Addressing the Use of Overseas Encrypted Platforms in Digital Sexual Violence in South Korea

I. Introduction

A. Background

In 2020, the Nth Room case provoked nationwide outrage in South Korea when it was revealed that perpetrators had used personal information to blackmail women and minors into performing sexually explicit acts on camera, which was then circulated to thousands of watchers who paid in cryptocurrency.1Following the nationally traumatic case, a series of legislation collectively known as the Nth Room Prevention Act was enacted. These laws largely focused on increasing sentencing for the creation, distribution, and possession of illegal sexual content,2 placing greater responsibilities on online platforms to monitor and remove such content,3 and newly criminalizing those who “possess[] or [have] seen or purchased [illegally filmed content].”4

Yet, instances of digital sexual violence in Korea continue to increase. According to the Korean National Police Agency, while instances of “contact sex crimes” (e.g., rape, “imitative rape,” and “indecent acts by compulsion”) remained relatively stable between 2017 and 2023, cases of digital sexual violence doubled.5 Alarmingly, a large share of perpetrators are minors.6 Perhaps relatedly, the steepest increase among victims is also seen in minors: the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family found that the number of underage digital sexual violence victims increased twenty-sixfold between 2018 and 2024.7

One factor of this increase in digital sexual violence is jurisdictional: much of the crime takes place on encrypted, overseas platforms such as Telegram and Signal. Of course, there are various factors that contribute to the persistence of digital sexual violence, including outdated evidentiary requirements (that the victim must feel “sexual stimulus” or “shame” for certain charges to succeed),8 a lack of dedicated police resources,9 and the reluctance of courts to impose prison sentences.10 But the fact that these crimes take place over encrypted platforms presents a particularly challenging issue in that the encryption and anonymity that such platforms offer to perpetrators (indeed, these qualities are what make such platforms appealing to them) lead to enforcement being incredibly difficult. With victims being unable to identify perpetrators, law enforcement needs platforms’ cooperation not only to apprehend criminals but also to investigate them. Indeed, the usage of such closed platforms to perpetrate digital sexual violence continues to increase.11 When the servers of such platforms are located overseas, enforcement challenges are only compounded by the added jurisdictional issues.

In such contexts, the Nth Room Prevention Act is largely ineffective. It applies only to content circulated “among the information made available to the public,”12 which the Korea Communications Commission has interpreted as excluding private Telegram chatrooms.13As a result, the law is largely toothless when it comes to identifying and apprehending perpetrators who operate within encrypted, overseas-based online platforms.

Furthermore, voluntary cooperation by platforms is limited. Although there is no definitive data on the exact percentage of Telegram’s usage in digital sexual violence in Korea, it is frequently cited as a major platform.14 Following the arrest of Telegram’s CEO, Pavel Durov, by French authorities in August 2024 for complicity in spreading child abuse images and drug trafficking, Telegram has agreed to hand over user IP addresses and phone numbers when presented with valid legal requests.15 Indeed, as of June 2025, Telegram had complied with over 95% of data requests submitted by South Korean authorities.16 However, this cooperation remains limited. Telegram retains discretion over disclosures,17 and raw numbers of disclosures are modest: just 372 in Q1 2025 and 270 in Q4 2024.18 In 2024 alone, the Digital Sexual Crime Victim Support Center received 16,833 reports,19 making the disclosure numbers appear staggeringly low. It is possible that Korean authorities were unable to submit more requests due to Telegram’s high threshold for disclosure (“receiv[ing] a valid order from the relevant judicial authorities that confirms you’re a suspect in a case involving criminal activities that violate the Telegram Terms of Service”20). A Head of Investigation at a District Prosecutor’s Office pointed out that much of the crime on Telegram occurs in “Secret Chats,” which are end-to-end encrypted and have a self-destruct timer,21 making it extremely difficult for law enforcement to gather enough information to meet Telegram’s threshold, since, without an insider sharing the link to the chatroom, investigators are unable to enter.22 Signal presents an even more dire picture. Although Signal’s Terms & Privacy Policy states it may share users’ data to “meet any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request,” the platform is end-to-end encrypted by default.23 Indeed, as criminals recognize that Telegram is no longer safe due to its willingness to comply, there has been an “exodus” to even more private apps, among which Signal is notable.24

Regardless, relying on platform discretion, no matter how high a compliance rate may seem, is insufficient.25 Putting pressure on individual CEOs until they comply, as was the case with Telegram, is a costly and unreliable method of securing cooperation. It is time for Korea to develop a clear legal regime, both domestically and internationally, that requires timely, meaningful cooperation and covers newer, more secure platforms as well.

With digital sexual violence escalating rapidly, fueled by the expansion of AI and encryption technology, this Comment hopes to present suggestions to mitigate the jurisdictional enforcement issues. While post-Nth Room legislation has made strides in sentencing and domestic platform accountability, overseas-based encrypted platforms remain a glaring blind spot. A stronger regulatory framework targeting these platforms is long overdue. A legal analysis of how Korea might address this jurisdictional and technological gap is not only timely but also broadly relevant. Other countries grappling with similar problems, such as Japan, could benefit from comparative insights and proposed solutions.

B. Overview of Digital Sexual Violence Crimes and Scope of Comment

There are no uniform definitions of digital sexual violence, nor of the categories of crime that fall under it. This Comment adheres to the definitions of manifestations of digital sexual violence put forth by the United Nations (U.N.). The U.N. has paid increasing attention to the broader category of “technology-facilitated violence against women and girls (TFVAWG).”26 While this Comment does not focus solely on acts of digital sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls, recognizing that men and boys, too, can be victims of such crimes, it finds that the definitions of the various manifestations of TFVAWG can be adopted to describe the same acts of violence regardless of gender.27

The U.N. has defined various manifestations of TFVAWG as follows: critically for this Comment, “sextortion” refers to the use of Information Communication Technologies (ICT) to blackmail a victim. In such cases, the perpetrator threatens to release intimate pictures of the victim in order to extort additional explicit photos, videos, sexual acts, or sex from the victim.28 “Doxing” refers to the publication of private information, such as contact details, on the Internet with malicious intent, usually with the insinuation that the victim is soliciting sex.29 It includes situations where personal information and data retrieved by a perpetrator is made public with malicious intent, clearly violating the right to privacy.30 “Trolling” consists of the posting of messages, the uploading of images or videos and the creation of hashtags for the purpose of annoying, provoking or inciting violence against women and girls. Many “trolls” are anonymous and use false accounts to generate hate speech.31 “Online mobbing and harassment” refers to the online equivalents of mobbing or harassment on social platforms, the Internet, in chat rooms, instant messaging and mobile communications.32 “Online stalking” refers to the repeated harassment of individuals, perpetrated by means of mobile phones or messaging applications, in the form of crank calls or private conversations on online applications (such as WhatsApp) or in online chat groups.33 “Online sexual harassment” refers to any form of online unwanted verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular by creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.34 “Revenge porn” consists of the non-consensual online dissemination of intimate images, obtained with or without consent, with the purpose of shaming, stigmatizing or harming the victim.35 It must also be noted that the U.N. has identified deepfake pornography as a new pattern of TFVAWG.36

This Comment focuses mainly on the crime of sextortion. Indeed, the Nth Room case was an egregious case of sextortion and was the catalyst for increased attention to the vulnerability of minors to such crimes in the digital space. Meanwhile, crimes that imitate the Nth Room case continue today—in 2025, one perpetrator who operated a very similar sextortion organization called “The Vigilantes” on Telegram was arrested by Korean law enforcement.37 Although the number of victims was more than twice that of the Nth Room case, Telegram had not cooperated in his arrest.38 The fact that both the proportion and absolute number of reported sextortion cases continues to rise is also alarming—while they accounted for 1.2% of all reported digital sexual violence cases in 2020 with 120 cases, in 2023 they accounted for 5.9% of digital sexual violence cases, with 970 reports.39 Of course, the total number of sextortion incidents, accounting for unreported cases, would be greater. The rising prevalence of sextortion, coupled with its enduring harm to victims40 and the continued obstacles to effective enforcement, underscores its significance as a particularly urgent problem.

As discussed above, this Comment does not focus only on digital sexual violence as experienced by women and girls. It is true that digital sexual violence is often a form of gender-based violence,41 leading some scholars to argue that acts of sexual violence, whether they occur online or offline, share the structural causes of patriarchy and historical power differences between the genders, and thus, technology facilitated violence is gender-based violence.42 It is also true that women consistently make up the majority of digital sexual violence victims43 and that there may be gender differences in sexual violence victimization experiences.44 Nevertheless, this Comment’s focus on legal regimes and enforcement mechanisms does not hinge on such gender-specific nuances. Therefore, its analysis is also applicable to male victims of digital sexual abuse.

In addition, this Comment does not focus only on minors. In fact, some scholars have criticized the fact that empirical studies regarding online predatory sexual behavior focus almost exclusively on children and adolescents.45 While this Comment is not an empirical study, it is not difficult to understand why concentrating on minors is tempting—community concerns abound about children’s vulnerability and safety.46 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Korea itself also highlighted that it had decided cases in which children and adolescents are victims under the premise that they deserve special protection.47 To be sure, cases in which the victims are minors present their own nuances. However, it is nevertheless also true that, in Korea, the proportion of victims of digital sexual violence in the 20 to 29 age group (52%) is larger than that in the 10 to 19 age group (25.3%).48 Accordingly, the Comment will allude to victims of digital sexual violence in Korea at large.

Finally, recognizing the unique enforcement challenges that encrypted overseas platforms present, this Comment limits its scope to crime that occurs on such platforms. This is not to discount the fact that much digital sexual violence takes place over domestic platforms such as KakaoTalk.49 However, as they fall under the purview of the Nth Room Act, and since such platforms tend to be less forgiving of such crimes when they take place on their platforms (KakaoTalk has revised its operating policies to allow it to permanently ban users who engage in sextortion),50 this Comment focuses on the more pressing issues overseas platforms present.

