Networked Multilateralism: International Organizations in an Era of Multisectoral Global Problems

“We urgently need innovative thinking on global governance and multilateralism so that they are fit for the twenty-first century.

First and foremost, we need a networked multilateralism based on strong links and cooperation between global and regional organizations, international financial institutions and other global alliances and institutions.”

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, 24 September 20201

I. Setting the Stage: Multisectoral Global Problems and the Rise of “Networked Multilateralism”

The contemporary global landscape is characterized by manifold, increasingly complex challenges that transcend national boundaries and cut across different sectors of international affairs. Problems such as climate change, mass migration, pandemics, artificial intelligence, population growth, or economic instability, among others, are inherently cross-border and cross-sectoral in nature. In addressing such problems that affect not only multiple states but also span multiple issue-areas (referred to here as multisectoral global problems), the fragmented international system faces considerable challenges emanating predominantly from the need for a well-coordinated, integrative, and collaborative approach across multiple International Organizations (IOs) with distinct but interrelated mandates and responsibilities, in order to deliver coordinated and effective global responses.

As a quintessential transboundary cross-sectoral crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic vividly demonstrated the hurdles facing IOs when required to work together around a shared global problem. In responding to the pandemic, particularly in its initial phases, a multitude of functionally specialized IOs each worked within their jurisdiction to devise their own crisis response with little to no cooperation or coordination with other pertinent IOs. Against this backdrop, in September 2020, about nine months into the pandemic, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres observed in his address to the UN Security Council that the global response to COVID-19, as with other global challenges, became “more and more fragmented.”2 The appropriate response, the Secretary-General emphasized, would have required proactive cooperation between multiple IOs to effectively and holistically address the multifaceted health, economic, and social crisis that the coronavirus had instigated. In this vein, he stated: “we need a networked multilateralism based on strong links and cooperation between global and regional organizations, international financial institutions and other global alliances and institutions.”3 “The institutions of global governance,” he stressed, “should work together in coordination, to contain, mitigate and reduce risks of all kinds,” while warning that the “pandemic is a wake-up call for even more catastrophic challenges that may arise,” which must not be met  “with the same disunity and disarray” that characterized the global response to COVID-19.4

Notably, the idea of networked multilateralism as a critical approach to addressing contemporary multisectoral global challenges already featured on the Secretary-General’s address before the General Assembly in the year prior to the eruption of COVID-19, where he called for enhanced integration and collaboration among the UN, other international bodies, regional organizations, and diverse non-state actors. This, he intoned, is essential for confronting modern transnational challenges that require coordinated, multidimensional responses. Networked multilateralism, he explained, is thus vital for making the UN “relevant to all” and capable of providing “real solutions to global challenges.”5

Alongside its inclusion in the UN Secretary-General’s speeches, the notion of networked multilateralism has occupied a growing role on the UN’s agenda over the past few years. This notion has appeared and been advocated in formal and informal documents circulated by the organization. This notion is featured, for example, in the Secretary-General’s 2021 “Our Common Agenda” report. In working to update our system of global governance, the Secretary-General writes, multilateralism in the sense of “cooperation among a small number of States,” as was the case when the UN Charter was established, is no longer sufficient and there is a need for “a form of multilateralism that is more networked, more inclusive and more effective.”6 In this view, “multilateralism that is more networked draws together on existing institutional capacities, overcoming fragmentation to ensure all are working together towards a common goal.”7 It is inherently “cross-pillar” and seeks to enhance coordination and cooperation between global and regional institutions, including financial international institutions.8

The concept also appears in the 2023 UN policy brief titled “A New Agenda for Peace.” There, the Secretary-General reiterates the call for a new era of networked multilateralism to address a series of interlocking transnational threats with mutually reinforcing effects, including the climate emergency, rising global inequalities, and emerging technologies.9 The brief provides action-oriented recommendations for strengthening global governance and addressing such cross-issue global threats in preparation for the Summit of the Future in 2024. It underscores the importance of networked multilateralism as a key approach to respond to the magnitude of pending global threats, as well as the need to “strengthen[] the toolbox for networked multilateralism.”10 In this context, the brief also highlights, among others, the importance of regional frameworks and organizations as “critical building blocks for networked multilateralism,”11 and argues that strong partnerships and “a new global peace and security architecture in which regional frameworks and organizations play a more prominent role” is necessary.12

The 2030 UN Agenda, which in 2015 outlined the UN’s vision for the future, has importantly recognized the interlinked and interdependent nature of contemporary global problems. Addressing cross-sectoral challenges like poverty, climate change, and inequality, the 2030 Agenda operationalizes contemporary problems through the adoption of various sustainable development goals (SDGs). The Agenda acknowledges that the “challenges … identified … are interrelated” and calls “for integrated solutions,” stressing that “[t]o address them effectively, a new approach is needed.”13 Accordingly, the Agenda echoes the need for engaging multiple stakeholders and recognizes the importance of an inclusive and cohesive approach, “bringing together Governments, the private sector, civil society, the United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources.”14 Indeed, as the General Assembly resolution adopting the 2030 Agenda notes: “The scale and ambition of the new Agenda requires a revitalized Global Partnership to ensure its implementation.”15

The essence of this Global Partnership can be found in the emphasis on the importance of collaboration between and across global and regional organizations, as highlighted in the various UN documents mentioned above. This element, captured in the concept of networked multilateralism, is similarly key in the International Peace Institute’s paper addressing peace support operations in Africa, published in the context of the Summit of the Future.16  This element has also been pronounced in the framework of the first EU-UN High-Level Dialogue, where the UN Secretary-General intimated that “[w]e need more than ever multilateralism. But not any kind of multilateralism, because no organization can … solve the problems of this world alone. We need a networked multilateralism.”17

This illustrative set of statements and documents attests to the burgeoning recognition in certain quarters of the global governance system of the challenges posed by multisectoral global problems in a fragmented system structured along sectoral lines. It further reflects the recognition of the corresponding need for closer links and cooperation among the diverse international organizations making up this system in order to effectively and cohesively address such problems—the need embodied in the concept of networked multilateralism. This growing practical understanding, however, has so far not been accompanied by a research effort striving to unpack this concept and its implications. In other words, despite its growing significance, little attention has been devoted to the notion of networked multilateralism in the vast international law (IL) and international relations (IR) literatures studying the fragmented global governance system.

