Beyond the Balloon: Regulating South Korea’s Foreign-Funded Leafleting as Political Activity

I. Introduction

This Comment addresses the rapidly changing legal landscape of South Korean leafleting: the practice of sending pamphlets into North Korea. Since its inception during the Korean War, the practice has been used both by the South Korean government and private parties as a propaganda device. In recent years, however, privatized leafleting has become an increasingly politically divisive instrument and its legal status has vacillated between presidential administrations. This Comment examines the historical development of leafleting and the legal arguments regulating its practice in an effort to demonstrate the relatively high administrative cost of current regulations. Rather than offer a polemical or apologetic argument for the legality of leafleting, this Comment proposes an alternative regulatory regime that scrutinizes the legality of leafleting’s donation streams and growing foreign influence on leafleting, rather than the mechanism or practice of leafleting itself. This Comment argues that regulating foreign funding for leafleting under the classification of “political activity” would more efficiently restrict the practice while also following precedential themes of national security and amending existing legal frameworks rather than creating new ones.

A. Background and Context

Leafleting in the Korean peninsula is a practice that dates to the Korean War and is nearly as old as the modern state of South Korea. Militaries on both sides produced and distributed propaganda leaflets as a form of psychological warfare to lower the opposing side’s morale, encourage defections, and broadcast their respective political ideologies.1 The U.S. and its military allies dropped an estimated 2.5 billion leaflets over the course of the conflict, while North Korean and Chinese forces produced between 30 to 300 million in return.2 These leaflets were called bbira (“삐라”) during the Korean War, which was a colonial Japanese loan word for publicly posted notices in Korean villages.3 Today, the official term is jundan salpo (“전만살포”), though bbira remains popular among older generations of Koreans.4 Despite facial differences on both sides, the leaflets produced during the war reflected similar themes of security and superiority, claiming “a comfortable life, encouraging surrender, security assurance, exploitation by powerful nations (the US, China and the Soviet Union), stimulating nostalgia, UN forces propaganda, support for the Chinese Army, casualties, emphasis on superior weaponry, winter troubles, criticism of the government, instilling nationalism, inspiring patriotism, and theories about puppet governments.”5 The psychological warfare divisions of both militaries designed their messages to undermine the legitimacy of the opposing regime while promoting the idea that individual soldiers could secure survival or moral redemption by laying down their arms.

Even after the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 formally ended combat operations, leafleting persists as a looming specter of war into the twenty-first century. As the twenty-first century dawned on a divided Korean peninsula, leafleting remained a tool by governments to decry the actions and ideologies of the other state. However, its shape began to change drastically starting in the early 2000s.

B. Notable Twenty-First Century Leafleting Incidents

Leafleting’s provocative nature quickly presented a contentious issue for contemporary inter-Korean negotiations. As a precondition to the inter-Korean summit in 2000, then-South Korean President Kim Dae-jung agreed to end government-sponsored leafleting.6 This decision was heavily criticized by the South Korean political opposition party as a concession to North Korean demands, a recurrent theme regarding policy responses to leafleting. In 2004, President Jung’s successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il agreed to stop additional government propaganda activities as a reciprocal de-escalation effort.7 In addition to a cease in leafleting exercises, South Korea also removed propaganda installations along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).8 The cessation of government leafleting did not end leafleting; on the contrary, the “[g]overnment-mandated ban on the sending of leaflets led to a rise of civilian-led launching of leaflets.”9 Individuals and organizations opposed to President Roh’s conciliatory stance towards North Korea began launching their own leafleting operations. 2010 marked a particularly contentious year as the sinking of the South Korean naval ship ROKS Cheonan substantially escalated tensions.10 In response to the sinking, the South Korean government briefly reinstated its government leafleting campaign, reinstalled speakers along the South Korean border, and broadcasted propaganda directly into North Korea.11 By 2014, tensions over leafleting spilled over into kinetic military action: North Korean forces near the DMZ fired anti-aircraft guns at a balloon launch by South Korean activists.12 In response, South Korean forces returned fire after several rounds landed on South Korean soil. This incident occurred shortly after a North Korean delegation visited South Korea and a separate naval incident involving both countries’ ships exchanging gunfire.13 These incidents reveal a recurring pattern of leafleting by private groups as a reactive approach—either in support or in protest—rather than a proactive measure. In 2016, North Korea resumed their own leaflet launches and sent an estimated one million leaflets via helium balloons into South Korea that year.14 While their official stance was a response to Seoul’s resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts along the DMZ,15 the increasing scale and frequency of private leafleting operations across the border is a highly plausible reason behind North Korean’s rescission of their pledge to stop leafleting. Even as diplomatic communications broke down, balloons continued to relay political messages. Some of these messages contradicted the South Korean government’s official stance, complicating negotiations and raising issues of free speech and national security. Four years later, North Korea justified the demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office at Kaesong, a collaborative economic project pairing North Korean labor with South Korean companies,16 as a response to South Korean activists’ leaflets.17

Most recently, Pyongyang released roughly 260 balloons laden with trash and manure into South Korean airspace as a symbolic symbol of retaliation.18 Unlike prior leafleting efforts, this launch stands out due to the absence of leaflets, highlighting yet another dimension to leafleting’s political messaging: the inherent violation of sovereign airspace.19 Kim Yo Jong, the Deputy Department Directory of the North Korean Publicity and Information Department and Kim Jong Un’s sister, sarcastically described the operation as North Korea’s own “exercise of freedom of expression.”20 The launch was also notable for its accompaniment of GPS jamming that disrupted flights at Incheon International Airport,21 and signaled the growing trend towards a re-militarization of the leaflet conflict and its technological evolution into the modern digital age.

II. Modern Evolution of Leafleting

This Section discusses the privatization of leafleting from its origins as an exclusively military psychological operations practice. The first section discusses the mechanics of contemporary leafleting including common payloads. The second Section analyzes the underlying reasons for the shift towards private practice. The third Section discusses the incorporation of religious materials into leafleting and its use as a proselytizing device. The fourth Section connects the rise of religious paraphernalia to its most recent development: the growing interest of non-Korean NGOs in leafleting and funding leafleting operations. Finally, the Section concludes with both domestic and geopolitical implications of laws introduced to curb leafleting as a transition into Section III’s discussion of current regulation. 

A. Modern Leafleting Practices

In the twenty-first century, the mechanics of leafleting on the Korean peninsula have undergone significant transformations to keep up with modern technological advancements. Distinctions are evident starting with the leafleting operations themselves: the U.S. and U.N. forces leveraged their aerial superiority to drop leaflets from airplanes during the Korean War; contemporary civilian groups largely rely on gas-filled balloons to carry their leafleting payloads.22 Despite their unassuming and primitive appearance, these balloons are carefully designed feats of engineering that are capable of traveling miles into North Korean territory, a difficult feat even for more advanced tools like drones.23 Under optimal weather conditions, leafleting balloons fly farther into North Korea than more technologically advanced tools such as hexacopter drones because they do not rely on line-of-sight control range.24 More convincingly, the affordability of these balloons, especially in comparison to drones, makes balloons the easy choice. In recent years, the balloons come equipped with sophisticated features such as a release timer, altitude monitor, and GPS trackers.25 There are additional differences between military and civilian leaflets beyond their delivery vehicles. Civilian leaflets still portray a strong sense of South Korean supremacy over North Korea, but seek to provide a more realistic glimpse of the two Koreas. Jin-heon Jung notes modern leaflets can be broadly categorized in the following ways:

(1) attacking the Kim regime directly as the satanic criminal of the Korean War and confronting all of its lies, 

(2) not exaggerating about South Korean society, 

(3) using no foreign (i.e., English) vocabulary, 

(4) using no cartoons or photos on the leaflets (CDs include photos), 

(5) including evangelical messages, and above all 

(6) writing in North Korean dialects.26

Leafleting’s privatization broadened its scope and has helped sustain its relevance during the transition from analog into digital communications. The payloads themselves, for example, usually carry more than paper messages: “$1 bills, mini radios, DVDs, instant noodles, nylon stockings, lighters and other essentials.”27 Balloons may also carry a wide variety of technology that convey media, news, and information such as USB sticks, CDs, and DVDs.28 The goal of these payloads is to “chip away at the totalitarian information blackout” that isolates ordinary North Koreans.29 Balloons sent by religious groups, meanwhile, carry religious materials including abridged versions of Bibles.30 These efforts intertwine religious proselytization with humanitarian concern, reflecting what Jin-Heon Jung terms “ballooning evangelism”: a fusion of psychological warfare and missionary activity.31

B. Impact of Privatization

The growing proliferation of privatized leafleting in Korea is the culmination of several factors: the South Korean government’s preference for alternative propaganda methods; increasing affordability; its adoption by North Korean defectors seeking high visibility acts; and increased foreign interest in humanitarian and religious issues in North Korea. Together, they form a complex legal and political issue with boundaries that the South Korean government has struggled to concretely define. In this seeming vacuum, the emergence of foreign interest in leafleting seems a foregone conclusion as groups seek to capitalize upon this unique opportunity for soft power against North Korea.

1. Government preferences shift away from leafleting

First, the South Korean government—especially under the liberal administrations—have curtailed state operated psychological operations and propaganda dissemination in an effort to sustain diplomatic engagements with North Korea.32 Even when dialogue breaks down, the government has opted for alternative methods of propaganda, such as loudspeakers instead of leafleting campaigns.33 The North Korean government, by contrast, continues to fund all its leafleting efforts into South Korea.34 The South Korean government’s preference for loudspeakers as default propaganda tools in recent decades is partially attributable to the increasingly politicized nature of leafleting in South Korean politics. Liberal administrations favor more reconciliatory communication with North Korea and have opposed leafleting. Conservative administrations have supported leafleting as an expression of free speech and do not support acquiescing to North Korean demands to stop leafleting.35 Even prior to the 2000 inter-Korean summit, president Kim Dae-jung’s progressive reconciliation policy (known as the “Sunshine Policy”) stressed de-escalation: “the best approach toward North Korea was one of patient conciliation: cooperation and economic interaction became the government’s main tools through which it would endeavor to decrease tensions on the Korean peninsula.”36 Most recently, presidential administrations have even gone so far as to ban private leafleting operations through a series of increasingly creative legislative measures.37

2. Technological innovation lowers costs

Cost is another reason why privatized leafleting has gained popularity, as it is often cheaper than state-funded exercises. As balloons are unmanned aerial vehicles, private leafleting operations do not require the extensive budget that historical leafleting drops from airplanes necessitated. Even at scale, “a privatized balloon campaign requires much less than a state funded military exercise.”38 Jung notes that “a full size balloon now costs about 120,000 KRW (approx. 100 USD), and includes 60,000 leaflets as well as small gifts such as ballpoint pens, scarves, underwear, bandages, medicine, radios, and 1 USD or similar currency (equivalent to a North Korean average monthly income or 3,000 North Korean Won as of 2012).”39 Engineering innovations, such as the utilization of different gases (helium, hydrogen, etc.) and materials (polyethylene, latex, etc.) have further lowered operational expenses.40 For cash-strapped groups and individuals these balloons return a high yield on investment, as the disproportionate response by the North Korean government in the past decade has clearly demonstrated.