To do so, this Comment will first provide an overview of Korea’s existing legal frameworks on digital sexual violence, examining first the digital sexual violence laws pre-Nth Room Act, then the revisions promulgated by the Nth Room Act, as well as the merits and limitations of the amendments. The Comment will then engage in a comparative analysis of other countries’ laws addressing digital sexual violence, focusing on how they interact with encrypted overseas platforms. Through this analysis, the Comment will draw ideas for domestic reforms Korea can implement. The Comment will then analyze international law regimes Korea can utilize; specifically, the Budapest Convention, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), and the ICCPR and CEDAW complaints mechanisms. It will also address concerns that increased enforcement of digital sexual violence regulations over encrypted platforms can present, namely the possible intrusion on privacy and freedom of expression rights. The Comment will conclude by proposing concrete legal measures, both domestically and internationally, that the Korean government should implement.

II. Overview of Korea’s Existing Legal Frameworks on Digital Sexual Violence

A. Korea’s Digital Sexual Violence Laws Pre-Nth Room Act

Statutes addressing digital sexual violence in Korea tend to be scattered throughout different acts, including the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses, the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, and the Criminal Act, without a separate act addressing only digital sexual crimes specifically.51 This section provides an overview of each Act, as they were before the revisions contained in the Nth Room Act, in turn.

1. Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes

The Act, which applies to minors and legal adults alike, stipulates certain acts as criminal by listing the elements of each distinct offense.52 It must be noted that the broader category of digital sexual violence is not a separate grouping within the Act. Rather, the crimes outlined below are listed as different kinds of “sexual crimes,” that is, a category encompassing both offline and online sexual crimes. The Act, before the Nth Room Act’s revisions, outlined only two explicitly digital crimes of sexual violence. One was “Obscene Acts by Using Means of Communication,” which refers to “send[ing] another person any words, sounds, writings, pictures, images, or other things that may cause a sense of sexual shame or aversion by telephone, mail, computer, or other means of communication, with intent to arouse or satisfy his/her own or the other person’s sexual urges.”53 The other was “Taking Photographs or Videos by Using Cameras,” which criminalizes “tak[ing] photographs or videos of another person’s body,”54 the “distribut[ion], [sale], lease[], provi[sion], or open[] exhibit[ion] or show[ing]” of such photographs or videos, including their duplicates and duplicates of duplicates,55 and “using an information and communications network” (as defined in the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection) to collect profits,56 as well as any attempt to commit any of the three.57

2. Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses

The purpose of the Act was specifically to address sex offenses committed against minors.58 Therefore, it does not apply to cases in which the victim is an adult. Similar to the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses outlines specific crimes. It also lists specific obligations of online service providers.59 While incorporating the digital sexual crimes outlined in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes as “sex offenses against children or youth” when committed against children or youth,60 it also defined the legal term of art “child or youth pornography” as the “depiction of children or youth, or persons or representations that can be obviously perceived as children or youth, doing any act defined in any of subparagraph 4 [which includes ‘sexual intercourse,’ ‘pseudo-sexual intercourse,’ ‘contacting or exposing all or part of the body,’ and ‘masturbation’] or engaging in any other sexual act . . . .”61 Relatedly, it criminalized the production, import, and export, as well as the commercial sale, lease, distribution, provision, possession, transportation, public exhibition or display of such materials.62 It must be noted that while the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes similarly criminalized acts such as the distribution, sale, and lease of sexual content regarding adults, this provision, which applies only to materials that contain minors, differed in that it also criminalized the possession of such materials, even when not for commercial purposes, when the person possessing them “kn[ew] that it is child or youth pornography.”63 Also differently from the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, the “procurement” of children for purposes of use in such materials is also a punishable offense.64 Finally, the Act creates positive legal obligations for “online service providers”65: they must take measures to detect “child or youth pornography,” delete such content, and prevent or block transmission thereof.66 Failure to do so can result in imprisonment or the imposition of a fine.

3. Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection

The Act contained only one article that expressly dealt with sexual content: Article 44-7 banned anyone from circulating “[i]nformation with obscene content distributed, sold, rented, or displayed openly in the form of code, words, sound, images, or motion picture.”67 The Act empowers, and in some cases, obliges, the Korea Communications Commission to take measures such as ordering the rejection or suspension of such content.68 A more general provision allowed users to request that a provider of information and communications services delete information where it “intrudes on other persons’ privacy, defames other persons, or violates other persons’ right otherwise.”69 However, there was no obligation on the part of the service provider to permanently delete such content; where “it is impracticable to judge whether information violates any right or it is anticipated that there will probably be a dispute between interested parties, a provider of information and communications services may take a measure to block access to the information temporarily.”70 The duration of such temporary measures was subject to a ceiling of only 30 days.71 Interestingly, the Act explicitly placed an obligation on the government to “cooperate reciprocally with other nations or international organizations” specifically in “[a]ffairs for the protection of youths in information and communications networks” but also more generally in “[a]ffairs for the facilitation of sounder and safer use of information and communications services.”72

4. Criminal Act

The Criminal Act had two articles that expressly criminalized the distribution, sale, lease, display, manufacture, possession, import, or export of “obscene documents, drawing, pictures, films or other things.”73

The Act also contains articles that can and have been employed to prosecute digital sexual crimes. The crime of “Indecent Act by Compulsion,” in which one, “through violence or intimidation, commits an indecent act on another,”74 has been interpreted to encompass situations in which perpetrators coerced victims, through threats or intimidation, into recording themselves partially or fully undressed, or to perform sexual acts.75 This was so because “the victim’s body was used as a tool to commit the act of sexual assault,” and therefore, the perpetrator was a “principal through innocent human agent.”76

The crime of “Coercion,” in which one “obstructs another from exercising his/her right by violence or intimidation, or coerces one to do any unobliged work,”77 has been recognized by the Ministry of Government Legislation to apply to instances of blackmailing using sexually explicit material.78

Finally, “Extortion,” in which one “causes another to surrender his/her property or obtains pecuniary advantage from the latter,”79 has also been applied in a case where an ex-partner threatened to distribute secretly recorded intimate footage if the victim refused to resume the relationship.80

B. Nth Room Prevention Act Overview

The Nth Room Prevention Act refers to a collection of revisions to Korea’s existing legal frameworks. The legislative history explicitly attributed the impetus of the proposal of some of the individual bills to the Nth Room case.81 Many of the revisions were proposed with a view to prevent similar crimes,82 as opposed to merely increase the sentencing or expand the scope of such crimes. This section, while not exhaustive, highlights the primary revisions.

1. Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes

The Nth Room Act imposed increased financial penalties and created new categories of offenses. The consequences for “Obscene Acts by Using Means of Communication,” defined in Part II-A, was increased from “imprisonment with labor for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won”83 to “imprisonment with labor for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding 20 million won.”84 The sentencing on the three categories of crimes falling under Article 14 “Taking Photographs or Videos by Using Cameras” was also increased.85

Article 14 also clarified, via an added parenthetical, that it applied to instances in which the victim took photographs or videos of themselves.86

Two paragraphs were added to Article 14 “Taking Photographs or Videos by Using Cameras”: Paragraph 4 added new punishments for the possession, viewing, or purchase of photographs referred to in the Article87 (“photographs or videos of another person’s body, which may cause any sexual stimulus or shame against the will of the person who was shot”), while paragraph 5 added an enhanced sentence provision for habitual offenders.88 Article 14-2 “Distribution of False Video Products” was added to address the issue of deepfakes, which the Article defines as a crime which happens when “[a] person . . . edits, synthesizes, or processes photograph, video, or audio . . . targeting the face, body or voice of a person for the purpose of dissemination, etc, in a form that may cause sexual desire or shame against the will of the person who is subject to video, etc.”89 While the production or publishing of such material, as well as the use of “information and communications networks” to commit such crimes to collect profits, are now punishable,90 simple possession or viewing are not explicitly covered, unlike the materials referred to in Article 14. Notably, Article 14-3 “Intimidation or Compulsion by Using Photograph, etc.” covers the crime of sextortion. Borrowing the definition of the broader crime of “Coercion” found in Article 324 of the Criminal Act, under Article 14-3, “(1) A person who intimidates another person by using photograph or its duplicates (including a duplicate of the duplicate) which may cause sexual desire or shame shall be punished by imprisonment for a limited term of at least one year,” and “(2) Any person who interferes with the exercise of a person’s right by intimidation under paragraph (1) or has the person to [sic] the work not obligatory for him/her shall be punished by imprisonment with labor for a limited term of at least three years.”91

2. Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses

The Act is notable in that it changed the terminology from “child or juvenile pornography” to “child or youth sexual exploitation materials” to better reflect the fact that “pornography targeting children and adolescents constitutes sexual exploitation and abuse of children and adolescents in itself.”92 It also increased sanctions on the production, import, export, sale, lease, distribution, provision, and public exhibition or display of such materials.93 Notably, it replaced the maximum sentencing of the purchase, possession, or viewing of such materials (with the knowledge of their character) with a minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment.94

It also added a provision criminalizing “Conversations for Purpose of Sexual Exploitation of Children or Youth,” which refers to “[c]ontinuously or repeatedly carrying on any conversation that may induce sexual desire or humiliation or disgust, or continuously or repeatedly having a child or youth participate in such conversations”95 and “[e]nticing or encouraging a child or youth to engage in an act specified in any item of subparagraph 4 of Article 2”96 (which refers to “buying sex from a child or youth”).97 It also established the legal groundwork for law enforcement to engage in sting operations specifically regarding “digital sex offenses.”98

3. Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection

The Act, which largely applies to “information and communications services,” was revised to explicitly apply to “any act done overseas if such conduct affects the domestic market or users in the market.”99 It also added an article providing: “[a] provider of information and communications services who meets the criteria prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as the average number of daily users, sales, and types of business, shall designate a person (hereinafter referred to as a ‘person responsible for preventing the circulation of illegally filmed materials or the like’) responsible for preventing the circulation of the following information (hereinafter referred to as ‘illegally filmed materials or the like’) available to the public through the information and communications network the provider operates or manages: [content criminalized by the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses].”100 The Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that platforms that “post[] at least 10 billion won in sales of information and communication services over the preceding year (referring to the preceding business year, in the case of a corporation)” or have “an average number of at least 100,000 users per day for three months immediately before the end of the preceding year” are covered by the article.101

4. Telecommunications Business Act

The Telecommunications Business Act, which aims to “contribute to the promotion of public welfare by encouraging sound development of the telecommunications business and ensuring convenience to the users of the telecommunications business,”102 was revised to both introduce new obligations on providers of “value-added telecommunications business” (this includes online platforms and websites)103 to “take measures necessary to prevent the circulation of the relevant information, such as deleting the information and blocking access thereto,”104 as well as lower the standards for when such obligations materialize.105

5. Criminal Act

The Criminal Act was revised to increase the age threshold of statutory rape from 13 to 16 years of age106 and newly criminalize the conspiracy of rape, imitative rape, quasi-rape, and inflicting or causing another’s bodily injury by rape.107 These amendments intended to prevent the harms that could be caused by sexual crimes.108

C. Nth Room Prevention Act Merits and Limitations

To be sure, the Nth Room Act has been effective in some respects. For one, the proportion of offenders who received fines (as opposed to prison sentences) for “Taking Photographs or Videos by Using Cameras” decreased from 75% in 2013 to 19.1% in 2021.109 With increased sentencing guidelines, the average prison sentence for perpetrators of digital sexual violence against children and adolescents has increased from 24.5 months in 2019 to 42.5 months in 2023.110 In 2022, a total of 281,931 reports and takedown requests regarding digital sex crime materials were submitted to “business operators obliged to take measures prescribed by Presidential Decree,” a 1,365.5% increase from the previous year.111

While these numbers are certainly impressive, the Nth Room Prevention Act suffers from some critical drawbacks. Most importantly, overseas platforms still fall outside of the purview of the Korean legal regime, leading to the “irony” where “the Nth Room Prevention Act was enacted due to institutional effectiveness issues, but Telegram, where the Nth Room incident occurred, cannot be regulated under the Nth Room Prevention Act.”112 This is so for a couple of reasons. The provisions of the Telecommunications Business Act do not apply to “private communications.” The legislative history recognizes this limitation with the Chairman of the Korea Communications Commission stating that applying the Act to private communications would be “unconstitutional,” and so the duties would apply only to publicly available content.113 Lawmakers indicated that other statutory measures in other Acts would address the Nth Room case; the specific proposed amendments to the Telecommunications Business Act aimed to prevent the secondary distribution of sexually exploitative material in online spaces.114 However, the amendments to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, which on their face explicitly apply to “any act done overseas if such conduct affects the domestic market or users in the market,”115 have proven ineffective in practice. Indeed, such issues were brought up in the legislative history—Lawmaker Lee Jong-geol implored the other lawmakers to present concrete plans to apply the laws to overseas platforms, criticizing that it was a “meaningless clause” unless platforms cooperated.116 He went as far as to say that “framing the matter in a way that suggests the recent Telegram chatrooms could be addressed under this provision” was an “inappropriate method to respond to the People.”117 Lawmaker Park Dae-cheol similarly called out the issue, reminding lawmakers that while the revisions were part of the Nth Room Prevention Act, they would instead effectively apply only to domestic platforms such as KakaoTalk (“It’s not KakaoTalk. It’s Telegram. Are we going to go to Russia and inspect it? It’s ineffective. Realistically, going to Russia and inspecting it isn’t feasible. We need to find an alternative”).118 Such concerns came into fruition: after the amendments were enacted, a pan-governmental taskforce, including, among other groups, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, has cited overseas platforms as “blind spots.”119

Another issue lies with the obligations placed on platforms. While the new requirement that platforms headquartered outside of Korea install a “person responsible for preventing the circulation of illegally filmed materials or the like” is a step forward, it is difficult to determine whether a platform meets the criteria for the requirement. Indeed, in Telegram’s case, even though the Korean government sent official letters to Telegram three times over the course of 2021 to 2023 requesting its cooperation in confirming whether it met the criteria for requiring a domestic agent, Telegram has been unresponsive.120 As such, the fact that the requirement hinges on platforms’ cooperation is problematic; domestic courts have no means to order compliance with the requirement if they cannot prove that the requirement even applies to the platform in question.

Another gap in the reforms is their failure to address the fragmented nature of the digital sexual violence regime, which is still spread across multiple statutes. If there are to be further revisions in the future, the patchwork framework does not make that project any easier. It could also be problematic for notice purposes—indeed, the Korean Institute of Criminology and Justice has pointed out that an issue with Korea’s criminal legal regime in general is that while the Criminal Act has not undergone a single major revision since its enactment in 1953, “a large number of special criminal laws have been promulgated, making the criminal legal system overly complex, making it difficult for the general public to properly understand the penalties imposed for specific crimes.”121 Thus, there is a need to streamline and synthesize the laws at some point.

Finally, critics have brought attention to the issue of reverse discrimination.122 As discussed above, while platforms are obligated to undertake measures to mitigate digital sexual violence, with failure to do so resulting in fines or criminal sanctions, many overseas platforms fall outside the purview. As a result, greater de facto restrictions are placed on domestic Korean platforms. This can lead to entry barriers being placed on potential new entrants into the platform market.123

Clearly, the Nth Room Prevention Act, while laudable for its efforts to address the issue of digital sexual violence, and while somewhat effective in increasing ex post punishments, fails to fully resolve the root issue that allows such crimes to persist—that they occur on overseas platforms.

III. Comparative Analysis of Laws Addressing Digital Sexual Violence

Countries’ approaches to tackling digital sexual violence greatly vary. This Comment examines the various ways States and international organizations utilize their legal systems to address the specific issue of dealing with overseas platforms.

A. Utilizing Existing Judicial Power to Regulate Platforms

1. Brazil

Brazil has been known to take somewhat drastic, unilateral measures against platforms to attain compliance. For instance, Brazil’s Supreme Court blocked access to X after it refused to ban several profiles deemed by the government to be spreading misinformation about the 2022 Brazilian Presidential election.124 X eventually complied with judicial orders to block certain accounts from the platform, name an official legal representative, and pay fines imposed for not complying with earlier court orders.125 Of course, while this is a case of restricting political free speech, which carries greater free speech implications than sextortion crimes, the strong-handed sanction is a methodology that could potentially be applied to platforms that do not comply with domestic enforcers’ requests regarding digital sexual violence. However, it must be noted that Brazil, with 17.14 million users of X, is one of X’s larger markets.126 As such, while Brazil may have had leverage against X, it is less certain whether Korea would have comparable leverage against online platforms.

2. The United States

Similarly to Korea, the United States relies on a fragmented statutory scheme comprised of various federal acts to regulate conduct that may constitute digital sexual violence. The Stored Communications Act, as amended by the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, grants governmental entities authority to compel disclosure by a “provider of electronic communication service” or “remote computing service” of the “contents of a wire or electronic communication” or “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service” when the government entity obtains a warrant.127 The amendments also authorized the U.S. to enter into executive agreements with other countries that remove restrictions under each country’s laws so that covered service providers in one country can comply with qualifying, lawful orders seeking electronic data issued by the other country.128 The warrant requirement to compel disclosure is problematic because such platforms, by virtue of being highly encrypted, make it difficult for government entities to show probable cause. Indeed, because of this high standard, U.S. government officials are held to a higher standard when attempting to obtain non-content data (that is, customer records129) from even U.S.-based companies than foreign governments are.130 In addition, defendants themselves cannot bring actions under the CLOUD Act executive agreements; they are “reserved for use by the authorities of the parties seeking to detect, prevent, investigate, or prosecute serious crimes.”131 Another challenge remains the Communications Decency Act 1996, which grants immunity to website operators for user-generated content, thereby hindering prosecution of platforms that host non-consensual images.132 While there were efforts to amend the Act to remove blanket immunity,133 they have not seen progress toward being incorporated as law.134 Accordingly, various government agencies have admitted to the issue of enforcement challenges on encrypted platforms.135

B. Granting Courts or Enforcement Authorities Greater Enforcement Powers

1. Germany

Germany’s Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken (hereinafter the Network Enforcement Act) came into effect in January 2018.136 Under the Network Enforcement Act, when a social media company with more than two million German users receives a complaint about a piece of controversial content, it must spring into action to determine whether the content is “manifestly unlawful” according to eighteen separate provisions of German criminal law.137 If the company determines that the content is unlawful, access to it must be removed within twenty-four hours.138 The Network Enforcement Act is notable in that the short turnaround time required of companies is better equipped to address the fast-paced nature with which content online can spread and create irreparable harm. However, it has a similar drawback to Korea’s case in that whether a social media company must comply or not depends on the number of domestic users, which is not always readily verified. Indeed, some users may disguise their location through a virtual private network (VPN).139 In addition, the act covers only social networks, which are defined as “telemedia service providers which, for profit-making purposes, operate internet platforms which are designed to enable users to share any content with other users or to make such content available to the public.”140 As such, platforms that are designed to enable individual communication are not social networks as defined by the Act.141

Notably, Germany added Section 110d to the German Code of Criminal Procedure, which widened the opportunity for post-approval by the judiciary in urgent circumstances.142 The provision, titled “Special procedure for operations to investigate criminal offenses under sections 176e and 184b Criminal Code,” states: “In cases of imminent danger, the approval of the public prosecutor’s office is sufficient” as regardingdissemination and possession of instructions to commit sexual abuse of children (§ 176e) and dissemination, procurement and possession of child pornographic content (§ 184b).143 Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act, by contrast, does not have a separate provision allowing for warrantless searches specifically for child sexual abuse. Article 216 provides that “seizure, search, or inspection of evidence may be conducted without a warrant” in the narrow case when there is “urgency at the scene of an offense.”144 Meanwhile, Article 218 provides for warrantless seizures only when an article has been “discarded by a criminal suspect or any other person, or those which have been voluntarily produced by their owner, possessor, or custodian.”145 While such narrow warrantless search or seizure provisions are understandable in the general context, since they constrain possible abuse by law enforcement, they make less sense in the specific context of digital sexual violence, where evidence is fleeting. Korea should consider making an allowance for warrantless investigations as pertaining to sexual violence, as Germany’s amendment does.