Markedly, the fragmented system of global governance as it has evolved in the post-Cold War era has been the subject of extensive debates in both IR and IL circles in recent decades. In this framework, scholars have sought to define and assess the consequences of the increasing institutional and normative density and diversity of the postwar international order while approaching the phenomenon from two different analytical perspectives. Whereas international jurists have predominantly relied on the concept of the “fragmentation” of international law, the work of IR scholars has largely revolved around the notion of “regime complexity.”18 However, studies within both frameworks have been largely preoccupied with the conflictual aspects of the growing normative and institutional complexity of the international system. In this context, they have mainly probed how the proliferation of international regimes, rules, and institutions may lead to normative conflicts, generate regime collisions, nurture cross-institutional strategizing by states, and affect the problem-solving capacity of global governance institutions operating within the confines of a single-issue area while possibly also pitting these institutions against each other. Hence, much like the architecture of the global governance system, both IL theory and IR theory remain committed to analysis of this system mainly along state and sectoral lines. Consequently, much less attention has been devoted in these theoretical frameworks to the issue of cooperation between global governance institutions across regimes in the face of global challenges that do not fit neatly within a single issue-area but rather span multiple issues and, as such, invite broader thinking along the lines of networked multilateralism.

This essay seeks to mitigate this gap in the literature. Engaging more closely with the concept of networked multilateralism, it contends that cooperation at the international level requires not only cooperation between states through bilateral avenues or multilateral institutions. Rather, it requires hitherto underdeveloped vision and mechanisms of cooperation between these various interdependent multilateral institutions themselves,19 an aspect that becomes ever more evident and crucial if one considers COVID-19 to be a bellwether for future cross-sectoral global problems.

The essay argues that for deeper and more effective inter-IO cooperation to take hold, a conceptual shift is in order. In particular, there is a need to reconsider and adapt our perceptions of global governance, IOs, and multilateralism, which have so far remained largely state-centric and confined to inter-state cooperation,20 leaving the idea of inter-IO cooperation in the face of multisectoral global problems less developed. In view of this, this essay revisits the theoretical underpinnings of the current global governance architecture and proposes embracing a new, more comprehensive and integrative approach to multilateralism, one that closely resonates with the UN Secretary-General’s notion of networked multilateralism. According to this approach, IOs should not be seen as merely state-created multilateral structures designed to facilitate inter-state cooperation around discrete and disconnected sectors of international affairs. Rather, these multilateral institutions—international actors in their own right—should be viewed as interconnected and interdependent institutions that together form part of the greater network of global governance. As such, and if they are to address the cross-sectoral global challenges lying ahead, IOs need the political legitimacy and the adequate legal and institutional mechanisms by which to cooperate with one another in an effective and cohesive manner.

The essay proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the existing IL scholarship on fragmentation and IR scholarship on regime complexity and highlights the blind spots of these debates, particularly with regard to the issue of cooperation between IOs governing different-but-interconnected sectors of the international order. Against this backdrop, the third section proposes adjusting and expanding our conceptual and theoretical outlook. Recognizing IOs as independent (yet interdependent) actors that constitute part of a broader network of global governance and drawing on the Secretary-General’s call for networked multilateralism, this section reconstructs inter-IO cooperation around cross-sectoral global problems as a pivotal element of the contemporary international order. The last section concludes the essay.

II. The Fragmented International System, Existing Debates, and What is Missing

The end of the Cold War constituted a defining moment in world politics and in the study of world politics. Following this critical juncture, the world witnessed a huge surge in international agreements alongside a proliferation of international regulatory and judicial institutions with often overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries. In response to these developments, extensive research efforts have been devoted to the emergence of a global governance system consisting of multiple nonhierarchical and partially overlapping spheres of authority. Both IL and IR scholars have tried to assess the implications of the growing normative and institutional density at the international level in the absence of centralized coordinating mechanisms or authority and to probe legal and political devices that may tackle the evolving reality of multiple and intersecting international jurisdictions.21

Two different approaches have been developed in this regard.22 International lawyers have analyzed questions relating to the proliferation of international regimes, norms, and institutions through the notion of the fragmentation of international law that threatens the integrity and coherence of the international legal system.23 IR scholars, for their part, have developed the regime complexity framework and focused on the implications of the densely institutionalized international setting for states’ strategic action or for the problem-solving capacity of institutions rooted within a particular issue area.24 These two research strands, briefly discussed below, have provided invaluable insights into the development and consequences of a global governance order characterized by increased specialization and diversification. Nonetheless, these strands of scholarship have left unresolved some pressing issues resulting from the segmentation of the international system along sectoral lines.

A. The Fragmentation Debate in International Law

The post-Cold War proliferation of international legal regimes, norms, and institutions—often termed the “fragmentation” of international law—has been the subject of a long and extensive debate among international jurists.25 This discourse has sought to assess the potential implications of fragmentation for the operation and normative structure of international law,26 with legal scholarship oscillating over time from deep concern to a more optimistic view of the phenomenon and the ability to mitigate its ill-effects.27

A notable concern raised by international lawyers is that, in the absence of a central global legislator, a world court, and hierarchical relationships between the various regimes of international law, fragmentation might generate conflicts between the substantive rules and principles originating from the different regimes.28 Such normative conflicts, it has been argued, could consequently subject states to contradicting obligations, give rise to situations in which it is unclear which legal rules are applicable, and, more generally, undercut the normative integrity, certainty, and coherence of the international legal system.29

Additionally, commentators have argued that these dangers, stemming from the complex interactions caused by the multiplicity of substantive sources of international law,30 may be further exacerbated by the multitude of international institutions that produce, interpret, and apply international law and, particularly, by the prevalent creation  of new adjudicative bodies across international regimes in the post-Cold War era.31 This institutional aspect of fragmentation has generated two main concerns. First is the concern that the proliferation of international courts will result in conflicting rulings and divergent interpretations of international law.32Since most international courts now operate within the bounds of specific legal regimes, some have feared that such specialized courts might engage in “hegemonic struggles,”33 with each framing the legal matters before it through the narrow lens of its own regime.34 Consequently, incompatible interpretations of identical or similar international norms might emerge,35 and different solutions might be offered to the same or similar problems.36

The second concern is that the non-hierarchical and non-systematic growth of judicial institutions throughout numerous international regimes will generate competition and conflicts over the potentially overlapping jurisdictions of these judicial bodies.37 This “overarching concern” over concurrent jurisdictions has, in turn, “raised multiple potential subproblems,”38 including the possibility of parallel legal proceedings and the risk that disputants might exploit fragmentation and its accompanying institutional pluralism to pursue their parochial interests through forum shopping and regime shifting.39 As Benvenisti and Downs warned, powerful states, in particular, could take advantage of fragmentation, as the multitude of international institutions provides such states with the “opportunity to abandon—or threaten to abandon— any given venue for a more sympathetic venue” if their interests are not adequately accommodated.40 These negative effects of fragmentation have, they claim, the potential to further undermine the normative force and integrity of international law and institutions.41

