3 Chi J Intl L 477
Robert O. Keohane

This article is an extension of commentary made in the Spring 2002 edition of the Chicago Journal of International Law concerning accountability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly essays by Kingsbury, Spiro, and Wapner. It is premised on the notion that too much NGO accountability is not necessarily a good thing. To make this point, it distinguishes between internal and external accountability and differentiates NGOs from more powerful entities, such as the United States. While the United States is more effectively held accountable from within, internationally it can usually act as it pleases. Given that NGOs are less powerful, and thus do not have the capability to act unilaterally in this manner, but rather must instead rely on their counterparts, a loose form of accountability through peer monitoring and reputation is more or less effective. In this sense, NGOs are more likely to be held accountable than states and therefore their accountability should be evaluated in the context of their relative weakness vis-à-vis governmental actors.