2. The European Union

The Digital Services Act (DSA), which entered into force in August 2023 for very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs)146 and in February 2024 to all other platforms in the European Union (EU) except for micro and small enterprises, is characterized by the EU as “the world’s first digital regulation that makes digital companies across the EU accountable for the content posted on their platforms.”147 The DSA has an intricate hierarchical system defining the various categories of digital companies. The broadest category is “providers of intermediary services,” with intermediary services including (1) ‘mere conduit’ (2) ‘caching’ and (3) ‘hosting’ services.148 Hosting services include cloud computing, web hosting, paid referencing services or services enabling sharing information and content online, including file storage and sharing.149 Online platforms, a “subcategory” of hosting services, are defined as “providers of hosting services that not only store information provided by the recipients of the service at their request, but that also disseminate that information to the public at the request of the recipients of the service.”150 VLOPs are those online platforms “which have a number of average monthly active recipients of the service in the Union equal to or higher than 45 million.”151

The DSA broadly defines “illegal content” to include the sharing of images depicting child sexual abuse, unlawful non-consensual sharing of private images, illegal hate speech, and online stalking.152 It imposes many regulations and obligations on online services, including mandating that providers of online platforms establish accessible, “swift, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary and fair” internal complaint-handling systems, subject to human review.153 Providers of hosting services, when they become aware of any information giving rise to a suspicion that a criminal offense involving a threat to the life or safety of a person or persons has taken place, is taking place or is likely to take place, are under an obligation to promptly inform law enforcement or judicial authorities.154

Notably, the DSA imposes different degrees of regulation according to the platforms’ size.155 As regarding VLOPs, the DSA grants the European Commission enforcement authority akin to its antitrust powers over them.156 The DSA also prioritizes notices from “trusted flaggers”157 and requires VLOPs to assess systemic risks from illegal content dissemination, including child sexual abuse material and non-consensual intimate or manipulated material.158 While the proportional regulations circumvent some of the entry barrier issues and reverse discrimination issues Korea’s Nth Room Prevention Act raised, and were ideal in theory, they proved difficult to implement in practice. Critically, the DSA seemingly does not fully apply to platforms such as Telegram. While pornography websites such as Pornhub and XVideos are listed as VLOPs/VLOSEs, and while the increased regulation of such websites is certainly important in mitigating the distribution of sexually abusive materials, Telegram and Signal are noticeably missing from the list.159 A critical issue is that “online platforms” are defined as “providers of hosting services that not only store information provided by the recipients of the service at their request, but that also disseminate that information to the public at the request of the recipients of the service.”160 The DSA further explicitly clarifies that “providers of hosting services should not be considered as online platforms where the dissemination to the public is merely a minor and purely ancillary feature that is intrinsically linked to another service, or a minor functionality of the principal service, and that feature or functionality cannot, for objective technical reasons, be used without that other or principal service, and the integration of that feature or functionality is not a means to circumvent the applicability of the rules of this Regulation applicable to online platforms.”161 Latching onto this definition, Telegram, insisting that “only some of Telegram’s functions may qualify as ‘online platforms’ under the DSA,”162 has maintained the stance that it does not qualify as a VLOP. According to Telegram, only some of the “non-essential elements” of the services provided by Telegram qualify as “online platforms,” and these services had fewer users than the threshold to be recognized as a VLOP.163 Although the EU has stated that it is investigating whether Telegram breached EU digital rules by failing to provide accurate user numbers, and that it can unilaterally designate Telegram as a VLOP based on its own investigation if it thinks that Telegram hasn’t been providing accurate user data,164 this has not yet come to fruition. Nevertheless, to give the platform some credit, it has installed a legal representative pursuant to Article 13 of the DSA.165

C. Installing New Institutions to Address Cybercrime, Including Digital Sexual Violence

1. Australia

Rather than relying on prior institutions to tackle the issue of digital sexual violence, Australia installed a new one. In 2015, Australia established “the Office of the Children’s eSafety Commissioner, with the focus on protecting young Australians from serious cyberbullying on social media sites and disrupting the online distribution of child sexual abuse material.”166 While at the time of establishment, the eSafety Commissioner only had authority to investigate online bullying and harassment against children,167 it has quickly expanded its mandate both in terms of the age of potential victims and scope of regulated behavior. Now, adults can also bring complaints for a wide variety of actions, including the non-consensual sharing of intimate images.168 In addition, the Online Safety Act authorizes eSafety to issue legally enforceable transparency notices to online platforms.169 The Australian regime is also notable for its extensive enforcement guidelines, which outline the situations in which enforcement action can be taken as well as the types of enforcement actions at the eSafety Commissioner’s disposal.170 The eSafety Commissioner is not only empowered to take various enforcement actions, including seeking court-ordered injunctions or court-ordered civil penalties, but it has also exercised its powers, with the Commissioner issuing an infringement notice to Telegram for almost $1 million for failing to respond to a transparency reporting notice deadline by over five months.171

2. Pakistan

Pakistan’s Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) explicitly touches on the dissemination of sexually explicit content, including deepfakes and child pornography.172 Under PECA, “the [Pakistan Telecommunication] Authority . . . shall forthwith pass such orders as deemed reasonable in the circumstances including an order for removal, destruction, preventing transmission of or blocking access to such information and the Authority may also direct any of its licensees to secure such information including traffic data.”173 However, especially with the 2025 amendments, which newly created the Social Media Regulation and Protection Authority,174 PECA has largely been used to limit freedom of expression, with it being employed to target journalists, human rights defenders, and political opposition.175 This, of course, presents a warning against granting enforcement authorities too much power.

D. Blanket Social Media Restrictions on Minors

Some countries have chosen more drastic measures; instead of apprehending perpetrators ad hoc, they bar minors under a certain age from using certain social media platforms entirely. In Australia, for instance, beginning on December 10, 2025, “age-restricted platforms” are no longer able to allow “under-16s” to create or keep an account.176 Australia explains: “It’s not a ban, it’s a delay to having accounts.”177 As of January 22, 2026, eSafety has determined that Facebook, Instagram, Kick, Reddit, Snapchat, Threads, TikTok, Twitch, X, and YouTube are required to comply.178Similar to Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, “services that have the sole or primary purpose of messaging, email, voice calling or video calling” are excluded from the “ban’s” purview.179

Although the blanket restriction would not protect adults from digital sexual violence, it could plausibly protect children—if children are not on such platforms, they can’t be exposed to violence, at least on those platforms. It also makes enforcement easier in eliminating the need for fact-heavy evidentiary showings of particular crimes; instead, a platform could presumably be held liable for not taking reasonable steps to prevent underage users from having accounts on their platforms.180 As of January 22, 2026, 4.7 million accounts identified as belonging to children have been shut down.181 It is yet to be seen whether such measures will translate to protecting minors from digital sexual violence.

IV. A Need for Cross-Border Cooperation

Digital sexual violence is a transnational problem, and much of it occurs on platforms beyond Korea’s jurisdiction. This reality calls for multilateral cooperation.

A. Ratifying the Budapest Convention

The Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) was opened for signature in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. It aims “to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.”182 Some notable articles from the original Convention include the following:

Article 12, which allows liability to attach to corporations and provides that “legal persons can be held liable for a criminal offence established in accordance with this Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural person . . . based on: (a) a power of representation of the legal person; (b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; (c) an authority to exercise control within the legal person;”183

Articles 27 to 34, which extensively outline how parties should provide mutual assistance to each other on such matters as expedited preservation of stored computer data, expedited disclosure of preserved traffic data, and interception of content data;184 and

Article 35, which establishes a “24/7 Network” whereby “[e]ach Party shall designate a point of contact available on a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-week basis, in order to ensure the provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence.”185

Since the original Convention was adopted, the evolution of cloud computing has made it increasingly difficult to collect electronic evidence.186 As such, the Second Additional Protocol, which aimed to enhance cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence, was adopted in 2021 and opened for signature in 2022.187 Specifically, Articles 7 and 8 oblige parties to “adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities to issue an order to be submitted directly to a service provider in the territory of another Party, in order to obtain the disclosure of specified, stored subscriber information in that service provider’s possession or control, where the subscriber information is needed for the issuing Party’s specific criminal investigations or proceedings”188 and provides details on how a Party can order another for “expedited production of subscriber information and traffic data.”189 However, while the focus on cross-border cooperation is certainly commendable, only two countries have ratified it thus far.190

Of course, the Budapest Convention is not perfect—it only binds Parties. Because of this, there is no direct oversight on Telegram since it is headquartered in the United Arab Emirates,191 which is not a Party to the Convention, and its parent company is located in the British Virgin Islands,192 which, again, is not covered by the Convention. Signal is a different matter—it is based in San Francisco,193 and the U.S. is a Party to the Convention. While the U.S. reserved the right to apply the Convention’s child pornography provisions “only to the extent consistent with the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States and as provided for under its federal law, which includes, for example, crimes of distribution of material considered to be obscene under applicable United States standards,”194 the practical effects of this reservation are yet to be seen.