3. Growing interest from diverse anti-North Korean advocacy groups

As leafleting has become more cost-effective, more private citizens and interest groups have started implementing balloon launches. Since ordinary civilians are not allowed near the DMZ without special permissions, these groups are unable to utilize the government’s preferred propaganda dissemination tools of loudspeakers. Furthermore, the use of balloons to carry leafleting into North Korea provides greater flexibility for launches: while most launch balloons in villages and towns near the DMZ for maximum penetration into North Korea, activists also launch balloons from Seoul.41 The reasons why individuals and non-government organizations (NGOs) seek to send messages and contraband into North Korea span a range of different anti-North Korean philosophies and goals, ranging from defectors with personal hostility, humanitarian aid, to proselytization of a specific religious belief.42

C. Prominent Leafleting NGOs

Initially an individual effort, privatized leafleting has expanded dramatically in the past two decades. While the original mission of disseminating anti-North Korean materials remain, different NGOs pursue this goal through various means. Additionally, certain groups have become far more prominent both for the volume of their activity as well as their willingness to engage with the broader South Korean public. A relatively recent trend has been the rise of foreign aid and interest in leafleting: several Korean leafleting NGOs have partnered with international (primarily U.S.) groups to coordinate launches and receive funding.

1. Fighters for Free North Korea

The two largest organizations that regularly launch leaflets into North Korea are founded by North Korean defectors. Fighters for Free North Korea (FFNK or 자유북한운동연합, “jahyoo bookhan oondong yunhab”) balloons usually carry secular, political leaflets critical of the North Korean government along with USB sticks and radios to assist North Koreans in accessing information beyond North Korea.43 FFNK also operates a seaborne arm that uses ocean currents to send message-in-a-bottle-style leaflets to North Korean shores.44 North Korean defectors in South Korea often experience discrimination and difficulty assimilating into South Korean society due to issues ranging from linguistic barriers to lower employment skillsets and educational backgrounds. To this extent, leafleting’s visibility forces recognition by the South Korean government, which provides leverage for other concessions, policy stance changes, or negotiations.45 FFNK’s founder, Park Sang Hak, has been repeatedly indicted under a range of various laws regarding his leafleting operations and remains a staunch critic of the current presidential administration’s leafleting regulatory regime.46 FFNK’s corporate license was revoked in 202047and Park was referred to South Korean prosecutors for violating aviation laws in 2024.48 

2. North Korean Christian Association and Voice of the Martyrs Korea

An overlapping demographic that is active in leafleting are religious groups. One such group, the North Korean Christian Association (NKCA), started in 2005 and launches roughly 700 to 1,500 balloons a year.49 In 2014 alone, NKCA launched 1,567 balloons with roughly 30,000 leaflets in each balloon.50 In addition to anti-North Korean literature similar to FFNK’s leaflets, NKCA also includes religious tracts, money, medical supplies, and food.51 NKCA is the most prolific religious actor in the leaflet space, but it is far from being the only one. Other organizations comprise “South Korean evangelical Protestants and conservatives, and US-based organizations, as well as groups from other Christian denominations.”52 Another notable religious organization is Voice of the Martyrs Korea (VOMK), which launches balloons carrying New Testament Bibles and food.53

D. New Legal Implications of Religious Leafleting

Organizations like NKCA and VOMK highlight a recent development in leafleting: the incorporation of religious materials and the implication of religious freedom in launching leaflets into North Korea. The Kim regime perceives religion as an “existential threat” with special emphasis placed on Christianity due to its close association with the United States.54 Protestant Christians are branded “collaborators of imperialistic forces and enemies of the nation and revolution” and missionary activity is prohibited.55 Even the act of simply “possessing a Bible, interacting with Christian missionaries, or engaging in worship can lead to severe punishment, including torture, forced labor, imprisonment, and execution.”56 For these reasons, religious leaflets are often packaged with food, medical supplies, and other necessities that would entice individuals to recover them when they land in North Korea.57 The inclusion of religious materials implicates religious freedom concerns as groups like VOMK and its supporters claim leafleting restrictions infringe upon their religious freedoms.

E. Increasing Interest in Leafleting by Non-Korean NGOs

The increasing awareness of humanitarian violations in North Korea through high profile arrests and new stories has led to the involvement of foreign, non-Korean organizations in leafleting.58 As leafleting operations scale up in size, organizations increasingly turn to international donors for funds. Organizations such as the U.S. Defense Forum Foundation not only finance balloon launchings, but also lobby U.S. politicians and organize Congressional hearings regarding North Korea.59 The impact of foreign donors is two-fold: not only are new issues of foreign interference in areas of national security and political elections raised, but the launches themselves have changed to meet donor expectations. 

Historically, North Korea’s isolationist stance has required informal channels of communications.60 Furthermore, while protests against Russia or China, other authoritarian regimes often compared with North Korea, can be effectuated online, North Korea’s strict internet blackout prevents access to North Korean citizens. Balloon launches of leaflets historically occurred at night in order to avoid detection by both local and North Korean authorities. In recent years, however, launches have occurred during the day in order to appeal to prospective donors.61 In this way, leafleting seems to have come full circle to its historical origins of not only interest in communication with the state of North Korea (including as protest), but also communicating with North Koreans.

F. Domestic and Geopolitical Implications of Leafleting Regulations

Leafleting’s technological innovations and privatized funding carry broader political and legal implications in South Korea. As discussed earlier, different administrations’ stances to North Korean engagement have charged leafleting into a political lightning rod. The legal status of leafleting has changed several times according to changes in administration and the evolving state of inter-Korean relations. This has given rise to a pattern of regulatory vacillation: when liberal administrations take office, leafleting is portrayed as a destabilizing force that requires strict regulation to avoid jeopardizing diplomatic engagement; when conservative administrations return to office, they champion leafleting as an exercise of free speech and relax its enforcement. The result is a legal and political environment in which the permissibility of leafleting depends less on consistent doctrinal principles and more on the prevailing administration’s posture toward North Korea.

III. Current Regulation of Leafleting

The current leafleting regulatory landscape has undergone significant change in the past five years. The initial ban on leafleting narrowly targeted the leaflets themselves, but this practice proved to be vulnerable to constitutional challenges regarding freedom of expression.62 Subsequent restrictions skirted the constitutional issue by focusing on the operational dimensions of leafleting: new laws restrict flying balloons across the DMZ and empower local law enforcement to seize leaflets and prevent launches upon discovery. There are two consistent underlying themes regarding attempts to legislate leafleting. First, all attempts to regulate leafleting has invoked some degree of national security, and the opposing legal arguments have sought to deny any causal relationship between leafleting and imminent harm to South Korean citizens or property. Second, all leafleting regulations have been proposed as amendments to existing laws rather than entirely new laws. This highlights the multi-dimensional challenge of regulating leafleting and the politically sensitive nature of leafleting. Efforts to overturn or block these amendments, especially post-2023, sought to connect leafleting to constitutional domains where courts have expressly permitted leafleting.

A. Anti-North Korean Leaflet Ban Act

In 2020 under President Moon Jae-in, the National Assembly passed an amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act. Known as the Anti-North Korea Leaflet Ban Act,63 the change in Article 24, ¶ 1, § 3 prohibited and punished the distribution of anti-North Korean leaflets with up to three years in prison.64 The opposition party opposed this amendment as a concession to North Korea, highlighting Kim Yo Jong’s demands earlier in 2020 to ban leafleting by private individuals.65 This amendment worked in tandem with an earlier action by the government to revoke the operational license of FFNK under Article 38 of the Civil Act, alleging that the group severely hindered the government’s unification policy;66 and also indicted FFNK’s founder for violations of the Act on Collection and Use of Donations (Donation Act).67 Notably, the latter action was specific to FFNK and aimed at individual conduct rather than FFNK’s corporate activity. Both the Anti-North Korea Leaflet Ban Act and the revocation of corporate licensing foreshadow the two regulatory approaches to leafleting: restricting the manner of leafleting (the very act of launching balloons) versus the instruments of leafleting (the resources, tools, and permissions for a successful launch).

B. Overturn of the Anti-North Korean Leaflet Ban Act

However, the fortunes of groups like FFNK quickly changed in the following administration, as the next president, Yoon Suk Yeol, revised South Korea’s stance towards North Korea with a shift towards deterrence over diplomacy.68 First, the South Korean Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision that the revocation of FFNK’s operational license was a proportionate response to the group’s activities.69 The Supreme Court found no ties between FFNK’s leafleting and direct and concrete harm as required under the Civil Act’s definition of harming the public interest.70 Instead, the Supreme Court agreed with FFNK’s argument that the North Korean demolition of the Kaesong Industrial inter-liaison office lacked proximate causation: “it is difficult to prove that the leaflet distribution in this case caused harm . . . based solely on the fact that North Korea unilaterally demolished the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office . . . for various political and military intentions and purposes.”71

Later that same year, the Korean Constitutional Court ruled the prior amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act as unconstitutional. The Court voted 7-2, concluding “it excessively restricts freedom of expression in a broad range of activities.”72 The threat of a prison sentence, it reasoned, should only serve as a last resort.73 Several judges viewed the amendment as wrongfully shifting the responsibility for North Korean provocations onto leaflet distributors while maintaining that the government still has a duty to keep activists in check through methods including police monitoring and intervention.74 This decision appeared to outline the constitutional limits of leafleting as it relates to security-based speech restrictions. After President Yoon’s attempt to declare martial law in early December 2024 quickly resulted in his impeachment and removal from office in 2025, the current presidential administration has proposed alternative anti-leafleting measures.75

C. Current Enforcement Mechanisms

The return of the liberal Democratic Party with President Lee Jae-Myung into office earlier this year swung the policy pendulum of North Korean engagement back towards diplomacy. During President Lee’s inauguration, his party announced plans to introduce alternative legislation that would block leafleting as a high priority.76 Several different legal frameworks were proposed, including amendments to the Aviation Safety Act, Disaster Safety Act, and the High-Pressure Gas Act.77 Each of these proposed regulations would restrict various aspects of leafleting: the Aviation Safety Act would close a regulatory loophole that currently permits balloon launches without a government permit if it is less than a certain weight; the Disaster Safety Act would limit access to areas bordering North Korea; and the High-Pressure Gas Act would regulate the balloons themselves.78 Out of these three, the Democratic Party has decided to pursue the Aviation Safety Act and also introduced a new law that permits police officers near the DMZ to halt balloon launches and related leafleting activity.79 This continued debate about the legal limits of leafleting highlight its relevance as a political flashpoint and the ongoing tension between Korean constitutional doctrine and diametrically opposed legislative policies.

