revolution for Tech Giants is Delayed to 2024, Bloomberg (Jul. 11, 2022), https://perma.cc/R6ZB-NBSV.
- 13Alan Rappeport, U.S. agrees to drop tariffs on countries that imposed digital services taxes as a global tax overhaul moves ahead, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/T4BV-VQUK.
- 14See Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of Consumption Tax Debate, 72 Ala L. Rev 131, 133 (2019).
- 15See id. at 131–135.
- 16Id.
- 17See Rappeport, supra note 13.
- 18Id.
- 19The Trump Administration’s retaliatory tariffs targeted French wine and cheese in particular. See Jim Tankersley et al., U.S. Will Impose Tariffs on French Goods in Response to Tech Tax, N.Y. Times (Jul. 10, 2020) https://perma.cc/G4AZ-LM32.
- 20See The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis and recovery across levels of government, OECD (May 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/9YHP-UDUX.
- 21See Francisco H. G. Ferreira, Inequality in the Time of COVID-19, IMF (2021), https://perma.cc/KA9Y-ZCFQ.See also Jim Tankersley et al., Biden’s Economic Team Suggests Focus on Workers and Income Equality, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/FMB4-Q4TA.
- 22Id.
- 23See Adinda Wisse, et al.,Report on the B.E.P.S. Inclusive Framework of the OECD, Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, 3–4 (2021).
- 24Alan Rappeport, Pastries and Persuasion: How a Global Tax Deal Got Done, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/353K-MHE9.
- 25Although the agreement has been agreed to by more than 130 countries, these countries have only endorsed a basic framework for the agreement. Because there are additional details relating to implementation that still need to be developed, no country has yet formally signed and ratified the agreement. The OECD originally planned to create a multilateral convention with a signing ceremony in 2022 followed by ratification in 2023. However, the signing ceremony has not yet occurred, and the organization announced in July 2022 that it is delaying the ratification process to 2024. See Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, OECD (2021), https://perma.cc/E235-G3HD. See also Alan Rappeport, A global deal to tax large corporations is delayed a year, N.Y. Times (Jul. 11, 2022), https://perma.cc/GDV5-WTXK.
- 26See OECD, supra note 25.
- 27See Daniel Bunn & Sean Bray, The Latest on the Global Tax Agreement, Tax Foundation (Jun. 13, 2023), https://perma.cc/E27R-WRH2.
- 28See Grant Wardell-Johnson, OECD’s Pillar One and Pillar Two – A Question of Timing, Bloomberg Tax (Jun. 14, 2022), https://perma.cc/D4GC-Y94E.
- 29See Daniel Bunn & Elke Asen, What European Countries Are Doing About Digital Services Taxes, Tax Foundation (Aug. 9, 2022), https://perma.cc/LS8E-ZV4Z.
- 30See id.
- 31See id.
- 32See Wardell-Johnson, supra note 28.
- 33See Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/E5F7-FHXH.
- 34See Bunn & Bray, supra note 27.
- 35See id.
- 36See Michelle Scott, Global Corporate Minimum Tax,Investopedia (Aug. 24, 2022), https://perma.cc/96NS-VZ56.
- 37See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29. See also USTR Welcomes Agreement with India on Digital Services Taxes, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Nov. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/W684-4C2E.
- 38See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, European Commission, https://perma.cc/TF5J-8VAR.
- 39See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
- 40See generally Michael Deveruex, The Ruding Committee Report: An Economic Assessment, 13 Fiscal Studies 96 (1992).
- 41See id. at 106–107.
- 42See Byoung-Inn Bai, The Code of Conduct and the E.U. Corporate Tax Regime: Voluntary Coordination without Harmonization, 15 J. of Int’l & Area Stud. 115, 117–18 (2008).
- 43See Jason Fernando, Globalization in Business With History and Pros and Cons, Investopedia (Mar.28, 2023), https://perma.cc/4F3Y-4L5Y.
- 44See James Hines & Larry Summers, How Globalization Affects Tax Design, NBER Working Paper No. 14664, 2 (2009).
- 45See id. at 9.
- 46See id. at 11.
- 47See id. at 1.
- 48See id. at 7.
- 49See Sam Bucovetsky, Asymmetric tax competition, 30 J. Urb. Econ. 167 (1991).
- 50See Hines & Summers, supra note 44.
- 51See generally Dani Rodrik, Why do more open economies have bigger governments?, 106 J. Pol. Econ.997 (1998).
- 52See Hines, supra note 44.
- 53See Lily Batchelder, Remarks by Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Lily Batchelder on Global Corporate Tax at the Hutchins Center at Brookings Institute and the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Apr. 15, 2022), https://perma.cc/R8GR-YQEG.
- 54See Sebastian Beer et al., International Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots, IMF Working Paper No. 168, 5–6 (2018).