With much of the existing legal debate on fragmentation focused on clashes between international norms and jurisdictional or interpretative collisions between international courts as the key issues,42 scholarly works have primarily searched for doctrinal and institutional mechanisms to avoid such conflicts and to resolve those that do arise.43 Despite the merits of this debate, we argue, it provides only a limited account of the fragmentation phenomenon and its implications for international law and global governance. First, this conflict and competition-oriented debate leaves unresolved situations in which coordination and cooperation across international regimes, institutions, and rules is required not merely to (negatively) avoid conflicts of norms or authorities but to (positively) secure a concerted international response to global problems that span multiples issues and regimes.44 Or, as Alvarez puts it, in the existing IL fragmentation debate “questions of how best to handle cross-boundary regime issues remain a ‘legal black-hole’.”45 Second, this debate is largely state-oriented, focusing mainly on the implications of fragmentation for states’ international obligations or for states’ strategic behavior in the face of competing and potentially conflicting international institutions, norms, and decisions. Third, this IL debate, with its court-centered approach and focus on the interplay between international judicial bodies with overlapping jurisdictions, overlooks the interactions between non-judicial international institutions exercising concurrent authority over actions or events, including the challenges of coordination and cooperation between them.46 This latter aspect, as seen below, has been taken up by IR scholars working within the regime complexity framework but only to a limited extent.

B. The Regime Complexity Debate in International Relations

IR scholars have adopted the regime complexity framework in an attempt to capture the density of the postwar global order in which multiple international rules and institutions intersect and claim to govern specific issue-areas in the absence of a central authority hierarchically managing the overarching governance architecture.47 In 2004, Raustiala and Victor first coined the concept of “regime complex,” defining it as a set of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions that includes more than one international agreement or authority governing a particular issue area.48 Various scholars have since deployed the concept and charted how regime complexes evolve around specific policy issues by mapping the complex of international agreements and institutions with authority over a given issue and identifying their relationships with each other. Contributors have covered issues ranging from climate change,49 intellectual property rights,50 and trade,51 to human rights,52 refugee policy,53 human trafficking,54 and global health.55

Building on Raustiala and Victor’s definition, Alter and Meunier subsequently introduced the related concept of “international regime complexity,” focusing on the condition of complexity that emanates from “the presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered.”56 They argued that while regime complexity also exists in the domestic realm, the “lack of hierarchy distinguishes international regime complexity, making it harder to resolve where political authority over an issue resides.”57 Against this backdrop, many scholars have gone on to show that regime complexity, as a defining feature of the post–Cold War international system, bears critical consequences. At the agential level, it affects the strategic behavior of states within a regime complex, while, at the system level, it impacts the problem-solving capacity of the institutions comprising a regime complex and threatens to undermine the effectiveness of broader global governance.

And so, at the state level, the main argument raised is that regime complexity opens the door for cross-institutional political strategies by states, inviting them to exploit conflicts and overlaps between institutions in the increasingly dense international system.58 As in the fragmentation literature, international institutions have often been seen by regime complexity literature as political tools that states may use and pit against each other by resorting to several cross-institutional strategies.59 States may, for example, engage in forum shopping, choosing between competing international venues according to where their interests may be best served.60 States may also turn to regime shifting, namely, moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or other standard-setting activities from one venue to another.61 Furthermore, a group of states may engage in competitive regime creation, forming à la carte institutions to pursue different policies and practices from those of existing institutions.62 The result is a power-based framework that creates more opportunities for (already powerful) states to promote their own interests through inter-institutional strategies.63

At the system level, IR scholars have examined how regime complexity influences global governance institutions’ effectiveness, authority, and legitimacy. Some have investigated the problem-solving capacity of regime complexes in specific issue areas.64 Others have probed the conditions under which institutional proliferation may engender inter-institutional competition and conflicts due to feedback effects65 or may enable states to promote cooperation in new areas through, primarily, unintentional spillovers and linkages.66

By analyzing and characterizing how regime complexes are structured, mapping them across sectors, and exploring their effects on both states’ political behavior and the functionality of international institutions and global governance, the regime complexity literature has greatly contributed to the understanding of the post-Cold War international order. Nevertheless, there are some deficiencies that limit its explanatory scope. As this literature stems from the traditional international regime theory nested in neoliberal institutionalism, it tends to take a state-centric perspective,67 focusing on the conduct of and cooperation between state actors within IOs (while often overlooking cooperation between IOs).68 This literature is thus essentially functional and rationalist in nature,69 concerned with the strategic behavior of states and the ways in which costly obligations may hinder the efficiency of a regime complex in solving a given policy problem.70 In this sense, the regime complexity framework is also rigidly sectoral, as it studies specific and allegedly discrete policy domains.71 In practice, however, many global problems, as noted in the first section, cannot be resolved through a single sectoral regime complex but require the response of cross-sectoral regime complexes. Lastly, the regime complexity framework is largely conflict-oriented, preoccupied with possible collisions between competing rules and institutions, much like the fragmentation literature. Its underlying premise is that overlapping institutions are a source of competition and conflict,72 which alter states’ preferences and prompt forum shopping or regime shifting, thereby undermining the law-based international order.73

C. The Gaps in Existing Debates

The fragmentation and regime complexity debates have shed important light on the growing normative and institutional density of the post-Cold War international order by explaining the phenomenon of the proliferation of global governance institutions and illuminating the critical challenges it poses in different contexts and issue areas. Nevertheless, these debates also have some limitations. In taking the phenomenon of multiple and partially overlapping international regimes, rules, and institutions as their analytical point of departure, the existing debates have mostly revolved around the potentially pernicious consequences of collisions between international norms or institutions and the opportunities such conflicts afforded for strategic action by political actors. In this framework, existing works have narrowly focused on how state actors may strategically advance their interests against the backdrop of overlapping international institutions as well as on the implications of such strategic action for interstate cooperation through international institutions.74 However, little attention has been given to the question of cooperation between those international institutions themselves75 and how their interorganizational interactions are established and evolve.76Finally, even in those instances where attempts have been made to study the interactions between separately established international institutions, such investigations have been limited to institutions embedded within a single sector or issue area,77 with a view to assessing those institutions’ capacity to solve the specific sectoral problem around which their jurisdictions converge.78