1. Aviation Safety Act

The passage of the Aviation Safety Act effectively closed a weight requirement loophole used by leafleting groups to launch balloons without government approval.80 The prior Act had allowed unmanned balloons to fly in no-fly zones without a government permit if its payload weighed less than 2 kilograms.81 Initially intended for weather balloons or educational balloons, unmanned balloons seeking to fly across or near the DMZ will require permission from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport.82 Unlike the prior amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act, which explicitly named leafleting, the revised Aviation Safety Act does not explicitly mention leafleting balloons but instead references unmanned devices and includes a hefty fine of 10 million Korean won (KRW) or a prison sentence of up to a year.83

The proposed changes to the Aviation Safety Act, which passed the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee vote on November 6th, 2025 was criticized by former President Yoon’s People Power Party, who argued that the law contradicted the ruling of the Constitutional Court.84 Supporters of the Act, however, drew a critical contextual distinction between the two, noting the 2023 ruling “targeted the content of distributed materials, whereas this amendment focuses on spatial restrictions to ensure aviation safety.”85

2. Police Officers’ Duty Execution Act

In addition to the Aviation Safety Act, the National Assembly also passed an amendment to the Police Officers’ Duty Execution Act that permits on-the-ground enforcement against balloon launches.86 This amendment is linked to the Aviation Safety Act’s amendment and serves as a belt-and-suspenders enforcement mechanism against balloon launches: police officers are empowered to directly “stop or order the dispersal of those who launch leaflets to North Korea.”87 This amendment is intended to address prior uncertainty regarding the legal basis of preventing the launching of balloon leaflets.88

IV. Current Scholarship

This Comment seeks to address the various legal arguments surrounding the regulation of leafleting before proposing an alternative approach. First, this Comment evaluates how the byproducts of leaflet’s privatization (privatization of warfare, introduction of religious materials, adoption by foreign, non-Korean interest groups) has complicated the traditional analysis of leafleting as a largely constitutional issue. By examining the common constitutional arguments underlying the regulation of leafleting, the Comment highlights unique factors that impact constitutional rights in South Korea (namely, national security and citizenship). The Comment next addresses how recent legislation has sought to avoid the fray of constitutional interpretations in favor of operational regulations. Finally, the Comment proposes an alternative method of regulating leafleting by restricting foreign donations which synthesizes the operative aspects of leafleting (funding to launch leafleting) with a novel approach to a constitutional issue (restriction of political activity to Korean citizens).

A. Overview of Legal Implications from Privatized Leafleting

As noted in the Comment’s introduction, the rise of privatized leafleting since 2000 instigated much of the regulation regarding modern leafleting. These laws, whether focused on the constitutional issues raised by the leaflets’ contents or the functional aspects of launch balloons, represent a significant shift from its origins in military strategy. Decades since the South Korean government officially wound down public leafleting operations in advance of the inter-Korean summit, it remains impossible to completely separate military policy from leafleting. The North Korean response to South Korean leafleting has ranged from confiscation of the balloons’ payloads upon landing, firing rounds that invariably land on South Korean soil, and launching leafleting operations of their own.

1. Violation of International Law

When North Korea launched their “trash balloons” in 2024, the South Korean Joint Chief of Staff claimed these balloons violated international law.89 However, Andrew Wolman’s article analyzing the same incident reached a contrary conclusion. First, he noted the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the “Chicago Convention”) as the primary document regulating the control of airspace and ratified by both North and South Korea.90 The Chicago Convention states that “[n]o state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise.”91 Presuming the North Korean balloons were aircraft, Wolman conceded they appeared to violate South Korea’s sovereign airspace because no authorization to enter South Korean airspace was granted.92 However, he argued, ultimately North Korean balloons should not be characterized as a violation of international law as they were instead “legitimate countermeasures—undertaken in response to South Korea’s violation of international law by allowing activists to launch leaflet balloons into its sovereign airspace.”93 Yet this argument is dependent on the claim that South Korean leaflets are the initial aggressor—an allegation that is soundly rejected by nearly all leafleting organizations. These organizations paint an entirely different picture: North Korean civilians are in desperate need of these leaflets and their accompanying supplies.94 The NGOs argument claims leafleting is itself a countermeasure to the North Korean state’s blockade of information to its citizens and their ability to leave the country. Admittedly, any such argument seeking to position itself as a justified reaction against an initial act of aggression is vulnerable to causal skepticism similar to the one noted in the opinion of the Korean Supreme Court’s overturning of the Anti-North Korean Leaflet Ban Act.95 Another germane example is the rise in leaflets after the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan: in this instance, the South Korean leaflets would arguably be considered as valid countermeasures in response to the sinking of the ship and the ensuing deaths of 46 sailors. North Korea’s decision to launch their trash balloons was a complex and multifaceted decision that cannot be solely predicated on the provocative nature of South Korean leafleting.

Additionally, Wolman’s argument that South Korea violated international law by permitting leafleting ignores the catch-22 faced by the South Korean government. If the government prevented the violation of international airspace law by shutting down balloon launches, then it may also find itself criticized for violating international human rights law by restricting its citizens’ freedom of speech and, in some cases, religion. This concern is not without merit, as other international bodies like the U.N. and allied countries like the U.S. have criticized the government’s attempts to restrict leafleting on these same grounds.

2. Privatization of military leafleting as privatized warfare

Given this context, leafleting’s privatization takes on an additional layer: the privatization of warfare. As discussed earlier in the cost evaluation of leafleting, the microeconomics seem to favor its privatization. There are also economic considerations at the geopolitical scale, as the U.S. is currently at an inflection point regarding its military investment in South Korea. The Trump administration is considering the withdrawal of 4,500 U.S. troops from a total of 28,500 from South Korea to other parts of the Indo-Pacific region.96 This is a reverse from recent Pentagon spending and direction to increase multilateral exercises such as participating in island hopping military drills.97 It is unclear whether the U.S. will go through with its new direction as the Pentagon has denied the veracity of the divestment, while other organizations have highlighted reasons to believe such a transfer is probable.98 Regardless of the outcome of U.S. foreign policy in South Korea, the outsourcing of leafleting to private groups and citizens often complicates, rather than discharges, the South Korean government’s liability from leafleting operations.

3. Incorporation of religious materials and causes into leafleting

Another complication since privatized leafleting began in earnest is the introduction of religious materials. North Korean defectors reported experiencing religious persecution by the North Korean government in violation of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.99 Global awareness of North Korean religious persecution dates back to the Korean War, and NGOs have continuously monitored violations.100 As briefly discussed earlier in Section II.D, the North Korean political ideology is particularly repressive towards Christians and designated them as members of the “hostile” class in the North Korean hierarchy.101 Groups such as the NKCA launch balloons with a religious motivation to evangelize the North Korean population. The NKCA has successfully converted other organizations by aligning their efforts with broader humanitarian goals, with their founder arguing he is “sending these balloons from a humanitarian point of view. What the North Korean defector groups are now doing is the sort of work a pastor must do.”102 Despite the humanitarian overtones, religious pamphlets also serve the leafleting NGOs’ broader anti-North Korean agenda: the religious messaging in the pamphlets often asks its reader to question the “de facto theocracy” of the North Korean leadership.103

Historically, the interpretation of religious freedom in South Korea has been influenced by the U.S. with American Christian missionary activity in the Korean peninsula predating the DMZ and Korean War.104 During the Cold War era, “American missionaries and domestic church leaders played a pivotal role in disseminating anticommunist ideas.”105 Yet despite the presence of U.S. chaplains on military bases and its leverage by the U.S. as an anti-communist stratagem, “military psywar materials rarely claimed Christianity as a superior morality and spirituality over Communism.”106 Instead, the military leaflets were predominantly secular in nature.107

4. Funding of leafleting by non-Korean NGOs and donors

The ability of balloon launches as a method of sending religious materials and humanitarian aid into otherwise unreachable territory proved a compelling case for many groups organized outside of South Korea. Partnerships between prevalent leafleting organizations and foreign entities quickly formed, such as a Japanese interest group which provided funds to NKCA “with the understanding [NKCA] will send leaflets urging North Koreans to help find the whereabouts of dozens of Japanese believed to have been abducted to the North.”108 Of particular interest are U.S. groups such as the Defense Forum Foundation (DFF), which funds FFNK’s balloon launches and also lobbies U.S. politicians on North Korean issues.109 The DFF’s mission statement clearly lists their U.S. interests: “promoting a strong national defense . . . focus[ing] on how to win the war on terror and how to protect the United States’ homeland from terror attacks.”110 Since 1996, DFF has lobbied Congress on issues in North Korea ranging from religious persecution, North Korean defectors, and human trafficking in North Korea.111 Through their financial contributions, organizations like DFF exert considerable soft power in areas that directly impact South Korea’s national security and relationship with North Korea.

An in-depth discussion of whether such financing constitutes “political activity” occurs in Section V.D.4. South Korea has attempted to restrict political activity by foreign (non-Korean) citizens through Articles 17 and 22 in the Immigration Act.112 Notably, however, this is a largely untested restriction. Given the recent political turmoil the country has faced, with several presidential impeachments and an unsuccessful attempt at declaring martial law, South Korean government officials are likely concerned such prohibitions will damage the country’s reputation as a relatively liberal democracy. The relatively smooth transition of power to the liberal administration and President Lee’s renewed focus on reconciliation with North Korea may make the consideration of such restrictions easier now than in recent years.

B. Modern Leafleting Reveals Legal Ambiguities

Leafleting’s evolution in the twenty-first century, like many technological advancements, increasingly challenges existing legal frameworks in South Korea to address the complex realities of an interconnected global society. Prior attempts to regulate leafleting focused around legal issues of the content of its speech and its impact on national security. The South Korean Constitution also provides the protection of free speech, albeit with some significant national security restrictions given its Korean War context.113 Despite these limitations, these protections place South Korea’s Constitution as the most comparable to the U.S. Constitution out of any East Asian country. The privatization of leafleting from its state-run psychological warfare origins has grown significantly due to a mix of non-governmental organizations, foreign donors, and religious groups leveraging new technologies and international funding streams to broaden their impact. This change has exposed several underdeveloped legal areas: first, modern balloon launches present new national security concerns regarding the privatization of warfare; second, religious content in leaflets raises questions about the freedom of religion; third, the politicized nature of balloon launches and their anti-North Korean content raise questions about the involvement of foreign individuals in South Korean politics. These trends illustrate the shortcomings of current legal approaches which are arguably myopic in their focus (regulating leaflet content, operational aspects of leafleting) but fail to regulate deeper issues arising from increased foreign influence in the modern era.

C. Leafleting’s Free Speech Implications

The privatization of leafleting has raised questions about the limits of free speech. Although the South Korean Constitution establishes the freedom of speech, the South Korean courts have taken a far more restrictive approach to whom this freedom applies. Furthermore, the unique geopolitical and historical context has created a significant restriction on free speech compared to the U.S. Both sides on the leafleting debate have at various points won significant legal victories on free speech arguments.

1. South Korean Constitution Article 21

Despite several distinct limitations to free speech compared to the U.S., lawmaker’s attempts to regulate leafleting on content grounds have been largely unsuccessful. Article 21 of the South Korean Constitution provides that “[a]ll citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.”114 Immediately, a limitation is apparent: only South Korean citizens’ freedom of speech is protected. The South Korean lawmakers’ attempts to regulate leafleting on constitutional grounds may seem foolhardy by U.S. standards, but this decision makes more sense in light of how quickly the South Korean government has moved to regulate speech online. South Korea, like the U.S., has a strong internet presence, with roughly 97% of its population connected to the internet.115 In particular, South Korea has placed more stringent restrictions on speech as it relates to digital activity: in 2008, the Korean Communications and Standards Commission was established to regulate online content.116 Even though some laws, such as the 2007 internet forum real-name verification law have since been repealed, other laws regulating content, such as the Network Act which regulates illegal online content, remain.117

It is of no surprise, then, that South Korea’s track record on freedom of speech has been criticized by international bodies like the United Nations. The Network Act in particular, has been targeted as overly restrictive, with U.N. Special Rapporteur Margaret Sekaggya calling for it to be “drastically reformed in order to better safeguard freedom of expression.”118 Since then, the Network Act has undergone revisions that have limited its scope.119 Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Seoul, James Heenan, has also criticized leafleting regulations in South Korea. Even as Heenan recognized leafleting’s delicate balance between free expression and legitimate national security, he raised concerns that the consequences outlined in the 2020 amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act as overly punitive.120

2. South Korean Constitution Article 37

Heenan’s characterization of leafleting as a delicate balancing act between free expression and national security concerns highlights an underlying tension found throughout the South Korean Constitution. Article 37 Paragraph 2 expressly provides for the limiting of citizens’ freedoms and rights “only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public warfare.”121 Like the U.S. Constitution, this is a document drafted in the context of conflict; however, the proximity of North Korea may help frame why matters of national security are of paramount importance. Nevertheless, legal scholars and politicians alike have noted the clause is intentionally nebulous and have raised concern over its overreach and potential for abuse.122 South Korea’s National Security Act (also known as the National Security Law, the “NSL”) is the authoritative statute, and Article 37 functions as the interpretative tool through which the limits of the NSL are defined.