- 55See id. at 5.
- 56See id.
- 57See id.
- 58See Steinar Hareide, Where is a company Tax resident?, PWC Norway’s Tax Blog (Mar. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/F34Q-K2GA.
- 59SeeKim, supra note 14, at 143.
- 60See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, OECD (2021), https://perma.cc/H9VK-V7JE.
- 61See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 5–6.
- 62See id. at 5.
- 63See id. at 6.
- 64See id.
- 65See id.
- 66See id.
- 67What is a Territorial Tax and Does the United States Have One Now?, Tax Policy Center (2020), https://perma.cc/WR47-X9UU.
- 68See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 6–10.
- 69See United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries 2021, UN (2021), https://perma.cc/MDH2-Q6WS.
- 70See id. at 2–3.
- 71See id.
- 72See id. at 37–39.
- 73See Beer et al., supra at note 54, at 7.
- 74See id.
- 75See id.
- 76See Pillar One Public Consultation Document, OECD 7 (2022),https://perma.cc/UQQ2-KG8L.
- 77See id.
- 78See id.
- 79See id.
- 80See id. at 4–5.
- 81See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 8.
- 82See id. at 7.
- 83See Daniel Bunn, Intellectual Property Came Back to U.S. After Tax Reform, but Proposals Could Change That, Tax Foundation (July 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/GLE8-HB84.
- 84See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
- 85See Lyons, supra note 8.
- 86See id.
- 87See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 9.
- 88See BEPS Action 6, OECD, https://perma.cc/BHY4-4T6W.
- 89See id.
- 90See Sebastian Beer & Jan Leprick, The Cost and Benefits of Tax Treaties with Investment Hubs, Findings from Sub-Saharan Africa 2 (World Bank Group Policy Rsch., Working Paper No. 8623, 2018).
- 91See Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy,supra note 25.
- 92See id.
- 93See BEPS Action 6, supra note 88.
- 94See id.
- 95See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 10.
- 96Tae Kim, It Looks like Apple is Bringing Back Home Nearly All of its $250 Billion in Foreign Cash, CNBC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/DHM3-89V6.
- 97See id.
- 98See id.
- 99See Beer et al., supra note 54, at 10.
- 100See id.
- 101See id.
- 102Alan Rappeport & Liz Alderman, Global Deal to End Tax Havens Moves Ahead as Nations Back 15% Rate, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2021),https://perma.cc/LNV9-T3NV.
- 103See Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy, supra note 25.
- 104See OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BPA Progress Report September 2021 – September 2022, OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/3K68-7Q79.
- 105Cliff Taylor, Trump’s U.S. Tax Reform a Significant Challenge for Ireland, The Irish Times (Nov. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/55H5-PANT.
- 106See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, supra note 38.
- 107See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
- 108See Rappeport, supra note 13.
- 109See Batchelder, supra note 53.
- 110See id.
- 111See Rappeport, supra note 24.
- 112See id.
- 113See id.
- 114See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
- 115See Joint Statement from the United States, Austria, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, Regarding a Compromise on a Transitional Approach to Existing Unilateral Measures During the Interim Period Before Pillar 1 is in Effect, U.S. Department of the Treasury (October 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/TTR3-MGUS.
- 116See Batchelder, supra note 53.
- 117See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
- 118See Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One: Two-Pillar Solution To the Tax Challenges Of the Digitalization Of the Economy, OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/Q67V-XNA6.
- 119See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
- 120See id.
- 121See Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One: Two-Pillar Solution To the Tax Challenges Of the Digitalization Of the Economy, supra note 118.
- 122See id.
- 123See id.
- 124See id.
- 125See id.
- 126See id.
- 127See Fact Sheet Amount A: Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One, supra note 60.
- 128See Progress Report on Amount A of Pillar One: Two-Pillar Solution To the Tax Challenges Of the Digitalization Of the Economy, supra note 118.
- 129See Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), supra note 33.
- 130See id.
- 131See id.
- 132See id.
- 133See Batchelder, supra note 53.
- 134See id.
- 135See Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), supra note 33.
- 136See id.
- 137See Rappeport, supra note 25.
- 138See OECD Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,OECD (2022), https://perma.cc/DS3V-W268.
- 139See id. at 4.
- 140See id.
- 141See id.
- 142See International Tax Reform: Multilateral Convention to Implement Amount A of Pillar One, OECD (2023), https://perma.cc/8683-YQWN.
- 143See id.
- 144See Bai, supra note 42, at 118.
- 145See Blum & Asen, supra note 29.
- 146See Devereux, supra note 40, at 97.
- 147See id. at 96.
- 148See Bai, supra note 42, at 118.
- 149See Devereux, supra note 40, at 96.
- 150See id.
- 151See id.
- 152See id.