By focusing on the conflictual aspects of the polycentric global governance system and following an often unisectoral and narrow state-oriented approach, existing IL and IR studies on fragmentation and regime complexity have turned a blind eye to the question of how international institutions governing distinct but interrelated issue areas can collaborate in response to cross-sectoral global problems and, particularly, to positively and proactively advance a common agenda in a timely, effective, and comprehensive manner. As mentioned above, the global experience in reacting to COVID-19 has highlighted these gaps and the pressing theoretical and practical need to address them. In our contemporary global reality, scholars can no longer afford to limit the scope of their inquiries to situations of conflict, to a single sector, or to state-centric conceptions of inter-state cooperation that view IOs as mere agents of state-principals. Rather, it is high time to extend our research efforts to new investigations into the manner in which, in the prevailing conditions of overlaps, interdependence, and lack of hierarchy in global governance, IOs from different regimes may effectively interact and cooperate to develop initiatives and common agendas around issues of joint concern as international actors in their own right. Such a move, as we now turn to explain, entails a novel conceptual approach to multilateralism, international cooperation, and IOs as central actors in global governance.

III. Rethinking Inter-IO Cooperation in Global Governance: Toward Networked Multilateralism

As stated at the beginning of this essay, contemporary global challenges are increasingly complex and multifaceted, cutting across the jurisdictional boundaries of numerous IOs. Consider pandemics, the climate crisis, poverty, migration, data privacy, advanced artificial intelligence, and many other issues occupying the international community. Addressing these challenges requires cooperation and coordination between IOs whose authority extends to different sectors of international affairs. Nevertheless, the question of cooperation between IOs in addressing cross-sectoral global problems has so far received little attention from IL and IR scholars.

The gap demonstrated by both the literature and the real-world experience with COVID-19, we argue, underscores the need to revise and update our perceptions of multilateralism, cooperation, and IOs within the broader context of global governance. To this end, we pick up on the UN Secretary-General’s call for “networked multilateralism” based on “strong links and cooperation” between, most notably, IOs, by developing our understanding of this concept. On our reading, this idea recognizes IOs not only as key, independent actors in the global governance system, but moreover as inter-dependent actors whose cooperation with other IOs is vital for the inclusive and effective management of global challenges. In other words, although operating in a fragmented and polycentric global governance system, IOs must be perceived by others and by themselves as interconnected (rather than isolated, self-contained) actors. Hence, in some instances, for IOs to fulfill their goals of delivering global public goods or solving cross-boundary problems, they must be able to operate in a cooperative manner and overcome the collective action problems they may face, much like other types of actors. In what follows, we develop this idea.

A. IOs as Independent and Interdependent Actoris in Global Governance

IOs have been at the heart of the theory and practice of global governance scholarship from its inception. Early scholarship, grounded in rational choice theory, depicted IOs as rule-based mechanisms designed by states to realize their goals and interests and overcome collective action problems. Later scholarship, however, turned to discuss the extent to which IOs hold independent and autonomous agential capacities, conceptualizing them as either bureaucracies, trustees, or orchestrators.79 Indeed, IOs have developed institutional expertise and have grown into well-oiled machines that can effectively carry out executive functions through their established secretariats, devise institutional policies and visions, and nurture organizational culture and values. Their activity has thus been recognized to not merely represent the sum of state parties’ preferences but also as embodying an independent agency and agenda of their own.80

Within this body of scholarship, in turn, much scholarly attention has been devoted to the relations of individual IOs with other actors in their external environment as well as to their internal organizational dynamics. Among others, scholars have studied IOs’ relationship and legitimation efforts vis-à-vis member states;81their design and the delegation of authority to them by states; their interactions with non-state actors (e.g., civil society and private actors); the varying degrees of autonomy across different IOs; and their behavior and prospects for institutional reform.82Scholars have further studied IOs’ internal bureaucratic struggles as well as the processes of change, preference formation, and agenda setting taking place within them.83

However, while IOs have been recognized as important nodes on the broader network of global governance,84 alongside states and other non-state actors, little attention has so far been given to the inter-organizational relationship among IOs and the potential for cooperation between IOs as a significant driver of effective global governance. Recent years, it should be noted, have seen some growing research interest in the theory and practice of inter-organizational relations and cooperation amid IOs.85Yet, much of this literature is grounded in the field of public administration and thus does not consider IOs as interdependent political actors who operate within the greater system of global governance. A notable contribution to this body of literature is the 2017 Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics,86 which introduces valuable insights to the study of relations between organizations at the international level, particularly from inter-organizational theory. However, even this work is limited to IO relations within confined, specific sectors, and neglects to devote attention to the need for positive and active cooperation between IOs in addressing cross-sectoral issues. For such cooperation to materialize, we argue, a conceptual shift in our understanding of multilateralism, international cooperation, and the role and conduct of IOs is a prerequisite. 

B. Multilateralism: Who’s In?

The concept of multilateralism in world politics has traditionally been understood as a mode of institutionalized cooperation between states. According to Ruggie, multilateralism is “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions.”87 For Ruggie, then, multilateralism is inherently about cooperation between state actors. In addition, his definition extends the nominal understanding of multilateralism as the mere coordination of national policies to a qualitative one, which follows from the premise that the multilateral setting may enhance the durability and adaptability of international cooperation and hence be conducive for solving collective action problems. As per this definition, international regimes and institutions have been and continue to be viewed as mechanisms designed to facilitate this type of inter-state multilateralism.88 Such facilitation of inter-state cooperation is perceived as the epitome of IO s’ existence.89

We argue, conversely, that although this notion of multilateralism has been used extensively to characterize the international system in recent decades, the Gordian knot between the idea of multilateralism and states as the distinctive parties involved in international cooperation must be loosened. The concept of multilateralism, we contend, should be responsive to the profound changes in circumstances, especially the increasing diversity of actors in the international arena90 and the growing importance of actors other than states in governing global problems: IOs, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, and others.91 More concretely, this concept should denote the possibility of cooperation between, and collective action amidst, a much broader array of actors including, chiefly, IOs. Along these lines, the UN Secretary General has stated: 

The context of collective action has evolved over the past 75 years. When the Charter of the United Nations was developed, multilateralism meant cooperation among a small number of states. Today, a broader range of State and non-State actors are participating in global affairs…. Any effort to improve our governance of the global commons and public goods and to manage risks must navigate this complexity and seek explicitly to incorporate these new approaches where they are likely to deliver better outcomes.92

Yet, as  already noted, many global problems transcend national borders and traverse sectoral boundaries. In a fragmented international system where different issue-areas are governed by distinct IOs, addressing multi-sectoral problems requires cooperation both between states and between IOs.