3. National Security Law

As one of the oldest laws in South Korea, the NSL was enacted on December 1, 1948, less than four months after South Korea’s establishment as the Republic of Korea.123 It was designed to “help counter any subversive threats that might develop” within South Korea and was also part of South Korea’s early attempts “to gain legitimacy for itself as the representative government of a separate, anti-communist state.”124 NSL’s Article 7 has been a contentiously litigated section of the statute as it focuses on the crimes of praise and incitement regarding antigovernment organizations. Paragraph 1, the “Pro-Enemy Actions Clause,” significantly restricts speech by prohibiting expressions of support for “an antigovernment organization.”125 This clause is often analyzed in tandem with Paragraph 5, the “Pro-Enemy Expression Materials Clause,” which punishes those who “manufactures, imports, reproduces, holds, carries, distributes, sells, or acquires any documents, drawings or other expression materials, with the intention of committing the act as referred to in paragraph (1) . . . ”126 The consequences are significant, with prison sentences up to 7 years for those convicted of violating either Paragraph 1 or 5.127 Even mere membership in an aforementioned antigovernment group carries a penalty of a year or more in prison.128

Since its inception, the NSL has been criticized for its liberal usage under authoritarian regimes: “the government has used it many times to arrest individuals, for acts ranging from praising North Korea in casual conversation to running as an opposition candidate in presidential elections.”129 The double-edged nature of this statute is far from a decorative ornament today: during the ROKS Cheonan sinking in 2010, President Lee Myung-bak’s administration tripled the number of Article 7 indictments against outspoken critics and marked the first increase in twenty years.130 The NSL has been repeatedly targeted as an outdated relic of the Cold War and an oppressive restriction on Korean civil society.131 Danielle Chubb notes the paradoxical inverse relationship between the NSL and its designated threat: “even as the North Korean threat diminished (as the North Korean state grew weaker and lost its benefactors), the NSL did not lose either prominence or power.”132 Most efforts to curb restrictions on citizens’ rights otherwise limited by Article 37 are through attempts to either reform or repeal the NSL, and it has been successfully revised seven times since its original enactment.133 The last time the NSL was amended was in 1991, when the National Assembly passed a law requiring a “knowledge of the fact that [participation in antigovernment expression] may endanger the existence and security of the state.”134

Given the similarities in origin between leafleting and the NSL raises the question as to whether the former might be effectively regulated under the latter. Both are heavily politicized issues that have largely resisted calls for their repeal. Although application of the NSL may appear paradoxical given its initial designation to prosecute pro-North Korean sentiment, the alternative interpretation of anti-government organizations may include anti-North Korean organizations whose goals hinder the incumbent administration’s designated approach to North Korean engagement. This is clearly the case with groups like FFNK, whose leaflets contain anti-North Korean rhetoric and has limited the liberal administrations’ impact and efforts to implement their reconciliatory Sunshine Policy with North Korea.135 As outlined earlier in the Comment, North Korean hostility to leafleting and FFNK’s continued operation of balloon launches likely meets the necessary threshold of “knowledge of the fact that [leafleting] may endanger the existence and security of the State” in the Pro-Enemy Actions Clause.136 Additionally, the FFNK likely meets Article 2’s defined term of “anti-government organization” as a domestic group which “aims at a rebellion against the State” because FFNK’s refusal to stop leafleting operations demonstrably violated President Moon’s pledge to cease leafleting across the DMZ, which North Korea claimed justified the demolition of the joint liaison building.137 One reason why President Moon did not consider indicting leafleting organizations under the NSL is likely because his political party has largely opposed the NSL.138 The decision to indict FFNK under an amended Inter-Korean Relations Development Act that expressly prohibited leafleting as opposed to indictment through the NSL, then, can best be understood as a calculated move in minimizing intraparty conflict. Current President Lee, therefore, is also unlikely to consider regulation of leafleting through the NSL should the current effectiveness of alternative regulatory workarounds to prohibit leafleting fail. Given his party’s voiced opposition and his predecessor’s attempted declaration of martial law,139 an invocation of national security to restrict an arguable exercise of free speech may have disastrous political fallout for President Lee.

D. Leafleting’s Freedom of Religion Implications

As first mentioned in Section II.C.2 and II.D, religious organizations (predominantly Christian evangelical groups) have recognized leafleting as a high visibility proselytizing device to the largely non-religious North Korean society. South Korea has no majority religious group although Protestant Christians constitute the plurality among South Koreans who identify as religious.140 Similar to the U.S. Constitution, the South Korean Constitution mandates the separation of religion and state, as well as freedom of religion. Historical challenges to religious freedom include conscientious objector cases.141 This section discusses the applicability of relevant constitutional articles to leafleting and argues courts are unlikely to recognize leafleting laws as an infringement on religious freedom.

1. South Korean Constitution Article 20

Free speech, however, is not the only constitutional issue with modern leafleting. As discussed earlier, the popularity of leafleting by religious groups implicates new potential conflicts with religious freedom. While religious freedom in the U.S. enjoys special treatment compared to other constitutional rights, religious freedom in Korea “tends to be treated equally with, or is even less valued than other basic rights.”142 Nevertheless, the South Korean Constitution does enumerate religious freedom in Article 20.143 Unlike the U.S. Constitution,144 religious freedom is provisionally separated from freedom of speech in the South Korean Constitution.145 In other ways, however, religious freedom appears similar across both constitutions: Article 20 Paragraph 1 states “[a]ll citizens shall enjoy freedom of religion”146 and Paragraph 2 separates church and state and does not recognize any state religion.147 These freedoms, however, can be constitutionally restricted under Article 37 for the same reasons of “national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare.”148 Launching religious leaflets into North Korea could arguably fall into all three of the provided reasons.

2. Leafleting likely fails the “public welfare” balancing test

Courts in South Korea have derived two measures—a balancing test and proportionality—from Article 37 to evaluate claims arising under Article 20. The “public welfare” rationale was recently applied as a balancing test during the COVID-19 pandemic over the ability of churches to meet for in-person religious services. In a Constitutional Court case regarding whether the Sunday administration of the first phase of the Judicial Examination violates the complainant’s freedom of religion, the Court implicated Article 37(2), holding that the complainant was not unreasonably discriminated against, because the finding that Sunday was the most convenient date for the majority of test takers is a valid public welfare restriction.149 In a separate case involving the suspension of church services during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Seoul Court of Appeals denied the church’s exemption request for in-person religious services based on a balancing test of the public welfare (in this case, limiting COVID-19 infections) over the church’s damages incurred from diminished financial donations.150 In another COVID-19 church case, by contrast, the Seoul High Court found the Seoul Metropolitan Government’s suspension on in-person church services unreasonably discriminated against the freedom of religion because other in-person activities such as in-person dining were allowed to continue operations with alternative safety measures in place.151 These two cases illustrate two measures (the balancing test and proportionality) that must be satisfied for courts to determine an infringement on the freedom of religion has occurred.

Although the incorporation of religious materials in leafleting may provide organizations with potential claims of religious freedom restrictions against leafleting regulations, such claims require a high threshold and are thereby unlikely to be recognized as unconstitutional restrictions. Currently, the South Korean government has neither imposed any restrictions specifically barring religious materials in leaflets nor barred religious groups from operating balloon launches. Religious groups seeking to challenge general leafleting regulations would likely face the difficult challenge of first convincing a court that the balancing test weighs in their favor: the desire to evangelize to North Koreans is greater than the public welfare of South Korean citizens (especially those closest to the DMZ).152 Second, religious groups will also need to demonstrate that leafleting regulations are unreasonably discriminatory to their leaflets relative to treatment against secular, anti-North Korean leaflets. The courts are unlikely to find arguments claiming leafleting benefits the public welfare persuasive because religious leafleting groups, while growing, still constitute a minority both in number and by operational volume. The likelihood of an unsuccessful challenge is further supported by the courts’ denial of in-person religious services during COVID-19, which emphasize the burden of proof these leafleting groups (especially non-Korean religious NGOs like VOMK) are likely unable to provide in order to meet the public welfare doctrine.153

E. Impact of Administrative Law Restrictions on Leafleting

The recently passed amendments discussed in Section III.C., namely the Aviation Safety Act and the Police Officers’ Duty Execution Act, have already impacted leafleting operations.154 These new laws, in conjunction with the threat of prosecution and renewed pressure from the new administration, have compelled many leafleting groups to pause their balloon launches. One civic group representing families of abductees held in North Korea announced their suspension of leafleting operations; another cited pressure from phone calls by political officials as the impetus for their pause.155 Others, however, circumvent the latest ban and continue to launch leaflets into North Korea. The following recent developments illustrate the arms race dilemma between leafleting groups and the lawmakers seeking to regulate them.

The first arrest of a man launching leafleting balloons in violation of this amendment occurred in June 2025.156 Currently, another 17 Korean citizens are under investigation for violating the Aviation Safety Act.157 Crucially, these packages exceeded the weight limits of the previous version of the Act meaning that this investigation is only nominally related to the newly amended Aviation Safety Act.158 While untested, potential workarounds for the existing law might include reclassification of the leafleting balloons as weather devices (some balloons already contain geospatial data trackers)159 or a change under a conservative administration that would authorize balloon launches.

Unlike the Aviation Safety Act workarounds, there are no recorded attempts to operate around the Police Officers’ Duty Execution Act given the extreme recency of its passage. One unlikely explanation is that leafleting NGOs and individuals have reverted back to secretive balloon launches that reduce the chances of police intervention. However, this is unlikely based on leafleting organizers’ statements.160 Moreover, this Act is likely to have a broader impact on leafleting NGOs rather than individuals as the former typically engages in larger scale launches and relies on social media to solicit donations to fund future launches.161

Other leafleting groups have changed their strategies to avoid aerial regulations to varying degrees of success. In June, a group of six U.S. citizens were detained for allegedly trying to send leaflet bottles into North Korea through ocean currents.162 Although referred to prosecutors for violating another regulation—the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety—officials have noted a new difficulty in a successful prosecution. As the suspected leafleteers are U.S. citizens in South Korea on a tourist visa, their non-resident status would allow them to leave the country prior to the conclusion of the investigation as “the police have no legal authority to stop them from departing.”163 This incident in particular raises a new concern: the exploitation of leafleting workarounds by non-Korean residences and broader foreign influence on leafleting. 