Regardless, the Budapest Convention is laudable in that it sets “state of the art principle based criminal law standards and important procedural rules with regard to the provisional storage of data to be potentially used as evidence in prosecuting criminal acts.”195 It is also more than just a law on the books; countries have utilized the Convention to request preservation of online materials—for the period of January to September 2019, the UK reported 77 incoming preservation requests from eighteen Parties and 169 outgoing preservation requests to twenty-seven Parties.196

As such, Korea should consider ratifying the Budapest Convention. Currently, Korea is merely an observer of, rather than a party to, the Budapest Convention.197 While Korea has been working on amending the Criminal Procedure Act to introduce a preservation order system, a requirement for joining the agreement,198 four previous attempts over four National Assemblies have failed to do so.199 With the Second Additional Protocol only open for signatures by the States Parties to the original Budapest Convention, and with the anticipation that more countries will join, it would only benefit Korea’s enforcement powers to sign the Convention since it would allow Korea to more effectively obtain evidence, which it could then either use to request further information from Telegram if needed, or, if the evidence is strong enough, to circumvent the need for online platforms’ cooperation outright. It could also have a strong signaling effect to other countries that remain hesitant to ratify the Second Additional Protocol. The more countries that join both the Budapest Convention and the Second Additional Protocol, the more effective cross-border enforcement will be.

B. More Aggressive Use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties

Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLATs) enable law enforcement authorities and prosecutors to obtain evidence, information, and testimony abroad in a form admissible in the courts of the Requesting State.200 The MLAT process and its benefits are available to government officials, often prosecutors, and typically do not apply to civil litigants or proceedings.201 In the U.S., courts review specific requests for assistance and may deny them if they fail to comply with applicable domestic law or procedure.202 Meanwhile, in Korea, regarding cases of “mutual assistance pertaining to investigation at request of foreign country,” it is on the Minister of Justice to make the final decision whether to comply with requests.203

MLATs have been criticized for a number of reasons. Many scholars note how costly and time-consuming the process is.204 The delay in obtaining evidence, especially when the evidence is located on encrypted platforms, and particularly when the platform offers self-destruct features, may be detrimental in prosecuting digital sexual crimes. In addition, with the onus on the state receiving the request to determine whether to comply with the request, diplomacy and power dynamics inevitably play a role. For example, although exact data on the proportion of MLAT requests that flow to the U.S. is unavailable, with many online platforms such as Facebook or X being located in the U.S., it would expectedly receive a sizable proportion of such requests. As such, countries are frustrated that U.S. law essentially determines global practices, viewing the globally-applied MLAT legal standards as a limit on state sovereignty.205 The same principle applies to any country that houses an online platform—if the requesting country lacks diplomatic power as compared to the country receiving the request, MLATs can be ineffective in practice. Such power differentials may be exacerbated when there is an imbalance in the demand for and reliance on cross-border assistance, as is the case in Korea: in 2024, while Korea made 1,117 assistance requests, it received less than 200.206

Nevertheless, I argue that despite their imperfections, MLATs are under-utilized. Korea should promote a more assertive interpretation of existing MLATs. For instance, signed in 1993, the U.S.-Korea MLAT provides: “The Contracting Parties shall provide mutual assistance . . . in connection with the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of offenses, and in proceedings related to criminal matters.”207 It further provides that such assistance shall include: “providing documents, records, and articles of evidence,”208 which in the case of online platforms, could include user IP addresses and other information, and “executing requests for searches and seizures,”209 which in the case of online platforms, could include warrants for data stored in the U.S., namely that of Signal. The word “shall” arguably places an obligation on the party receiving the request to comply with the request; there is an argument that if the party refuses to comply, it is their burden to explain why they refuse. The MLAT also obliges the Requested State to “promptly execute the request or, when appropriate, transmit it to the authority having jurisdiction to do so.”210 Korea can argue that “promptly,” in the context of digital sexual violence, means a period much shorter than the 13 months it can take in some cases.211

Similar arguments can be applied to other MLATs Korea is a party to. As of July 2024, South Korea had MLATs with 77 countries.212 It must also be noted that Korea’s statutory regime affords precedence to MLATs, with Article 3 of the Act on International Judicial Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters codifying: “Where a mutual assistance treaty includes different provisions from those of this Act with respect to mutual assistance, the provisions of the treaty shall prevail over the provisions of this Act.”213 That is, with the sheer number of MLATs Korea is a party to, along with the deference already awarded to such treaties, Korea is, structurally at least, equipped to further utilize the existing MLATs.

C. Utilizing ICCPR and CEDAW Complaint Mechanisms

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted in 1966,214 forms, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the so-called “International Bill of Human Rights.”215 As set out in its Optional Protocol, the Human Rights Committee can receive and consider individual communications (i.e., complaints).216 To date, 175 countries have ratified the ICCPR.217

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979 and “establishes not only an international bill of rights for women, but also an agenda for action by countries to guarantee the enjoyment of those rights.”218 CEDAW, under its Optional Protocol, also allows individual claimants to submit communications for the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to consider.219 To date, 189 countries have ratified CEDAW,220 making it one of the most widely ratified human rights treaties.221

CEDAW employs strong language obliging State Parties to take active and extensive measures to combat discrimination against women. For example, State Parties “agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake . . . [t]o adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women,”222 “[t]o establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination,”223 and “[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise.”224

Meanwhile, international law is often an effective tool in pressuring federal governments to adopt change. In Toonen v. Australia, for example, the Australian federal government was unable to compel the Tasmanian government to repeal its sodomy laws as it had no powers over the operation of state criminal law.225 It could only act if compelled to do so internationally, using the external affairs powers in the constitution.226 Accordingly, Toonen brought the case to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 1991.227 Utilizing the Human Rights Committee’s 1994 decision that Tasmania’s laws violated the ICCPR,228 the Australian government introduced the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Bill 1994, which gave every Australian over the age of eighteen, gay or straight, the right to sexual privacy.229 Although the Tasmanian Law remained inconsistent with the federal law for a few years, a reform bill decriminalizing homosexuality in Tasmania passed in 1997, making consensual sexual relations with a member of the same sex legal in all jurisdictions in Australia.230

Korea can take a page out of Toonen’s book. The Human Rights Committee, in its 2023 Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea, explicitly called on the State to “ensure that all cases of violence against women . . . are reported and thoroughly investigated, that perpetrators are prosecuted and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions, and that victims are adequately compensated,” to “provide victims with access to effective remedies . . . ” and particularly notably, to “ensure effective implementation of measures to prevent and address online sex offences, including by ensuring swift takedowns of criminal content, including upon the request of victims, and by imposing appropriate and effective sanctions on online platforms and distributors that fail to delete or block criminal content from their platforms.”231 Because Korea has ratified the ICCPR and both of its Optional Protocols,232 the government can strategically have victims of digital sexual violence bring ICCPR claims against the State for failing to implement the Human Rights Committee’s recommendations. A similar strategy may be employed regarding CEDAW—because Korea has ratified both CEDAW and its Optional Protocol,233 claimants may, for example, assert that the government did not “take all appropriate measures . . . to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women” in violation of Article 6234 when it failed to obtain cooperation from Telegram or Signal. Of course, under both mechanisms, all available domestic remedies must have been exhausted for claims to be admissible,235 but with the blind spots present in the Nth Room Prevention Act, this should not be an issue. The government can then, in turn, utilize these decisions as normative and diplomatic leverage to pressure other governments to engage in more aggressive cross-border cooperation.

V. Concerns

Platform disclosure regimes inevitably implicate privacy and freedom of expression concerns. Indeed, there was much criticism that the Nth Room Act imposed too much censorship.236 However, in a challenge that Article 22-5 of the Telecommunications Business Act was unconstitutional because it infringed on freedom of communication secrecy and freedom of expression, the Constitutional Court of Korea unanimously shut the challenge down, citing the “minimum infringement” principle.237

Nonetheless, more aggressive enforcement regimes could trigger not only a finding of unconstitutionality from the Constitutional Court but also implicate the core human rights of privacy and freedom of expression. There are very real concerns that, like in the case of Pakistan, regulations can serve as a pretext for infringing on freedom of expression unrelated to digital sexual violence.

To mitigate such concerns, Korea could turn to a proportionality test in evaluating its future enforcement mechanisms and decisions. For instance, requiring platforms to disclose the data of users whenever broad keywords that could more often appear in non-illegal contexts are used would be a violation of the proportionality principle. However, requiring platforms to disclose the names and IP addresses of users in certain Telegram or Signal chatrooms that have been used as platforms for illegal conduct hardly seems like a tall order in the interest of arresting a perpetrator of digital sexual violence; the fact that these users were in the chatrooms itself indicates that they are likely already engaged in illegal acts. Korea could also utilize the proportionality principle to determine the types of data that a platform must disclose. For instance, it could install a lower evidentiary threshold for asking for disclosure of names and IP addresses and could require a judicial order or warrant for disclosure of chat content. Finally, instead of granting the government sweeping authority over content on social media in general, like Pakistan’s Social Media Regulation and Protection Authority enjoys, Korea should continue to narrowly define enforcement regimes’ authority to regulate digital sexual violence. Indeed, the obligations on platforms to delete certain content under Article 22-5 of the Telecommunications Business Act is limited to three specific kinds of sexually abusive content.238 Another additional advantage of implementing the proportionality principle is that platforms would be more likely to cooperate; with a mitigated threat of disclosure compromising their users’ privacy, platforms would be less resistant to these regimes.

VI. Conclusion

No single solution is perfect. It is the amalgamation of both domestic legal reforms and global enforcement regimes that will enable Korea to more effectively prosecute digital sexual violence that occurs on overseas encrypted platforms.