It follows that to address certain global problems in today’s world, there is a need to adopt an approach to multilateralism that is neither limited to state cooperation nor restricted to a specific governance realm (i.e., health, trade, environment), but rather recognizes IOs as significant actors who, too, are required to engage in collective action to manage cross-sectoral crises. As the UN under Secretary-General Guterres indicates, IOs do in fact perceive themselves not only as cooperative frameworks designed to allow states to solve collective action problems but also as actors who seek avenues for cooperation with fellow organizations in order to deliver global public goods and, together with other fellow IOs, face collective action problems of their own. In that spirit, the Secretary-General has noted in the 2021 Our Common Agenda report: “For my part, I will seek to enhance cooperation with regional organizations…, international financial institutions and other relevant multilateral institutions.”93

A similar approach is promoted as a “shared responsibility” of IOs in a 2016 OECD report that has compared and assessed the governance practices, operational modalities, and cooperation efforts of more than 50 IOs.94 Acknowledging the key role to be played by IOs, which “operate in an institutionally-crowded area,” in promoting multilateral solutions to the threats posed by transboundary problems such as climate change, health epidemics, terrorism, and illicit financial flows, the report concluded:

Collectively, international organisations across the globe can build on their respective experience in standard setting, coordinate their action and combine their technical expertise to remain relevant on the global scale. It is our shared responsibility to rebuild trust in the international architecture and in its capacity to deliver better policies for better lives.95

The OECD report has therefore allocated the responsibility for delivering cooperative policies for better lives to IOs and not only to states. Following this logic, IOs should be acknowledged as interdependent peers that are capable of cooperating with each other and operating in a networked manner, thus creating networked multilateralism.

C. Networked: In What Sense?

There are empirical, methodological, and theoretical rationales for adopting a network perspective in the context of world politics.96 Empirically, since the 1990s scholars have identified and characterized the emergence and operation of different types of networks at the global level, including transnational networks of non-state actors,97 trans-governmental bureaucratic networks,98and private-public partnerships.99 Such characterization has emphasized the interconnectedness–across borders–of various types of actors, which has enabled them to promote common agendas within states through advocacy, national policymaking and legislation, or domestic litigation, as well as to deploy concerted action at the global level through treatymaking, lobbying, and supranational litigation.

Methodologically, perceiving these actors as constituting transnational networks has inspired the application of social network analysis as a method for systematically analyzing the role and the patterns of penetration and effect by transnational actors within given sectors, such as global environmental governance100 or human rights.101 In this scholarship, social structures are visualized as intricate webs, mapping the interconnections between actors operating domestically, transnationally, and globally.

Lastly, theoretically, the concept of networks (for example, trans-governmental networks) has been used as a metaphor for describing an informal and elastic form of relationships which maintain open, multidirectional channels of interaction, communication and influence between their nodes. Such relationships facilitate cooperation in dealing with multifaceted crises and problems.102

It follows that adopting a network metaphor is helpful in portraying how multiple types of actors participate and interact in global governance. The type of interaction such a metaphor captures is reciprocal: actors, represented as nodes, partake in the endless weaving of the web connecting them but are also shaped by it. Moreover, the metaphor connotes the lack of a necessary or formal hierarchy between the actors involved. In the context of global governance, a network metaphor is therefore especially useful in accounting for the diversity of actors taking part in the practice of governing common issues that transcend national, organizational, and sectoral boundaries, also capturing the lack of formal hierarchy between different organizations as well as the absence of a single, central governing authority.

However, we maintain, specific attention should be devoted to applying a network perspective to the role and position of IOs in global governance.103 IOs should not only be viewed as hosts of interactions between their member states104 or between states and other non-state actors.105 In other words, IOs should not be seen as merely clusters of nodes representing other actors. Rather, they too should be represented as nodes in and of themselves—as independent actors that participate in the networked activity of global governance, clustered together with other IOs. In line with this perspective, IOs should no longer be viewed as discrete and isolated governance structures, each governing a specific area of international affairs. Instead, they should be seen as interdependent actors which are part of a larger network of global governance. For this network to deliver the multidimensional responses necessary to successfully address today’s cross-sectoral global challenges, IOs must be able to operate cooperatively.

D. Networked Multilateralism: The Road Ahead

The possibility of inter-IO cooperation is contingent on the adoption of a broader understanding of multilateralism. The map of the networked global space should thus be redrawn in a way that does justice to IOs’ role as independent and interdependent actors, forming a cluster where global governance is carried out. Still, realizing the vision of networked multilateralism will require more than scholarly re-imaginings. It will require making significant changes to the rules and mechanisms forming, structuring, and limiting the practice of IOs as well as in the outlook of states concerning the role of IOs.

To be clear, it would be inaccurate to suggest that there are strictly no mechanisms or possibilities for IO cooperation currently in place. Indeed, some mandates for interorganizational collaboration can be identified in various international legal instruments. These include the constitutive documents of some IOs (such as the WHO Constitution), the texts of relevant international regulations (for instance, the 2005 International Health Regulations), and formal cooperation agreements concluded between IOs.106

On the ground, however, as explained by the OECD report mentioned above, IOs seem to pause at mere coordination of their activities, achieved mainly through “soft mechanisms, such as exchange of information, observing action of relevant bodies and joint meetings,” while systematic or frequent development of joint instruments and action remains limited.107 Furthermore, as Rhodes added: “even in situations where there are clear needs and opportunities for cooperation [between IOs], it does not necessarily take place. It may also take place only at a very basic and informal level with limited impact in practice.”108 Focusing on the UN, Naujoks reported increasing inter-agency cooperation in the aftermath of the Global Compact for Migration process, but he, too, observed that cooperation is “more aspiration than practice.”109 The experience with COVID-19, as described by the UN Secretary-General, seems to convey a similar picture.

Various possible factors may be responsible for impeding inter-IO cooperation. One factor is the absence of appropriate coordination mechanisms and regularized systems for inter-regime collaboration and the consequent lack in practical experience in such cooperation. Another significant constraint is the lack of state backing due to states’ preference for “short-term political and economic interests over long-term interests.”110 This claim surely corresponds with research examining IOs as pawns in states’ strategic and preference-maximizing behavior.111 Yet, as argued throughout this section, IOs can no longer be viewed as mere proxies of their member states but rather should be recognized as independent and interdependent actors in global governance. And, indeed, inter-organizational cooperation is sometimes explicitly called for by IOs themselves. Nonetheless, while state recognition of the legitimacy of inter-IO cooperation is critical for IOs to frontstage and showcase their cooperation,112 one should not dismiss the role and responsibility of these organizations in regularizing cross-institutional collaboration, thereby enabling networked multilateralism to transpire, at least backstage.