V. Proposed Approach to Regulating Leafleting

After examining the constitutional questions and other legal frameworks currently used to permit or restrict leafleting activity, this section changes course by proposing a different legal approach. While the current administration’s operational approach has curbed leafleting for now, an incoming administration could easily reverse or refuse to enforce these regulatory laws. A more effective solution, then, is to prevent leafleting by making it financially difficult to launch the balloons at all. Given the growing interest of foreign (non-Korean) interest in leafleting and the political messages in many leaflets, the author raises the possibility of restricting foreign donations and foreign NGO involvement by re-classifying leafleting as a constitutionally recognized political activity. This represents a meaningful shift from prior constitutional approaches as the South Korean Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, explicitly restricts certain rights—including political activity—to South Korean citizens.164

A. Regulating Leaflets via Funding Restrictions on Foreign Donations

Rather than focus on the operative aspects of leafleting regulation, lawmakers and policy officials should instead examine the funding—both its sources and purported purpose—underlying these balloon launches. An analysis of leafleting funds presents an attractive alternative to other regulatory laws because NGOs participating in leafleting take donations from foreign, non-Korean entities. Moreover, this method precludes the reinvention of statutory wheels as certain areas of law, such as political activity, already have heavy restrictions on funding in place. Consequently, there remain three important questions to consider: how might leafleting be considered political activity, how is funding for political activity regulated, and how might support for this method be proposed?

B. Is the Regulation of Leafleting’s Funding an Effective Strategy?

Previous attempts to regulate funding for leafleting groups have focused on the groups themselves. Using FFNK as an illustration, the Ministry of Unification under President Moon attempted to halt their leafleting operations by revoking their corporate status.165 This threatened the group’s ability to claim tax deductions for any donations received as well as tax benefits for their donors.166 As outlined earlier in Section III.B., the South Korean Supreme Court ruled in FFNK’s favor as it did not find that the revocation of FFNK’s corporate license constituted a proportionate response to its activities.

By contrast, shifting regulation away from the leafleting organizations and onto the donors, especially non-Korean citizens, shifts the liability in the other direction. While leafleting groups are likely to contest leafleting restrictions on constitutional grounds or devise workarounds for administrative law regulations, restricting non-Korean citizens or foreign NGOs from donating is far less likely to be challenged in court. This is largely because South Korean law specifically enumerates certain rights exclusively for Korean citizens. For example, the South Korean Constitution recognizes a guaranteed status of aliens “as prescribed by international laws and treaties,” but also specifically categorizes citizens as the exclusive subject of certain basic constitutional rights.167 More specifically, the national security implications triggered in launching balloons across the DMZ and the highly politicized perception of leafleting further diminishes the risk these new restrictions will be overturned barring an administration change. Finally, determining a legal basis for leafleting under political activity due to a demonstrable impact on election outcomes may counter-intuitively reduce future amendments by a sympathetic future presidential administration.

C. Determining Whether Leafleting Constitutes Political Activity

Defining “political activity” is an unexpectedly difficult task as the term is not explicitly defined. The first subsection highlights its ambiguity in the Immigration Act, as well as potential circumstances of enforcement. To determine whether leafleting falls within the scope of “political activity”, several different interpretations are proposed in the following subsections: subsection 2 analyzes political activity as a “domestic” act; subsection 3 interprets political activity through a contents-based approach; and subsection 4 finally considers an outcomes-based approach to political activity.

1. Political activity in the Immigration Act

First, the paramount question of whether leafleting itself constitutes political activity remains largely unresolved. In large part this is due to the difficulty of defining political activity. Article 17 Paragraph 2 of the Immigration Act prohibits non-Koreans from engaging in “any political activity.”168 Article 22 broadly empowers the South Korean Ministry of Justice to restrict the activities, residency, or apply any other “necessary measures” against non-Korean citizens if it is in the interests of “peace and order of the public or an important interest of the Republic of Korea.”169 Critically, the term “political activity” as mentioned in Article 17 of the Immigration Act is not actually defined despite the fact that engaging in such activities is grounds for deportation under Article 46 Paragraph 1.8.170 This omission raises important statutory interpretation questions, which remain mostly unanswered.171 The most significant implication is that it is a largely untested restriction as no such enforcement has actually been applied against a foreign citizen or entity. During the impeachment proceedings of former President Yoon, the Chinese Embassy in Seoul issued a statement to Chinese citizens visiting South Korea warning them not to participate in “any political activity including expressing political opinions.”172 However, a South Korean government official clarified that “[n]o foreigners have been ordered to be deported or to stop interfering (in political matters in Korea).”173 This ambiguity has been noted by legal scholars as ineffective due to its lack of enforcement and raising a potential challenge in the Korean Constitutional Court.174 Another difficulty is that Article 17 appears to preclude a large majority of foreign nationals who might be donating to leafleting groups. Paragraph 2 notes that “No foreigner sojourning in the Republic of Korea shall engage in any political activity . . . ”175 The clause “sojourning in the Republic of Korea” includes not only tourists, as in the case of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea during the anti-Yoon protests, but also those who are in Korea under work visas.176 The underlying commonality in sojourning, then, is the requirement of physical presence in South Korea.177 While some non-Korean citizens associated with leafleting are domiciled in South Korea, non-Korean citizens who do not have any other contact with South Korea aside from donating to leafleting organizations may likely fall outside the bounds of this regulation. Furthermore, they may not be deterred by the punishment of deportation for engaging in political activity as they may not have any intentions to visit South Korea in the first place. While leafleting is an increasingly high-profile news story in South Korea, it remains largely unknown outside of South Korea. For non-individual donors including those organized as non-profit entities, proposed alternative regulations targeting non-profit permits may be more effective than restricting their ability to send funds. This approach would effectively end-run international leafleting financing and curb foreign political involvement in a sensitive area of national security.

2. Political activity in the South Korean Constitution

Even as political activity remains largely undefined in the Immigration Act,178 a look to other South Korean laws provides useful context. The argument that the scope of political activity is limited to domestic politics appears to be supported by the South Korean Constitution’s references to political activities. Article 112 Paragraph 2 restricts Justices of the Constitutional Court from political party membership and participation in political activity.179 The fact that political party membership is mentioned in conjunction with political activity suggests the political activity may not be an all-encompassing term. Similarly, Article 114 Paragraph 4 restricts election commission members from the same.180 In order to construct a persuasive argument that leafleting is an eligible political activity, additional emphasis should be placed on the domestic political polarization of leafleting and claims that changes to leafleting regulations are correlated with changing presidential administrations. Another potential argument by analogy would be that leafleting, as either an instrument or obstacle in a political party’s engagement with North Korea, falls within “domestic” political activity that supports foreign policy. Similarly, one could argue that since balloon launches originate in South Korea, they constitute a domestic political activity, although this is not as compelling because they are intended for North Korea. 

3. Leafleting’s contents as political activity

In addition to analyzing political activity through statutory interpretation, one can also turn to the content of the leaflets themselves and determine whether dissemination of leafleting would be a political activity. Leaflets often contain material critical of the North Korean government but usually do not include political mentions of the South Korean government. This argument proposes a broader definition of political activity that is not limited to “domestic” issues. Additionally, while the religious content in some leaflets is not usually perceived as a “political” topic, groups like NKCA point out that the North Korean political ideology perceives the Kim family as religious leaders, too.181 Consequently, NKCA argues, the incorporation of religious materials is also a politically destabilizing effect intended to question Kim Jong Un’s legitimacy.

A comparative or historical analysis of leaflets from the Korean War to contemporary leaflets may provide useful insights supporting the designation of leaflets as political activity. During the Korean War, leaflets were used to disseminate propaganda but also convey important military information, such as informing civilians of an imminent bombing to allow for an evacuation or to avoid unexploded ordnances.182 Today, leaflets still disseminate propaganda that actively portrays the North Korean leadership as unstable or evil; others contain political cartoons that mock the North Korean nuclear development program or the Kim family.183 Demonstrating the continuity of leaflet content supports the argument that leaflets are a political activity intended to garner sympathy and support for one political side (South Korea) and distrust towards the designated political opponents.

4. Leafleting’s national security implications on elections constitute political activity

Finally, a consequentialist argument could also be proposed, to the effect that leafleting constitutes a political activity because its national security implications impact election outcomes. The argument assumes that leafleting’s impact, whether through North Korean responses or as a bellwether of anti-North Korean sentiment, is significant enough to raise national security implications. This is arguably implicated by multiple presidential administrations having outlined their respective stances on regulating leafleting. However, it is significantly weakened by the South Korean Supreme Court’s difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between South Korean leafleting and incidents at the DMZ.184 North Korea views leafleting as hostile provocations, and “countermeasures” to leafleting, whether shooting balloons down or launching their own across the border, are leveraged by South Korean politicians on the campaign trail to support their preferred stance against North Korea.185 Liberal presidential candidates, in particular, espouse strong regulations against leafleting.186 While statistics demonstrating that a strategy of a spike in leafleting to provoke a North Korean response which in turn benefit the conservative candidate with a hardline, security-first approach to North Korea (generally tolerant of leafleting) have not been conducted, lawmakers can regardless propose this argument through a preventative perspective. This argument is compelling because it leverages leafleting as a connection between national security and foreign donations, posing questions about whether foreign influence is influencing domestic election results.

D. Regulating Funding under Political Activity

Having established that funding for leafleting—or leafleting itself—could constitute political activity under the Immigration Act,187 the following subsections are a comprehensive attempt to demonstrate the preference for regulation under the Immigration Act compared to other areas: election and campaign finance, NGO funding, and donation laws. 

1. Election and campaign finance laws

Within the broad range of political activity, many of the existing regulations are primarily concerned with campaign and election finance, such as the Political Funds Act.188 However, the Political Funds Act and similar election laws are likely only tangentially relevant to leafleting: though certain administrations are more friendly to leafleting than others, many leafleting groups typically do not focus on domestic political issues such as sponsoring politicians.189 These laws may appear to already provide the strongest restrictions against foreign donations, but they are highly unlikely to apply to individual foreign donors. Consequently, lawmakers seeking to effectively restrict foreign funds towards leafleting should continue to look elsewhere.

2. Laws governing NGO funding

It is undisputed that foreign donations are now an integral aspect of leafleting.190 Donations often make up a significant amount of revenue for many groups such as VOMK: “Voice of the Martyrs Korea has never received any support at any time from any government or government-funded agency. ‘We are 100% supported by donations from individuals and churches, says Foley.’”191 In 2024, VOMK received ₩3,609,326,985 in donations which constituted roughly 98% of their total annual revenue.192 Although the financial statement does not reveal what percentage of these donations come from foreign donors, it does list a net gain of more than 19 million Won in foreign currency transactions.193 Other organizations like FFNK have adapted their balloon launch strategy to maximize donations and reach (typically by posting on social media).194 This demonstrated reliance on donations highlights the feasibility that regulating donations—especially foreign donations—may significantly impact an organization’s ability to effectively maintain consistent and scalable leafleting operations.

Several approaches are considered here. One approach would avoid outright restricting foreign donations and instead prohibit domestic leafleting organizations from being eligible to subsidize their expenses using foreign donations. To this end, the Assistance for Non-profit, Non-governmental Organizations Act which promotes public-interest activities that “contribute to the development of a democratic society” appears promising.195 Although this does not directly impact foreign donors, Article 6 stipulates that NGOs may subsidize their business expenses and receive other forms of assistance.196 Additionally, eligible NGOs can seek special tax status under the Restriction of Special Taxation Act to further reduce or exempt any tax obligations.197 In contrast to other statutes such as the Civil Act’s Article 38, under which courts look for proportionate response, no such test exists to determine whether an NGO’s activities promote the development of a democratic society. A possible argument may point to the purpose of leafleting as intended to help North Koreans in North Korea, which supports the claim that leafleting NGOs do not promote the development of South Korea’s democracy but merely advertise it to North Koreans through their leaflets.

