Print Archive
For better or worse, technology at heart is—except to the extent that artificial intelligence fundamentally becomes involved—not so much a creator as a facilitator and enhancer of human acts, actions and activities, allowing them to become more effective, less costly, or sometimes even just merely feasible. Perhaps nowhere that is more pertinent then when it comes to human activities in outer space, which are still overwhelmingly conducted remotely and hence crucially dependent on technology. Given that “the law” has always been geared to address humans and their acts, actions, and activities, this gives rise to a rather special approach to maintaining and further developing a legal regime for outer space. The present Article intends to address and assess some of the most pertinent aspects of the unique body of space law from precisely this perspective, to shed some light on how “the law” would, could, and/or should handle relevant human endeavours in or with regard to outer space, in particular in the context of legal responsibilities and liabilities.
A number of emerging technologies increasingly prevalent on contemporary battlefields—notably unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) and various military applications of artificial intelligence (AI)—are working a sea change in the way that wars are fought. These technological developments also carry major implications for the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed in armed conflict, including for an under-examined yet potentially valuable form of evidence: information and material collected or obtained by military forces themselves.
Such “battlefield evidence” poses various legal and practical challenges. Yet it can play an important role in justice and accountability processes, in which it addresses the longstanding obstacle of law enforcement actors’ inability to access the conflict-torn crime scenes. Indeed, military-collected information and material has been critical to prosecutions of international crimes and terrorism offenses in recent years.
The present Article briefly surveys the historical record of battlefield evidence’s use. It demonstrates that previous technological advances—including in remote sensing, communications interception, biometrics, and digital data storage and analysis—not only enlarged and diversified the broader pool of military data but also had similar downstream effects on the (far) smaller subset of information shared and used for law enforcement purposes.
The Article then examines how current evolutions in the means and methods of warfare impact the utility of this increasingly prominent evidentiary tool. Ultimately, it is argued that the technical features of UAS and military AI give rise to significant, although qualified, opportunities for collection and exploitation of battlefield evidence. At the same time, these technologies and their broader impacts on the conduct of warfare risk inhibiting the sharing of such information and complicating its courtroom use.
Space exploration promises new opportunities but also new risks. After centuries of national settlements and international conflicts on Earth, and the Cold War era of two great power states racing to the Moon, today we see a rapidly proliferating arena of actors, both governmental and non-governmental, undertaking bold new ventures off-Earth while posing an array of new risks. These multiple activities, actors, and risks raise the prospects of regulatory gaps, costs, conflicts, and complexities that warrant reconsideration and renovation of legacy legal regimes such as the international space law agreements. New approaches are needed, beyond current national and international law, beyond global governance. We suggest that interplanetary risks warrant new institutions for risk regulation at the interplanetary scale. We discuss several examples, recognizing that interplanetary risks may be difficult to foresee. Some interplanetary risks may arise in the future, such as if settlements on other planets entail the need to manage interplanetary relations. Some interplanetary risks are already arising today, such as space debris, space weather, planetary protection against harmful contamination, planetary defense against asteroids, conflict among spacefaring actors, and potentially settling and terraforming other planets (whether to conduct scientific research, exploit space mining, or hedge against risks to life on Earth). These interplanetary risks pose potential tragedies of the commons, tragedies of complexity, and tragedies of the uncommons, in turn challenging regulatory institutions to manage collective action, risk-risk tradeoffs, and extreme catastrophic/existential risks. Optimal interplanetary risk regulation can learn from experience in terrestrial risk regulation, including by designing for adaptive policy learning. Beyond national and international law on Earth, the new space era will need interplanetary risk regulation.
This Essay sketches an informal theory of the impact of technological change on international economics, and hence international relations expressed as international law. The theory points to a policy trilemma, something that I call Cerberus in a perhaps futile attempt at an arresting metaphor. The Essay uses the trilemma to illuminate the general trends in technology policy we see playing out in China, Europe, and the United States. It argues that we have the privilege of witnessing an ongoing natural experiment in optimal technology regulation and legal policy, with no guarantee as to which approach will prevail.
Of course, like all natural experiments, the signal struggles to emerge against a background of geopolitical noise. Events and projects unrelated to policy competition might decide the game, and we might never find out what an optimal strategy may entail. Still, we can’t rule out the chance that we might learn something as the great game plays out.