- 153See Franz Vanistendael, The Ruding Committee Report: A Personal View, 13 Fiscal Stud. 85, 86 (1992).
- 154See id at 89.
- 155See id.
- 156See Devereux, supra note 40, at 100.
- 157See id. at 102.
- 158See id. at 103–04.
- 159See id. at 105.
- 160See id. at 104.
- 161See Council Directive 2003/48/EC, on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, 2003 O.J. (L 157).
- 162See Council Directive 2014/107/EU, Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 2014 O.J. (L 359).
- 163See Vanistendael, supra note 153.
- 164See Bai, supra note 42, at 128.
- 165See id. at 119.
- 166See Vanistendael, supra note 153, at 93.
- 167See id. at 94.
- 168See id.
- 169See id.
- 170See id.
- 171See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
- 172See Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar One Blueprint : Inclusive Framework on BEPS, ¶ 186–215 (2020), https://perma.cc/9EZC-UDWZ.
- 173See id.
- 174See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
- 175See id.
- 176See Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy, supra note 38.
- 177See id.
- 178See id.
- 179See id.
- 180See id.
- 181See Bunn & Asen, supra note 29.
- 182See Josh White, OECD extends pillar one timeline in outcome statement, Int’l Tax Rev. (July 12, 2023), https://perma.cc/R6WK-8DD8.
- 183Id.
- 184See Rappeport, supra note 24.
- 185Alan Rappeport, A Tax Deal, in Trouble, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/35YW-QTSZ.
- 186See id.
- 187Joseph W. Sullivan, A Global Minimum Corporate Tax Is a Bad Idea Whose Time Hasn’t Come, Foreign Pol’y (April 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/7F8R-J7WK.
- 188Id.
- 189See Rappeport, supra note 185.
- 190See German Lopez, Still Undecided, N.Y. Times (Nov. 9, 2022), https://perma.cc/99FD-VYAZ.
- 191See Brady: OECD/G20 Global Minimum Tax is a Dangerous Economic Surrender,G.O.P. House Ways and Means (Jul. 1, 2021), https://perma.cc/G6M6-A764.
- 192SeeMembers of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD (July 9, 2023), https://perma.cc/Z3VD-PYVV.
- 193See Batchelder, supra note 53.
- 194Jeff Stein, As Wealthy Nations Back Yellen’s Call for Global Taxation, Fears About National Differences Quietly Persist, Wash. Post (Oct. 31, 2021) https://perma.cc/347P-G2LA.
- 195See id.
- 196See Pillar One – Amount A: Regulated Financial Services Exclusion, OECD (2022) https://perma.cc/PU4V-4X6J.
- 197Id.
- 198See id.
- 199Id.
- 200Id.
- 201See id.
- 202See Pillar One – Amount A: Extractives Exclusion, supra note 196.
- 203See id.
- 204Id.
- 205See Singapore Taxes on Corporate Income,PWC, LLP (May 4, 2023), https://perma.cc/YF2A-QPCH.
- 206See Ireland Taxes on Corporate Income, PWC, LLP (Jul. 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/F3HD-N5WV.
- 207See Press Release, Oxfam, OECD tax deal is mockery of fairness (Oct 8. 2021), https://perma.cc/Q58Y-4FXV.
- 208See Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development, Fin. Accountability Transparency & Integrity Panel, 25 (2021), https://perma.cc/3THN-R7JU.
- 209Gary Silverman, Bermuda Digs in Against Global Corporate Tax Deal, Irish Times (June 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/P836-QPA5.
- 210See Bermuda Taxes on Corporate Income, PWC, LLP, (Jun. 29, 2023), https://perma.cc/7C5H-UYXY.
- 211See Rappeport, supra note 24.
- 212See Julie McCarthy, The New Global Tax is Bad for Development, Brookings Inst. (May 16, 2022), https://perma.cc/7C5H-UYXY.
- 213See id.
- 214See Carlos Mureithi, Why Kenya and Nigeria Haven’t Agreed to a Historic Global Corporate Tax Deal, Quartz (Nov. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/5ZF7-JF3V.
- 215See id.
- 216See id.
- 217See The Effect of the OECD’s Pillar 1 Proposal on Developing Countries – An Impact Assessment, Oxfam (2022), https://perma.cc/DB84-EB82.
- 218See McCarthy, supra note 212.
- 219See A New Era Of International Taxation Rules – What Does This Mean For Africa?, Afr. Tax Admin. F. (2021), https://perma.cc/M2FY-3GJZ.
- 220Sissie Fung, The Questionable Legitimacy of the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, 2 Erasmus L. Rev. 76 (2017).
- 221See About the G20, G20, https://perma.cc/P2RR-VK52.
- 222Id.
- 223See Mccarthy, supra note 212.
- 224See Financial Integrity for Sustainable Development, supra note 208.