Meanwhile, foreign NGOs are regulated through the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Foreign Nongovernmental Aid Organizations Act, which regulates nonprofit welfare organizations with “head offices abroad and engaging in social welfare activities in Korea . . . with the financial source from abroad.”198 Foreign leafleting groups likely fall under the eligible fields of health, education, living protection, disaster relief or community development as balloons often carry medical supplies, food, and money in addition to leaflets. Admittedly, amendments that would carve out leafleting as an eligible social welfare activity would present the same dilemma current administrative laws regulating leafleting.

3. Donation laws

A more direct approach would be to regulate the donations as received by the NGOs. The Donation Act requires registration for individuals or organizations if over ten million Won has been collected.199 Using Jung’s 2014 cost approximations of ₩120,000 for a full-sized balloon, many leafleting organizations fall meet this threshold of launching more than 83 balloons.200 There has already been an attempt to leverage the Donation Act against leafleting: FFNK’s Park Sang Hak was charged with violating the Donation Act and after failing to register donations intended for FFNK from 2015 to 2019.201 However, other organizations have scrupulous records and have taken precautionary measures to ensure that their permits are not revoked.202 Potential amendments to the Donation Act include qualifying the acceptable activities for which donations may be collected in Article 4 Paragraph 2.203 Since the Donation Act is overseen by the Ministry of the Interior and Safety rather than the Unification Ministry, amendments to the Donation Act may ripple far beyond the intended scope of leafleting and reduce broader philanthropy initiatives and foreign charitable contributions into the country. 

4. Immigration Act

Given the significant caveats associated with the aforementioned laws, a return to the Immigration Act for potential is warranted. The Immigration Act, as noted in Section V.C.1., contains a statutory interpretation question over the definition of political activity. Given that this phrase has recently been used in a context involving non-Korean citizens, a third approach seeks to directly expand the interpretation of political activity in Article 17 or amends the Immigration Act to include foreign donations as potential possibilities that might survive both in the National Assembly and any subsequent legal challenges.

One interesting distinction between laws governing political activity and laws involving donations is in their respective constructions. The former is typically written as a negative right: “No foreigner…shall engage in any political activity with the exception of cases provided for by this Act . . .”204 or “[n]o one shall contribute or receive any political fund . . .”205 The latter, by contrast, phrases donations as a positive right: “registration . . . shall be allowed only for one of the following activities.”206This construction presents useful implications because it would apply a greater degree of justification that leafleting, if categorized as a political activity, should be an exception to which non-citizens are granted.207 This interpretation, then, would not require any amendments to the Immigration Act itself. Granted that leafleting is a recognized political activity under the Immigration Act, the next step in the argument to connect foreign donations to political activity would be the claim that supporting leafleting, including through monetary donations, falls within the prohibition on engaging in “any political activity.” A potential counterargument may argue that such an expansive view of political activity violates constitutional protections. Although this may be true for the U.S. Constitution, the South Korean Constitution limits the grant of certain rights including freedom of speech to only its citizens. 

E. Feasibility of Proposed Leafleting Restrictions

Finally, all that remains is determining who might propose any of the aforementioned changes. As leafleting is a heavily politicized topic, it is highly unlikely the conservative party would support any measure that would restrict leafleting. The current liberal administration under President Lee Jae-Myung, however, has already implemented administrative amendments that appear to have significantly reduced or stalled any ongoing leafleting initiatives. Consequently, there is little momentum to immediately restrict leafleting through foreign donations. Historical patterns have demonstrated that the pendulum may swing favorably towards leafleting with a change in administration. Prior legal challenges and precedent have overturned leafleting bans on various grounds, and the latest bans may similarly be overturned.

Perhaps a more interesting point is that conservative opposition for this plan, if proposed, would be difficult because it is presented as a strong national security measure. The South Korean conservative factions have generally supported strong national security laws, including the National Security Act. This inherent tension between conventional party lines and this proposed solution to previously ineffective leafleting solutions has identified a political paradox with the potential of definitively regulating leafleting—an activity as old as the modern nation state of South Korea—out of existence.

VI. Conclusion

An analysis of the existing leafleting scholarship reveals a significant amount of focus is given to its relationship with national security, freedom of speech, and back-and-forth legislation aimed at restricting the practice of balloon launches. Leafleting is an increasingly partisan issue and closely tied to one of the most critical political issues in South Korea: its relationship with North Korea. Since its inception as propaganda during the Korean War the contents, logistics, and perception of balloon launching leaflets have evolved. Today, a wide range of private organizations have developed sophisticated balloons with specific messages that rely on support from both South Korean citizens as well as international donors. While national security laws generally focus on freedom of speech and religion, which in the South Korean Constitution is restricted to South Korean citizens, the increasing number of foreign donations behind leafleting and its polarization among opposing political parties presents an opportunity for a different analysis centered on political activity in South Korea by non-citizens.

The Comment first discusses leafleting as a Cold War holdover that has paradoxically retained its relevance into the twenty-first century, and then focuses on new developments arising from the South Korean government’s decision to stop leafleting in 2004, essentially making it a privatized practice. The privatization of what was once a military operation raises unique issues regarding national security and helps explain the growing number of different leafleting organizations and their varying goals. This also provides insight into a relatively new aspect of leafleting: balloon launches funded by religious organizations with the intention of spreading Christianity into North Korea, disrupting North Korea’s bottleneck on information, supporting existing dissidents (political, religious, other) in North Korea, or a mixture of these reasons. Finally, the growth of religious leafleting highlights an increasing amount of foreign investment (monetary, labor, etc.) in leafleting. The most recent case of spreading religious materials through a message-in-a-bottle method and the subsequent detainment of six participating Americans underscores how leafleting will continue to adapt to restrictive legislation (instead of floating balloons over the border carried by the wind, these individuals sought to send the same contents carried by ocean currents onto North Korean beaches).

This Comment then addresses how the privatization of leafleting has raised new issues with legal implications. The conventional approach to leafleting regulations has fallen out of favor because of successful constitutional challenges invoking the freedom of speech and religion. Currently, the most successful regulations involve the invocation of administrative law on the operative aspects of balloon launches, but these risk obsolescence as leafleting organizations develop new methods of disseminating leaflets into North Korea.

This Comment proposes an alternative approach to leafleting regulations that may reduce inefficiency costs incurred by the back-and-forth invalidating from either the Korean Constitutional Court or by the succeeding presidential administration. Rather than drafting laws aimed at the operative aspects (flying balloons) or its contents (constitutional issues of speech and religion), regulations should focus on another effect incurred from modern adaptations to leafleting: the potential engagement of political activity by non-citizens and foreign NGOs through monetary support. Addressing this question requires analysis of another legally ambiguous concept: political activity. While political activity is largely understood in an election or domestic politics context, several different arguments are presented that demonstrate how leafleting may qualify as political activity. Next, an analysis of the scope of foreign donations is analyzed for potential connections to political activity. While donations involving either non-Korean citizens or foreign NGOs are explicitly discussed in a few different statutes, the proposed solution is to instead connect foreign donations as restricted political activity for non-Korean citizens under the Immigration Act. This approach does not require any statutory amendments in the Immigration Act as it relies on an expansive definition of political activity, has already been explored to some degree in recent events, and its presentation as a preventative measure against foreign influence in elections will improve its chances of surviving changes from a future administration friendlier to leafleting. 

Given the rapidly changing legal developments in leafleting, domestic political shifts, and broader geopolitics, there are multiple avenues for future research or additional analysis. One potential exploration would be differentiating between leafleting groups: while this Comment classified the different leafleting groups together as private actors, differences in degree of frequency and organizational focus may be worth future delineation. Another example would be to frame the leafleting regulatory regime in South Korea under a comparative analysis. The South Korean Constitution contains many similarities to the U.S. Constitution, and an examination of divergences in the protection of certain freedoms or foreign influences may be an interesting discussion. Finally, this Comment has identified several legal paradoxes that are apparent in leafleting and associated laws. While these were largely noted rather than examined in depth, future scholarship may find compelling insights in them.