Domestically, Korea should revamp its existing legal frameworks. For one, it should change the criteria for installing a domestic agent. Instead of relying on the number of users, which has proven to be a difficult standard to verify in both the Korean regime and the EU DSA regime, Korea could consider relying on instances of app downloads or website pageviews. If such measures also prove difficult to implement, Korea could, instead, maintain the number of users as the relevant criterion but lower the threshold to one that, even if platforms aren’t compliant in disclosing data, would plausibly encompass platforms such as Telegram and Signal. It could then, as the EU claims it could, unilaterally designate such platforms as ones that meet the criterion. The domestic agent will in turn present law enforcement with a direct chain of communication with platforms as well as an additional potential pressure point.

Korea should also install new institutions to deal with cybercrime, as Australia did. While Korea does have institutions such as the National Center for Digital Sexual Crime Response which has proven to be effective in helping victims,239 it is not endowed with the same degree of authority as the Australian eSafety Commissioner. While this would not fully solve the problem of platform compliance, adopting the Australian model, with its authority to issue legally enforceable transparency notices and levy fines, would create another node of pressure on such platforms instead of solely relying on prosecutors to bring cases.

Regarding minors, end-to-end encrypted platforms may present more good than bad. As such, an outright ban on using such platforms, at least on minors, is also a solution to be carefully contemplated. Of course, this raises instant concerns about free speech. However, the ban need not apply to domestic platforms such as KakaoTalk nor overseas but non-end-to-end encrypted platforms such as Facebook and X, since they already tend to show high compliance with law enforcement requests. While a ban on end-to-end encrypted platforms is a drastic measure, the exemption of most platforms from the ban might present a happy medium between maintaining free speech rights while protecting minors. I imagine this scenario can go one of many ways: the crime may migrate to the platforms that minors are not barred from using. This will mean that such crimes are more within the enforcement authorities’ reach. Or the crime may continue to persist on such platforms by circumventing bans. In such a case, the evidentiary bar for finding platforms liable (and having to comply with enforcement authorities’ requests) will be lower; the fact that a minor had access to the platform in the first place will constitute a violation of domestic laws. Or still, the crime may move to even more discreet platforms, such as the Dark Web. It must be noted that there is a trade-off to such a phenomenon that is beyond the scope of this Comment: while the Dark Web poses investigation and law enforcement difficulties in its “encryption and anonymity features,”240 it is also true that the Dark Web is more difficult to access for the average user than most social medial platforms.241 It is unclear at this point whether the benefits of shielding potential victims from entry into platforms which are comparatively easier to reach will offset the added enforcement difficulties if the crime migrates to more encrypted platforms; it may be worthwhile to look to the effectiveness of Australia’s social media bans once data becomes available.

Internationally, Korea should become a more active participant in enforcement regimes. Ratifying the Budapest Convention is a necessary first step in accessing global enforcement resources. With global connectivity only increasing, it is imperative that Korea join the Budapest Convention and familiarize itself with its processes to better be equipped to tackle not only digital sexual violence as it presents itself today, but also digital sexual violence in its future, more evolved, forms. Korea, via individual victims, should also utilize the ICCPR and CEDAW complaint mechanisms to generate an international law decision it can then apply in its cross-border enforcement.

Digital sexual violence is hardly an issue to be solved overnight. Yet, the law remains far behind. The proposed reforms in this Comment are concrete, implementable measures that the Korean government should consider adopting.