From the launch of Sputnik I in 1957 to proposals for In-Space Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM) and new lunar activities such as resource utilization, advancing technology has always been a driving factor in the creation of space law. From a legal-historical perspective, the notion of law as creation should be contextualized in a broader legal-philosophical transition that began with the rise of positivism. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty orbits unsteadily between international obligations and national implementation measures, rendering significant States’ understandings of those provisions. Our understanding of Article VI turns on perhaps the most creative legal endeavor: interpretation. Bing Cheng established Article VI as a lynchpin between international obligations and national measures by finding in its first sentence an attribution clause extending responsibility to non-governmental activities falling under the jurisdiction of States. Though Cheng’s interpretation has been accepted by scholars, and some domestic rules evidence its employ by States, the interpretation has been assailed on the basis that Cheng did not follow the strictures of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Codification, such as the VCLT, is itself an act of creation, which can have unintended consequences. Through the lens of Article VI, this Article explores interpretation as creation. It seeks to demonstrate that antipodal interpretations can be correct, that our determination of which interpretation to follow involves something other than a strict, positivist approach, and that the outcome of this debate may be more significant than perceived as states create a path forward for new space activities.
Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to transform public international lawyering in at least five ways: (i) helping to identify the contents of international law; (ii) interpreting existing international law; (iii) formulating and drafting proposals for new legal instruments or negotiating positions; (iv) assessing the international legality of specific acts; and (v) collating and distilling large datasets for international courts, tribunals, and treaty bodies.
This Article uses two case studies to show how LLMs may work in international legal practice. First, it uses LLMs to identify whether particular behavioral expectations rise to the level of customary international law. In doing so, it tests LLMs’ ability to identify persistent objectors and a more egalitarian collection of state practice, as well as their proclivity to produce inaccurate answers. Second, it explores how LLMs perform in producing draft treaty texts, ranging from a U.S.-China extradition treaty to a treaty banning the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control systems.
Based on these analyses, the Article identifies four roles for LLMs in international law: as collaborator, confounder, creator, or corruptor. In some cases, LLMs will be collaborators, complementing existing international lawyering by drastically improving the scope and speed with which users can assemble and analyze materials and produce new texts. At the same time, without careful prompt engineering and curation of results, LLMs may generate confounding outcomes, leading international lawyers down inaccurate or ambiguous paths. This is particularly likely when LLMs fail to accurately explain particular conclusions. Further, LLMs hold surprising potential to help to create new law by offering inventive proposals for treaty language or negotiating positions.
Most importantly, LLMs hold the potential to corrupt international law by fostering automation bias in users. That is, even where analog work by international lawyers would produce different results, humans may soon perceive LLM results to accurately reflect the contents of international law. The implications of this potential are profound. LLMs could effectively realign the contents and contours of international law based on the datasets they employ. The widespread use of LLMs may even incentivize states and others to push their desired views into those datasets to corrupt LLM outputs. Such risks and rewards lead us to conclude with a call for further empirical and theoretical research on LLMs’ potential to assist, reshape, or redefine international legal practice and scholarship.
For a quarter-century, a consensus has prevailed that territorial sovereignty applies online as it does offline. Since practically all the Internet’s infrastructure and its billions of users reside on the territory of states, conventional wisdom holds that sovereignty must extend to cyberspace. Such accounts ignore how people experience cyberspace as a distinctive place, and how current international law lacks safeguards to prevent states from exercising their sovereignty to splinter the Internet into a set of national networks. Territorial sovereignty is also hard to square with pledges by the world’s democracies to keep the Internet free, open, and global; yet it is not the only way that international law knows to define the powers of a state.
Drawing from the law of the sea, this Article argues that we should anchor the nature of state authority in cyberspace in the limited sovereign rights that coastal states possess in the waters off their shores. Unlike the plenary powers that sovereignty vests in states over their entire land territory, a coastal state’s sovereign rights weaken the further one goes out to sea, and they are subject to the rights of other states (and of their nationals) to engage in certain peaceful uses of such waters. By redefining state authority over cyberspace in terms of layers of sovereign rights that are subject to the digital rights of others, states can enact legitimate online regulations within international legal constraints that preserve the Internet’s free, open, and global character.