• See Abbi Clark, Propaganda During the Korean War: UN & US Psyops from the Sky, Grey Dynamics (Jan. 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/K8CV-NZP5.
• Sayuri Umeda, South Korea: Amended Law Criminalizes Sending Leaflets to North Korea by Balloon, Libr. of Cong. (Jan. 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/YJ4H-4MXE.
• Eun-jeong Kim, North Korea’s Response to US Army Propaganda Leaflets during the Korean War, 35 War & Soc’y 298, 299 (2016).
• Jee Abbey Lee, Explainer: Why “Leafleting” to North Korea Ruffles Feathers, Open Nuclear Network (June 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/2GTV-A4P9.
• Eun-jeong Kim, supra note 3, at 307.
• See Yong-ho Tae, Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea, H.R.N.K. Insider (Jan. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/Z3S2-BSKJ.
• Id.
• Id.
• Id.
• Anti-North Korea leaflets, KBSWorld: Inside North Korea (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/DM82-J78B.
• Victor Cha, The Aftermath of the Cheonan, CSIS (May 25, 2010), https://perma.cc/X2EZ-3UMY; see also Umeda, supra note 2 (noting that the South Korean government also briefly resumed leafleting in 2014).
• Richard Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, 1379 Rand Res. 1, 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/2Z9L-AKCS; see also Sang-Hun Choe, A ‘Balloon Warrior’ Subverts North Korea, Thousands of Leaflets at a Time, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/HHN7-LTXN (highlighting the “godfather” of leafleting, Lee Min-Bok).
• Sang-Hun Choe, Koreas Exchange Fire After Activists Launch Balloons Over Border, N.Y. Times (Oct. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/7GHD-76GA.
• See North Korea is dropping leaflets on the South – what do they say?, BBC News (Jan. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/N45G-VH2W.
• Id.
• Scott A. Snyder, North Korea’s Loyalty Test and the Demolition of Inter-Korean Relations, Council on Foreign Relations (June 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/8JFF-587N.
• Id. 
• Je-hun Lee, Trash balloons are exercise of ‘freedom of expression,’ says N. Korea’s Kim Yo-jong, Hankyoreh (May 30, 2024), https://perma.cc/V6VE-KYMM.
• See generally Andrew Wolman, North Korean Trash Balloons and International Law, 50 Brook. J. Int’l L. 102, 105–08 (2024) (discussing the sovereignty of airspace over a state and the implications of North Korea’s “trash balloons”).
• See Je-hun Lee, supra note 18.
• Wolman, supra note 19, at 103.
• See Korean War Leaflets and Safe Conduct Passes, Nat’l Museum of the U.S. Air Force, (last visited Nov. 23, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y23C-MUG5; see also Clark, supra note 1 (describing the U.S. Army’s Psychological Warfare Section and use of airplanes to drop leaflets). But see Joseph Trevithick, The Pentagon Dropped Billions of Leaflets Which No One Read: Korean War propaganda campaign was inept, Trench Art (Mar. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/VBD2-QKN5 (arguing that even though the U.S. Army deposited billions leaflets from airplanes, logistical failures prevented optimal reach).
• See Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, supra note 12, at 8.
• Richard Mason, Non-State Actors in North Korean Airspace, 36 SAIS Rev. Int’l Affs. 69, 81 (2016) (“A hexacopter is not such a direct competitor to a balloon because it will not provide the deep penetration into North Korea that a balloon can offer in principle.”).
• See Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, supra note 12, at 6–7.
• Jin-Heon Jung, Ballooning Evangelism: Psychological Warfare and Christianity in the Divided Korea 26 (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Rel. and Ethnic Div., Working Paper No. 14-07, 2014), https://perma.cc/8USP-K4CE. However, all six categories are not always true for all leaflets; multiple examples exist, for instance, of leaflets containing cartoons caricaturing Kim Jong Un and his family.
• How Propaganda Flyers Try to Win Over N. Koreans, Chosun Daily (Oct. 16, 2014), https://perma.cc/5989-WHM5.
• See Mason, supra note 24, at 70.
• Sang-Hun Choe, The Clues Inside North and South Korea’s Balloons, N.Y. Times (June 29, 2024), https://perma.cc/6NTX-QF2U.
• Id.
• See Jin-Heong Jung, supra note 26, at 1. 
• See Prachi Vidwans, In South Korea, trash balloons prompt a debate over free speech, Inst. of Current World Affs. (Sep. 25, 2024), https://perma.cc/T8ET-V9XH (noting the anti-leafleting law under former president Moon Jae-in, an interaction between a liberal Paju mayor and leafleting activists, and the characterization of the debate over leafleting as along party lines); see also Soon-wan Kwon, Democratic Party Revives Leaflet Ban via Aviation Law, Chosun Daily (Sep. 25, 2025), https://perma.cc/X4JJ-PS9M.
• Ju-min Park, South Korea starts removing anti-North Korean loudspeakers on border, Reuters (Aug. 4, 2025), https://perma.cc/J9PZ-ZBCC.
• Id.
• See Kwon, Democratic Party Revives Leaflet Ban via Aviation Law, supra note 32 (noting the Constitutional Court under Yoon Suk Yeol overturned the Anti-North Korea Leaflet Ban Act for violating the freedom of expression).
• Danielle L. Chubb, Statist nationalism and South Korea’s National Security Law, in Patriotism in East Asia 137, 145 (Jun-hyeok Kwak & Koichiro Matsuda eds., 2014).
• See infra Section III.C.
• Jin-Heon Jung, supra note 26, at 29.
• Id.
• See Mason, supra note 24, at 82, Table 4.
• Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, supra note 12, at 9.
• Id. at 3.
• See Mason, Non-State Actors in North Korean Airspace, supra note 24, at 70.
• See Jin-Heon Jung, supra note 26, at 23.
• See Ju-min Park & Dogyun Kim, South Korea’s balloon crackdown hits anti-North Korea activists, Reuters (July 7, 2025), https://perma.cc/XP3Q-F3Y4.
• See Activist indicted for sending anti-regime leaflets to North Korea, Korea Times (Jan. 18, 2022), https://perma.cc/J8XY-UYDD; see also Daehyun Kim, ‘Leaflet Distribution to North Korea’ Park Sang-hak Sentenced to Probation with Fine for Violation of the Fundraising Act in First Trial, Asia Bus. Daily (Mar. 8, 2022), https://perma.cc/JEK9-8GXL. 
• Jeongmin Kim & Kelly Kasulis, South Korea Revokes Corporate License for Two Defector-led Activist Groups, NK News (July 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/UAH6-J573. See also infra note 67.
• Joon Ha Park, ROK police refer activist to prosecutors for launching balloons into North Korea, NK News (Nov. 12, 2024), https://perma.cc/W35Q-8439.
• See Sang-Hun Choe, A ‘Balloon Warrior’ Subverts North Korea, Thousands of Leaflets at a Time, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/TQ2K-XYYT.
• See How Propaganda Flyers Try to Win Over N. Koreans, supra note 27.
• See Mason, Non-State Actors in North Korean Airspace, supra note 24, at 70.
• See Jin-Heon Jung, supra note 26, at 9.
• See Mason, Non-State Actors in North Korean Airspace, supra note 24, at 70.
• 2025 Annual Report, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom 30 (2025), https://perma.cc/34W2-83ST.
• Id.
• Id. 
• See Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, supra note 12, at 3.
• Bernd Debusmann Jr., What happened to U.S. citizens like Otto Warmbier detained in North Korea, BBC News (July 18, 2023), https://perma.cc/E97X-3JQ9.
• Defense Forum Foundation’s (DFF) Programs Promoting Freedom and Human Rights in North Korea, Defense Forum Foundation (2017), https://perma.cc/YD4S-9463.
• The U.S. does not formally recognize North Korea and has no diplomatic relations with the country. Supra note 54, at 31.
• See Jee Abbey Lee, supra note 4 (contrasting FFNK’s day time launches for social media views with another leafleting group whose preference to launch at night and without public notice reduces the possibility of legal sanctions by the South Korean government).
• See infra Section IV.C.
• Kwon, Democratic Party Revives Leaflet Ban via Aviation Law, supra note 32.
• Hyeon-seung Lee, Korea’s Constitutional Court rules anti-North Korean leaflet distribution is free speech, ChosunBiz (June 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/BD28-A4NR.
• See Tae, supra note 6 (connecting Kim Yo-Jong’s statement on June 4, 2020 to the accelerated drafting by August 3 and passage of the amendment by the end of December).
• Article 38 of the Civil Act outlines the conditions under which a corporate license may be revoked, such as when a corporation exceeds the scope of its stated activity or engages in acts that harm public interests. Minbeob [Civil Act] art. 38 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/HCA5-YL9S.
• Na-young Kim, Defector activist indicted over last Year’s anti-N.K. leafleting, Yonhap News Agency (Jan. 28, 2022), https://perma.cc/6NFG-4F86.
• Mark E. Manyin & Liana Wong, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF10165, South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations 46 (2024).
• Jeongmin Kim, ROK court reverses ruling against activists over anti-North Korea leafleting, NK News (May 5, 2023), https://perma.cc/6XP9-EMAM.
• Id.; see also Civil Act art. 38, supra note 66.
• See Jeongmin Kim, supranote 69.
• Tong-hyung Kim, South Korea’s Constitutional Court strikes down law banning anti-Pyongyang leafleting, AP News (Sep. 26, 2023), https://perma.cc/AED2-WHGD. 
• Id. (quoting the Court’s opinion that state power of punishment should only be mobilized as a last resort).
• Id. (citing the views of majority opinion judges Kim Hyung-doo, Lee Eun-ae, Lee Jong-seok, and Lee Young-jin).
• Jeongmin Kim & Joon Ha Park, Lee Jae-myung wins South Korean presidency, pledging to pursue peace with North, NK News (June 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/BQB2-2KM4. 
• Kwon, Democratic Party Revives Leaflet Ban via Aviation Law, supra note 32.
• Hyeon-seung Lee, supra note 64.
• Id.
• Soon-wan Kwon, Democratic Party Unilaterally Passes Anti-North Korea Leaflet Restraint Law, Chosun Daily (Dec. 15, 2025), https://perma.cc/2F6G-RL8T.
• See Kwon, Democratic Party Revives Leaflet Ban via Aviation Law, supra note 32.
• Dong-ju Bae, Parliament Passes Aviation Safety Act to Ban Leaflet Flights to North Korea, ChosunBiz (Dec. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/9GL4-MCAN.
• See Kwon, Democratic Party Revives Leaflet Ban via Aviation Law, supra note 32.
• Id.
• Hae-in Lee, Democratic Party-Led Committee Passes Amendment to Anti-North Leaflet Ban, Chosun Daily (Nov. 7, 2025), https://perma.cc/7YB7-WA64.
• Id. (quoting Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport Kim Yun-duk).
• See Kwon, Democratic Party Unilaterally Passes Anti-North Korea Leaflet Restraint Law, supra note 79.
• Jong-hyun Lee, National Assembly Passes Police Duty Law as 3-night Filibuster Ends, ChosunBiz (Dec. 14, 2025), https://perma.cc/892L-MCHU.
• Jooheon Kim, Seoul Praises Legal Change Banning Activist Balloon Launches Toward North Korea, NK News (Dec. 4, 2025), http://perma.cc/C9YP-8TMD (noting “South Korean police previously said they had no authority to intervene [in stopping balloon launches]”).
• Jeongmin Kim, North Korea calls feces-carrying balloons a ‘gift’ to the South from its people, NK News (May 30, 2024), https://perma.cc/RT3Z-TPNK.
• See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
• Id. art. 3(c).
• See Wolman, supra note 19, at 108.
• Id. at 125.
• See Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, supra note 12, at 4 (“Korean NGOs’ belief in the effectiveness of their balloon launches is sustained partly by the testimony of North Korean defectors who decided to escape based on the information delivered by balloon.”).
• See Tong-hyung Kim, supra note 72 (concluding that the South Korean activists should not be held responsible for the damage and danger directly caused by North Korean response to leafleting).
• Nancy A. Youssef et al., U.S. Considers Withdrawing Thousands of Troops From South Korea, Wall St. J. (May 23, 2025), https://perma.cc/GNJ6-WC5R.
• Id.
• Victor Cha, South Korea’s Response to U.S. Demands: Minimize Risk, Maximize Reward, CSIS (Oct. 6, 2025), https://perma.cc/6RA2-JL4Z (noting two reasons to disregard the Pentagon’s denial of the rumored transfers: Trump’s historical questioning of troops in South Korea and a changing emphasis from North Korea to China).
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 18. Although North Korea did not sign the declaration as it did not join the U.N. until 1991, its membership obligates compliance with the declaration. See also Greg Scarlatoiu, Remember the People of North Korea on 2025 Human Rights Day, HRNK (Dec. 10, 2025), https://perma.cc/XD5N-XG6E.   
• See 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: North Korea, U.S. Department of State: Office of International Religious Freedom (2023), https://perma.cc/TG7L-CWJY (summarizing reports of denial of religious freedom by various NGOs including Korea Future and Open Doors USA).
• 2025 Annual Report, supra note 54, at 30.
• Vidwans, supra note 32.
• Jee Abbey Lee, supra note 4.
• See Jin-HeonJung, supra note 26, at 12 (noting Christianity was more firmly established in the Northern peninsula than the South prior to the demarcation of the 38th parallel).
• Id. at 18.
• Id.
• Id.
• Choe, Koreas Exchange Fire After Activists Launch Balloons Over Border, supra note 13.
• See Defense Forum Foundation, supra note 59.
• Mission and History, Defense Forum Foundation, https://perma.cc/6WWS-6PCY (last visited Nov. 22, 2025).
• See Defense Forum Foundation, supra note 59.
• Chulibgukgwanribeob [Immigration Act] arts. 17, 22 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Immigration Act], translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/5NPQ-T9LP.
• See, e.g., Daehanminkuk Hunbeob [Hunbeob] [Constitution] art. 37 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter Constitution], translated in Statute of the Republic of Korea’s online database, https://perma.cc/ZN59-2AY7.
• Id. art. 21.
• Hyun-Woo Lee & Chang-Young Jeon, South Korea 2025 Report, Oxford University: Reuters Inst. (June 17, 2025), https://perma.cc/4BP5-96QP.
• Geoffrey Fattig, Only Words on Paper? Freedom of Speech & Expression in South Korea, 6 Yonsei J. Int’l Stud. 127, 134 (2014).
• See Evan Ramstad, South Korea Court Knocks Down Online Real-Name Rule, Wall St. J. (Aug. 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/4LZ8-HA3Q. See also Fattig, supra note 116, at 135. 
• Fattig, supra note 116, at 135 (quoting Margaret Sekaggya, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Addendum, Mission to the Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/55/Add.2 (Dec. 23, 2013)).
• The Network Act has undergone several amendments in recent years: online service providers are not allowed to collect or use resident registration numbers without authorization (2012), providers must obtain user consent (2017), and providers must report cybersecurity incidents within 24 hours (2024). See Recent Amendments to the Network Act, Korean Legal Info. Inst., https://perma.cc/K6H9-AJS3 (last visited Sep. 28, 2024).
• Ju-min Park & Dogyun Kim, South Korea’s balloon crackdown hits anti-North Korea activists, Reuters (July 7, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y42L-MVUD.
• See Immigration Act, supra note 112, art. 37.
• See generally John M. Leitner, To Post or Not to Post: Korean Criminal Sanctions for Online Expression, 25 Temp. Int’l & Compar. L.J. 43 (2011); Ho Youm Kyu, The Constitutional Court and Freedom of Expression, 1 J. Korean L. 37 (2001).
• Diane Kraft, South Korea’s National Security Law: A Tool of Oppression in an Insecure World, 24 Wis. Int’l L.J. 627, 627 (2006).
• Chubb, supra note 36, at 147.
• Gukga boanbeob [National Security Law] art. 7 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter NSL], translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/DW4D-CJW6.
• Id. art. 7.5.
• Id. art. 7. See also Seohee Kwak, Dynamics between national security laws and repertoires of political action: A comparative analysis of Hong Kong and South Korea, 16 Asian Pol. & Pol’y 78, 84 (2024) (outlining potential prison sentences for those who “praise, incite, promote, or cooperate with an antistate group or its members”).
• “Antistate groups” are also translated as “antigovernment organization”: see id. art. 7.3.
• Kraft, supra note 123, at 631.
• See Fattig, supra note 116, at 142.
• While last amended in 1991, Article 7 was challenged in 2015 although it was found constitutional as it violated neither the void-for-vagueness doctrine nor infringed freedom of expression under excessive restriction. While last amended in 1991, Article 7 was challenged in 2015 although it was found constitutional as it violated neither the void-for-vagueness doctrine nor infringed freedom of expression under excessive restriction. Case on National Security Act’s Penalty Clauses for Conduct Including Pro-Enemy Actions and Manufacture of Expression Materials with Intention of Committing Pro-Enemy Actions, Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Sep. 26, 2023, 2017Hun-ba42 146, 148 (S. Kor.).