• You-bin Cho, Nth Room Case: How Many Years for ‘Digital Sex Crime’ in Korea?, Korea Times (Oct. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/4Y69-DTGL.
• Chang-yong Kim, “Photos Distributed on Telegram”…5 Years After the ‘Nth Room Prevention Act,’ Sexual Exploitation of Minors Continues, JoongAng (May 4, 2025), https://perma.cc/FK7M-4GNM.
• Telecommunications Business Act, art. 22-5 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Law Information Center’s online database, https://perma.cc/C9LF-U24S.
• Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, art. 14 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/J3M6-K3DY.
• Chae-eun Kang, ‘Deepfake Sexual Crimes’ Increase Fivefold Compared to Last Year…National Assembly Library Publishes ‘Data & Law’, Korean Legal News (Oct. 28, 2024), https://perma.cc/2K65-GTLK. Translations of crime categories (e.g. “contact sex crimes,” “quasi-rape,” “indecent acts by compulsion”) from Criminal Act (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/SR2Y-LUWB.
• Kang, supra note 5.
• So-young Kim, Digital Sex Crimes Targeting Teenagers…Damage Increases Twenty-sixfold in Six Years, Dong-a Ilbo (Apr. 11, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y86X-WLAM.
• See, e.g., Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, art. 14 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/J3M6-K3DY.
• Yu-jin Lee, [Exclusive] ‘Since the Nth Room case,’ Digital Sex Crime Police Specialists Increased by Only 10 in 3 Years, Kyunghyang Shinmun (Sept. 20, 2022), https://perma.cc/7JL3-24NW.
• In 2023, of final court judgments on digital sexual violence cases involving minors as victims, 56.1% of final court judgments resulted in probation, 6.5% resulted in fines, and 36.8% resulted in prison sentences. Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, Adong·cheongsonyeon daesang dijiteol seongbeomjoe jeungga, cheobeoldo ganghwa chuse [Digital Sex Crimes Targeting Children and Adolescents are on the Rise, and Punishments are also Being Strengthened] 5 (2025). The courts’ general forgiveness of young offenders does not explain such leniency here—only 11.7% of the offenders were minors. Id. at 2.
• Women’s Human Rights Institute of Korea, 2024 Dijiteolseongbeomjoe pihaeja jiwon bogoseo [2024 Digital Sex Crime Victim Support Report] 30 (2025). The Women’s Human Rights Institute of Korea inferred this conclusion from cloud (referring to closed platforms) deletion support case data, which increased by 93.8% from 2023 to 2024.
• Telecommunications Business Act, art. 22-5 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Law Information Center’s online database, https://perma.cc/C9LF-U24S.
• Korea Communications Commission, (Explanatory material) Explaining the Technical and Administrative Measures Against Illegal Filming (effective December 10th), Korea Commc’ns Comm’n (Dec. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/G7KG-X47Q.
• See, e.g., Hyunsu Yim, South Korea Vows Tougher Stance After Outcry Over Sexual Deepfakes in Telegram Chatrooms, Reuters (Aug. 27, 2024), https://perma.cc/EX55-DRMH.
• Lily Jamali, Telegram Will Now Provide Some User Data to Authorities, BBC (Sept. 23, 2024), https://perma.cc/WLH9-MVHM.
• Telegram Cooperating with Over 95% of Korean Police Data Requests, KBS World (June 29, 2025), https://perma.cc/744W-DCCJ.
• Telegram Privacy Policy, art 8.3, Telegram (Sept. 29, 2024), https://perma.cc/63N4-QU4G.
• Cheol-jun Kim, [Exclusive] Loopholes in Telegram Investigations, Ilyo Sisa (May 26, 2025), https://perma.cc/3V3A-DMBU.
• Korea Ministry of Government Legislation, Characteristics and Current Status of Digital Sex Crimes, Easy to Find, Practical Law (Feb. 15, 2026), https://perma.cc/64ZH-RPT8.
• Telegram Privacy Policy, art. 8.3, supra note 17.
• “Secret chats are meant for people who want more secrecy than the average fella. All messages in secret chats use end-to-end encryption . . . On top of this, Messages cannot be forwarded from secret chats . . . You can order your messages, photos, videos and files to self-destruct in a set amount of time after they have been read or opened by the recipient.” Telegram FAQ, Telegram, https://perma.cc/BPD4-8BDF (last visited Mar. 7, 2026).
• Kim, supra note 18.
• Signal Terms & PrivacyPolicy, Signal (May 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/U2FV-PXC2.
• Won-yeong Choi et al., Deepfake Crimes Move to Signal, Leading to a ‘Balloon Effect’, Dong-a Ilbo (Mar. 3, 2025), https://perma.cc/7QEV-BRL9.
• Indeed, let us not forget that failure to respond to a subpoena is a punishable offense; a 95% compliance rate is hardly commendable.
• See, e.g., Online and Technology-facilitated Violence Against Women and Girls, United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, https://perma.cc/UNR4-2R8D.
• This is not to discount the fact that women and girls are particularly vulnerable to such crimes. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences on Online Violence Against Women and Girls from a Human Rights Perspective ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/47 (June 18, 2018) (“Women are both disproportionately targeted by online violence and suffer disproportionately serious consequences as a result.”). However, the analysis this Comment undertakes, which pertains to enforcement of digital sexual violence laws vis-à-vis encrypted online platforms, is applicable to such crimes targeting males and females alike.
• Id. ¶ 35.
• Id. ¶ 36.
• Id.
• Id. ¶ 37.
• Id. ¶ 38.
• Id. ¶ 39.
• Id. ¶ 40.
• Id. ¶ 41.
• U.N. Secretary-General, Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women and Girls: Technology-facilitated Violence Against Women and Girls ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/79/500 (Oct. 8, 2024). Deepfakes are “digitally altered images, audio, or videos created using AI that appear as though someone has said or done something they never actually did. While the technology can be used for entertainment or creative purposes, deepfakes are increasingly misused as a form of digital abuse – for example, to create non-consensual sexual images, spread disinformation, or damage a person’s reputation.” AI-powered Online Abuse: How AI is Amplifying Violence Against Women and What Can Stop It, UN Women(Nov. 18, 2025), https://perma.cc/DTF9-75ZR.
• Jun-ho Yoon, [Exclusive] Five Years After the Implementation of the “Nth Room Prevention Act,” the “Methods” have Evolved, but the “Response” has been Weak, Segye Ilbo (May 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/LAP8-23EF.
• Id.
• Min-yi Kim, Deiteoro boneun dijiteol seongbeomjoe [Digital Sex Crimes Seen Through Data], 11 Nat’l Assemb. Libr. Data & L. 1, 2 (2024)(citing Korean National Police Agency statistics).
• Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age 62 (Marie-Helen Maras & Thomas J. Holt eds., 2017).
• G.A. Res. 79/152, at 6 (Dec. 19, 2024).
• Rangita de Silva de Alwis, A Rapidly Shifting Landscape: Why Digitized Violence is the Newest Category of Gender-Based Violence, La Revue des Juristes de Sciences Po 62, 64 (2024). See also Powell & Henry, supra note 40, at 117–18 (“[D]igital technologies are being used not only as a form of control, abuse and harassment but also as a further expression and consolidation of masculine entitlement and privilege, as proof of masculine prowess and conquest.”).
• Interestingly, the proportion of female victims is decreasing. In 2018, 84.1% of digital sexual violence crime victims were female. In 2022, this percentage decreased to 75.3%. Jisun Kim et al., Korean Institute of Criminology and Justice, Analysis of Changes in Digital Sex Crimes and Evaluation of Policy Implementation: Effective After the Nth Room Prevention Law 5 (2024) (citing 2023 Women’s Human Rights Institute of Korea data and 2022 Report on Support for Digital Sex Crime Victims).
• Nicole K. Jeffrey & Charlene Y. Senn, Gender Differences in Sexual Violence Victimization Experiences and Validity of Victimization Reports: A Think-Aloud Study, 62 J. Sex Rsch.1820, 1833 (2025).
• Powell & Henry, supra note 40, at 81.
• Id.
• Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], Oct. 29, 2020, 2018Do16466 3 (S. Kor.), https://perma.cc/7BZC-3EG8.
• These statistics are from the first half of 2024. Kim, supra note 39.
• Sang-yeon Park, Cyberbullying, Including “KakaoTalk Prison,” is a Growing Social Insensitivity to the Problem of Deepfake Sexual Crimes, Seoul Sinmun (Sept. 2, 2024), https://perma.cc/W95U-PYJZ.
• User Safety, KakaoTalk, https://perma.cc/YX5F-YMU5 (last visited Mar. 7, 2026).
• Hyejin Kim, A Study on the Actual Conditions of Digital Sex Crime Policies in Major Countries and Issues and Direction of the Sex Crime Policy in Korea: Case Studies of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and Germany, 18 J. Dig. Convergence 85, 86 (2020).
• Jeonghye Kim et al., Korea Women’s Development Institute, Ways of Legislative Improvement in Response to Technology-Facilitated Sexual Violence 15 (2022).
• Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, art. 13, amended by Act. No. 21066, Oct. 1, 2025 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/JDU2-CJRB.
• Id. art. 14 para. 1. Interestingly, the lack of consent is not an element; rather, the statute focuses on the state of mind of the victim; that is, the filming must have caused “sexual stimulus or shame against the will of the person who was shot.”
• Id. art. 14 para. 2.
• Id.art. 14 para. 3.
• Id. art. 15.
• Act on the Protection of Children of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses, art. 1, amended by Act. No. 21274, Dec. 30, 2025 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/9MST-LL5N.
• Id. art. 17.
• Id. art. 2 para. 2 item (b).
• Id. art. 2 para. 5.
• Id. art. 11 paras. 1–3.
• Id. art. 11 para. 5.
• Id. art. 11 para. 4.
• Defined as those who “provide services for other people to utilize online materials through an information and communications network.” Id. art. 2 para. 8.
• Id. art. 17 para. 1.
• Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, art. 44-7 para. 1 subpara. 1, amended by Act. No. 21066, Oct. 1, 2025 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/TNR5-M3QD.
• Id. art. 44-7 paras. 2–3.
• Id. art. 44-2 para. 1.
• Id. art. 44-2 para. 4 (emphasis added).
• Id.
• Id. art. 62.
• Criminal Act, arts. 243–244, amended by Act. No. 20908, Apr. 8, 2024 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/3SB9-C3ZS.
• Id. art. 298.
• Daebeobwon [S. Ct.], Feb. 8, 2018, 2016Do17733, https://perma.cc/5MXS-YH6G.
• Id. (Translation of ganjeopjeongbeom, as used in the opinion, to “Principal through innocent human agent” from Criminal Act, art. 34, amended by Act. No. 20908, Apr. 8, 2024 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/S6UE-MGG5).
• Criminal Act, art. 324, amended by Act. No. 20908, Apr. 8, 2024 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/3SB9-C3ZS.
• Korea Ministry of Government Legislation, Illegal Filming, Distribution, and Threats of Distribution, Easy to Find, Practical Law, https://perma.cc/FPW6-A435.
• Criminal Act, art. 350, amended by Act. No. 20908, Apr. 8, 2024 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/3SB9-C3ZS.
• Incheon Jibangbeobwon [Incheon Dist. Ct.], Nov. 12, 2012, 2021Gohap134 (S. Kor.).
• See Proposed Partial Amendments to the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes 3, Bill No. 2024883, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020); Proposed Partial Amendments to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection 3, Bill No. 2024963, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020); Proposed Partial Amendments to the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses 3, Bill No. 2108400, 21st Nat’l Assemb. (2021).
• See Proposed Partial Amendments to the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes 3, Bill No. 2024883, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020); Proposed Partial Amendments to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection 3, Bill No. 2024963, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020); Proposed Partial Amendments to the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses 3, Bill No. 2108400, 21st Nat’l Assemb. (2021); Proposed Partial Amendments to the Telecommunications Business Act 3, Bill No. 2024959, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020).
• Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, art. 13, amended by Act. No. 21066, Oct. 1, 2025 (S. Kor.), translated inKorea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/6UX8-XKTS.
• Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, art. 13 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/245K-SJTQ.
• For taking such photographs, as well as distributing, selling, leasing, providing, or openly exhibiting or showing such photographs, the maximum imprisonment was increased. For the crime of “using an information and communications network” (as defined in the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection) to collect profits, the maximum sentence was removed. Instead, a minimum sentence of three years was instated. Id. art. 14 paras. 1–3.
• Id. art. 14 para. 2.
• Id. art. 14 para. 4.
• Id. art. 14 paras. 1, 5.
• Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, art. 14-2 para. 1 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/245K-SJTQ.
• Id. art. 14-2 paras. 1–3.
• Id. art. 14-3.
• Korea Ministry of Government Legislation, Production or Distribution of Child or Youth Sexual Exploitation Materials, Easy to Find, Practical Law, https://perma.cc/K3HX-2ETQ; see also Proposed Partial Amendments to Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses, Bill No. 2024979, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020).
• Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses, art. 11 paras. 1–3, translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/5GC4-DNQB.