The American Declaration of Independence kindled the first successful decolonial movement in the modern world, culminating in the enactment of the United States Constitution. From colony to sovereign state to great power, the United States modeled for subordinated peoples abroad how to win their own battles for sovereignty. Since the end of the Second World War, however, America’s eighteenth-century precedent of revolutionary self-determination is no longer the prevailing path to decolonization. The traditional warmaking toolkit for winning independence—revolution, illegality, and violence—has been replaced by more orderly tactics consonant with the rule of law. Evolution, lawfulness, and continuity are the touchstones in the new global model of decolonial constitutionalism that now lights the path to self-determination.
Decolonial constitutionalism is the use of legal, legitimate, and non-violent means to assert sovereignty, to secure rights, or to achieve recognition for a people, nation, or state that is legally or politically subordinate to domestic or foreign actors. In contrast to the American model of revolutionary self-determination, this new global model of decolonial constitutionalism has pluralized actors and sites of contestation, though the decisive objective of decolonization remains the same. Once won in the theatre of war, decolonization is now prosecuted in parliaments, courts of law, and the public square. The protagonists are no longer soldiers and generals; they are politicians, lawyers, judges, and civil society. Nor does self-determination today necessarily entail establishing a new state in the international order and taking a seat among equals alongside the countries of the world. In our new era of non-violent claims to sovereignty, decolonial movements choose instead to write new constitutions for existing states, to amend enduring constitutions, to enforce treaty rights, to promulgate multilateral agreements, or to pursue analogous courses of disruptive constitutional activity well short of declarations of independence. Decolonial constitutionalism therefore refers to a suite of strategies to exercise self-determination, defined expansively to comprise a broad scope of decolonial objectives consistent with the rule of law.
In this Article, I introduce, illustrate, and theorize decolonial constitutionalism as the modern form of self-determination. Drawing from historical and modern decolonial movements, I show how subordinated peoples have seized the levers of law and politics to innovate new paths to self-determination without taking up arms, in the process showing similarly situated peoples how to achieve their own goals of independence, nationhood, or constitution-making in a manner that reinforces rather than undermines the rule of law. These strategies have proven ultimately more productive for decolonial movements to free their peoples from bondage in law or politics, to attract ideologically aligned partners at home and abroad, and to more effectively communicate to internal and external audiences the moral legitimacy of their claims to self-determination.
This article investigates the concept of tenure security within international law, emphasizing the global legal architectures that influence and shape land tenure governance at the intersections of international human rights law and development. By tracing the evolution of tenure security from colonial practices to modern development paradigms, the article contends that international development and human rights frameworks often perpetuate dispossession and inequality. It critiques the convergence of human rights and development narratives around the formalization of land tenure, demonstrating how this practice reinforces Western legal frameworks and ontologies of land. The article examines a range of instruments including various UN CESCR General Comments, Reports and Guidelines issued by UN Special Rapporteurs, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure, and the Sustainable Development Goals and indicators. It explores the mechanisms through which these international frameworks propose solutions for securing land tenure based on a resource ontology, highlighting how they perpetuate land commodification, marginalize and displace vulnerable populations, and contribute to the proliferation of racial capitalism. It further underscores the limitations of international human rights law mechanisms in addressing the complexities of land tenure security, dispossession, and the neoliberal agendas underlying and driving global land governance. Advocating for a decolonial approach, it challenges some of the foundational assumptions of international law and calls for the unsettling of Eurocentric and capitalist ontologies of land embraced by international development and international human rights law alike.
Companies rely on creditors for funding to operate, making it crucial to have legislative and procedural frameworks that protect the interests of these creditors. This article engages in a comparative analysis of corporate creditors’ protection rights on a global scale, emphasizing the Ethiopian case. The study contends that while countries may adopt distinct approaches to safeguard corporate creditors, and variations may exist in the strictness of rules across different strategies, nations have a universal commitment to implement strategies to ensure adequate protection for creditors’ interests.
In international trade, State interventions often challenge the efficacy of traditional anti-dumping and countervailing measures under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. This article examines the limitations of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) in addressing State interventions, such as export taxes, export bans on raw materials, and non-commercial activities by State-owned enterprises.