• Chubb, supra note 36, at 147.
• Kwak, supra note 127.
• NSL, supra note 125 art. 7.1. See also Major Decisions in Brief: 89Hun-Ka113, Const. Ct. S. Kor.: Decisions, https://perma.cc/4Z2U-9PLH (last visited Nov. 22, 2025) (connecting the 1990 Constitutional Court Case on the Crime of Praise and Incitement under the National Security Act to the 1991 amendment).
• Notably, the South Korean Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court’s finding that FFNK’s leaflet distribution increased risks of military conflict in the DMZ in 2023. See Jeongmin Kim, supra note 69.
• NSL, supra note 125 art. 7.1. But note the legal paradox that anti-North Korean leafleting would thereby constitute a pro-enemy action.
• Id. art. 2.1.
• See Eun-ji Bahk, Liberal bloc’s push to repeal National Security Law ignites political firestorm, Korea Times (Dec. 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/4XSF-GK68.
• Shreyas Reddy, Prosecutors seek 30-year jail term for Yoon over North Korea drone incursions, NK News (Apr. 24, 2026), https://perma.cc/TP7Z-LUYY.
• Republic of Korea 2023 International Religious Freedom Report, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom 1 (2023), https://perma.cc/WP8W-MY3S.
• Id. at 5–6.
• Daeho Choi & Taesoo Kim, Governmental Response to ‘COVID-19’ and Religious Freedom in Korea as Compared to the United States, 14 Religions 173, 188 (2023).
• See Constitution, supra note 113, art. 20.
• See U.S. Const. amend. I.
• See Constitution, supra note 113, art. 21.
• Id.art. 20.1.
• Id. art. 20.2.
• Id. art. 37.1.
• See Date of the First Phase of the Judicial Examination Case, Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Sep. 27, 2001, 2000Hun-Mal159 (13-2 KCCR 353) (S. Kor.). The court also appears to distinguish the culture of religious institutions in South Korea against the U.S. when determining unreasonable religious discrimination: “Unlike numerous Western countries where Christian culture forms the basis of society in Korea, Sunday is merely a holiday, not a day set out for specific religious service.”
• Seoul Haengjungbeobwon [Seoul Admin. Ct.], Aug. 26, 2021, 2021Ah12139 (S. Kor.).
• Seoul Godeungbeobwon [Seoul High Ct.], June 6, 2022, 2021Nu76387 (S. Kor.).
• See generally Ifang Bremer, ROK border residents clash with activists over anti-North Korea leafleting, NK News (Oct. 31, 2024), https://perma.cc/5J6L-Q6S2 (highlighting an incident between the leafleting groups and residents who oppose them).
• See Date of the First Phase of the Judicial Examination Case, supra note 149.
• See Jooheon Kim, South Korea passes law allowing police to stop leafleting toward North Korea, NK News (Dec. 16, 2025), https://perma.cc/PFD3-Z933.
• Hyun-soo Kim, Abductee family group to suspend leaflet campaigns against N. Korea, Yonhap News Agency (July 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/4KEZ-J4CT.
• See Hyeon-seung Lee, supra note 64.
• Jooheon Kim, 17 South Koreans referred to prosecutors for sending leaflets toward North Korea, NK News (Nov. 21, 2025), https://perma.cc/J92E-NPDP.
• Id.
• Mason, Low-Cost Options for Airborne Delivery of Contraband into North Korea, supra note 12, at 6.
• See Park & Kim, supra note 45 (noting that activists like “Lee Min-bok [are] among several South Korea-based activists who stopped their missions . . . Lee now spends his days writing online posts”).
• See infra Section V.D.2.
• See South Korea police detain six Americans trying to send cash, rice to North Korea, Reuters(June 27, 2025), https://perma.cc/7YL3-VPAN.
• Jooheon Kim, Americans referred for criminal charges for sending Bibles, rice to North Korea, NK News (Aug. 26, 2025), https://perma.cc/E6JT-A96L.
• Compare U.S. Const. amend. I with Constitution, supra note 113.
• See Kim & Kasulis, supra note 47.
• Id.
• Constitution, supra note 113, art. 6.2.; see generally Jin Shin Yoon, Non-Citizens’ Rights, Constitutional Review and an Inclusive Democracy: A Case Study of South Korea, 19 J. Korean L. 81 (2020).
• Immigration Act, supra note 112, art. 17.2.
• Id. art. 22.
• Id. art. 46 ¶ 1.8.
• Interestingly, the Comment Author was unable to locate any scholarship in English or translated into English that addresses this issue.
• Min-ho Jung, Political activity by foreign nationals turns focus on existing law, Korea Times (Apr. 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/9FXU-NWE5.
• Id.
• The question of whether the term may be challenged in the Korean Constitutional Court has been asked since at least 2017. See Wonchul Nam, Foreigners’ political activities and limits, Korea Times (Jan. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/58C3-DXYK; see also Law on foreigners’ political activity in JK Kim Dong-uk case called ‘vague, ineffective’, Korea Times (Feb. 2, 2025), https://perma.cc/3Q8M-9ALT(involving a 2024 alleged violation of the Immigration Act by a pro-Yoon Canadian-Korean celebrity).
• Immigration Act, supra note 112, art. 17.2.
• Id. art. 18.1 (noting residents with a status of sojourn are “eligible for employment activities”).
• Id. art. 17.2.
• See supra Section V.C.1.
• Constitution, supra note 113, art. 112.2.
• Id. art. 114.4.
• See Jee Abbey Lee, supra note 4.
• See Korean War Leaflets and Safe Conduct Passes, supra note 22.
• See How Propaganda Flyers Try to Win Over N.Koreans [sic], supra note 27.
• See Jeongmin Kim, supra note 69.
• See Shreyas Reddy, Presidential rivals offer conflicting visions for North Korea in policy pledges, NK News(May 12, 2025), https://perma.cc/7QVK-G7EA.   
• President Lee Jae-myung mentioned leafleting regulations on his inauguration day. Da-gyum Ji, Seoul urges end to anti-North leaflets, signals policy shift, Korea Herald (June 9, 2025), https://perma.cc/RJ3C-2JZZ. See also supra Sections I.B, II.B.1.
• See supra Section V.C.1.
• Jeongchijageumbeob [Political Funds Act] (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/W754-JLD6.
• See Response to Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee’s Call for Investigation of Balloon Launching NGOs, Voice of the Martyrs Korea (June 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/2H54-LCVY (“We have never printed or distributed political flyers at any time.”).
• Although the Political Funds Act governs campaign finance and election donations, there are no free speech protections to nonpolitical donations.
• See NGO Publishes Full Audit, NGO Permit Online Ahead of Police Investigation into Balloons, Voice of the Martyrs Korea (July 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/JS38-B378.
• See VOM Incorporated Financial Statements, Voice of the Martyrs Korea, https://perma.cc/DXE2-DNNZ (last visited Nov. 23, 2025).
• Id. at 4. The absolute difference (both gain and loss of foreign currency transactions) is nearly 80 million won.
• See Jee Abbey Lee, supra note 4.
• Biyeongnimingandanche jiwonbeob [Assistance for Non-Profit, Non-Governmental Organizations Act] (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/N8KG-XZ6Z. Eligibility extends to nonprofits and NGOs with over 100 members.
• Id. art 6.1.
• Id. art. 10. 
• Oeguk minganwonjodanche-e gwanhanbeob [Foreign Nongovernmental Aid Organizations Act] art. 2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/N8KG-XZ6Z. 
• Gibugeomoe mojib mit sayong-e gwanhanbeob [Act on Collection and Use of Donations] art. 4.1 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/82UJ-Q28L.
• Jin-Heon Jung, supra note 26, at 29. An investigation from January 2024 to April 2025 counted a total of 1,025 balloons launched with 17 arrests, though it is unclear whether they were all part of a single organization. See Jooheon Kim, supra note 157.
• See Na-young Kim, supra note 67.
• VOMK, for instance, has made available records of their yearly financial statements and their permit online. Financial Accountability, Voice of the Martyrs Korea, https://perma.cc/8FBM-K5M6 (lasted visited May 3, 2026).
• Gibugeomoe mojib mit sayong-e gwanhanbeob [Act on Collection and Use of Donations] art. 4.2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/82UJ-Q28L.
• Immigration Act art. 17.2.
• Jeongchijageumbeob [Political Funds Act] art. 2.1 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/N8MQ-CT4Q.
• Gibugeomoe mojib mit sayong-e gwanhanbeob [Act on Collection and Use of Donations] art 4.2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/82UJ-Q28L.
• This analysis references contract law principles on whether a list of items would be considered a comprehensive closed set.