• Id. art. 11 para 5.
• Id. art. 15-2 para. 1 subpara. 1.
• Id. art. 15-2 para. 1 subpara. 2.
• Id. art. 2 subpara. 4.
• Act on the Protection of Children and Youth Against Sex Offenses, arts. 25-2, 25-3, 25-4 & 25-5, translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/5GC4-DNQB.
• Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, art. 5-2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/5EJG-AX4C.
• Id. art. 44-9.
• Enforcement Decree of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, art. 35-2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/935R-RJ3F.
• Telecommunications Business Act, art. 1 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/R7SK-PHJW.
• Central Radio Management Service, Value-added Telecommunications, https://perma.cc/38MP-AXZS (last visited Nov. 27, 2025).
• Telecommunications Business Act, art. 22-5 para. 1. (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/AX4Y-T6RV.
• Prior to the revisions, providers were obligated to engage in such measures only where the provider themselves “clearly recognize[d]” the situation. Telecommunications Business Act, art. 22-5, amended by Act. No. 21066, Oct. 1, 2025 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/AT3C-T3QA. The revision lowered the standard to merely “recognized.” Telecommunications Business Act, art. 22-5 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/28X8-UPDW.
• Criminal Act, art. 305 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/93TE-Y5XZ.
• Id. art. 305-3.
• Proposed Partial Amendments to the Criminal Act, Bill No. 2024882, 20th Nat’l Assemb. (2020).
• Jisun Kim et al., Korean Institute of Criminology and Justice, Nbeonbang bangjibeop ihu dijiteol seongbeomjoe byeonhwayangsang mit jeongchaekyogwa pyeongga [Analysis of the Changes in Digital Sex Crimes and Evaluation of Policy Implementation and Effectiveness after the Nth Room Prevention Law] 8 (2023).
• Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, supra note 10.
• Jisun Kim et al., supranote 109, at 15.
• Joonbok Lee, A Study on the Limitations and Improvement of the Nth Room incident Prevention Act for the Eradication of Digital Sex Crimes, 22 J. Pol. Sci. 159, 175 (2022).
• Nat’l Assemb. of the Rep. of Kor., Minutes of the 378th Plenary Sess., at 39 (May 20, 2020).
• Id.
• Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, art. 5-2 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/X42C-DCGF (last visited Apr. 17, 2026).
• Nat’l Assemb. of the Rep. of Kor., Minutes of the 377th Plenary Sess., at 21 (May 7, 2020).
• Id.
• Id. at 18.
• Joint Ministries, Dip-peikeu seongbeomjoe daeeung ganghwa bangan [Strengthening Measures to Respond to Deepfake Sexual Crimes] 3 (2024). While this report addressed the specific issue of deepfakes, the same issue applies to the broader category of digital sexual violence.
• Hyeong-won Kim, Telegram Remains Silent on Domestic Agent Verification Requests for Three Years, Josun Ilbo (Sept. 26, 2024), https://perma.cc/D2UY-CKAQ.
• Jee-young Yun et al., Korean Institute of Criminology and Justice, 20dae gukoeui hyeongsaipbeop-pyeongga mit hyanghu gwaje [Evaluation of Criminal Law Legislation by the 20th National Assembly and Further Challenges] 3 (2020).
• Lee, supra note 112, at 176.
• Id. at 175.
• Ben Derico & Ione Wells, Brazil Lifts Ban on Musk's X After it Pays $5m Fine, BBC (Oct. 8, 2024), https://perma.cc/P396-7Y9A.
• Gabriel Sá Pessoa, Brazil’s Top Court Justice Orders X to Pay $1.4 Million Fine for Non-compliance, AP News (Feb. 20, 2025), https://perma.cc/9MTT-FJFP.
• Leading Countries Based on Number of X (Formerly Twitter) Users as of October 2025, Statista (Oct. 2025), https://perma.cc/H9R8-RVJM.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
• Regarding CLOUD Act Executive Agreements, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://perma.cc/D2SW-4B88.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).
• Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data Across Borders: The Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Policy 473, 479 (2016).
• Regarding CLOUD Act Executive Agreements, supra note 128.
• Powell & Henry, supra note 40, at 210.
• See, e.g., EARN IT Act, S. 1207, 118th Cong. (2023).
• The EARN IT Act died in 2023; its last update as of November 29, 2025 is that it was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. S.1207 - EARN IT Act of 2023, https://perma.cc/M93M-SZU5.
• See How We Investigate, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, https://perma.cc/8HGF-KN4W; United States Government Accountability Office, Online Exploitation of Children: Department of Justice Leadership and Updated National Strategy Needed to Address Challenges 27 (2022).
• Imara McMillan, Enforcement Through the Network: The Network Enforcement Act and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 Chi. J. Int’l L. 252, 254 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
• Id.
• Id.
• Marc Liesching, § 1 NetzDG Scope of Application, in Strafrechtliche Nebengesetze (Georg Erbs & Max Kohlhaas, 218th supplement 2018).
• Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl I] at 3352, § 1, para. 1, sentence 1 (Ger.), translation available at https://perma.cc/BX3F-KC4K.
• Patrick Zurth, The German NetzDG as Role Model or Cautionary Tale? Implications for the Debate on Social Media Liability, 31 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1084, 1109 (2021).
• Lee, supra note 112, at 171.
• Strafprozessordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure], § 110d (Ger.), https://perma.cc/DD2F-BL4R.
• Criminal Procedure Act, art. 216 para. 3 (S. Kor.), translated inKorea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/ASY2-JYM6.
• Id. art. 218.
• Very large online platforms and search engines are those with over 45 million users in the EU. DSA: Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines, Eur. Comm’n, https://perma.cc/N65Q-HYA6.
• Digital Services Act, Eur. Council, https://perma.cc/TP3X-7RQL.
• Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) ¶ 5, https://perma.cc/U26S-XDH8.
• Id. ¶ 29.
• Id. ¶ 13.
• Id. art. 33 ¶ 1.
• Id. ¶ 12.
• Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, supra note 148, ¶ 58.
• Id. art. 18 ¶ 1.
• “Rules are proportionate to the companies’ size and impact on society.” Digital Services Act, supra note 147.
• Questions and Answers on the Digital Services Act, Eur. Comm’n (Feb. 22, 2024), https://perma.cc/X66D-TU6Y.
• Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, supranote 148, ¶¶ 61–62.
• Id. ¶ 80.
• Digital Services Act, supra note 147.
• Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, supra note 148, ¶ 13.
• Id.
• Cynthia Kroet, Telegram Still Doesn’t Meet Large Platform Requirements Under DSA, Euronews (Aug. 21, 2024), https://perma.cc/M7RT-EZ3F.
• User Guidance for the EU Digital Services Act, Telegram, https://perma.cc/4CEB-ZGWE.
• Henry Foy et al., EU Investigating Telegram Over User Numbers, Fin. Times (Aug. 28, 2024), https://perma.cc/MRA5-Z3ZJ.
• User Guidance for the EU Digital Services Act, supra note 163.
• What we do, Austl. Gov’t eSafety Comm’r, https://perma.cc/QF47-N528 (last visited Oct. 25, 2025).
• Powell & Henry, supra note 40, at 217.
• eSafety Comm’r, Compliance and Enforcement Policy: eSC CEP 2 (2024).
• Responses to Transparency Notices, Austl. Gov’t eSafety Comm’r, https://perma.cc/948T-YJD3.
• eSafety Comm’r, supra note 168.
• Australia Takes Enforcement Action Against Telegram for Serious Delay in Terror and Child Sexual Abuse Transparency, Austl. Gov’t eSafety Comm’r (Feb. 24, 2025), https://perma.cc/Y72S-3XVK.
• Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, No. XL of 2016, arts. 19 & 19A (Pak.).
• Id.
• Pakistan: Authorities Pass Bill with Sweeping Controls on Social Media, Amnesty Int’l (Jan. 24, 2025), https://perma.cc/FPG5-EH3H.
• Id.
• Social Media ‘Ban’ or Delay FAQs, Austl. Gov’t eSafety Comm’r, https://perma.cc/4GXP-VCPY (last visited Nov. 29, 2025).
• Id.
• Katy Watson & Tabby Wilson, Social Media Firms have Come to Ban ‘Kicking and Screaming’, says Australia eSafety Boss, BBC (Jan. 23, 2026), https://perma.cc/SBM2-KUHK.
• Social Media ‘Ban’ or Delay FAQs, supra note 176.
• Id.
• Watson & Wilson, supra note 178.
• Details of Treaty No.185, Council of Eur., https://perma.cc/GW39-WAP7.
• Convention on Cybercrime art. 12, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185.
• Id. arts. 27–34.
• Id. art. 35.
• Jan Kleijssen & Pierluigi Perri, Cybercrime, Evidence and Territoriality: Issues and Options,in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2016 147 (Martin Kuijer & Wouter Werner eds., 2017).
• Ana Gascón Marcén, The Budapest Convention and the UN Cybercrime Convention Negotiations,in Global Cybersecurity and International Law 173, 177 (Antonio Segura Serrano ed., 2024).
• Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence art. 7, Dec. 5, 2022, C.E.T.S. No. 224.
• Id. art. 8.
• Details of Treaty No.224, Council of Eur., https://perma.cc/E448-Q9F4.
• Telegram, Britannica, https://perma.cc/2MRD-FVHB.
• Telegram Privacy Policy, Telegram, https://perma.cc/4X4K-5HJU.
• Signal, Britannica, https://perma.cc/75MX-NTHS.
• Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.185 - Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185), Council of Eur., https://perma.cc/9DB2-BTU8.
• David Wicki-Birchler, The Budapest Convention and the General Data Protection Regulation: Acting in Concert to Curb Cybercrime?, 1 Int’l Cybersecurity L.R. 63, 63 (2020).
• Achievements, Council of Eur., https://perma.cc/RE3S-AJKP.
• Parties/Observers to the Budapest Convention and Observer Organisations to the T-CY, Council of Eur., https://perma.cc/Z6DR-QPHT.
• Joint Ministries, supra note 119, at 9.
• Ju-won Seong, The Only G20 Member Not to Have Joined the Budapest Convention, But the Court Remains Passive, EDaily (Nov. 28, 2025), https://perma.cc/EDY3-6AHS.
• U.S. Department of Justice Office of International Affairs: Criminal Division, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties of the United States 2 (2022).
• T. Markus Funk, Federal Judicial Center, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory 5 (2024).
• Id. at 6.
• Act on International Judicial Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, art. 15 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/4YBR-8VQW.
• Funk, supra note 201, at 14.
• Tiffany Lin & Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the Proposed U.S.-U.K. Agreement 4 (2017).
• Si-on Park, Cross-border Crime is Surging…South Korea’s Requests for International Police Cooperation Reach an All-time High, HanKyung Law & Biz (Aug. 10, 2025), https://perma.cc/KD2S-4M32.
• Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters art. 1, Kor.-U.S., Nov. 23, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-1.
• Id. art. 2.
• Id.
• Id. art. 5.
• Gail Kent, The Mutual Legal Assistance Problem Explained, Stan. Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y (Feb. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/7EPR-TP6H.
• Press Release, Ministry of Justice, South Korea and Republic of Singapore Sign Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (July 24, 2024).
• Act on International Judicial Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, art. 3 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/4YBR-8VQW.
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, https://perma.cc/K23U-VUDA.
• International Bill of Human Rights, United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, https://perma.cc/GC25-RZYZ.
• G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
• Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, https://perma.cc/AM6W-Q637.
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 December 1979, United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, https://perma.cc/J8ZB-L5E8.
• G.A. Res. 54/4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Oct. 6, 1999).
• Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, supra note 217.
• Malliga Och, The Local Diffusion of International Human Rights Norms – Understanding the Cities for CEDAW Campaign, 20 Int’l Feminist J. Pol. 425, 426 (2018).
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 2(b), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
• Id. art. 2(c).
• Id. art. 2(e).
• Douglas Pretsell & Timothy Willem Jones, How Human Rights Became Gay Rights: A History of Toonen v Australia, 46 Hum. Rts. Q. 437, 442 (2024).
• Id.
• Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994).
• Id. ¶ 9.
• Pretsell & Jones, supra note 225, at 453.
• Id. at 454.
• Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KOR/CO/5 (Nov. 24, 2023).
• UN Treaty Body Database, https://perma.cc/K3XZ-3GU3.
• Id.
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, supra note 222, art. 6.
• G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 216, art. 2; G.A. Res. 54/4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 4 ¶ 1 (Oct. 6, 1999).
• Lee, supra note 112, at 173.
• Dae-yoon Park, The “Nth Room Prevention Act” Controversy Over Pre-censorship: The Constitutional Court Ruled it Constitutional, “It Meets the Minimum Infringement Principle”, Sisa Law (Oct. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/M2ZK-UTLX.
• Telecommunications Business Act, art. 22-5 para. 1 (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research Institute’s online database, https://perma.cc/9FRE-DTJ3.
• In 2024, it helped to delete 300,237 instances of sexually abusive content from online platforms. Women’s Human Rights Institute of Korea, supra note 11, at 30.
• Taking on the Dark Web: Law Enforcement Experts ID Investigative Needs, Nat’l Inst. Just.(June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/A7XG-GQ47.
• Kristin Finklea, The Dark Web: An Overview, Congress.gov (Dec. 2, 2024), https://perma.cc/ZV6V-R27F.