Of course, inter-IO cooperation is not always necessary, and some global problems may be handled successfully within the remit of a single organization. Moreover, IOs’ capacity for cross-institutional cooperation may vary depending on their respective resources, membership, and other factors. However, while inter-institutional harmony cannot be expected, effective networked multilateralism requires that the conditions necessary for inter-IO cooperation in a fragmented global governance system be secured, enhancing not only connectivity and diffusion among IOs,113 but also joint proactive action to identify and address cross-cutting global challenges and concerns.

The notion of networked multilateralism unpacked herein responds to the practical and theoretical gaps identified in the preceding discussion. It goes beyond the state-centric, conflict-oriented, and sector-specific understanding of existing debates on the polycentric and fragmented global governance system. And instead of focusing on the mere structure and architecture of this system,114 it shifts attention to the interfaces and interactions that operationalize global governance.115 In so doing, the idea of networked multilateralism makes room for more ambitious action on the part of the various institutions forming part of the network of global governance–action that is proactive in working to achieve common goals and interests rather than simply avoiding or solving normative or institutional collisions. In line with the recognition of IOs as a fundamental part of “the larger institutional whole” of global governance,116 the concept of networked multilateralism highlights the particularly crucial role of IOs and inter-IO cooperation in practicing proactive international governance.

IV. Conclusions

The end of the Cold War, following which the contemporary fragmented international system has consolidated, marked a historical turning point for theories on global governance and multilateral institutions. We submit that the UN’s agenda for promoting networked multilateralism, brought to the forefront by the inadequacies of the global governance system exposed by the COVID-19 crisis, is similarly a turning point. It is a call to prepare for the multisectoral global challenges lying ahead with the understanding that we can no longer afford a system of global governance whose components are precluded from effectively working together to achieve common aims. Specifically, there is an urgent need to construct an effective network of global governance in which IOs can more vigorously and systematically join hands in action in the face of future multisectoral global crises and challenges.

Developing the concept of networked multilateralism, this Essay proposes embracing a more integrative vision of global governance and a more inclusive approach to multilateralism. Rather than seeing IOs as isolated structures governing discrete sectors of international affairs, it argues that they should be viewed as part of the interconnected and interdependent network of global governance. With this in mind, the Essay advances a new, broader approach to multilateralism that transcends the outdated paradigm of inter-state multilateralism. This approach, we contend, seems more compatible with a nonhierarchical and fragmented international order in which a myriad of actors must interact and cooperate in order to provide global public goods and address multifaceted global problems.

Admittedly, facilitating effective networked multilateralism and developing the mechanisms required for securing IO cooperation would be no small feat. Achieving it is contingent not only on the political will and interest of states but also on a fundamental restructuring of the practices guiding the operation of IOs and possibly also their legal mandates. However, in light of the current reality of interdependence and the nature of the global challenges on the horizon, we argue that there is no alternative but to update the traditional modes of global governance. This Essay has sought to take a first step in this direction, laying down the conceptual and theoretical case for systematizing and consolidating IO cooperation as a key element in global governance. Taking this agenda a step further would require both academics and practitioners to revisit the conceptual, legal, and institutional structures of the global governance system and to redesign them in a manner more compatible with the complex, multidimensional challenges of the 21st century.

• Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Warns against Continued Ad Hoc Responses to Foreseeable Risks, in Security Council Briefing on Post-Pandemic Global Governance, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/20278 (Sep. 24, 2020) [hereinafter UNSC Press Release], https://perma.cc/X6KY-SZYQ.
• Id.
• Id.
• Id.
• Press Release, Secretary-General, Networked, Inclusive Multilateralism Can Help Overcome Challenges of Era, Says Secretary-General, Opening General Assembly Session, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/19746-GA/12179 (Sep. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/TD4H-Y8RF.
• U.N. Secretary-General, Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary General, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/75/982 (Aug. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Our Common Agenda].
• Id.
• Id. at 66–67.
• U.N. Secretary-General, Our Common Agenda: Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace, at 2–14, U.N. Doc. EOSG/2023/9 (July 3, 2023).
• Id. at 14.
• Id. at 12.
• Cedric de Coning et al., A New Agenda for Peace and the Climate Emergency, IPI Glob. Observatory (Sep. 25, 2023), https://perma.cc/DR5E-SJBZ.
• G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶ 13 (Sep. 25, 2015).
• Id. ¶ 39.
• Id.
• See International Peace Institute, Summit of the Future: Advancing African Perspectives for a Networked and Inclusive Multilateralism (Feb. 2024), https://perma.cc/24DV-28ET.
• See UN Chief Stresses Importance of “Networked Multilateralism” Before EU-UN High-Level Dialogue, Xinhua(huaxia ed., July 8, 2022), https://perma.cc/N9PZ-Q7UU.
• Benjamin Faude & Thomas Gehring, Regime Complexes as Governance Systems, in Research Handbook on the Politics of International Law 176–204 (Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher A. Whytock eds., 2017); Christian Kreuder-Sonnen & Michael Zürn, After Fragmentation: Norm Collisions, Interface Conflicts, and Conflict Management, 9(2) Glob. Constitutionalism 241 (2020).
• Rafael Biermann, Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking, 3 Rev. Int’l Orgs. 151 (2008); Christian Downie, Competition, Cooperation, and Adaptation: The Organizational Ecology of International Organizations in Global Energy Governance, 48(2) Rev. Int’l Studs. 364 (2022); Andrea Schneiker & Jutta Joachim, Linking Pins as Drivers of Interagency Cooperation: Humanitarian NGOs and Security Networks, 18(4) Globalizations 600 (2021).
• See Miles Kahler, Global Governance: Three Futures, 20(2) Int’l Studs. Rev. 239 (2018); Michael Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation (2018).
• Faude & Gehring, supra note 18.
• Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• For a survey and mapping of the scholarship, see Tamar Megiddo, Beyond Fragmentation: On International Law’s Integrationist Forces, 44(1) Yale J. Int’l L. 115 (2019); and Sivan Shlomo-Agon, Farewell to the F-word? Fragmentation of International Law in Times of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 72(1) U. Toro. L.J. 1 (2022).
• See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, The Promise and Perils of Theorizing International Regime Complexity in an Evolving World, 17 Rev. Int’l Orgs. 375 (2022); Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7(1) Persps. on Pol. 13 (2009); Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9(1) Persps. on Pol. 7 (2011); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58(2) Int’l Orgs. 277 (2004). See generally Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• See supra note 23.
• Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• For a more optimistic view, see Chiara Giorgetti & Mark A. Pollack, Beyond Fragmentation: Cross-Fertilization, Cooperation, and Competition among International Courts and Tribunals 1, 5, 22 (Chiara Giorgetti & Mark Pollack eds., 2022); and Anne Peters, The Refinement of International Law: From Fragmentation to Regime Interaction and Politicization, 15(3) Int’l J. Const. L. 671, 703 (2017). But see Shlomo-Agon, supra note 23, at 2–3, 13 (taking a more skeptical approach).
• Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25(4) Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (2004); Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25(4) Mich. J. Int’l L. 849, 856–58 (2004); Peters, supra note 26;  Joel P. Trachtman, The Future of International Law (2014).
• Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative Integration as Authority Allocation, in The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity 99 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008); Hafner, supra note 27, at 856–8; Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18, at 245-6.
• Broude, supra note 28.
• Peters, supra note 26; Trachtman, supra note 27.
• Giorgetti & Pollack, supra note 26, at 8.
• Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 553, 562 (2002).
• Alexandra Khrebtukova, A Call to Freedom: Towards a Philosophy of International Law in an Era of Fragmentation, 4 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rels. 51, 56 (2008).
• Jonathan I. Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 Recueil des cours 101, 347 (1998).
• Hafner, supra note 27, at 858 (cautioning against divergent solutions to the same legal question); Khrebtukova, supra note 33, at 56 (pointing out the dangers of systemic normative incoherence); Pemmaraju S. Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its Fragmentation?, 25(4) Mich. J. Int’l L. 929, 935 (2004) (considering the implications of forum proliferation for legal consistency).
• Giorgetti & Pollack, supra note 26, at 7.
• Id. at 7–8.
• Id. at 8; Hafner, supra note 27, at 857–58. See also Michael Zürn & Benjamin Faude, On Fragmentation, Differentiation and Coordination, 13(3) Glob. Env’t Pol. 119, 125 (2013); Joost Pauwelyn & Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 44(1) Corn. Int’l L.J. 77 (2009); Lawrence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29(1) Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2004).
• Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60(2) Stan. L. Rev. 595, 597 (2007).
• Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Between Fragmentation and Democracy: The Role of National and International Courts 14–15 (2017).
• Jeffrey Dunoff, A New Approach to Regime Interaction, in Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation 136–74 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012) (arguing that the dominant scholarly focus on norm conflicts and jurisdictional clashes between international tribunals is methodologically misguided, and proposing instead a framework centered on ongoing relational interactions among regimes outside judicial fora); Margaret A. Young, Introduction: The Productive Friction between Regimes, in Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation 1–20 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012) (surveying the fragmentation literature and arguing that scholarly attention should extend beyond conflicting norms and tribunal collisions to encompass the broader, dynamic ways in which international regimes interact across legislative, administrative, and institutional settings).
• Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• Shlomo-Agon, supranote 23.
• José E. Alvarez, The WHO in the Age of the Coronavirus, 114(4) Am. J. Int’l L. 578, 585 (2020).
• Megiddo, supra note 23; Shlomo-Agon, supra note 23.
• Karen J. Alter & Kal Raustiala, The Rise of International Regime Complexity, 14 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 329 (2018).
• Raustiala & Victor, supra note 24, at 278–79.
• Kenneth W. Abbott, Engaging the Public and the Private in Global Sustainability Governance, 88(3) Int’l Affs. 543 (2012); Keohane & Victor, supra note 24.
• Helfer, supra note 38; Valbona Muzaka, Linkages, Contests and Overlaps in the Global Intellectual Property Rights Regime, 17(4) Eur. J. Int’l Rels. 755 (2010).
• Cristina L. Davis, Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy, 7 Persps. on Pol. 25 (2009); Jean-Frédéric Morin & Laura Gomez-Mera, The Evolution of Governance Systems: The Case of the Trade Regime, 22 Int’l Studs. Rev. 15(2019).
• Emily Hafner-Burton, The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human Rights Trade Conditionality in Europe, 7(1) Persps. on Pol. 33 (2009).
• Alexander Betts, Institutional Proliferation and the Global Refugee Regime, 7(1) Persps. on Pol. 53 (2009).
• Laura Gómez-Mera, International Regime Complexity and Regional Governance: Evidence from the Americas, 21(1) Glob. Governance 19 (2015).
• Thurid Bahr et al., Understanding Regime Complexes through a Practice Lens: Repertoires of Interorganizational Practices in Global Health, 27 Glob. Governance 71 (2021).
• Alter & Meunier, supra note 24, at 13.
• Id.
• Id.; Faude & Gehring, supra note 18; Joseph Jupille et al., Institutional Choice and Global Commerce (2013).
• Julia C. Morse & Robert O. Keohane, Contested Multilateralism, 9(1) Rev. Int’l Orgs. 385 (2014).
• Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 61 Int’l Orgs. 735 (2007); Fariborz Zelli, Effects of Legitimacy Crises in Complex Global Governance, in Legitimacy in Global Governance: Sources, Processes, and Consequences, 169–86 (Jonas Tallberg et al. eds., 2018).
• Helfer, supra note 38.
• Hafner-Burton, supra note 51; Christian Kreuder-Sonnen & Bernhard Zangl, Varieties of Contested Multilateralism: Positive and Negative Consequences for the Constitutionalisation of Multilateral Institutions, 5(3) Glob. Constitutionalism 327 (2016); Johannes Urpelainen & Thijs Van de Graaf, Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions, 45 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 799 (2014).
• Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 39; Faude & Gehring, supra note 18, at 187. But see Jonathan W. Kuyper, Global Democratization and International Regime Complexity, 20(3) Eur. J. Int’l Rels. 620(2014); Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18, at 247.
• Alter & Meunier, supra note 24, at 20–25; Amandine Orsini et al., Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance, 19 Glob. Governance 27 (2013).
• Tann Johnson & Johannes Urpelainen, A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and Separation, 66 Int’l Orgs. 645 (2012). See alsoBenjamin Faude & Felix Groβe-Kreul, Let’s Justify! How Regime Complexes Enhance the Normative Legitimacy of Global Governance, 64(2) Int’l Studs. Q. 431 (2020); Gómez-Mera, supra note 53.
• Gómez-Mera, supra note 53.
• Notably in recent years, burgeoning literature on the role of non-state actors in regime complexes has emerged, focusing mainly on the environmental sector. See, e.g., Jessica F. Green, Hierarchy in Regime Complexes: Understanding Authority in Antarctic Governance, 66 Int’l Studs. Q. 1 (2022); Amandine Orsini, Multi-forum Non-state Actors: Navigating the Regime Complexes for Forestry and Genetic Resources, 13 Glob. Env’t Pol. 34 (2013); Amandine Orsini & Claire Godet, Food Security and Biofuels Regulations: The Emulsifying Effect of International Regime Complexes, 14 J. Contemp. Eur. Rsch. 4 (2018).
• Alter, supra note 24; Bahr et al., supra note 54; Kuyper, supra note 62.
• See generally Bahr et al., supra note 54; Green, supra note 67.
• Downie, supra note 19.
• See, e.g., Matias E. Margulis, The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global Hunger Challenge, 19 Glob. Governance 53 (2013).
• Gómez-Mera, supra note 53.
• Faude & Gehring, supra note 18.
• Downie, supra note 19.
• Schneiker & Joachim, supra note 19.
• Downie, supra note 19; Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organizational Relations in World Politics(Rafael Biermann & Joachim A. Koops eds., 2017).
• Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• See Duncan Snidal & Henning Tamm, Rational Choice: From Principal-Agent to Orchestration, in International Organization and Global Governance 135 (Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., 2d ed. 2018).
• Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 Int’l Orgs. 699 (1999); Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory, in Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 3–38 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). Seegenerally Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States(2017) (critically tracing the history of international organizations’ power expansionism).
• Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 Int’l Orgs. 53, 379 (1999); Ian Hurd, Theorizing International Organizations: Choices and Methods in the Study of International Organizations, 2 J. Int’l Orgs. Studs. 7 (2011).
• See generally Michael Tierney & Catherine Weaver, Principles and Principals? The Possibilities for Theoretical Synthesis and Scientific Progress in the Study of International Organizations (2005).
• Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 79; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Going Native in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions, 36 Compar. Pol. Studs. 209 (2003); Erin R. Graham, International Organizations as Collective Agents: Fragmentation and the Limits of Principal Control at the World Health Organization, 20 Eur. J. Int’l Rels. 366 (2014); Sikina Jinnah, Overlap Management in the World Trade Organization: Secretariat Influence on Trade-Environment Politics, 10 Glob. Env’t Pol. 54 (2010).
• Biermann, supra note 19.
• See, e.g., Downie, supra note 19; Schneiker & Joachim, supra note 19; Palgrave Handbook, supra note 76; Valentina Mele & Giulia Cappellaro, Cross‐level Coordination among International Organizations: Dilemmas and Practices, 96 Pub. Admin. 736 (2018).
• Palgrave Handbook, supra note 76.
• John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 Int’l Orgs. 561, 571 (1993).
• Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony 243–45 (1984); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harv. Int’l L.J. 487, 500 (1997); Miles Kahler, Global Governance: Three Futures, 20 Int’l Studs. Rev. 239 (2018); Catherine Rhodes, Opportunities and Constraints for Cooperation between International Organizations, 2 Nordic Env’t L.J. 175, 176 (2010).
• Abraham Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 22–27 (1995); Angelo Golia Jr. & Gunther Teubner, Networked Statehood: An Institutionalised Self-contradiction in the Process of Globalisation?, 12 Transnat’l Legal Theory 7, 12–13 (2021).
• Luk Van Langenhove, The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0, 1 Glob. Pol’y 263 (2010).
• Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 15 (2006); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 59 (2009); Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (2010); Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998). Note that within the regime complexity literature, recent works have introduced the concept of the “global governance complex,” thus broadening the conception of institutional complexity in the international arena and the types of actors taking part in it e.g., Alter, supra note 24; Metter Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Ordering Global Governance Complexes: The Evolution of the Governance Complex for International Civil Aviation, 17 Rev. Int’l Orgs. 293 (2022). Nevertheless, these works still harbor state-centric undertones as they remain confined to the viewpoint of states, are framed around the achievement of state goals, and scrutinize the relationships of states with other actors including IOs.
• Our Common Agenda, supra note 6, at 66.
• Id.
• OECD, International Regulatory Co-operation: The Role of International Organizations in Fostering Better Rules of Globalization(Andrea Uhrhammer & Kate Lancaster. eds. 2016).
• Id. at 3–4.
• See Peter M. Haas, Addressing the Global Governance Deficit, in International Environmental Governance 499–514 (Peter M. Haas ed., 2017); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2009).
• See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 90.
• See Slaughter, supra note 95.
• Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & Contemp. Probs. 15 (2005).
• Tobias Böhmelt & Gabriele Spilker, The Interaction of International Institutions from a Social Network Perspective, 16 Int’l Env’t Agreements: Pol. L. & Econ. 67 (2016); Jean-Frédéric Morin et al., Boundary Organizations in Regime Complexes: A Social Network Profile of IPBES, 20 J. Int’l Rels. & Dev. 543 (2017).
• Amanda Murdie, The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations, 44 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 1 (2014).
• Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, Transgovernmental Networks and Multi-level Governance, in The Handbook on Multilevel Governance 358 (Henrik Enderlein et al. eds., 2010).
• Biermann, supra note 19; Rakhyun E. Kim, Is Global Governance Fragmented, Polycentric, or Complex? The State of the Art of the Network Approach, 22 Int’l Studs. Rev. 903 (2020).
• Hafner-Burton,supra note 51. See generally Thomas Sommerer & Jonas Tallberg, Diffusion Across International Organizations: Connectivity and Convergence, 73 Int’l Orgs. 399 (2019).
• Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, supra note 90.
• OECD, supra note 93, at 95; Rhodes, supra note 87, at 176.
• OECD, supra note 93, at 95–95.
• Rhodes, supranote 87, at 177.
• Daniewl Naujoks, Multilateralism for Mobility: Interagency Cooperation in a Post-pandemic World, in COVID-19 & Migration: Understanding the Pandemic and Human Mobility 183–93 (Ibrahim Sirkeci & Jeffrey H. Cohen eds., 2020).
• Rhodes, supra note 87, at 183.
• Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 39.
• Cf. Matthias Kranke, Exclusive Expertise: The Boundary Work of International Organizations, 29 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 453 (2020).
• Sommerer & Tallberg, supra note 103.
• Alter, supra note 24; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, supra note 90.
• Kreuder-Sonnen & Zürn, supra note 18.
• Alter, supra note 24, at 394.